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Abstract 
This  dissertation  is  concerned  with  the  relationships  between  experiments  in  
literature,  science,  and  politics  in  twentieth-­‐‑century  United  States  culture.  I  argue  that  
the  three  can  be  considered  together  by  understanding  “experimentation”  as  a  set  of  
processes  rather  than  a  method,  and  highlighting  the  centrality  of  writing  and  reading  to  
experiments  in  all  three  arenas.  Drawing  on  scientist  Ludwik  Fleck’s  concept  of  
“valuable  experiments,”  I  read  specific  experiments  in  each  field  in  conversation  with  
the  others,  highlighting  the  ways  in  which  science  and  politics  require  aesthetic  
structures,  the  ways  in  which  science  and  literature  reconfigure  politics,  and  the  ways  in  
which  politics  and  literature  can  intervene  in  and  reconfigure  scientific  practices.  
Ultimately,  I  try  to  develop  a  reading  practice  that  can  make  visible  the  shared  
transformative  capacities  of  science,  literature,  and  radical  politics.  
  
In  the  course  of  three  chapters,  I  analyze  the  formal  and  conceptual  innovations  
of  writers  such  as  William  Burroughs,  Ralph  Ellison,  and  Carson  McCullers,  who  were  
intimately  affected  by  the  uses  of  experimental  science  in  corrective  institutional  
practice.  In  doing  so,  I  develop  a  concept  of  “experimental  literature”  that  is  distinct  
from  avant-­‐‑garde  literature  and  can  account  for  the  investments  that  these  writers  share  
with  scientists  such  as  Albert  Hofmann,  Albert  Einstein,  and  Margaret  Mead.  I  argue  
that  experimental  writers  denature  literary  genres  that  depend  on  coherent  subjects,  
     v  
transparent  reality,  and  developmental  progress  in  order  to  disrupt  similar  assumptions  
that  underpin  positivist  science.  By  understanding  valuable  experimental  science  and  
writing  as  continuous  challenges  to  standardized  scientific  knowledge,  I  show  how  
these  writers  contribute  to  ongoing  radical  social  projects  of  queer  and  black  radical  
traditions—such  as  those  of  George  Jackson  and  the  Combahee  River  Collective—which  
are  grounded  in  knowledge  as  an  aesthetic  and  political  practice.  
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1.	  Introduction:	  Valuable	  Experiments	  
	  	  
“I	  can’t	  help	  but	  dream	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  criticism	  that	  […]	  would	  multiply,	  not	  
judgments,	  but	  signs	  of	  existence;	  it	  would	  summon	  them,	  drag	  them	  from	  their	  sleep.	  
Perhaps	  it	  would	  invent	  them—all	  the	  better.	  All	  the	  better.	  […]	  It	  would	  not	  be	  
sovereign	  or	  dressed	  in	  red.	  It	  would	  bear	  the	  lightning	  of	  possible	  storms.”1	  	  	  It	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  in	  its	  best	  moments	  this	  dissertation	  can	  be	  read	  as	  something	  of	  a	  love	  song	  to	  those	  valuable	  experiments	  in	  literature,	  science,	  and	  politics	  that	  traversed	  the	  experience	  of	  life	  in	  mid-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  United	  States	  culture,	  affirming	  them	  as	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  involved	  in	  “freeing	  life	  wherever	  it	  is	  imprisoned,	  or	  tempting	  it	  into	  uncertain	  combat”	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Philosophy	  171).	  This	  hope	  has	  been	  inspired	  by	  Gilles	  Deleuze’s	  and	  Felix	  Guattari’s	  beautiful	  love	  song	  to	  art,	  science,	  and	  philosophy:	  What	  Is	  Philosophy?	  In	  it,	  they	  write,	  “What	  defines	  thought	  in	  [these]	  three	  great	  forms	  […]	  is	  always	  confronting	  chaos,	  laying	  out	  a	  plane,	  throwing	  a	  plane	  over	  chaos”	  (197).	  Their	  text	  invents	  “art,”	  “science”	  and	  “philosophy”	  as	  concepts	  that	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  ongoing	  chaos	  of	  the	  material	  world	  that	  precedes	  them	  and	  which	  they	  compose	  in	  the	  service	  of	  life.	  In	  my	  own	  way,	  I	  trace	  specific	  emergences	  of	  literature,	  science,	  and	  politics	  as	  material	  practices	  of	  thought	  that	  have	  composed,	  decomposed,	  and	  recomposed	  the	  prior	  chaos	  that	  undergirded	  and	  traversed	  the	  social	  and	  material	  organizations	  of	  life	  in	  the	  1930s	  through	  the	  1970s	  in	  the	  US.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Foucault	  “The	  Masked	  Philosopher,”	  323.	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Although	  I	  have	  been	  inspired	  by	  their	  work,	  my	  dissertation	  moves	  along	  a	  different	  current.	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  text,	  as	  a	  work	  of	  philosophy,	  departs	  from	  a	  historicist	  enterprise	  that	  might,	  for	  example,	  trace	  the	  proliferation	  of	  the	  uses	  and	  meanings	  of	  “science”	  or	  “art”	  in	  historical	  contexts.	  Instead,	  they	  give	  art,	  science,	  and	  philosophy	  very	  precise	  and	  singular	  functions	  in	  relation	  to	  field	  of	  absolute	  singularities,	  of	  chaos	  “defined	  not	  so	  much	  by	  its	  disorder	  as	  by	  the	  infinite	  speed	  with	  which	  every	  form	  taking	  shape	  in	  it	  vanishes”	  (118).	  	  But	  their	  project	  is	  not	  so	  much	  anti-­‐historicist	  as	  it	  is,	  rather,	  simply	  different	  than	  historicism:	  indeed,	  they	  assert	  that	  the	  concepts	  they	  develop	  only	  attain	  consequence	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  historical,	  “in	  contact	  with	  an	  experience	  or	  a	  lived”	  (128).	  For	  thought	  to	  be	  “correctly	  raised	  at	  the	  level	  of	  practice,”	  Deleuze	  writes,	  it	  “cannot	  be	  dissociated	  from	  the	  imperatives	  of	  experimentation	  and	  struggle”	  (Deleuze,	  Empiricism	  16).	  	  Although	  a	  concern	  with	  philosophy	  can	  be	  found	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  focus	  primarily	  on	  “art”	  and	  “science,”	  and	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  their	  particular	  functions	  have	  been	  “raised	  at	  the	  level	  of	  practice,”	  which	  is	  to	  say,	  how	  they	  have	  produced	  an	  alternatively	  composed	  politics	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  specific	  “imperatives	  of	  experimentation	  and	  struggle”	  that	  accompanied	  intensified	  and	  mutating	  forms	  of	  social	  control	  in	  the	  middle	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  I	  bring	  Deleuze’s	  and	  Guattari’s	  project	  into	  contact	  with	  the	  historicism	  they	  sidestep,	  but	  which	  resonates	  immanently	  in	  their	  references	  to	  American	  Literature	  as	  the	  literature	  of	  escape	  and	  their	  interest	  in	  anti-­‐prison	  struggles	  in	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the	  US.2	  These	  struggles	  not	  only	  informed	  their	  concepts,	  but	  also	  enabled	  them	  to	  produce	  new	  ways	  of	  seeing,	  understanding,	  and	  affirming	  the	  immanent	  success	  of	  these	  struggles.	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  find	  where	  minor	  art	  as	  literature	  and	  minor	  science	  have	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  dominant	  and	  institutionalized	  history	  that	  goes	  under	  their	  names	  and	  stills	  their	  generative	  capacities	  by	  mobilizing	  them	  in	  the	  service	  of	  a	  false	  determinism.	  My	  project,	  then,	  has	  been	  one	  of	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  literature	  and	  science	  as	  experimentation	  in	  actually	  existing	  struggles	  for	  freedom—minor	  politics—that	  do	  not	  see	  social	  prescription	  as	  their	  aim.	  	  To	  that	  end,	  I	  have	  taken	  the	  question	  of	  imprisonment—of	  “freeing	  life	  wherever	  it	  is	  imprisoned”—quite	  literally.	  Between	  the	  1930s	  and	  the	  1970s,	  science	  and	  its	  rhetoric	  were	  mobilized	  for	  managing	  and	  normalizing	  the	  US	  population	  through	  new	  methods	  of	  microtaxonomization	  (often	  enabled	  through	  technoscience)	  and	  diagnostic-­‐prescriptive	  imperatives.	  Corrective	  institutions,	  in	  particular,	  became	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  the	  diagnostic	  practices	  of	  psychological,	  criminological,	  and	  sociological	  sciences	  for	  knowledge	  of	  the	  subjects	  they	  housed.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  brought	  the	  previously	  separate	  functions	  of	  the	  prison	  and	  the	  mental	  hospital	  together	  in	  new	  combined	  facilities.	  Additionally,	  the	  juridical	  system	  itself	  turned	  towards	  scientific	  authority	  as	  the	  primary	  means	  for	  establishing	  “evidence,”	  and	  scientific	  knowledge	  gained	  through	  empirical	  testing	  came	  to	  double	  as	  legal	  policy.	  The	  new	  institutions	  became	  sites	  in	  which	  inmates	  were	  test	  subjects	  for	  methods	  of	  treatment	  and	  correction,	  and	  non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See:	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Claire	  Parnet,	  Dialogues	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Columbia	  Univ.	  Press,	  2002);	  and	  Felix	  Guattari,	  Chaosophy:	  Texts	  and	  Interviews,	  1972-­‐77	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press,	  2008).	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normative	  communities	  were	  increasingly	  the	  statistical	  and	  predictive	  data	  of	  empirical	  investigation.	  Experimentation,	  then,	  in	  this	  context	  appeared	  not	  as	  a	  struggle	  for	  freedom;	  it	  instead	  acted	  in	  the	  service	  of	  what	  Thomas	  Kuhn	  has	  called	  “normal	  science.”	  Normal	  science	  names	  the	  institutionalized	  and	  highly	  methodized	  practices	  of	  science,	  which	  operate	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  “objectivity”	  and	  “disinterest,”	  while	  becoming	  increasingly	  corporatized	  and	  militarized.	  This	  normal	  science,	  as	  Sandra	  Harding	  describes	  it,	  produces	  knowledge	  “to	  benefit	  only	  those	  who	  also	  have	  the	  capital	  to	  distribute	  the	  results	  for	  profit	  or	  organize	  and	  maintain	  social	  control”	  (Harding	  71).	  Experimentation	  in	  this	  sense	  serves	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  normation	  and	  normalization,	  operating	  so	  the	  suppress	  race,	  sex,	  and	  gender	  difference	  through	  a	  regulatory	  violence.	  Although	  literary	  and	  scientific	  experiments	  are	  rarely	  understood	  in	  conversation	  with	  one	  another,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  number	  of	  midcentury	  writers	  and	  scientists	  developed	  alternative	  forms	  of	  experimentation	  that	  produced	  a	  shared	  project	  of	  both	  critiquing	  rapidly	  changing	  policies	  and	  practices	  intended	  to	  correct	  deviant	  bodies	  and	  behaviors	  through	  scientific	  authority,	  and	  also	  offering	  alternative	  understandings	  of	  and	  practices	  for	  organizing	  social	  life—alternatives	  grounded	  in	  their	  own	  experience	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  institutional	  changes.	  To	  this	  end,	  their	  experiments	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  engaging	  in	  both	  the	  “critical”	  or	  diagnostic	  and	  “clinical”	  or	  reparative	  functions	  that	  Deleuze	  ascribes	  to	  literature	  and	  to	  medical	  science.	  But	  here,	  for	  literature	  and	  for	  science,	  the	  patient	  would	  not	  be	  an	  individual	  pathologized	  subject,	  but	  the	  social	  order	  and	  its	  subjugating	  practices.	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In	  the	  course	  of	  three	  chapters	  I	  analyze	  the	  formal	  and	  conceptual	  innovations	  of	  the	  writers	  William	  Burroughs,	  Ralph	  Ellison,	  and	  Carson	  McCullers,	  who	  were	  intimately	  affected	  by	  these	  changing	  institutional	  conditions.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  develop	  a	  concept	  of	  “experimental	  literature”	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  avant-­‐garde	  literature	  and	  brings	  them	  into	  conversation	  with	  the	  innovative	  experiments	  of	  scientists	  Albert	  Hofmann,	  Albert	  Einstein,	  and	  Margaret	  Mead.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  experimental	  writers	  denature	  literary	  genres	  that	  depend	  on	  coherent	  subjects,	  transparent	  reality,	  and	  developmental	  progress,	  just	  as	  these	  scientists	  disrupted	  similar	  assumptions	  that	  underpin	  positivist	  science.	  Both	  groups	  produce	  what	  scientist	  Ludwik	  Fleck	  describes	  as	  “valuable	  experiments.”	  Valuable	  experiments	  expose	  the	  difficulty	  of	  translating	  sense	  perception	  into	  knowledge,	  and	  thus	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  epistemological	  assumptions	  of	  their	  fields.	  They	  therefore	  require	  new	  mechanisms	  for	  asking	  questions,	  and	  unique,	  undetermined	  experimental	  techniques.	  	  Far	  from	  understanding	  these	  experiments	  as	  parallel	  developments	  in	  separate	  fields,	  however,	  I	  put	  them	  in	  parataxis	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  science	  is	  aesthetically	  organized	  and	  literature	  serves	  an	  epistemological	  function.	  Taken	  together,	  they	  expose	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  normal	  science	  is	  not	  disinterested,	  objective,	  or	  transparent,	  but	  instead	  has	  depended	  on	  aesthetic	  determinations	  and	  hierarchies	  that	  have	  detrimental	  political	  effects	  meted	  out	  along	  lines	  of	  race,	  sex,	  and	  gender.	  By	  using	  this	  paratactic	  practice	  of	  inquiry,	  which	  I	  call	  minor	  empiricism,	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  valuable	  experiments	  are	  part	  of	  a	  shared	  project	  that	  affirms	  the	  immanent	  success	  of	  the	  disruption	  of	  positivist	  and	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deterministic	  values,	  which	  can	  offer	  new	  insights	  into	  understanding	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  politics	  that	  were	  also	  waging	  war	  against	  the	  stilling	  and	  control	  of	  life.	  In	  particular,	  I	  use	  these	  experiments	  to	  understand	  the	  writing	  and/as	  practices	  of	  queer	  and	  black	  radical	  politics,	  found	  immanently	  in	  Burroughs’s	  experience	  as	  well	  as	  in	  those	  of	  the	  prisoner	  and	  black	  radical	  George	  Jackson	  and	  the	  black	  feminist	  group,	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective.	  All	  three	  engage	  in	  the	  same	  critical/clinical	  practice	  of	  valuable	  experimentation,	  the	  full	  implications	  of	  which	  can	  only	  become	  apparent	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  epistemological	  aspects	  of	  their	  work,	  made	  visible	  in	  contact	  and	  continuity	  with	  the	  valuable	  experiments	  of	  literature	  and	  science.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  have	  drawn	  my	  own	  reading	  practice	  from	  what	  Deleuze	  describes	  as	  “intensive	  reading,”	  or	  “reading	  with	  love.”	  Although	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  understand	  the	  experiments	  I	  investigate	  through	  the	  analytic	  lenses	  provided	  by	  science	  studies	  and	  the	  history	  of	  medicine	  as	  well	  as	  critical	  race	  studies,	  feminism,	  and	  Marxism,	  I	  have	  primarily	  focused	  on	  reading	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  labor	  that	  can	  “relate	  a	  book	  directly	  to	  what’s	  Outside,”	  requiring	  immanently	  developed	  methods	  for	  the	  specific	  configuration	  of	  relations	  (Deleuze,	  Negotiations	  9).	  The	  writing	  of	  each	  chapter,	  then,	  has	  been	  a	  matter	  of	  reading	  literary,	  science,	  and	  political	  experiments	  as	  responding	  to	  and	  combatting	  the	  specific	  forms	  of	  oppression	  experienced	  by	  the	  writers,	  scientists,	  and	  activists	  who	  conduct	  them.	  By	  tracking	  the	  excesses	  that	  produce	  relations	  among	  the	  books,	  writers,	  experiments,	  scientists,	  and	  political	  struggles,	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  might	  connect	  up	  to	  and	  extend	  their	  experiments	  by	  producing	  new	  and	  vital	  relations	  to	  them	  in	  our	  own	  moment.	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In	  the	  first	  chapter,	  “How	  Does	  an	  Experiment	  Begin?”	  I	  explore	  William	  Burroughs’s	  first	  two	  novels,	  Junky	  (1953)	  and	  Queer	  (written	  1951-­‐3,	  published	  1985).	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  early	  novels’	  strange	  approaches	  to	  autobiographical	  form—	  Junky	  is	  a	  pseudonymous	  self-­‐ethnography,	  and	  Queer	  is	  written	  in	  the	  third-­‐person—offer	  insight	  into	  Burroughs’s	  experimental	  project	  of	  writing	  the	  queer	  self.	  This	  self-­‐creation	  project	  enabled	  him	  to	  reject	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  about	  identity	  that	  had	  made	  him	  a	  medical	  and	  national	  subject.	  In	  1949,	  Burroughs	  underwent	  experimental	  treatment	  for	  heroin	  addiction	  at	  the	  Lexington	  Federal	  Narcotics	  Hospital	  and	  Prison	  where,	  far	  from	  being	  cured,	  he	  instead	  came	  to	  understand	  the	  state	  and	  economic	  interests	  involved	  in	  what	  was	  to	  become	  the	  national	  War	  on	  Drugs.	  I	  read	  Burroughs’s	  account	  of	  “junk”	  (heroin)	  sociality	  and	  circulation	  alongside	  Albert	  Hofmann’s	  early	  experiments	  synthesizing	  lysergic	  acid	  diethylamide	  (LSD)	  and	  his	  accidental	  ingestion	  of	  the	  chemical	  in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  for	  both	  the	  disorganization	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  self-­‐	  perception	  occasioned	  by	  drug	  use	  started	  an	  experimental	  investigation	  that	  could	  only	  proceed	  through	  a	  self-­‐experiment.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  scientist	  Ludwik	  Fleck	  and	  sociologist	  of	  science	  Hans-­‐Jörg	  Rheinberger,	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  experimental	  self-­‐descriptions,	  including	  Burroughs’s	  technique	  of	  the	  routine,	  were	  crucial	  to	  both	  his	  and	  Hofmann’s	  capacity	  to	  disrupt	  the	  subject-­‐object	  distinction	  usually	  required	  of	  the	  most	  methodical	  experimental	  procedures.	  They	  were	  thus	  able	  to	  produce	  new	  conceptions	  of	  life,	  including,	  ultimately,	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  DNA	  not	  organized	  around	  code	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  queer	  social	  organization	  built	  around	  a	  productively	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unstable	  conception	  of	  “the	  self”	  that	  is	  inseparable	  from	  inchoate	  sensorial	  experience.	  The	  second	  chapter,	  “Can	  You	  Sense	  an	  Invisible	  Experiment?,”	  moves	  from	  autobiography	  to	  “realism.”	  In	  it,	  I	  argue	  that	  Albert	  Einstein’s	  thought	  experiments	  with	  realism	  in	  the	  quantum	  universe,	  against	  those	  of	  the	  now-­‐prevalent	  statistically-­‐	  based	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation,	  develop	  a	  black	  radical	  approach	  to	  ontology	  that	  helps	  to	  make	  visible	  a	  similar	  approach	  found	  submerged	  in	  Ralph	  Ellison’s	  Invisible	  Man	  (1952),	  both	  of	  which	  are	  actualized	  and	  transformed	  in	  the	  letters	  of	  black	  radical	  prisoner	  George	  Jackson,	  published	  in	  Soledad	  Brother	  (1970).	  Reading	  these	  three	  thinkers	  as	  “entangled”	  in	  the	  quantum	  physics	  sense—that	  is,	  affecting	  each	  other	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  causality—allows	  me	  to	  extrapolate	  from	  their	  shared	  concerns	  new	  modes	  of	  reading	  and	  new	  understandings	  of	  political	  intervention	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  a	  black	  radical	  freedom	  project	  that	  could	  undermine	  the	  institutional	  conflation	  of	  blackness,	  madness,	  and	  criminality	  at	  mid-­‐century.	  I	  show	  how	  all	  three	  thinkers	  developed	  forms	  of	  “realism”	  that	  did	  not	  assume	  the	  “real”	  was	  transparently	  available	  for	  representation.	  Instead,	  by	  making	  use	  of	  tight	  spaces—for	  Einstein,	  the	  light-­‐blitz	  box;	  for	  Ellison,	  his	  narrator’s	  underground	  “hole;”	  and	  for	  Jackson,	  his	  prison	  cell—	  these	  thinkers	  produced	  thought	  experiments	  that	  moved	  the	  question	  of	  knowledge	  from	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  subject-­‐observer	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  unseen	  objects.	  Insisting	  on	  such	  reality	  required	  them	  to	  invent	  methods	  for	  expanding	  the	  realm	  of	  sense	  perception	  beyond	  the	  given	  processes	  of	  sight,	  hearing,	  smell,	  taste,	  and	  feel.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  imagine	  a	  political	  and	  epistemological	  standpoint	  of	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invisible,	  impossible	  objects.	  Their	  non-­‐normative	  realisms	  therefore	  offer	  new	  perspectives	  from	  which	  to	  critique	  the	  psychocarceral	  system,	  which	  criminalized	  black	  radical	  perception	  as	  a	  form	  of	  insanity.	  While	  science,	  aesthetics,	  and	  politics	  are	  often	  considered	  separate	  fields	  of	  inquiry,	  investigating	  these	  three	  thinkers	  as	  “entangled”	  helps	  to	  articulate	  the	  political	  and	  aesthetic	  implications	  of	  investigations	  into	  the	  quantum	  in	  the	  twentieth-­‐century	  and	  the	  major	  epistemological	  and	  aesthetic	  interventions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  immanent	  success,	  of	  black	  radical	  politics.	  In	  the	  third	  chapter,	  “When	  Can	  You	  Experience	  Empiricism?”	  I	  explore	  how	  science	  came	  to	  exercise	  its	  authority	  through	  claims	  to	  both	  unity	  and	  disinterest,	  and	  how	  a	  surprising	  group	  of	  women	  writers,	  including	  Carson	  McCullers,	  Margaret	  Mead,	  and	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective,	  tactically	  reconfigured	  and	  mobilized	  a	  range	  of	  literary	  conventions	  in	  order	  to	  expose	  science	  itself	  as	  multiple	  and	  tactical.	  I	  argue	  that	  minority	  with	  regards	  to	  identity—whether	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  age,	  race,	  or	  gender—had	  come	  to	  be	  aligned	  with	  the	  “irrational,”	  and	  a	  newly	  unified	  science,	  conceived	  “disinterested”	  and	  “objective,”	  had	  come	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  hallmark	  of	  rationality	  and	  a	  means	  of	  bildung,	  bringing	  youth	  into	  proper	  citizen-­‐subjectivity.	  This	  new	  conception	  of	  science	  gave	  it	  authority	  to	  prescribe	  social	  and	  political	  policy	  that	  often	  reinforced	  white,	  patriarchal	  rule.	  One	  remarkable	  aspect	  of	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective’s	  Statement	  (1977)—in	  which	  this	  group	  of	  black	  lesbian	  feminists	  articulate	  their	  intersectional	  politics	  and	  revolutionary	  goals—is	  their	  choice	  to	  ground	  their	  radical	  practice	  in	  a	  study	  group.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  contribute	  to	  a	  history	  of	  black	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radical	  intervention	  that	  recognizes	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  US	  educational	  system,	  which	  perpetuates	  normative,	  patriarchal	  values	  and	  separates	  personal	  life	  from	  both	  political	  life	  and	  empirical	  knowledge.	  I	  argue	  that	  earlier	  challenges	  to	  the	  standardization	  of	  adolescent	  thought,	  be	  found	  in	  the	  anti-­‐bildungsroman	  novels	  of	  Carson	  McCullers,	  which	  refuse	  to	  culminate	  in	  the	  coming-­‐into-­‐	  majority	  of	  their	  adolescent	  narrators	  [The	  Heart	  Is	  a	  Lonely	  Hunter	  (1940),	  The	  Member	  of	  the	  
Wedding	  (1946),	  and	  Clock	  without	  Hands	  (1961)],	  and	  in	  anthropologist	  Margaret	  Mead’s	  ethnographic	  rejection	  of	  universalizing	  theories	  of	  childhood	  development	  [Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Samoa	  (1929)],	  contribute	  to	  Combahee’s	  project	  while	  also	  expanding	  the	  field	  in	  which	  their	  work	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  intervene.	  These	  writers	  disrupt	  the	  authority	  of	  positivist	  science	  by	  developing	  a	  radical	  empiricism	  that	  understands	  experience	  as	  an	  undetermined,	  minor	  experiment	  that	  can	  affirm	  the	  radical	  potential	  of	  becoming,	  in	  Deleuze’s	  terms,	  “forever	  minor.”	  By	  emphasizing	  the	  centrality	  of	  minority	  in	  terms	  of	  age	  to	  an	  intersectional	  understanding	  of	  oppression	  in	  the	  US,	  their	  work	  makes	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  analyses	  race,	  class,	  gender,	  and	  sexuality	  that	  Combahee	  later	  articulates.	  Moreover,	  by	  anticipating	  the	  political	  value	  of	  the	  particularity	  of	  experience,	  their	  work	  joins	  Combahee’s	  in	  creating	  a	  minor	  scientific	  practice	  that	  makes	  an	  intervention	  against	  the	  continued	  validation	  of	  normal	  scientific	  knowledge	  as	  the	  guiding	  force	  of	  humanistic	  political	  and	  social	  determinations.	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2.	  Experimental	  Beginnings:	  Addiction	  and	  the	  Self	  Experiment	  in	  
William	  S.	  Burroughs’s	  Junky	  and	  Queer	  
	  
“His	  basic	  assumptions	  were	  untenable,	  and	  his	  initial	  experiments	  irreproducible,	  yet	  
both	  were	  of	  enormous	  heuristic	  value.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  with	  all	  really	  valuable	  
experiments.	  They	  are	  all	  of	  them	  uncertain,	  incomplete,	  and	  unique.	  And	  when	  
experiments	  become	  certain,	  precise,	  and	  reproducible	  at	  any	  time,	  they	  no	  longer	  are	  
necessary	  for	  research	  purposes	  proper	  but	  function	  only	  for	  demonstrations	  or	  ad	  hoc	  
determinations.”1	  
	  
“[O]nce	  one	  steps	  outside	  what’s	  been	  thought	  before,	  once	  one	  ventures	  outside	  what’s	  
familiar	  and	  reassuring,	  once	  one	  has	  to	  invent	  new	  concepts	  for	  unknown	  lands,	  then	  
methods	  and	  moral	  systems	  break	  down	  and	  thinking	  becomes	  […]	  a	  ‘perilous	  act,’	  a	  
violence	  whose	  first	  victim	  is	  oneself.	  […]	  People	  will	  readily	  agree	  that	  intense	  
physical	  pursuits	  are	  dangerous,	  but	  thought	  too	  is	  an	  intense	  and	  wayward	  pursuit.	  
Once	  you	  start	  thinking,	  you’re	  bound	  to	  enter	  a	  line	  of	  thought	  where	  life	  and	  death,	  
reason	  and	  madness,	  are	  at	  stake,	  and	  the	  line	  draws	  you	  on.	  You	  can	  think	  only	  on	  this	  
magical	  line….”2	  
	  
	  	  	   William	  Lee	  is	  statistically	  unfit	  for	  treatment.	  Or	  such	  is	  the	  assessment	  of	  Narco’s	  doctors.	  When	  opiate	  addled	  Lee,	  protagonist	  of	  William	  S.	  Burroughs’s	  first	  three	  novels,	  enters	  the	  Lexington	  Federal	  Narcotics	  Hospital	  and	  Prison	  about	  halfway	  through	  the	  text	  of	  Junky,	  he	  is	  placed	  not	  on	  the	  upper	  level	  with	  the	  “Do-­‐Rights”—those	  for	  whom	  “permanent	  cure”	  seems	  a	  likely	  prospect—but	  below	  with	  the	  men	  destined	  for	  “population”—those	  for	  whom	  “cure”	  is	  not	  anticipated	  and	  the	  only	  treatment	  is	  two	  days	  of	  methadone	  reduction	  and	  a	  seven	  day	  stay	  in	  junk-­‐free	  lock-­‐up	  before	  being	  shuffled	  to	  the	  main	  prison	  or	  out	  to	  work	  (Junky	  51,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Fleck,	  85.	  2	  Deleuze	  and	  Parnet,	  103	  (emphasis	  mine).	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56).	  In	  Burroughs’s	  text,	  the	  population	  appears	  as	  a	  litany	  of	  statements	  whose	  speakers	  are	  unnamed,	  detailing	  makeshift	  procedures	  for	  eliciting	  psychochemicals	  from	  everyday	  items:	   	  	   	   …for	  cooking	  the	  carbolic	  acid	  out	  of	  the	  phenol,	  sweet	  oil	  and	  tincture	  	  	   	   of	  opium	  script.	  	   ‘I	  tell	  the	  croaker	  I’ve	  got	  an	  aged	  mother	  and	  she	  uses	  that	  prescription	  for	  piles.	  After	  you	  get	  the	  sweet	  oil	  drained	  off,	  you	  put	  the	  stuff	  in	  a	  tablespoon	  and	  hold	  it	  over	  a	  gas	  flame.	  That	  burns	  the	  phenol	  right	  out.	  It’ll	  hold	  you	  twenty-­‐four	  hours.’	  	   …his	  girl	  smuggled	  stuff	  into	  him	  in	  an	  orange.	  ‘So	  there	  we	  were	  in	  	  	   County,	  Goddamn	  both	  of	  us	  shitting	  in	  our	  pants	  like	  a	  goose.	  Hell,	  	  when	  I	  bit	  into	  that	  orange	  it	  was	  so	  bitter.	  Must	  have	  been	  fifteen	  or	  	  twenty	  grains	  in	  it,	  shot	  in	  with	  a	  hypo.	  I	  didn’t	  know	  she	  had	  that	  much	  sense.’	  	  	   	   …	  ‘Sweet	  oil	  and	  tincture.	  The	  oil	  floats	  to	  the	  top	  and	  you	  draw	  it	  off	  	  	   	   with	  a	  dropper.	  Cooks	  up	  black	  as	  tar.’	  	  	   	   …We	  used	  to	  make	  a	  pipe	  out	  of	  a	  bottle	  and	  a	  rubber	  tube.	  We	  got	  	  	   	   through	  smoking	  we’d	  break	  the	  bottle.’	  	  	   	  	   	   ‘Cook	  it	  up	  and	  shoot	  it.’	  (52)	  	  Here,	  Burroughs’s	  text	  mobilizes	  a	  set	  of	  concerns	  that	  guide	  the	  inquiry	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Narco’s	  management	  of	  prisoner-­‐patients	  along	  lines	  of	  statistically	  determined	  probabilities	  produces	  them	  as	  abstract	  figures	  of	  a	  population.	  This	  method	  of	  organizing	  treatment	  introduces	  the	  statistical	  logic	  that	  governs	  a	  certain	  strain	  of	  biological	  and	  medical	  science—especially	  those	  sciences	  invested	  in	  knowledge	  of	  populations,	  pathology,	  treatment,	  and	  discipline	  (among	  them:	  criminology	  and	  psychology)	  and	  also	  in	  prediction	  and	  control	  (epidemiology,	  genetics,	  and	  pharmacology	  for	  example).	  Simultaneously,	  this	  scene	  also	  begins	  to	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reveal	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  underground	  science,	  albeit	  one	  (here)	  still	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  particularly	  revelatory	  economy	  of	  heroin	  circulation:	  the	  junk	  economy.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  science	  nonetheless	  that	  could,	  in	  fact,	  exceed	  that	  economy.	  This	  creative	  misuse	  of	  the	  hospital-­‐prison	  indicates	  a	  potential	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  experiment	  that	  will	  begin	  to	  turn	  the	  very	  materials	  and	  methods	  of	  the	  particular	  practices	  of	  capitalism	  and	  control	  associated	  with	  addiction	  and	  addiction	  treatment	  into	  ways	  out	  of	  a	  seemingly	  total	  system.	  Against	  the	  usual	  implications	  of	  scientistic	  statistical	  thinking,	  corrective	  treatment,	  and	  mass	  imprisonment—which	  presume	  knowledge	  only	  in	  numbers	  (of	  figures),	  percentages,	  and	  probabilities—Burroughs’s	  narrator	  produces	  the	  individual	  subjects	  of	  population	  as	  unstable	  and	  singular,	  as	  proliferating	  and	  multiple	  selves	  whose	  thoughts	  and	  experiments	  with	  drug	  production	  repurpose	  the	  penal	  and	  laboratory	  spaces	  of	  “Narco”	  (as	  it	  was	  known)	  for	  a	  “kick”	  (a	  high,	  in	  this	  instance	  on	  the	  government’s	  watch	  and	  dime)	  instead	  of	  The	  Kick	  (getting	  off	  of	  junk,	  “the	  cure”).	  This	  marks	  the	  beginnings	  of	  what	  will	  become	  for	  Burroughs	  a	  conceptual	  and	  material	  tool	  for	  rejecting	  social	  treatment	  and	  producing	  social	  alternatives.	  Like	  other	  American	  writers	  in	  this	  period,	  writing	  in	  or	  about	  these	  institutions,	  he	  produces	  literary	  and	  social	  experiments	  that	  both	  emerge	  from	  and	  counter	  the	  very	  scientific-­‐diagnostic	  grounds	  that	  put	  him	  in	  treatment.	  These	  furtive	  experimental	  beginnings	  enable	  Burroughs	  to	  reject	  The	  Subject,	  as	  a	  state	  form	  and	  medical	  research	  object	  that	  depends	  on	  relations	  to	  norms	  (normalization)	  and	  institutional	  legitimation,	  for	  The	  Self.	  And,	  ultimately,	  we	  will	  see	  that	  from	  the	  junk	  economy	  and	  its	  regulative	  sites,	  including	  Narco,	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  experimental	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practice	  will	  emerge	  and	  extend:	  an	  experimental	  practice	  in	  which	  scientific	  and	  politico-­‐aesthetic	  resistance	  and	  production	  are	  deeply	  imbricated	  in	  unexpected	  ways.	  	   Narco’s	  specific	  historical	  function	  as	  a	  state-­‐run	  site	  of	  both	  the	  imprisonment	  of	  addicts	  and	  medical	  experiments	  on	  them	  reveals	  the	  confluence	  of	  disciplinary	  and	  control	  strategies	  at	  play	  in	  mid-­‐century	  US	  governance:	  an	  attempt	  to	  totalize	  control	  by	  linking	  and	  unifying	  seemingly	  disparate	  sciences	  (psychology	  and	  criminology)	  and	  goals	  (treatment	  and	  punishment).	  Narco’s	  existence	  as	  both	  a	  hospital	  and	  prison,	  from	  its	  celebrated	  opening	  in	  1935	  to	  the	  final	  closing	  of	  its	  Addiction	  Research	  Center	  (ARC)	  under	  a	  cloud	  of	  ethics	  violations	  accusations	  in	  1976,	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  what	  the	  authors	  of	  The	  Narcotic	  Farm:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  
America’s	  First	  Prison	  for	  Drug	  Addicts—one	  of	  the	  few	  texts	  available	  dedicated	  exclusively	  to	  this	  important	  site—describe	  as	  “the	  nation’s	  ambivalence	  about	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  drug	  addiction”	  (Campbell,	  Olsen,	  and	  Walden	  12).	  The	  Narcotic	  Farm	  ends	  by	  championing	  Narco’s	  negotiation	  of	  this	  ambivalence	  and	  its	  “accomplishments	  that	  remain	  milestones	  in	  addiction	  science	  and	  treatment,”	  amongst	  which	  they	  include	  “developing	  the	  first	  quantitative	  scales	  for	  measuring	  degrees	  of	  addiction,	  severity	  of	  withdrawal,	  and	  the	  addictiveness	  of	  other	  drugs”	  and	  the	  now-­‐prevalent	  “idea	  that	  addiction	  is	  a	  chronic,	  relapsing	  disease”	  (166,	  23).	  The	  pathologization	  of	  behaviors	  and	  states	  of	  being	  and	  their	  conversion	  into	  data	  points	  as	  described	  by	  these	  authors,	  however,	  are	  not	  uncomplicatedly	  positive	  or	  merely	  neutral	  medical	  practices,	  nor	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  “the	  nation”	  needed	  to	  “deal	  with”	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  treat	  and	  control)	  “drug	  addiction”	  a	  transparent	  or	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neutral	  truth.	  Both	  of	  these	  assumptions	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  under-­‐girded	  by	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  powerful	  dual	  promise	  and	  danger	  that	  drugs—as	  a	  potential	  commodity	  for	  corporate	  economic	  capture	  and	  an	  unpredictable,	  disruptive	  social	  force—have	  posed	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  nation.	  Indeed,	  despite	  official	  national	  anti-­‐drug	  policy,	  the	  economic	  force	  of	  drugs	  and	  their	  potential	  for	  political	  strategies	  was	  in	  no	  way	  lost	  on	  the	  United	  States	  government.	  In	  addition	  to	  researching	  drugs	  as	  potential	  weapons,	  the	  CIA	  also	  formed	  alliances	  with	  drug	  cartels	  in	  Italy,	  and	  later	  Asia	  and	  South	  America,	  throughout	  this	  period	  in	  order	  to	  further	  other	  political	  projects,	  including	  the	  fight	  against	  communism.	  3	  	   At	  Narco,	  this	  duality	  played	  out	  in	  a	  single	  site	  as	  the	  hospital-­‐prison	  became	  a	  dealer	  in	  more	  than	  one	  sense:	  while	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  confined,	  managed,	  and	  treated	  prisoner-­‐addicts,	  on	  the	  other	  it	  redistributed	  drugs,	  including	  not	  only	  opiates	  for	  studies	  of	  the	  re-­‐addiction	  process	  but	  also	  large	  numbers	  of	  synthetic	  pharmaceuticals	  for	  drug	  safety	  tests	  and,	  importantly,	  LSD	  for	  CIA-­‐funded	  investigations	  into	  psychochemical	  “mind	  control”	  possibilities	  (Campbell,	  Olsen,	  and	  Walden	  165).	  Prisoners	  could	  opt	  out	  of	  other	  forms	  of	  punishment	  by	  enrolling	  in	  these	  experiments,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  conducted	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  gaining	  knowledge	  for	  future	  treatment	  and	  prevention	  possibilities,	  but	  which	  in	  reality	  frequently	  served	  corporate	  pharmacological	  and	  military-­‐industrial	  ends.4	  Narco,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See:	  Alfred	  W.	  McCoy,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Heroin:	  CIA	  Complicity	  in	  the	  Global	  Drug	  
Trade	  (New	  York:	  Lawrence	  Hill	  Books,	  2003).	  4	  The	  Narcotic	  Farm	  is	  a	  tremendous	  compilation	  of	  documents,	  photographs,	  and	  historical	  descriptions	  of	  the	  Lexington	  Federal	  Narcotics	  Hospital,	  but	  its	  minimal	  treatment	  of	  the	  ethical	  implications	  of	  the	  coercive	  conditions	  of	  prison	  experimentation,	  its	  mostly	  unproblematized	  acceptance	  of	  “knowledge”	  about	  and	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as	  this	  double	  site	  of	  dealing,	  offers	  a	  privileged	  vantage	  point	  for	  observing	  the	  role	  of	  capital	  and	  the	  state’s	  attempts	  to	  harness	  it	  in	  the	  mutually	  reinforcing	  state	  strategies	  of	  “treatment”	  and	  “punishment”	  at	  mid-­‐century	  in	  the	  US.	  It	  also,	  for	  that	  very	  reason,	  can	  help	  reveal	  a	  number	  of	  often	  hidden	  scientific,	  socio-­‐political,	  and	  aesthetic	  alternatives	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  fissures	  between	  these	  ideologies	  and	  practices.	  	  Burroughs,	  who	  went	  to	  Narco	  for	  “The	  Kick”	  in	  1949,	  recognized	  the	  multiplication	  and	  consolidation	  of	  control	  strategies	  in	  this	  period,	  and	  produced	  what	  philosopher	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  would	  later	  conceptualize	  as	  a	  “line	  of	  escape,”	  an	  experimental	  line	  that	  begins	  in	  Junky	  and	  continues	  into	  Queer	  and	  Naked	  Lunch.5	  This	  chapter	  is	  interested	  in	  tracking	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Burroughs	  locates	  these	  fissures	  and	  begins	  to	  experiment	  in	  the	  first	  two	  of	  those	  three	  linked	  novels.	  This	  chapter	  looks	  to	  Burroughs’s	  early	  novels	  in	  order	  to	  ask,	  how	  does	  an	  experiment	  
begin?	  Against	  traditional	  notions	  of	  the	  well-­‐defined	  and	  methodical	  experiment,	  sociologies	  of	  science	  coupled	  with	  Burroughs’s	  novels	  will	  help	  reveal	  that	  this	  question	  can	  only	  be	  answered	  in	  particularities	  and	  singularities:	  how	  have	  specific	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  contemporary	  treatment	  procedures	  for	  addiction,	  and	  its	  tacit	  endorsement	  of	  corporate	  pharmacological	  practices	  with	  regards	  to	  Narco’s	  experiments	  make	  it	  in	  some	  ways	  yet	  another	  troubling	  entry	  into	  the	  national	  narrative	  of	  addiction	  history	  and	  treatment.	  5	  Deleuze’s	  concept,	  ligne	  de	  fuite,	  is	  usually	  translated	  as	  “line	  of	  flight.”	  However,	  as	  Brian	  Massumi	  notes,	  such	  a	  translation	  is	  misleading,	  as	  “flying”	  is	  not	  implied	  by	  the	  original	  French.	  Michelle	  Koerner	  further	  argues	  that	  the	  concept	  is	  drawn	  from	  American	  prisoner	  and	  black	  radical	  George	  Jackson	  and	  is	  linked	  to	  “running”	  and	  “fugitivity,”	  not	  flight,	  which	  makes	  “escape”	  a	  more	  useful	  translation.	  See:	  Brian	  Massumi,	  “Notes	  on	  Translation,”	  in	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  
Plateaus:	  Capitalism	  and	  Schizophrenia	  (Minneapolis:	  Univ.	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1987);	  and	  Michelle	  Koerner,	  “Line	  of	  Escape:	  Deleuze’s	  Encounter	  with	  George	  Jackson,”	  Genre	  44:2	  (Summer	  2011).	  
	   17	  
experiments	  begun,	  and	  what	  were	  the	  particular	  material	  grounds	  from	  which	  each	  
emerged?	  By	  tracking	  these	  origins,	  I	  hope	  to	  link	  up	  these	  experimental	  practices	  and	  escapes	  to	  contemporary	  conditions—including	  not	  only	  the	  continued	  and	  draconian	  War	  on	  Drugs	  and	  low	  rates	  of	  addiction	  recovery,	  but	  also	  battles	  surrounding	  identity	  politics	  and	  political	  representation—in	  order	  to	  begin	  producing	  possibilities	  for	  continuing	  experimental	  lines	  and	  ways	  out.6	  	   Burroughs’s	  literary,	  aesthetic,	  and	  political	  experiments,	  initiated	  in	  Junky	  and	  Queer,	  and	  then	  extended	  and	  altered	  to	  engage	  new	  conditions	  in	  Naked	  Lunch,	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  conjunction	  with	  (that	  is	  to	  say,	  emerging	  from)	  the	  specific	  forms	  of	  increased	  state	  control	  around	  narcotics	  throughout	  his	  lifetime.	  Twice	  in	  
Junky,	  Burroughs	  remarks	  on	  the	  expanding	  reach	  of	  the	  Harrison	  Narcotics	  Act	  of	  1914,	  which	  regulated	  the	  distribution	  of	  opium	  (giving	  sole	  control	  of	  it	  to	  doctors)	  and	  made	  it	  taxable.	  The	  Act	  was	  subsequently	  tightened	  in	  1924	  to	  make	  importation	  of	  opiates	  illegal,	  and	  expanded	  again	  in	  1937	  to	  include	  marijuana	  under	  its	  auspices.7	  By	  the	  time	  Burroughs	  died	  in	  1997,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  long	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  As	  of	  2007,	  over	  half	  of	  prisoners	  in	  federal	  prisons	  were	  being	  held	  on	  drug-­‐related	  charges.	  (See:	  William	  J.	  Sabol,	  Ph.D.,	  and	  Heather	  C.	  West,	  Bureau	  of	  Justice	  
Statistics,	  Prisoners	  in	  2007	  (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  December	  2008):	  22,	  NCJ224280,	  Appendix	  Table	  12.)	  The	  federal	  Substance	  Abuse	  and	  Mental	  Health	  Services’	  treatment	  report	  	  (TEDS)	  for	  2005	  puts	  national	  treatment	  completion	  rates	  for	  all	  programs	  around	  35%.	  The	  same	  agency’s	  2002	  Drug	  and	  Alcohol	  Services	  Information	  System	  Report	  (DASIS)	  puts	  recidivist	  admissions	  (2	  or	  more	  admissions)	  at	  56%.	  See:	  http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k9/outptTX/outptTX.htm	  (TEDS)	  (accessed	  July	  16,	  2011)	  and	  http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k4/manyTX/manyTX.htm	  (DASIS)	  (accessed	  July	  16,	  2011)	  Even	  taken	  together,	  these	  statistics	  give	  the	  barest	  outline	  of	  the	  low	  success	  rates	  for	  heroin	  addition	  treatment.	  	  7	  It	  is	  this	  later	  expansion	  that	  Lee	  first	  mentions	  in	  Junky;	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  that	  peyote	  was	  not	  yet	  controlled	  by	  the	  narcotics	  act	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  (J	  15,	  122).	  In	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been	  in	  an	  increasing	  state	  of	  “carceral	  crisis,”	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  prison-­‐industrial	  complex	  fueled	  by	  the	  national	  War	  on	  Drugs	  that	  continues	  to	  this	  day.	  Between	  the	  two,	  drug	  use	  became	  increasingly	  stigmatized,	  and	  laws	  were	  passed	  that	  made	  it	  illegal	  not	  only	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  drugs,	  but	  also	  to	  be	  an	  addict.	  William	  Lee	  mentions	  one	  such	  law	  passed	  in	  Louisiana,	  which	  he	  counter-­‐diagnoses	  as	  part	  of	  a	  “national	  hysteria.”	  Upon	  returning	  from	  a	  brief	  stay	  in	  Mexico,	  he	  notes	  that	  in	  his	  absence:	  	   	   Louisiana	  passed	  a	  law	  making	  it	  a	  crime	  to	  be	  a	  drug	  addict.	  Since	  no	  	  	   	   particular	  time	  or	  place	  is	  specified,	  and	  the	  term	  “addict”	  is	  not	  	  clearly	  defined,	  no	  proof	  is	  necessary	  or	  even	  relevant	  under	  a	  law	  so	  	  formulated.	  No	  proof,	  and	  consequently	  no	  trial.	  This	  is	  police	  state	  	  legislation	  penalizing	  a	  state	  of	  being.	  Other	  states	  were	  emulating	  Louisiana.	  (Burroughs,	  Junky	  119)	  	  This	  mid-­‐century	  change	  in	  legal	  strategy	  for	  policing	  narcotics	  was	  consonant	  with	  a	  larger	  change	  in	  national	  strategy	  for	  maintaining	  social	  control.	  	  Legal	  scholar	  Bernard	  Harcourt	  points	  out	  that	  while	  the	  total	  number	  of	  incarcerated	  people	  is	  currently	  at	  a	  national	  high,	  the	  per	  capita	  number	  of	  confined	  persons	  in	  the	  US	  actually	  reached	  its	  peak	  in	  1955	  when	  over	  600	  out	  of	  every	  100,000	  people	  were	  institutionalized	  in	  either	  a	  prison	  or	  a	  mental	  health	  facility	  (Harcourt	  1751).	  By	  the	  1960s,	  most	  mental	  asylums	  were	  shut	  down,	  and	  as	  psychiatrist	  Jonathan	  Metzl	  notes,	  “prisons	  emerged	  where	  hospitals	  once	  stood”	  (Metzl	  xxi).	  By	  2010,	  according	  to	  the	  International	  Association	  for	  Correctional	  and	  Forensic	  Psychology,	  prisons	  had	  become	  definitively	  the	  largest	  mental	  health	  institutions	  in	  the	  country	  (IACFP	  749).	  Across	  the	  middle	  decades	  of	  the	  century,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1970,	  the	  state	  also	  took	  control	  of	  peyote	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  The	  Controlled	  Substances	  Act.	  See:	  David	  S.	  Musto,	  The	  American	  Disease:	  Origins	  of	  Narcotic	  
Control	  (London:	  Oxford	  Univ.	  Press,	  2003).	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the	  hospital	  and	  prison	  converged,	  and	  paradoxically,	  alongside	  increasing	  standardization	  of	  diagnosis	  and	  advances	  in	  forensic	  techniques,	  behaviors	  and	  states	  of	  being	  came	  to	  be	  not	  only	  pathologized	  but	  also	  criminalized,	  and	  the	  distinction	  between	  “punishment”	  and	  “treatment”	  became	  increasingly	  obscure.	  Subsequently,	  more	  and	  more	  people	  were	  diagnosed	  and/or	  convicted	  and	  then	  confined,	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  people	  were	  especially	  far	  from	  the	  imagined	  norm	  of	  the	  ideal	  subject-­‐citizen	  (that	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  were	  poor,	  non-­‐white,	  female,	  and/or	  queer).	  This	  strategy	  enabled	  state	  management	  and	  control	  of	  the	  material	  resources—primarily	  in	  the	  form	  of	  their	  own	  bodies—of	  those	  who	  otherwise	  had	  the	  fewest	  resources	  to	  circulate.	  Put	  another	  way,	  the	  new	  methods	  of	  institutionalization	  gave	  the	  state	  another	  resource	  for	  ensuring	  that	  those	  who	  already	  had	  resources	  maintained	  them,	  and	  those	  who	  did	  not	  became	  resources	  (not	  in	  terms	  of	  labor,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  bodies)	  for	  capitalist	  enterprises,	  especially,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry.	  Given	  this	  increase	  in	  captive,	  useable	  bodies—justified	  by	  the	  statistical	  logic	  and	  scientific	  impulse	  guiding	  these	  institutions—the	  site	  of	  the	  laboratory	  expanded,	  turning	  the	  prison	  and	  asylum	  into	  massive	  Petri	  dishes	  for	  experimentation.	  Simultaneously,	  these	  institutions	  and	  their	  experimental	  practices	  rendered	  the	  people	  on	  whom	  the	  experiments	  were	  conducted	  politically	  and	  legally	  invisible.	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Value	  Theory:	  Normal	  Science	  and	  Experimental	  Economies	  	  	  	   The	  use	  of	  criminology	  and	  psychiatry,	  even	  at	  their	  emergence,	  as	  disciplinary	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  state	  is	  well	  documented,	  as	  is	  the	  long	  history	  of	  the	  primary	  role	  of	  financial	  backing	  in	  enabling	  and	  guiding	  scientific	  research.8	  In	  the	  US,	  in	  the	  early	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  Rockefeller	  Foundation	  in	  effect	  privatized	  much	  biological,	  medical,	  and	  social	  science	  research,	  and	  also	  brought	  these	  disciplines	  together	  for	  problem	  solving	  and	  ostensibly	  humanitarian	  (and	  often	  moralizing)	  causes.9	  Simultaneously,	  the	  military	  began	  major	  funding	  of	  the	  sciences	  after	  WWI,	  and	  quickly	  became	  the	  single	  largest	  patron	  of	  University	  science.10	  Since	  then,	  private	  corporations	  and	  the	  military	  have	  continued	  to	  mine	  the	  social	  and	  hard	  sciences	  and	  have	  determined	  the	  problems	  that	  much	  institutional	  science	  would	  address	  for	  almost	  a	  century.	  This	  meant	  that	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  as	  the	  social	  sciences	  refined	  and	  expanded	  the	  reach	  of	  their	  technologies	  of	  “populations”	  and	  “norms,”	  and	  the	  United	  States	  drastically	  altered	  its	  funding	  structures	  for	  the	  sciences,	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  scientific	  practice	  became	  increasingly	  prevalent.	  Science	  in	  any	  broad	  sense,	  then,	  is	  not	  the	  villain	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See,	  for	  example:	  John	  Tagg,	  The	  Burden	  of	  Representation:	  Essays	  on	  Photographies	  
and	  Histories	  (Minneapolis:	  Univ.	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1993)	  on	  early	  psychology	  and	  criminology;	  and	  Larry	  R.	  Stewart,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Public	  Science:	  Rhetoric,	  Technology,	  
and	  Natural	  Philosophy	  in	  Newtonian	  Britain,	  1660-­‐1750	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  Univ.	  Press,	  1992)	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  industrial	  utility	  of	  scientific	  research	  and	  social	  support.	  9	  See:	  Ron	  Chernow,	  Titan:	  The	  Life	  of	  John	  D.	  Rockefeller,	  Sr.,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Vintage	  Books,	  2004);	  and	  Mark	  Dowie,	  American	  Foundations:	  An	  Investigative	  History	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press,	  2001).	  10	  See:	  Roger	  Geiger,	  "Science,	  Universities,	  and	  National	  Defense,	  1945-­‐1970,"	  Osiris	  2:7	  (1992):	  26-­‐48.	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this	  study.	  Instead,	  following	  Sandra	  Harding,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  science—one	  that	  Harding,	  following	  Thomas	  Kuhn,	  has	  called	  “normal	  science”—became	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  large-­‐scale	  capital,	  governmental	  resources,	  and	  in	  particular,	  the	  military.	  That	  dependence	  subjected	  institutional	  science	  and	  its	  related	  professions	  (including	  the	  medical	  sciences)	  primarily	  to	  capitalist	  rather	  than	  experimental	  concerns.	  As	  Harding	  notes,	  this	  ensures	  that	  “knowledge	  [is]	  produced	  to	  benefit	  only	  those	  who	  also	  have	  the	  capital	  to	  distribute	  the	  results	  for	  profit	  or	  organize	  and	  maintain	  social	  control”	  (Harding	  71).	  	  	   While	  Harding	  draws	  the	  concept	  of	  “normal	  science”	  from	  Kuhn,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  her	  compelling	  analysis	  of	  the	  roles	  of	  capitalism	  and	  gender	  in	  “normal	  science”	  is	  not	  particularly	  committed	  to	  Kuhn’s	  notions	  of	  “revolutionary	  science”	  or	  “paradigm	  shifts.”	  I	  too	  take	  up	  the	  term	  “normal	  science”	  without	  endorsing	  Kuhn’s	  narrativization	  of	  scientific	  revolutions	  as	  a	  neutral	  description	  of	  scientific	  practice.	  While	  his	  text	  usefully	  deconstructs	  the	  linear	  historical	  narrative	  usually	  put	  forth	  about	  the	  history	  of	  science	  and	  helps	  to	  relativize	  scientific	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  not	  particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  capitalism	  itself	  operates	  by	  a	  set	  of	  dialectical	  procedures,	  conceived	  as	  progress,	  that	  require	  his	  text	  ultimately	  to	  affirm	  “revolutionary	  science’s”	  recapture	  by	  institutional	  science	  as	  it	  operates	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  continuation	  of	  normal	  science.	  In	  fact,	  such	  a	  progress	  narrative	  helps	  to	  hide	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  drive	  towards	  scientific	  advancement	  and	  technoscientific	  progress	  both	  enables	  and	  justifies	  new	  strategies	  of	  social	  control.	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   Normal	  science,	  in	  fact,	  has	  become	  the	  tool	  par	  excellence	  of	  what	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  following	  Burroughs,	  has	  called	  our	  contemporary	  control	  society:	  a	  society	  defined	  by	  constant	  circulation,	  connection,	  and	  flexible	  management	  techniques,	  which	  appear	  as	  greater	  autonomy	  but	  in	  fact	  merely	  shift	  the	  practices	  of	  social	  control	  to	  an	  increasingly	  corporatized	  neoliberal	  regime.11	  Consequently,	  the	  hierarchies	  and	  pedagogies	  of	  larger	  scientific	  dissemination	  have	  rendered	  invisible	  much	  experimental	  science—which	  resists	  corporate	  capture—just	  as	  they	  helped	  render	  invisible	  not	  only	  the	  people	  on	  whom	  normal	  science	  had	  the	  most	  direct	  effects,	  but	  also	  the	  political	  and	  aesthetic	  experiments	  those	  people	  wielded	  as	  tools	  against	  their	  institutional	  subjugation.	  In	  both	  instances—that	  of	  
experimental	  science	  and	  political	  and	  aesthetic	  experimentation—these	  appositional	  experiments	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  what	  scientist	  and	  early	  sociologist	  of	  science,	  Ludwig	  Fleck,	  in	  the	  opening	  quotation	  to	  this	  chapter,	  has	  called	  the	  “valuable	  experiment.”	  Valuable	  experiments	  are	  those	  experiments	  in	  which	  knowledge	  is	  emergent	  and	  unstable.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  that	  emergent	  quality	  relegates	  these	  experiments	  and	  their	  strange,	  half-­‐formed	  perceptive	  and	  descriptive	  practices	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  invisible	  within	  dominant	  history.	  On	  the	  other,	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  In	  both	  “Control	  and	  Becoming”	  (an	  interview	  with	  Antonio	  Negri)	  and	  “Postscript	  on	  Control	  Societies,”	  Deleuze	  describes	  the	  term	  “control	  societies”	  as	  originating	  with	  Burroughs	  and	  consonant	  with	  Foucault’s	  analyses	  of	  contemporary	  transformations	  away	  from	  disciplinary	  societies.	  The	  movement	  from	  discipline	  to	  control	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  move	  from	  isolation	  and	  confinement	  to	  constant	  communication	  and	  capital	  flows,	  from	  production	  to	  “metaproduction,”	  from	  the	  sovereign	  signature	  to	  the	  floating	  code.	  While	  disciplinary	  and	  control	  strategies	  may	  operate	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  strategies	  of	  the	  control	  society	  are	  disguised	  autonomy	  or	  self-­‐management	  (for	  example,	  ankle	  bracelets	  for	  remote	  monitoring	  that	  allow	  prisoners	  to	  live	  at	  home),	  but	  in	  fact	  merely	  expand	  the	  reach	  of	  social	  control	  (Deleuze,	  Negotiations	  169-­‐182).	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emergent	  quality	  that	  renders	  the	  perceptions	  and	  practices	  of	  valuable	  experiments	  temporarily	  unavailable	  for	  control	  or	  capture	  by	  capitalist	  exchange,	  and	  hence,	  constitutes	  them	  as	  a	  space	  of	  radical	  and	  disruptive	  possibility.	  These	  first	  “uncertain,	  incomplete,	  and	  unique”	  attempts	  to	  isolate	  and	  describe	  unexpected	  phenomena	  emerge	  in	  and	  temporarily	  disrupt	  the	  research	  of	  “normal	  science”	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  civil	  society.	  	   The	  concept	  of	  the	  “valuable	  experiment,”	  helps	  articulate	  a	  similarity	  between	  a	  strain	  of	  disruptive	  scientific	  experiments	  and	  disruptive	  experimental	  
writing,	  of	  which	  Burroughs	  offers	  an	  example.	  Indeed,	  Burroughs’s	  first	  two	  novels	  participate	  in	  what	  might	  be	  called	  “the	  beginning”	  of	  a	  valuable	  experiment.	  Drawing	  on	  Fleck’s	  theoretical	  apparatus,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  work	  of	  another	  sociologist	  of	  science,	  Hans-­‐Jörg	  Rheinberger,	  and	  the	  specific	  insights	  cultural	  critic	  Richard	  Doyle	  offers	  about	  Albert	  Hofmann’s	  LSD	  experiments,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  similarities	  among	  the	  specific	  scientific	  and	  aesthetico-­‐political	  experiments	  detailed	  here	  are	  more	  than	  metaphorical;	  they	  are	  shared	  processes	  with	  related	  material	  implications.	  For	  both	  science	  and	  literature,	  each	  of	  these	  experiments	  is	  inextricable	  from	  the	  experimenter’s	  experience;	  in	  none	  of	  these	  is	  the	  self	  external	  or	  inconsequential	  to	  the	  experiment.	  Rather,	  valuable	  experiments	  are,	  in	  fact,	  also	  always	  forms	  of	  self-­‐experimentation,	  enabling	  personal	  and	  collective	  epistemological	  shifts	  that	  alter	  material	  practices	  and	  material	  conditions:	  self-­‐experiments	  are	  linked	  as	  unpredictable,	  disruptive,	  and	  productive	  operations.	  	  	   This	  tight	  linking	  of	  the	  material,	  biological,	  thinking	  self	  with	  the	  epistemological	  and	  material	  production	  of	  the	  experiment	  suggests	  that	  that	  the	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valuable	  experiment	  is	  an	  experiment	  with	  values;	  it	  (at	  least	  temporarily)	  disrupts	  and	  reconfigures	  the	  scientific,	  aesthetic,	  and	  social	  values	  of	  the	  financial	  interests	  guiding	  institutional	  science	  and	  their	  linked	  control	  strategies.	  The	  experiment,	  then,	  has	  its	  own	  economy:	  an	  experimental	  economy.	  Thus,	  science	  and	  literature	  are	  not	  merely	  subject	  to	  economic	  laws;	  their	  valuable	  experiments	  expand	  the	  field	  of	  the	  material	  and	  of	  value	  in	  ways	  that	  alter	  both	  what	  counts	  as	  economic	  and	  also	  actual	  lived	  economic	  conditions.	  	  	   Any	  particular	  “economy,”	  defined	  most	  simply	  as	  the	  management	  of	  finite	  resources,	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  set	  of	  conceptual	  presuppositions	  that	  are	  constitutive	  of	  and	  co-­‐extensive	  with	  its	  material	  practices.	  The	  presuppositions	  and	  practices	  of	  capitalism	  most	  important	  for	  this	  chapter	  are	  the	  divisibility	  and	  reification	  of	  processes	  (for	  example,	  “labor”	  made	  divisible	  into	  countable	  labor-­‐time),	  equivalence	  by	  the	  production	  of	  likeness	  (labor	  and	  money,	  bodies	  and	  other	  bodies),	  and	  exchangeability	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  financial/commodity	  exchange	  and	  political	  representation).	  Practices	  within	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  play	  out	  according	  to	  these	  suppositions,	  yet	  any	  particular	  sub-­‐economy—for	  example,	  that	  of	  pharmaceutical	  medicine	  or	  the	  illegal	  drug	  trade—varies	  the	  forms	  in	  which	  these	  suppositions	  are	  expressed,	  according	  to	  that	  economy’s	  needs.	  Much	  work	  has	  gone	  into	  thinking	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  supplementary	  economies	  (for	  example,	  “the	  affective	  economy”)	  emerge	  to	  account	  for	  and	  supplement	  the	  elisions	  of	  larger	  capitalist	  value	  systems.12	  These	  provocative	  analyses	  of	  the	  supplementary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See,	  for	  example,	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  “Affective	  Economies,”	  Social	  Text	  79	  22:2	  (2004):	  117-­‐139.	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economies	  often	  reveal	  the	  flexibility	  of	  capitalism	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  can	  come	  to	  manage	  even	  seemingly	  non-­‐economic	  forces.	  The	  experiments	  detailed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  by	  contrast,	  are	  emergent	  experiments	  and	  therefore	  do	  not—cannot—take	  capitalist	  presuppositions	  as	  true	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  as	  they’re	  emerging,	  they	  cannot	  be	  commoditized,	  reified,	  or	  made	  divisible).	  They	  are,	  in	  their	  emergence,	  not	  yet	  available	  to	  or	  of	  use	  for	  the	  business	  interests	  that	  might	  eventually	  capture	  them.	  These	  experimental	  procedures	  and	  their	  co-­‐extensive	  economies	  would	  not,	  to	  use	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde,	  proceed	  by	  a	  plan	  of	  attack	  or	  dialectical	  critique	  enabled	  by	  an	  “outside”	  or	  a	  vision	  of	  “totality.”	  They	  are,	  instead,	  emergent	  in	  their	  own	  processes	  of	  production,	  of	  being	  written.	  For	  literature	  this	  means,	  to	  draw	  from	  Burroughs,	  responding	  to	  the	  “intolerable”—a	  situation	  in	  which	  material	  conditions	  and	  practices	  are	  no	  longer	  suitable	  for	  life—not	  with	  mere	  critique	  or	  reform,	  but	  with	  a	  recognition	  that	  one	  has	  been	  “maneuvered	  into	  a	  lifelong	  struggle,	  in	  which	  [one	  has]	  no	  choice	  except	  to	  write	  [a]	  way	  out”	  (Burroughs,	  Queer	  135).	  	  
Experimental	  Materialism:	  Reading	  the	  Self	  	  	  	   As	  Burroughs	  writes	  his	  way	  out,	  from	  Junky	  to	  Queer,	  the	  state-­‐sponsored	  but	  “illegal”	  capitalism	  of	  the	  mid-­‐century	  junk	  economy	  makes	  way	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  experimental,	  queer	  economy.	  To	  think	  how	  literature	  experiments	  with	  materiality	  and	  epistemology	  as	  valuable	  science	  experiments	  do,	  in	  ways	  that	  value	  experimental	  writing	  as	  embodied	  production,	  Burroughs’s	  novels	  require	  a	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materialist	  reading	  practice	  different	  from	  historical	  materialism	  and	  irreducible	  to	  hermeneutics.	  Here,	  I	  take	  a	  cue	  from	  both	  Helene	  Cixous	  and	  Deleuze	  in	  their	  engagements	  with	  literature.	  Cixous	  describes	  her	  most	  famous	  literary	  concept,	  
écriture	  féminine,	  as	  a	  writing	  and	  reading	  practice	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  material	  labor	  and	  use	  of	  writing	  and	  reading,	  rather	  than	  explication	  and	  interpretation,	  as	  fundamental	  to	  alternative	  (non-­‐capitalist,	  non-­‐masculinist)	  economic	  formations.13	  Similarly,	  Deleuze	  suggests	  that	  his	  engagement	  with	  literature	  “is	  not	  a	  question	  of	  commenting	  on	  a	  text	  by	  a	  method	  of	  deconstruction,	  or	  by	  a	  method	  of	  textual	  practice,	  or	  by	  any	  other	  method;	  it	  is	  a	  question	  of	  seeing	  what	  use	  it	  has	  in	  an	  extra-­‐textual	  practice	  that	  prolongs	  the	  text”	  (Deleuze,	  “Nietzsche”	  86).	  Following	  their	  lead,	  my	  engagement	  with	  Burroughs	  is	  not	  primarily	  one	  of	  trying	  to	  discover	  what	  his	  texts	  mean,	  so	  much	  as	  seeing	  what	  they	  make	  and	  make	  possible.	  How	  did	  Burroughs	  draw	  from	  the	  specific	  and	  intolerable	  conditions	  he	  experienced	  in	  order	  to	  transform	  those	  conditions	  and	  make	  way	  for	  new	  experiences?	  Eventually,	  then,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  ask	  not	  only	  how	  do	  experiments	  begin,	  but	  also	  how	  can	  they	  be	  used,	  prolonged,	  or	  extended?	  Thus,	  I	  am	  tracking	  Burroughs’s	  experimental	  beginnings	  not	  so	  much	  to	  produce	  a	  completed	  narrative	  arc	  of	  his	  experimental	  practice,	  but	  instead,	  to	  imagine	  ways	  of	  extending	  his	  experimentation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Cixous’s	  call	  for	  écriture	  féminine	  has	  primarily	  appeared	  in	  the	  US	  literary	  study	  as	  a	  call	  for	  representation	  of	  female-­‐authored	  texts	  and	  female	  characters	  in	  the	  literary	  canon.	  However,	  her	  essays—especially	  those	  that	  appeared	  in	  the	  first	  English	  translations	  of	  her	  work—make	  it	  clear	  that	  écriture	  féminine	  has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  texts	  as	  objects	  or	  with	  women	  writers	  per	  se.	  Écriture	  féminine	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  literary	  practice	  that	  rejects	  and	  poses	  an	  alternative	  to	  masculine	  practices	  of	  meaning	  making.	  See:	  Helene	  Cixous,	  “Sorties,”	  “Castration	  or	  Decapitation,”	  and	  “The	  Laugh	  of	  Medusa”	  in	  New	  French	  Feminisms:	  An	  Anthology.	  Eds.	  Elaine	  Marks	  and	  Isabelle	  Courtivron	  (New	  York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  1981).	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   Through	  Burroughs’s	  two	  early	  novels,	  we	  can	  access	  the	  first	  of	  those	  questions	  and	  begin	  to	  wrestle	  with	  the	  second.	  These	  are	  frequently	  considered	  the	  least	  experimental	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  most	  conventional)	  of	  his	  works	  when	  compared	  to	  Naked	  Lunch,	  the	  cut-­‐up	  trilogy,	  or	  the	  Red	  Night	  novels.	  Moreover,	  why	  not	  investigate	  Naked	  Lunch,	  which	  has	  a	  much	  more	  clearly	  antagonistic	  relationship	  to	  medical	  treatment	  practices	  in	  the	  character	  of	  Dr.	  Benway?	  Indeed,	  Benway’s	  appearance	  as	  a	  seminal	  character	  in	  Naked	  Lunch	  might	  be	  said	  to	  mark	  a	  moment	  at	  which	  Burroughs	  overtly	  takes	  the	  medical	  establishment	  as	  the	  hostile	  and	  controlling	  enemy	  it	  has	  been,	  for	  him,	  all	  along.	  In	  part,	  I	  don’t	  begin	  with	  those	  because	  by	  the	  time	  we	  get	  to	  Naked	  Lunch,	  the	  Nova	  Trilogy,	  and	  subsequent	  novels,	  Burroughs	  has	  already	  produced	  and	  reconfigured	  an	  experimental	  system	  that	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  track	  its	  origins	  (that	  is,	  the	  recognizable,	  “normal”	  material	  conditions	  from	  which	  the	  novels	  emerge);	  in	  these	  later	  novels,	  Burroughs	  is	  on	  to	  a	  new	  set	  of	  experiments	  that	  build	  from	  and	  extend	  the	  earlier	  experimental	  procedures.14	  The	  larger	  reason	  for	  tracking	  experimental	  procedures	  in	  the	  early	  works,	  however,	  is	  precisely	  because	  they	  are	  assumed	  (by	  both	  readers	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  For	  example,	  Naked	  Lunch,	  which	  uses	  some	  of	  the	  same	  techniques	  as	  Queer,	  actually	  begins	  a	  new	  experiment	  with	  “the	  cut,”	  which	  Burroughs	  then	  continues	  into	  The	  Nova	  Trilogy.	  Naked	  Lunch	  is	  a	  novel	  that	  can	  be,	  as	  Burroughs	  writes	  in	  “The	  Atrophied	  Preface”	  (the	  final	  section	  of	  the	  book),	  “cut	  into	  […]	  at	  any	  intersection	  point”	  (Naked	  Lunch	  187).	  It	  experiments	  with	  questions	  of	  totality	  and	  organization	  in	  ways	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  work	  Burroughs	  did	  in	  the	  early	  novels,	  but	  which	  are	  not	  yet	  available	  as	  questions	  in	  them.	  William	  S.	  Burroughs,	  Naked	  
Lunch:	  The	  Restored	  Text.	  Eds.	  James	  Grauerholz	  and	  Barry	  Miller	  (New	  York:	  Grove	  Press,	  2001).	  See	  also:	  Michelle	  Koerner,	  “From	  Controlled	  Substances	  to	  Control	  Societies,”	  in	  The	  Uses	  of	  Literature:	  Gilles	  Deleuze’s	  American	  Rhizome.	  Dissertation,	  Duke	  University.	  (Durham,	  NC:	  ProQuest,	  2010).	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Burroughs	  himself)	  to	  be	  autobiographical,	  and	  autobiography	  bears	  in	  special	  ways	  on	  the	  production	  and	  perception	  of	  experiments.	  	  	   Burroughs	  overtly	  acknowledges	  the	  autobiographical	  nature	  of	  each	  book	  in	  its	  introduction.	  Yet	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  each	  might	  be	  considered	  “autobiographical”	  are	  not	  nearly	  as	  transparent	  as	  such	  acknowledgment	  might	  suggest.	  Both	  Junky	  and	  Queer	  were	  written	  during	  a	  period	  from	  1951-­‐53,	  and	  Burroughs	  thought	  of	  them	  as	  part	  of	  the	  same	  project	  (Junky	  xi).	  Junky	  was	  originally	  published	  under	  the	  pseudonym	  “William	  Lee,”	  and	  was	  marketed	  as	  Lee’s	  autobiography.	  Queer,	  which	  remained	  unpublished	  until	  1985,	  was	  published	  under	  Burroughs’s	  own	  name,	  but	  written	  in	  the	  third-­‐person.	  Junky	  tells	  of	  Burroughs-­‐cum-­‐William	  Lee’s	  experiences	  in	  the	  underground	  of	  the	  junk	  economy	  in	  New	  York	  City	  and	  later	  Mexico	  in	  the	  late	  1940s.	  Queer	  is	  the	  narrative	  of	  his	  time	  in	  Mexico	  while	  waiting	  out	  US	  drug	  charges,	  his	  experience	  of	  withdrawal	  and	  sexual	  reawakening,	  and	  his	  search	  for	  a	  South	  American	  hallucinogenic	  plant	  known	  as	  yage.	  Biographically,	  there	  is	  a	  major	  break	  between	  the	  two	  novels,	  which	  is	  never	  mentioned	  in	  the	  body	  of	  either	  novel,	  but	  which	  Burroughs	  acknowledges	  in	  the	  1985	  introduction	  to	  Queer:	  the	  accidental	  shooting	  death	  of	  his	  wife	  Joan	  Vollmer	  at	  his	  own	  hands,	  after	  which	  he	  kicks	  his	  heroin	  addiction	  for	  some	  time.	  Burroughs	  describes	  the	  psychological	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  novels,	  saying:	  	   	   In	  my	  first	  novel,	  Junky,	  the	  protagonist,	  “Lee,”	  comes	  across	  as	  	  	  	   	   integrated	  and	  self-­‐contained,	  sure	  of	  himself	  and	  where	  he	  is	  going.	  	  In	  Queer	  he	  is	  disintegrated,	  desperately	  in	  need	  of	  contact,	  	  completely	  unsure	  of	  himself	  and	  his	  purpose.	  	  	   	   The	  difference	  of	  course	  is	  simple:	  Lee	  on	  junk	  is	  covered,	  protected,	  	  and	  also	  severely	  limited.	  […]	  When	  the	  cover	  is	  removed,	  everything	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that	  has	  been	  held	  in	  check	  by	  junk	  spills	  out.	  (Queer	  127)	  	  The	  “I”	  of	  Junky,	  the	  “he”	  of	  Queer,	  and	  the	  other	  person	  that	  is	  the	  Burroughs-­‐I	  of	  the	  introductions	  are	  loosely	  contiguous	  but	  also	  starkly	  different	  from	  one	  another:	  differences	  largely	  revealed	  in	  their	  relationships	  to	  junk.	  While	  junk	  use	  and	  junk	  sociality	  can	  produce	  non-­‐normative	  perceptive	  practices,	  the	  above	  quote	  reveals	  Burroughs’s	  understanding	  of	  junk	  addiction	  (being	  “on	  junk”)	  as	  a	  means	  of	  controlling	  and	  containing	  the	  self.15	  Burroughs	  understands	  a	  junk	  habit	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  limit	  or	  control	  (delimiting	  both	  perception	  and	  affect)	  on	  the	  self	  that	  can	  no	  longer	  organize	  and	  guide	  him	  when	  he	  writes	  Queer.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  novels	  manifests	  formally	  in	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  first-­‐person	  narration	  of	  Junky	  to	  third-­‐person	  narration	  in	  Queer.	  Accounting	  for	  that	  difference,	  Burroughs	  states,	  “While	  it	  was	  I	  who	  wrote	  Junky,	  I	  feel	  that	  I	  was	  being	  written	  in	  Queer”	  (128).	  	  	   As	  Doyle	  shows	  (and	  Fleck	  and	  Rheinberger	  corroborate),	  the	  autobiography	  offers	  special	  insight	  into	  the	  procedures	  of	  experimentation,	  their	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  self,	  and	  the	  effects	  such	  reconfiguration	  has	  on	  material	  practices.	  In	  particular,	  these	  accounts	  of	  scientific	  experiments	  and	  Burroughs’s	  early	  novels	  reveal	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  the	  usual	  distinctions	  between	  subject	  and	  object	  are	  disrupted	  at	  both	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  levels,	  a	  disruption	  that	  has	  deep	  implications	  for	  both	  the	  value	  of	  “objectivity”	  in	  scientific	  analyses,	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  that	  Junky	  unequivocally	  glamorizes	  heroin	  use.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  quite	  the	  opposite:	  Junky	  describes	  the	  great	  social	  difficulties	  of	  junk	  addiction.	  Burroughs	  spends	  the	  remainder	  of	  his	  life	  in	  search	  of	  The	  Final	  Kick	  and	  of	  alternative	  methods	  for	  social	  organization	  and	  perception,	  whose	  possibilities	  he	  first	  glimpsed	  while	  on	  junk.	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(de)valuation	  of	  “subjects”	  in	  politics.	  The	  brief	  episode	  I	  quoted	  from	  Junky	  in	  the	  opening	  pages	  of	  this	  chapter	  starts	  a	  process—in	  the	  very	  moment	  of	  seemingly	  absolute	  state	  control,	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  possible	  expressions	  of	  inmate	  subjectivity—from	  which	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  underground	  perceptivity	  and	  set	  of	  practices	  emerge.	  All	  these	  experiments,	  then,	  invoke	  a	  kind	  of	  science	  and	  experimentation	  not	  implicated	  in	  the	  production	  of	  taxonomic	  objects	  of	  knowledge	  or	  immediate	  corroboration	  of	  facts;	  instead,	  the	  experiment	  is	  reconceived	  as	  a	  process	  of	  inquiry-­‐production,	  raising	  further	  questions	  and	  further	  experimental	  practices.16	  
Junky	  and	  Queer—along	  with	  Doyle’s	  revelations	  about	  Hofmann’s	  experiments—experiment	  with	  the	  subject	  as	  object,	  producing	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  of	  the	  self	  no	  longer	  determined	  politically,	  aesthetically,	  or	  ontologically	  by	  the	  subject/object	  distinction,	  nor	  the	  related	  demands	  of	  political	  and	  epistemological	  subjecthood	  and	  objectivity.	  This	  is	  to	  say,	  these	  novels	  offer	  a	  pedagogy	  for	  understanding	  the	  ways	  the	  autobiographical	  novel	  for	  Burroughs	  is	  not	  a	  document	  of	  the	  existing	  self,	  but	  a	  mode	  of	  producing	  (non-­‐subject/anti-­‐subject)	  selves:	  a	  process	  that	  operates	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  valuable	  scientific	  self-­‐experimentation.	  	   That	  Burroughs	  conceives	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  novels	  as	  a	  switch	  from	  self	  as	  observer	  and	  documenter	  of	  the	  junk	  world	  in	  Junky	  (it	  tells	  “the	  straight	  story”	  of	  junk)	  to	  self	  as	  experimental	  object	  being	  written	  in	  Queer—a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  It	  is	  perhaps	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  valuable	  experiment	  emerges	  from	  the	  biological	  sciences—that	  is,	  science	  concerned	  specifically	  with	  life	  and	  its	  conditions.	  To	  this	  end,	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  related	  to	  vitalist	  
experiments,	  which	  Rob	  Mitchell	  describes	  in	  Experimental	  Life:	  Vitalism	  in	  Romantic	  
Science	  and	  Literature	  as	  “mechanisms	  for	  enabling	  new	  questions	  and	  concepts”	  (11).	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difference	  that	  hinges	  on	  his	  relationship	  to	  junk	  and	  has	  major	  economic	  repercussions	  for	  Burroughs—evinces	  the	  particular	  potentials	  and	  dangers	  of	  psychochemicals	  I	  outlined	  earlier.	  These	  potentials	  and	  dangers	  have	  not	  only	  personal,	  but	  also	  scientific	  effects.	  Burroughs’s	  experiments,	  which	  begin	  while	  addicted,	  demonstrate	  the	  capacity	  of	  psychochemicals	  to	  instigate	  experiments.17	  But	  in	  Lee’s	  passage	  from	  removed	  observer	  to	  experimental	  object,	  Burroughs’s	  novels	  also	  reveal	  the	  perceptual	  limits	  of	  experimental	  practices	  that	  depend	  on	  a	  separation	  of	  subject	  and	  object.	  	  This	  limit	  is	  also	  evidenced	  by	  Albert	  Hofmann’s	  experiments	  with	  LSD.	  In	  “LSDNA:	  Consciousness	  Expansion	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Biotechnology,”	  Richard	  Doyle	  details	  Hofmann’s	  early	  experiences	  in	  the	  late	  1930s	  and	  early	  ‘40s.	  He	  first	  synthesized	  Lysergic	  Acid	  Diethylamide	  (LSD-­‐25)	  for	  lab	  rat	  experiments	  with	  ergot,	  a	  neurotropic	  fungus	  thought	  to	  have	  pharmaceautical	  potentials.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  his	  accidental	  ingestion	  of	  the	  chemical,	  and	  his	  subsequent	  experiments	  on	  himself.	  Doyle	  offers	  a	  reading	  of	  Hofmann’s	  shifting	  understating	  of	  himself	  that	  demonstrates	  how	  Hofmann’s	  self	  experiments	  disrupt	  the	  usual	  distinctions	  between	  object	  and	  observer	  required	  of	  scientific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  I	  am	  not	  in	  any	  way	  claiming	  that	  drugs	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  valuable	  experiments	  (in	  fact,	  most	  instances	  of	  people’s	  ‘experimenting	  with	  drugs’	  are	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  what	  I	  am	  describing	  here),	  but	  psychochemicals’	  disorganizing	  of	  perceptive	  practices	  in	  Burroughs’s	  and	  Hofmann’s	  specific	  situations	  do	  help	  instigate	  one.	  For	  Burroughs,	  the	  different	  feel	  of	  the	  junk	  world-­‐-­‐a	  feel	  that	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  both	  the	  sensorial	  experience	  of	  being	  on	  heroin,	  and	  the	  non-­‐normative	  social	  situation	  of	  junkies—helps	  to	  make	  an	  experiment	  possible.	  The	  habit	  of	  junk,	  however,	  normalizes	  these	  perceptions,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  makes	  desire	  impotent.	  This	  is	  why	  it	  is	  during	  withdrawal	  in	  Queer	  that	  the	  experiment	  instigated	  in	  Junky	  takes	  shape.	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experiments,	  a	  disruption	  that,	  despite	  the	  usual	  illegitimacy	  of	  self-­‐experiments,	  ultimately	  leads	  to	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  the	  biological	  sciences	  and	  genetics	  research.	  	  	   Hofmann	  enters	  a	  line	  of	  experimental	  questioning	  that	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  separate	  the	  subject-­‐cogito	  from	  its	  embodied,	  and	  largely	  disorganized,	  sensorial	  and	  perceptive	  experiences	  of	  the	  object	  being	  studied;	  knowledge	  is	  inseparable	  from	  “irreducible	  participation”:	  embodied	  and	  aesthetic	  experience	  (Doyle	  111).	  While	  synthesizing	  LSD,	  Hofmann	  is	  “interrupted	  in	  [his]	  work	  by	  unusual	  sensations.”	  Remarkably,	  Doyle	  notes,	  “this	  interruption	  of	  the	  I,	  rather	  than	  ending	  an	  experiment,	  begins	  one”	  (109).	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  has	  accidentally	  absorbed	  LSD	  (and	  if	  so,	  if	  it	  has	  caused	  these	  weird	  sensations	  he	  cannot	  yet	  identify),	  he	  “has	  recourse	  to	  an	  extraordinary	  non-­‐sequitur”:	  he	  will	  conduct	  a	  self-­‐experiment	  (110).	  His	  experience	  demands	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  experiment;	  he	  encounters	  an	  experimental	  system	  that	  can	  only	  proceed	  if	  the	  self	  is	  taken	  as	  assay.	  For	  Hofmann,	  then,	  the	  regulations	  of	  objective	  subject	  observer	  are	  revealed	  as,	  in	  this	  instance,	  a	  less	  than	  productive	  limit,	  a	  delimitation,	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  embodied	  experiences	  of	  a	  biological	  being	  studying	  biological	  phenomena.	  And	  so	  he	  must	  invent	  a	  new	  set	  of	  practices	  for	  such	  an	  experiment:	  even	  the	  form	  of	  the	  self-­‐experiment	  is	  immanent	  and	  experimental!	  Entering	  into	  the	  unknown—of	  potency,	  of	  effects,	  of	  procedure—is	  to	  here	  open	  oneself	  to	  danger,	  and	  so	  Hofmann	  must	  embark	  “with	  caution.”	  Without	  a	  precedent,	  he	  must	  constantly	  ask	  himself	  “How	  to	  go	  on?”	  (110).	  Rather	  than	  documenting	  visible	  or	  visualized	  effects,	  as	  he	  might	  have	  with	  the	  rats	  (documenting	  countable	  and	  defined	  behaviors	  and	  movements),	  he	  must	  find	  new	  ways	  of	  accounting	  for	  half-­‐
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perceptions	  and	  half-­‐expressions:	  the	  desire	  to	  laugh,	  the	  struggle	  to	  speak	  intelligibly.	  Lacking	  models	  or	  marked	  gradients,	  he	  cannot	  know	  what	  counts	  as	  significant	  variation,	  and	  so	  he	  resorts	  to—is	  overtaken	  by—a	  kind	  of	  graphomania.	  He	  becomes	  a	  “recording	  device,”	  producing	  extensive	  personal	  journals	  from	  which	  Doyle	  extracts	  and	  synthesizes	  his	  account	  of	  the	  changing	  conceptions	  and	  material	  experience	  of	  the	  self	  in	  the	  self-­‐experiment	  (112).	  	   This	  notion	  of	  becoming	  a	  recording	  device	  of	  the	  self—a	  self	  unknown	  to	  the	  self	  as	  it	  undergoes	  a	  dangerous	  experimental	  process—will	  find	  resonances	  with	  William	  Lee	  in	  Queer.	  The	  danger	  for	  either	  Hofmann	  or	  Burroughs—should	  his	  experiment	  proceed—is	  a	  radical	  danger	  that	  threatens	  not	  only	  his	  own	  life	  (a	  life),	  but	  also	  the	  very	  understanding	  of	  life	  that	  has	  heretofore	  governed	  him.	  For	  both	  Burroughs	  and	  Hoffman,	  their	  understandings	  of	  life	  are	  informed	  by	  an	  increasingly	  prevalent	  conception	  of	  its	  life	  processes	  as	  activated	  by	  transference	  of	  “information”	  among	  bodily	  structures	  .18	  The	  self-­‐experiment	  enables	  a	  radical	  thought	  that	  indicates	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  complete	  and	  total	  breakdown	  of	  the	  systems	  of	  organization	  that	  control	  and	  discipline	  the	  relationship	  between	  thought	  and	  life;	  it	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  organization	  for	  life	  itself	  not	  limited	  to	  communication	  and	  control.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Doyle	  describes	  Hofmann’s	  experiment	  as	  “science	  at	  its	  best,”	  by	  which	  he	  means	  a	  moment	  when	  “as	  inquiry,	  its	  direction	  cannot	  be	  predicted.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  For	  more	  on	  the	  history	  of	  information	  and	  communication	  as	  biological	  concepts,	  see:	  Lily	  Kay,	  Who	  Wrote	  the	  Book	  of	  Life:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Genetic	  Code	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  Univ.	  Press,	  2000).	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What	  Doyle	  affirms	  in	  Hofmann’s	  experiment	  is	  the	  revelation	  of	  an	  organism’s	  non-­‐identity;	  it	  is	  a	  reminder	  that	  despite	  statistical	  predictions	  and	  probabilities,	  “any	  specifically	  biological	  differences	  cannot	  be	  known	  in	  advance”	  (104).	  It	  suggests	  the	  unknowable	  and	  therefore	  unpredictable	  potentialities	  of	  life	  
and	  of	  science,	  which,	  Doyle	  writes,	  “[imply]	  not	  relativism,	  but	  an	  extraordinary	  capacity	  for	  surprise…”	  (105).	  The	  influence	  and	  insights	  of	  Hofmann’s	  experience-­‐experiments	  would,	  in	  the	  1980s,	  result	  in	  dramatic	  changes	  in	  conceptions	  and	  investigations	  of	  DNA.	  Genetic	  information	  would	  cease	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  knowable	  information:	  a	  stable,	  semantic	  phenomenon	  or	  “secret”	  to	  be	  unlocked.	  Instead,	  it	  would	  become	  a	  “spectacularly	  mutable	  technology	  of	  replication	  and	  differentiation.”	  The	  “undoing	  of	  identity”	  in	  Hofmann’s	  experiments	  disrupts,	  at	  least	  temporarily,	  the	  communication	  and	  control	  epistemology	  of	  genetics,	  reframing	  its	  inquiries	  in	  terms	  of	  difference	  and	  distribution,	  not	  codes	  and	  programs	  (106-­‐7).	  	  
Experimental	  Systems,	  Technical	  Objects:	  How	  Experiments	  Happen	  	  	   Doyle’s	  reading	  of	  Hofmann	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  impact	  of	  his	  work	  helps	  reveal	  the	  potentials	  of	  aesthetic—which	  is	  to	  say	  embodied,	  sensorial—experience	  for	  new	  forms	  of	  scientific	  knowledge-­‐production.19	  And	  it	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  read	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Despite	  a	  common	  conception	  of	  aesthetics	  as	  the	  study	  of	  “beauty”—a	  conception	  largely	  indebted	  to	  a	  Romantic	  era	  focus	  on	  aesthetic	  judgment	  and	  taste	  with	  regards	  to	  art—the	  long	  history	  of	  aesthetics,	  and	  its	  re-­‐entry	  into	  scientific	  inquiry,	  has	  focused	  more	  generally	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  perception	  and	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Burroughs’s	  aesthetic	  experiments	  as	  experiments	  with	  biological	  and	  social	  life.	  Burroughs’s	  reconfiguration	  of	  his	  subject-­‐self	  and	  by	  consequence	  life	  itself—a	  reconfiguration	  that	  becomes	  possible	  in	  Junky	  in	  contact	  with	  heroin,	  and	  materializes	  in	  his	  subsequent	  withdrawal	  in	  Queer—is	  enabled	  by	  the	  disruptive	  sensations	  of	  junk	  and	  junk-­‐withdrawal	  that	  produce	  his	  attunement	  to	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  life.	  They	  enable	  an	  extraordinary	  capacity	  for	  surprise	  that	  will	  liberate	  William	  Lee	  from	  being	  the	  subject	  of	  state	  control	  and	  the	  capitalist	  cycles	  of	  the	  heroin	  trade	  in	  Junky	  and	  allow	  him	  to	  discover	  and	  produce	  his	  selves	  in	  
Queer.	  What	  Burroughs	  and	  Doyle	  together	  offer	  us	  is	  a	  way	  into	  thinking	  the	  relationship	  among	  attunement,	  aesthetics,	  and	  experimentation.	  For	  both,	  the	  experiment	  registers	  not	  in	  easily	  cognitivized	  or	  organized	  visual	  cues,	  but	  much	  more	  expansively	  in	  what	  Fred	  Moten	  calls	  “the	  socialization	  of	  the	  ensemble	  of	  the	  senses”	  (Moten,	  Break	  229).	  Their	  experimental	  experiences	  of	  the	  social	  and	  of	  the	  self	  as	  a	  social	  being	  are	  first	  felt	  in	  synaesthetic,	  proprioceptive,	  and	  embodied	  ways	  (in	  ways	  that,	  in	  fact,	  disrupt	  the	  distinctions	  between	  the	  senses).	  If	  “strange	  sensations”	  open	  Hofmann	  to	  the	  forms	  of	  aesthetic	  embodiment	  that	  underlie	  biology,	  in	  Burroughs’s	  work,	  junk	  sociality	  as	  a	  “feeling”	  indicates	  an	  aesthetics	  of	  social	  existence	  with	  which	  and	  from	  which	  he	  begins	  to	  experiment.	  	  	   And	  for	  Burroughs,	  as	  for	  Hofmann,	  new	  procedures	  will	  have	  to	  be	  invented,	  and	  they	  will	  have	  to	  be	  invented	  in	  the	  process	  of	  production	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  affective	  experience.	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari,	  in	  What	  is	  Philosophy,	  connect	  aesthetics	  to	  art	  without	  directly	  relating	  it	  to	  judgments	  of	  taste,	  suggesting	  that	  art	  itself	  is	  not	  based	  in	  objects,	  but	  in	  the	  “extraction	  of	  percepts	  and	  affects.”	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Philosophy	  24).	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This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  procedures	  will	  be	  invented	  inside	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  coextensive	  with,	  immanent	  to,	  the	  experiment,	  rather	  than	  external	  or	  prior	  to	  it.	  This	  demands	  new	  perceptive	  tools	  for	  us,	  then,	  in	  order	  to	  attune	  ourselves	  to	  such	  experiments.	  Fleck	  and	  Rheinberger	  offer	  such	  tools.	  In	  traditional	  accounts,	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  a	  self-­‐experiment	  would	  be	  understood	  as	  exceptional	  or	  scientifically	  illegitimate;	  for	  Fleck	  and	  Rheinberger,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Fleck’s	  and	  Rheinberger’s	  empirical	  accounts	  of	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  beginnings	  of	  actual	  laboratory	  experiments	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  general	  conception	  of	  scientific	  experimental	  methods	  is	  itself	  exceptional;	  it	  runs	  counter	  to	  experimental	  scientific	  
practice.	  Experiments	  simply	  do	  no	  proceed	  as	  we	  think	  they	  do.20	  In	  Toward	  a	  
History	  of	  Epistemic	  Things:	  Synthesizing	  Proteins	  in	  the	  Test	  Tube,	  Rheinberger	  usefully	  details	  the	  common	  understanding	  of	  scientific	  experiments,	  saying:	  	   	   According	  to	  a	  long-­‐standing	  tradition	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  	  	   	   experiments	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  singular,	  well-­‐defined	  empirical	  	  instances	  embedded	  in	  the	  elaboration	  of	  a	  theory	  and	  performed	  in	  	  order	  to	  corroborate	  or	  to	  refute	  certain	  hypotheses.	  In	  the	  classical	  formulation	  of	  Karl	  Popper,	  ‘the	  theoretician	  puts	  certain	  definite	  questions	  to	  the	  experimenter,	  and	  the	  latter,	  by	  his	  experiments,	  tries	  to	  elicit	  a	  decisive	  answer	  to	  these	  questions	  and	  to	  no	  others.	  All	  other	  questions	  he	  tries	  hard	  to	  exclude.’	  (28)	  	  Here,	  Rheinberger	  refers	  to	  Karl	  Popper,	  an	  early	  philosopher	  of	  science,	  whose	  1934	  book,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Scientific	  Discovery,	  helped	  to	  establish	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  understanding	  the	  proceedings	  of	  scientific	  experiments—a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  In	  large	  part	  this	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  effect	  of	  larger	  historical	  narrativization,	  but	  rather,	  is	  built	  into	  the	  practice	  of	  science	  writing,	  which	  makes	  invisible	  much	  experimental	  practice.	  See:	  Bruno	  Latour	  and	  Steve	  Woolgar,	  Laboratory	  Life:	  The	  
Construction	  of	  Scientific	  Facts	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  Univ.	  Press,	  1986).	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framework	  that	  still	  to	  this	  day	  governs	  popular	  perceptions	  of	  science	  experiments,	  and	  might	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  reasonable	  explanation	  for	  the	  operations	  of	  “normal	  science”	  experimentation.	  	   By	  contrast,	  Fleck,	  a	  Polish	  scientist	  and	  biologist	  in	  his	  own	  right,	  writing	  around	  the	  same	  time	  as	  Popper,	  drew	  from	  accounts	  of	  August	  Paul	  Von	  Wasserman’s	  syphilis	  antibody	  studies	  and	  his	  own	  work	  studying	  bacteriological	  variability	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  sociological	  analysis	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  scientist	  move	  from	  initial	  and	  vague	  perceptions	  of	  unexpected	  phenomena	  to	  honed	  and	  repeatable	  test	  procedures	  that	  could	  then	  be	  said	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  collectively	  agreed	  upon	  “scientific	  facts.”	  Fleck’s	  empirical	  accounting	  produced	  a	  much	  more	  constructivist	  and	  relativist	  model	  than	  did	  Popper’s.	  Moreover,	  his	  description	  affirmed	  the	  contingency	  of	  events,	  the	  epistemological	  framework,	  and	  the	  psychological	  receptivity	  (“mood”)	  of	  the	  experimenter	  as	  important	  factors	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  experiment	  (Fleck	  89).	  Rheinberger’s	  much	  later	  work	  (published	  in	  1997,	  but	  tracking	  experiments	  conducted	  around	  mid-­‐twentieth-­‐century)	  was	  influenced	  by	  Fleck’s	  approach,	  which	  helped	  Rheinberger	  refine	  and	  produce	  new	  conceptual	  apparatuses	  for	  understanding	  continued	  experimental	  procedures.21	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Rheinberger’s	  work	  largely	  bypasses	  Kuhn’s	  seminal	  1962	  work,	  The	  Structure	  of	  
Scientific	  Revolutions,	  relying	  instead	  more	  heavily	  on	  Fleck’s	  analyses.	  Fleck’s	  work	  shares	  a	  number	  of	  similarities	  with	  Kuhn’s	  work	  (and,	  in	  fact,	  Kuhn	  was	  familiar	  with	  Fleck’s	  writings).	  But	  Fleck’s	  monograph	  was	  not	  translated	  into	  English	  until	  1979,	  and	  therefore	  did	  not	  have	  the	  larger	  impact	  in	  the	  American	  academy	  that	  Kuhn’s	  work	  did.	  While	  both	  offer	  more	  relativistic	  models	  that	  disrupt	  ideas	  of	  scientific	  “objectivity,”	  one	  major	  (and	  oft-­‐noticed)	  distinction	  between	  their	  works	  is	  that	  Fleck	  does	  not	  extend	  his	  analyses	  to	  produce	  an	  overarching	  (and	  dialectical)	  conceptual	  model	  to	  explain	  the	  longue	  durée	  of	  scientific	  progress,	  as	  Kuhn	  does	  with	  the	  ideas	  of	  “revolutionary	  science”	  and	  “the	  paradigm	  shift.”	  To	  my	  
	   38	  
	   Drawing	  on	  researchers’	  personal	  journals	  at	  mid-­‐century,	  which	  reveal	  the	  frequently	  haphazard	  and	  poorly	  defined	  proceedings	  of	  many	  important	  experiments,	  Rheinberger	  argues	  that	  scientists	  do	  not	  begin	  by	  choosing	  a	  “theoretical	  framework”	  as	  Popper	  suggested,	  but	  by	  choosing	  an	  “experimental	  system”	  (25).	  By	  “experimental	  system,”	  Rheinberger	  means	  first	  the	  arbitrarily	  isolated	  segment	  of	  the	  world	  that	  the	  scientist	  is	  investigating.	  This	  later	  expands	  to	  include	  the	  proliferation	  of	  linked	  experiments	  that	  develop	  from	  the	  initial	  experimentation	  and	  expand	  or	  contract	  the	  segment	  of	  the	  world	  being	  studied.	  He	  writes:	  	   	   [Experimental	  systems]	  are	  systems	  of	  manipulation	  designed	  to	  give	  	  	   	   unknown	  answers	  to	  questions	  that	  the	  experimenters	  themselves	  are	  	  not	  yet	  able	  to	  clearly	  ask.	  Such	  set-­‐ups	  are,	  as	  [biologist	  Francois]	  Jacobs	  	  once	  put	  it,	  “machines	  for	  making	  the	  future.”	  They	  are	  not	  simply	  experimental	  devices	  that	  generate	  answers:	  experimental	  systems	  are	  vehicles	  for	  materializing	  questions.	  	  They	  inextricably	  cogenerate	  the	  phenomena	  or	  material	  entities	  and	  the	  concepts	  they	  come	  to	  embody.	  Practices	  and	  concepts	  thus	  “come	  packaged	  together.”	  (28)	  	  For	  Rheinberger,	  then,	  experiments	  are	  not	  theory-­‐first	  fact-­‐finding	  operations,	  but	  are	  instead	  subjectively	  organized	  investigative	  practices	  that	  generate	  concepts,	  questions,	  and	  further	  practices	  from	  specific,	  local,	  and	  contingent	  grounds.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  mind,	  this	  is	  to	  Fleck’s	  credit,	  as	  it	  allows	  him	  to	  avoid	  a	  too-­‐totalizing	  model	  of	  scientific	  practice	  –	  an	  avoidance	  that	  aids	  Rheinberger’s	  re-­‐entry	  into	  Fleck’s	  work.	  Rheinberger	  suggests	  that	  the	  histories	  he	  is	  recounting	  “cannot	  easily	  be	  reconstructed	  in	  terms	  of	  paradigmatic	  conceptual	  shifts,	  which	  makes	  [them]	  resistant	  to	  a	  historiography	  oriented	  toward	  theoretical	  breakthroughs”	  (35).	  This	  observation	  also	  holds	  true	  for	  Fleck.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  differences	  between	  Fleck	  and	  Kuhn,	  see:	  Babette	  E.	  Babich,	  “From	  Fleck’s	  Denkstil	  to	  Kuhn’s	  Paradigm:	  Conceptual	  Schemes	  and	  Incommensurability,”	  International	  Studies	  in	  the	  
Philosophy	  of	  Science	  17:1	  (2003):	  75-­‐92.	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conceptual	  and	  inquiry-­‐producing	  possibilities	  enabled	  by	  a	  specific	  experimental	  system	  cannot	  be	  known	  in	  advance,	  nor	  can	  they	  be	  methodically	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  repeatable,	  objective	  method)	  derived.	  The	  material	  concepts	  they	  produce,	  however,	  can	  be	  grouped	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  generality	  under	  the	  descriptive	  category	  of	  “epistemic	  objects.”	  For	  Rheinberger,	  epistemic	  objects	  aren’t	  “objects”	  per	  se,	  but	  are,	  rather,	  “irreducibly	  vague”	  structures,	  reactions,	  functions,	  or	  processes	  that	  the	  experimenter	  perceives.	  In	  the	  early	  stages,	  epistemic	  objects	  cannot	  be	  named	  or	  known,	  except	  by	  repeating	  a	  “list	  of	  their	  constitutive	  actions”	  until	  they	  cohere.	  Once	  the	  epistemic	  object	  attains	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  coherence,	  it	  can	  then	  be	  thought	  –	  along	  with	  instruments,	  inscription	  devices,	  and	  model	  organisms	  –	  as	  a	  “technical	  object”;	  it	  becomes	  a	  method	  or	  tool	  that	  can	  be	  mobilized	  in	  the	  investigation	  of	  further	  epistemic	  things	  (29).	  	   What	  becomes	  apparent	  from	  both	  Fleck’s	  and	  Rheinberger’s	  work	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  any	  specific	  experimental	  results	  depend	  on	  the	  material,	  social,	  and	  psychological	  conditions	  from	  which	  they	  emerge.	  No	  clear	  and	  pre-­‐ordained	  method	  for	  emergent	  experimental	  procedures	  can	  be	  deduced;	  such	  procedures	  are	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  immediate	  concerns	  and	  questions	  that	  arise	  from	  a	  given	  and	  contingent	  set	  of	  phenomena.	  Rather	  than	  providing	  methodological	  guidance	  for	  producing	  experiments,	  what	  Fleck	  and	  Rheinberger	  actually	  provide	  is	  a	  minimal	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  perceiving	  and	  understanding	  an	  experimental	  procedure	  after	  it	  has	  occurred.	  Here,	  what	  Fleck	  and	  Rheinberger	  offer	  are	  some	  conceptual	  tools	  that	  can	  be	  used	  retrospectively—given	  our	  late	  recognition	  that	  Burroughs	  has	  indeed	  embarked	  on	  an	  experimental	  series	  in	  his	  early	  novels—to	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help	  us	  identify	  and	  understand	  the	  specific	  material	  and	  epistemological	  conditions	  to	  which	  Burroughs	  responds.	  In	  a	  larger	  sense,	  reading	  experiments	  in	  this	  way—as	  a	  set	  of	  operations	  that	  cross	  disciplines;	  involve	  original,	  disruptive	  perceptions	  generated	  by	  specific	  conditions;	  and	  produce	  questions	  about	  and	  responses	  to	  those	  conditions—will	  help	  us	  both	  identify	  and	  affirm	  experiments	  when	  and	  where	  they	  occur.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  this	  reading	  practice	  helps	  us	  trace	  and	  affirm	  Burroughs’s	  specific	  experiments,	  and	  offers	  us	  potentials	  for	  perceptive	  and	  experimental	  practices	  that	  we	  can	  link	  up	  to	  the	  experiments	  he	  has	  begun.	  
	  
The	  Junk	  System	  	  	   To	  locate	  the	  experimental	  system	  that	  Junky	  and	  Queer	  first	  isolate	  in	  some	  ways	  requires	  that	  in	  our	  retrospective	  analysis	  of	  the	  experiment	  we	  read	  the	  texts	  not	  only	  as	  autobiographies	  of	  Burroughs’s	  selves,	  but	  also	  put	  them	  back	  into	  the	  larger	  context	  from	  which	  they	  are	  extracted:	  a	  context	  that	  includes	  their	  publication	  and	  reception	  histories,	  and	  the	  many	  striking	  differences	  between	  them.	  This	  will	  help	  us	  trace	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Junky	  and	  Queer	  identify	  and	  engage	  their	  own	  specific	  conditions,	  and	  work	  together	  not	  progressively	  or	  dialectically,	  but	  constructively:	  experimenting	  with	  epistemic	  objects	  and	  mobilizing	  them	  as	  technical	  objects	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  trajectories	  out,	  lines	  of	  escape.	  	  	   Junky	  found	  a	  home	  with	  pulp	  publisher	  Ace	  almost	  immediately	  after	  Burroughs	  wrote	  it.	  Queer,	  by	  contrast,	  could	  not	  find	  a	  publisher,	  and	  remained	  unpublished	  until	  1985.	  Despite	  being	  published	  during	  the	  AIDS	  crisis	  and	  just	  
	   41	  
prior	  to	  the	  advent	  of	  queer	  theory,	  Queer	  has	  been	  largely	  ignored	  by	  literary	  and	  cultural	  studies,	  including	  queer	  studies	  (until	  very	  recently).	  Junky	  has	  not	  suffered	  such	  a	  fate,	  and	  has,	  for	  the	  almost	  60	  years	  since	  its	  publication,	  stood	  as	  one	  of	  the	  definitive	  texts	  on	  addiction.	  A	  number	  of	  explanations	  have	  been	  posited	  for	  the	  differences	  between	  their	  successes.	  Oliver	  Harris,	  who	  has	  edited	  editions	  of	  both	  books	  and	  has	  published	  numerous	  essays	  on	  Burroughs,	  suggests	  that	  social	  morality	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  era	  and	  Burroughs’s	  own	  discomfort	  (one	  might	  say,	  closetedness)	  about	  his	  sexuality	  made	  Queer	  unpublishable,	  while	  Junky,	  which	  appeared	  more	  sociological	  in	  nature,	  could	  by-­‐pass	  both	  public	  and	  self-­‐censors.22	  	  	   While	  taking	  seriously	  the	  very	  real	  difficulties	  of	  homosexual	  life	  in	  the	  ‘40s	  and	  ‘50s,	  I	  also	  want	  to	  suggest	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  problems	  posed	  by	  national	  values	  and	  censorship,	  another	  factor	  contributing	  to	  the	  books’	  differing	  success	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  aesthetic	  manifestations	  of	  those	  values	  and	  their	  felicity	  with	  capitalism	  and	  business	  practices	  of	  the	  publishing	  industry.	  The	  “straight,”	  sociological	  reportage	  style	  of	  Junky	  made	  it	  generically	  recognizable	  and	  able	  to	  fit	  into	  existing	  marketing	  strategies.	  Additionally,	  Burroughs’s	  letters	  written	  around	  the	  time	  of	  Junky’s	  publication	  reveal	  that	  he	  was	  not	  only	  guided	  by	  desires	  for	  fame	  and	  money,	  but	  also	  that	  he	  understood	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  market,	  whether	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  underground	  junk	  economy	  or	  the	  legal	  publishing	  one.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  Allen	  Ginsberg,	  Burroughs	  asks	  (regarding	  his	  publisher	  at	  Ace):	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See:	  Oliver	  Harris,	  “Can	  You	  See	  a	  Virus?	  The	  Queer	  Cold	  War	  of	  William	  Burroughs,”	  Journal	  of	  American	  Studies	  33:2	  (1999):	  243-­‐66.	  
	   42	  
	   	   Is	  he	  or	  is	  he	  not	  going	  to	  publish	  JUNK?	  Two	  books	  already	  out	  on	  the	  	   	   subject—DOWN	  ALL	  YOUR	  STREETS	  and	  H	  IS	  FOR	  HEROIN.	  I	  think	  	  	   	   this	  beginning	  of	  deluge.	  NOW	  is	  time	  to	  publish	  or	  we	  bring	  up	  rear	  	  and	  lose	  advantage	  of	  timeliness…	  Subject	  is	  hot	  now,	  but	  it	  won’t	  be	  hot	  long.	  (Junky	  xix)	  	  It	  is	  not	  merely,	  however,	  that	  junk	  and	  junk	  narratives	  were	  hot	  commodities.	  Junky	  could	  also	  be	  made	  morally	  palatable	  by	  packaging	  its	  scintillating	  narrative	  inside	  the	  same	  cover	  with	  The	  Agent,	  a	  junk	  narrative	  told	  from	  a	  cop’s	  point	  of	  view.	  The	  two-­‐for-­‐one	  book	  became	  a	  miniature	  of	  the	  dialectical	  procedures	  by	  which	  mid-­‐century	  capitalism	  both	  produced	  and	  regulated	  illegal	  markets.	  Their	  illegality	  was,	  of	  course,	  always	  validated	  and	  funded	  by	  legitimate	  markets:	  Burroughs	  reveals	  that	  agents	  put	  real	  government	  money	  into	  junk	  circulation	  in	  their	  crack-­‐downs	  on	  addicts.	  	  Simultaneously,	  addicts	  were	  enlisted	  as	  stoolies,	  and	  agents	  became	  addicts	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  infiltrating	  the	  junk	  economy	  (Burroughs	  calls	  them	  “addict	  agents”),	  completing	  the	  hermeneutic	  circle	  of	  legitimate	  and	  junk	  economies	  (140).	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  junk	  (heroin)	  economy	  a	  junk	  economy—a	  parodic	  
and	  real	  illegal	  economy	  that	  reveals	  the	  junk	  (bad)	  nature	  of	  legitimate	  capitalism—but	  so	  is	  the	  publishing	  industry,	  which	  mobilizes	  the	  repressive	  hypothesis,	  purporting	  to	  condemn	  the	  use	  of	  junk,	  while	  offering	  it	  up	  for	  consumption.	  Queer,	  by	  contrast,	  produces	  queer	  content	  and	  a	  queer	  aesthetic	  irreducible	  to	  binaristic	  “homosexuality”	  that	  might	  be	  set	  against	  normative	  “heterosexuality”	  in	  a	  similar	  kind	  of	  reinscription	  process.23	  Moreover,	  its	  generic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  In	  fact,	  despite	  his	  longstanding	  notoriety	  as	  an	  openly	  queer	  member	  of	  the	  counter-­‐culture	  movement,	  Burroughs	  has	  proven	  exceptionally	  difficult	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movements	  to	  utilize.	  Always	  preferring	  the	  term	  “queer”	  to	  “gay,”	  and	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unrecognizability—its	  formal	  queerness—made	  it	  virtually	  unmarketable.	  Even	  with	  its	  publication	  in	  1985,	  it	  remained	  queer	  in	  ways	  that	  prevented	  even	  queer	  theory	  from	  bringing	  it	  under	  its	  investigative	  auspices.24	  Junky	  was	  simply	  more	  readily	  available	  for	  capture	  by	  multiple	  markets	  than	  was	  Queer.	  	   Junky,	  however,	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  one	  half	  of	  the	  dialectics	  of	  legality,	  nor	  is	  it	  merely	  a	  cog	  in	  the	  addiction	  fact-­‐producing	  machine.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  economic	  conditions	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  that	  when,	  in	  Junky,	  William	  Lee	  isolates	  the	  system	  of	  junk	  as	  his	  experimental	  system,	  it	  is	  a	  bracketed,	  extra-­‐legal	  portion	  of	  the	  larger	  capitalist	  economy	  at	  work	  in	  the	  US	  and	  trans-­‐nationally.	  The	  junk	  system	  is	  full	  of	  epistemic	  objects,	  including	  junk	  itself,	  junkies,	  pushers,	  the	  in-­‐between	  spaces	  of	  the	  junk	  trade,	  and	  the	  processes	  of	  circulation	  of	  junk	  both	  financially	  and	  biologically.	  However,	  Lee	  is	  not	  the	  first	  junky,	  and	  other	  junkies	  have	  experimented	  and	  produced	  technical	  objects—tools—he	  can	  use.	  Among	  them,	  of	  course,	  are	  the	  repurposed,	  newly	  revisioned	  medical	  and	  household	  objects	  that	  Lee	  lists	  in	  the	  passage	  that	  opened	  this	  chapter:	  bottles,	  tubes,	  droppers,	  even	  oranges.	  But	  more	  importantly,	  the	  junky	  epistemology	  has	  developed	  conceptual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  highly	  resistant	  to	  collective	  ideologies	  and	  identity	  politics,	  he	  has	  been	  quoted	  as	  saying,	  “I’m	  not	  gay,	  and	  I’m	  sure	  as	  hell	  not	  part	  of	  any	  movement.”	  See:	  William	  S.	  
Burroughs:	  A	  Man	  Within,	  dir.	  Yony	  Leyser	  (BulletProof	  Film,	  2010):	  DVD.	  24	  Timothy	  Murphy	  comments	  that	  one	  reason	  for	  the	  absence	  of	  Queer	  from	  queer	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  is	  in	  fact,	  not	  the	  closeted	  narrative	  (that	  then	  “comes	  out”	  with	  its	  publication	  in	  the	  80s)	  that	  Harris	  describes	  it	  to	  be.	  Murphy	  notes,	  “In	  his	  writing,	  at	  least,	  Burroughs	  has	  always	  already	  been	  ‘out’	  and	  spends	  little	  time	  narrating	  how	  he	  got	  there.	  […]	  The	  dialectic	  of	  ‘in’	  and	  ‘out’	  is	  of	  little	  use	  to	  Burroughs	  the	  novelist,	  as	  is	  the	  narrative	  norm	  based	  on	  it.”	  Timothy	  Murphy,	  Wising	  Up	  the	  
Marks:	  The	  Amodern	  William	  Burroughs	  (Berkely:	  Univ.	  of	  California	  Press,	  1997):	  60.	  Burroughs’s	  queer	  epistemology	  is	  not	  the	  epistemology	  of	  the	  closet	  that	  informed	  much	  early	  queer	  theory.	  See	  also:	  Eve	  Kosofsky	  Sedgwick,	  Epistemology	  
of	  the	  Closet	  (Berkeley:	  Univ.	  of	  California	  Press,	  1990).	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tools—technical	  objects—that	  help	  him	  map	  and	  negotiate	  the	  junk	  world,	  and	  eventually	  allow	  him	  to	  begin	  to	  catalogue	  and	  repeat	  the	  constitutive	  features	  of	  what	  will	  become	  for	  these	  novels	  his	  most	  important	  epistemic-­‐cum-­‐technical	  object:	  The	  Routine.	  	   Most	  critics	  suggest	  that	  the	  form	  of	  The	  Routine	  begins	  in	  Queer	  but	  finds	  its	  fullest	  expression	  in	  Naked	  Lunch.25	  But	  in	  fact,	  The	  Routine	  emerges	  as	  a	  vague	  object	  in	  Junky:	  Lee	  the	  junky	  sociologist	  of	  junk	  repeatedly	  describes	  routines	  as	  they	  occur.	  The	  people	  who	  populate	  Junky	  are	  presented	  as	  “characters”	  or	  “personalities”—descriptions	  that	  suggest	  the	  constituted	  nature	  of	  their	  identities,	  linking	  them	  to	  the	  act	  of	  “being	  written”	  by	  Burroughs	  the	  author	  (43,	  55,	  63,	  etc.).	  But	  this	  is	  no	  Nabokovian	  internalization	  and	  self-­‐reflexivity	  of	  the	  narrative.	  Instead,	  it	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  externalization	  of	  literary	  practice	  to	  actual	  lives.	  Junky	  does	  not	  merely	  document	  or	  represent	  lives;	  it	  repeats	  them	  in	  invented	  characters	  who	  operate	  as	  a	  repetition	  of	  real-­‐world	  junk	  practices—it	  externalizes	  junk	  experience.	  (Though,	  writing	  in	  the	  first-­‐person,	  Burroughs	  is	  not	  quite	  yet	  able	  to	  externalize	  and	  depersonalize	  his	  own	  experience.)	  The	  junk	  experience	  is	  of,	  as	  we	  will	  come	  to	  see,	  an	  unstable	  and	  shifting	  world,	  where	  identity,	  too,	  is	  unstable.	  Routines—repetitions	  of	  one’s	  story—help	  produce	  junkies	  as	  apparently	  stable,	  as	  somewhat	  coherent	  “personalities”	  or	  “characters.”	  This	  instability	  of	  identity	  is	  not	  particular	  to	  the	  junk	  world—Judith	  Butler	  later	  theorize	  identity	  as	  performative	  and	  iterative	  with	  regards	  to	  both	  the	  self	  and	  the	  state,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Among	  them,	  Timothy	  Murphy	  and	  Oliver	  Harris.	  See	  both,	  “No	  Final	  Glossary:	  Fugitive	  Words	  in	  Junky	  and	  Queer,”	  in	  Wising	  Up	  the	  Marks	  and	  the	  introduction	  to	  
Queer.	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others	  have	  theorized	  the	  stabilization	  of	  the	  unstable	  subject	  via	  identity	  as	  a	  necessary	  strategy	  of	  capitalism	  more	  generally26—but	  the	  particular	  value	  of	  this	  instability	  in	  the	  junk	  economy	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  qualitatively	  different	  and	  differently	  useful.	  	  	   This	  difference	  in	  value	  is	  because	  the	  junk	  world	  is	  qualitatively	  different,	  palpably	  different:	  an	  alternative	  world	  differently	  inhabiting	  the	  space	  and	  time	  of	  the	  otherwise-­‐same	  city.	  Certainly	  one	  can	  register	  this	  difference	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  visual.	  Junk	  has	  visible	  effects:	  Burroughs	  says	  users	  look	  like	  junk.	  But	  that	  is	  not	  merely	  because	  it	  causes	  a	  weathered	  or	  haggard	  appearance,	  but	  because	  junk	  
embodies	  them.	  It	  produces	  a	  way	  of	  moving	  in	  the	  world	  and	  a	  series	  of	  stylized	  gestures	  that	  link	  even	  unlike	  “physical	  types”	  (25).	  So	  the	  visible	  cues	  are	  secondary	  to	  a	  sensorial	  embodiment	  that	  marks	  the	  junk	  world.	  The	  experience	  of	  junk	  is	  less	  an	  experience	  of	  seeing	  differently	  than	  an	  experience	  of	  feeling	  differently.27	  Burroughs	  describes	  a	  good	  shot	  of	  heroin	  as	  first	  felt:	  it	  prickles	  (21).	  But	  one’s	  bodily	  awareness	  is	  heightened	  when	  on	  junk:	  a	  bad	  shot	  is	  first	  known	  because	  it	  feels	  different.	  But	  more	  than	  that,	  junk	  changes	  the	  feel	  of	  its	  locales	  within	  the	  city.	  Even	  when	  “the	  connection	  has	  gone	  somewhere	  else	  […]	  the	  feel	  of	  junk	  is	  still	  there.	  It	  hits	  you	  at	  the	  corner,	  follows	  you	  along	  the	  block,	  then	  falls	  away	  like	  a	  discouraged	  panhandler”	  (25).	  Junk	  confronts	  you,	  stands	  in	  your	  way,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  See:	  Judith	  Butler,	  The	  Psychic	  Life	  of	  Power:	  Theories	  in	  Subjection	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  Univ.	  Press,	  1997),	  and	  J.	  K.	  Gibson-­‐Graham,	  The	  End	  of	  Capitalism	  (As	  We	  
Knew	  It):	  A	  Feminist	  Critique	  of	  Political	  Economy	  (Minneapolis:	  Univ.	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2006).	  27	  This	  concept	  of	  “feeling,”	  for	  Burroughs,	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  related	  to	  the	  “mood”	  of	  the	  researchers	  in	  Fleck’s	  description.	  For	  both,	  the	  “feeling”	  or	  “mood”	  produces	  the	  possibility	  of	  attunement	  to	  new	  perceptions.	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alters	  your	  movements,	  your	  way	  of	  experiencing	  and	  being	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  destabilizes	  and	  alters	  space,	  time,	  and	  language	  in	  unpredictable	  ways.	  	   In	  Wising	  Up	  the	  Marks:	  The	  Amodern	  William	  Burroughs,	  Timothy	  Murphy	  details	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  liminality	  and	  instability	  of	  institutionalized	  spaces	  allows	  them	  to	  be	  remapped	  and	  repurposed	  by	  the	  junky.	  He	  describes	  this	  remapping	  of	  the	  city	  as	  a	  “fugitive	  cartography”	  that:	  subsists	  less	  in	  the	  separate	  destinations	  than	  in	  the	  open	  spaces	  
between,	  the	  adjacent	  or	  transitional	  spaces:	  street	  corners,	  subway	  stations,	  doctors’	  waiting	  rooms,	  Skid	  Row	  bars,	  and	  short-­‐term	  slum	  apartments—the	  whole	  itinerary	  of	  the	  addict.	  (48)	  	  Murphy	  describes	  these	  spaces	  as	  the	  unanticipated	  effect	  of	  “economic	  modernization—the	  methodical	  effort	  to	  produce	  manageable	  urban	  space.”	  As	  functional	  spaces	  were	  created	  (houses,	  offices,	  mass	  transportation	  vehicles),	  so	  too	  were	  these	  liminal	  spaces:	  spaces	  for	  waiting	  or	  moving	  between.	  These	  liminal	  spaces	  become	  the	  space	  of	  the	  junky.	  Murphy	  further	  explains	  how	  this	  spatial	  instability	  is	  mirrored	  in	  the	  temporal	  instability	  of	  junk-­‐time:	  The	  control,	  or	  discipline,	  imposed	  by	  the	  police	  in	  order	  to	  stabilize	  the	  liminal	  spaces	  is	  fundamentally	  temporal	  control.	  .	  .	  The	  police	  move	  through	  liminal	  spaces—especially	  the	  streets,	  bars,	  and	  subway	  tunnels—according	  to	  a	  relatively	  regular	  rhythm,	  a	  pulse	  or	  ‘beat’	  that	  the	  junky	  must	  anticipate	  and	  complement;	  the	  junky	  plays	  a	  syncopated	  rhythm,	  as	  in	  ragtime	  or	  jazz,	  against	  the	  regular	  beat	  of	  the	  police.	  Thus,	  junky	  social	  organization	  is	  necessarily	  discontinuous,	  improvisatory,	  and	  not	  rigidly	  structured	  or	  centered.	  (50-­‐51)	  	  The	  junky	  lives	  in	  the	  in-­‐between	  time,	  just	  as	  he	  does	  the	  in-­‐between	  spaces.	  And	  just	  as	  the	  junky	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  unexpected	  architectural	  excesses	  and	  temporal	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gaps	  of	  control	  systems,	  he	  also	  makes	  use	  of	  semantic	  instability	  and	  excesses,	  a	  fact	  attested	  to	  by	  the	  “glossary”	  of	  junk	  terms	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  novel.	  Burroughs-­‐Lee	  writes:	   It	  should	  be	  understood	  that	  these	  words	  are	  subject	  to	  rapid	  changes,	  and	  that	  a	  word	  that	  has	  one	  hip	  meaning	  one	  year	  may	  have	  another	  the	  next.	  […]	  Not	  only	  do	  the	  words	  change	  meanings,	  but	  meanings	  vary	  locally	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  A	  final	  glossary,	  therefore,	  cannot	  be	  made	  of	  words	  whose	  intentions	  are	  fugitive.	  (Junky	  133)	  	  The	  junky	  uses	  the	  instability	  of	  language	  to	  keep	  both	  himself	  and	  his	  language	  fugitive	  from	  the	  law:	  Henry,	  Charly,	  and	  Benny	  protect	  the	  user	  from	  being	  caught	  conversing	  about	  heroin,	  cocaine,	  or	  benzedrine.	  The	  right	  words	  at	  the	  right	  time	  can	  make	  all	  the	  difference	  between	  getting	  an	  easy	  score	  and	  getting	  beat;	  knowing	  the	  code	  allows	  you	  to	  differentiate	  a	  mark	  from	  a	  pigeon	  from	  the	  man	  (129-­‐133).	  Constant	  shifts	  keep	  the	  junky	  on	  his	  toes,	  but	  they	  help	  to	  keep	  him	  safe,	  too.	  They	  are	  part	  of	  the	  world	  he	  inhabits.	  It	  is	  not	  merely	  that	  space,	  time,	  and	  language	  are	  unstable	  in	  the	  junk	  world,	  but	  that	  instability	  is	  valued	  as	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  
possibility	  of	  the	  junky	  and	  junk	  sociality.28	  	   But	  as	  Murphy	  has	  already	  noted,	  the	  junky	  doesn’t	  live	  in	  the	  junk	  world	  alone.	  He	  limns	  and	  negotiates	  dominant	  society	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Routines	  begins	  to	  emerge	  for	  Burroughs	  as	  one	  way	  in	  which	  the	  junky	  produces	  himself	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	  illegal	  capitalist	  economy	  of	  the	  heroin	  trade	  can	  value	  instability	  because	  it	  is	  not	  an	  economy	  dependent	  on	  property	  relations	  and	  property	  ownership.	  In	  a	  trade	  in	  which	  money	  is	  simply	  used	  to	  buy	  more	  using	  (a	  shot	  of	  heroin),	  one	  doesn’t	  need	  or	  want	  to	  enter	  into	  property	  contracts—one	  wants	  to	  avoid	  the	  accountability	  that	  comes	  with	  ownership.	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  source	  of	  great	  difficulty	  for	  the	  addict	  when	  he	  encounters	  the	  “legitimate”	  capitalism	  of	  medical	  pharmacology.	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apparently	  stable	  for	  social	  interactions	  that	  cross	  those	  borders.	  Something	  that	  hints	  at	  what	  the	  routine	  will	  become	  first	  emerges	  as	  Lee	  and	  fellow	  addict	  Roy	  attempt	  to	  get	  a	  doctor	  to	  write	  them	  a	  prescription	  for	  dope.	  “There	  are	  several	  varieties	  of	  writing	  croaker,”	  Lee	  says;	  “Some	  will	  write	  only	  if	  they	  are	  convinced	  you	  are	  an	  addict,	  others	  only	  if	  they	  are	  convinced	  you’re	  not.”	  In	  order	  to	  convince	  doctors	  in	  whichever	  direction	  is	  necessary—a	  lie	  (such	  as	  a	  physical	  ailment)	  or	  the	  truth	  (“I	  need	  it”),	  it	  matters	  not—“most	  addicts	  put	  down	  a	  story	  worn	  smooth	  by	  years	  of	  use.	  […]	  Roy	  had	  an	  operation	  scar	  on	  his	  stomach	  that	  he	  used	  to	  support	  his	  gallstone	  routine”	  (Burroughs,	  Junky	  17).	  Calling	  it	  a	  “routine”	  makes	  it	  easy	  to	  assume	  that	  Roy	  has	  not	  really	  had	  a	  gallstone	  operation.	  .	  .	  but	  we	  actually	  don’t	  know.	  More	  importantly:	  it	  makes	  no	  difference.	  A	  routine	  is	  not	  a	  routine	  because	  it	  is	  a	  fabulation,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  repeated	  for	  use	  in	  a	  given	  situation,	  regardless	  of	  its	  truth-­‐value.	  	  
	  
The	  Routine:	  Form	  and	  the	  Anti-­‐Subject	  Self	  
	  	   Burroughs	  does	  not	  define	  a	  routine,	  though	  he	  uses	  the	  word	  repeatedly	  when	  he	  gives	  descriptive,	  empirical	  accounts	  of	  various	  encounters	  between	  “characters.”	  	  Most	  routines	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  cons	  for	  extracting	  money	  or	  drugs,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  “cons”	  because	  the	  content	  of	  the	  routine	  is	  untrue	  so	  much	  as	  because	  their	  purposes	  are	  deceptive.	  The	  meaning	  or	  purpose	  that	  a	  routine	  offers	  to	  the	  receiver	  has	  no	  ties	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  material	  fact	  or	  coherent	  interior	  identity;	  it	  is	  itself	  a	  production.	  And	  routines	  are	  not	  the	  province	  solely	  of	  the	  addict,	  or	  even	  of	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people.	  The	  state,	  it	  turns	  out,	  can	  throw	  down	  a	  routine	  as	  readily	  as	  a	  junky,	  such	  as	  when	  it	  uses	  the	  myth	  of	  junkies	  trying	  to	  produce	  child-­‐addicts	  as	  “a	  propaganda	  routine	  to	  stir	  up	  anti-­‐junk	  sentiment	  and	  pass	  some	  new	  laws”	  (Burroughs,	  Junky	  120).	  Routines	  are	  a	  method	  of	  meaning	  and	  identity	  production	  aimed	  at	  extracting	  
value	  from	  someone	  else	  or	  disciplining	  him;	  a	  routine	  as	  the	  method	  by	  which	  the	  junky	  or	  the	  state	  produces	  his/its	  identity	  reveals	  that	  identity	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  quality	  of	  individuals	  or	  a	  social	  fact	  so	  much	  as	  an	  effect	  and	  a	  tool.	  	   As	  a	  tool	  for	  producing	  meaning	  and	  stability	  in	  a	  shifting	  world,	  routines	  are	  actually	  primarily	  wielded	  against	  the	  junky.	  While	  the	  junky	  sometimes	  turns	  them	  against	  the	  state,	  his	  desires	  for	  something	  from	  the	  state—access	  to	  junk—makes	  his	  routine	  of	  subject-­‐production	  into	  a	  constant	  desire	  for	  an	  “I”	  the	  state	  can	  recognize.	  The	  “I”	  becomes	  an	  addictive	  substance	  that	  the	  state	  can	  dole	  out	  to	  the	  junky	  (when	  it	  affirms	  his	  routine	  as	  worthy	  of	  junk)	  or	  deny;	  the	  “I”	  as	  a	  method	  for	  fulfilling	  needs	  becomes	  itself	  a	  need.	  So	  as	  it	  turns	  out,	  then,	  junk	  is	  not	  the	  only	  substance	  to	  which	  one	  can	  be	  addicted,	  nor	  are	  substances	  themselves	  inherently	  addictive.	  Situations	  produce	  addictions—addictions	  are	  methods	  of	  control	  that	  operate	  by	  producing	  excess	  need.	  And	  addictions	  to	  junk	  and	  the	  subject	  (“I”)	  in	  
Junky	  are	  coupled	  with	  an	  addiction	  to	  money.29	  The	  junky	  is	  always	  selling	  to	  buy,	  cycling	  through	  money	  as	  through	  junk.	  Their	  circulation	  is	  both	  interactive	  (money	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  idea	  of	  addictive	  situations,	  rather	  than	  addictive	  substances,	  goes	  against	  much	  anti-­‐drug	  rhetoric	  (especially	  that	  of	  “gateway	  drugs’).	  Yet	  several	  of	  the	  most	  interesting,	  compassionate,	  and	  experimental	  treatment	  and	  management	  facilities	  for	  drug	  addiction	  are	  built	  precisely	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  anything	  can	  be	  addictive	  in	  the	  right	  circumstances.	  One	  such	  example	  is	  the	  Portland	  Hotel	  and	  safe	  injection	  site	  in	  Vancouver,	  BC.	  See:	  Gabor	  Mate,	  In	  the	  Realm	  of	  Hungry	  Ghosts:	  Close	  
Encounters	  with	  Addiction	  (Berkeley,	  CA:	  North	  Atlantic	  Books,	  2010).	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buys	  junk),	  and	  also	  parallel	  (junk	  buys	  money).	  In	  a	  later	  interview	  with	  Daniel	  Odier,	  Burroughs	  clarifies	  the	  addictive	  nature	  of	  money	  that	  first	  appears	  in	  Junky,	  saying:	  	   	   You	  see	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  with	  the	  whole	  concept	  of	  money.	  It	  	   	   takes	  always	  more	  and	  more	  to	  buy	  less	  and	  less.	  Money	  is	  like	  junk.	  A	  	   	   dose	  that	  fixes	  you	  on	  Monday	  won’t	  fix	  you	  on	  Friday.	  […]	  It	  eats	  	  	   	   quality	  and	  shits	  out	  quantity.	  […]	  That	  is	  why	  by	  its	  nature	  money	  is	  	  	   	   worth	  always	  less	  and	  less.	  (Odier	  74)	  	  Capitalism	  is	  a	  junk	  economy	  because	  it	  is	  also	  a	  con,	  a	  junk	  deception.	  It	  appears	  stable—a	  dollar	  equals	  four	  quarters	  equals	  a	  dollar—but	  money	  itself	  is	  worth	  less	  and	  less,	  and,	  in	  many	  ways	  (especially	  following	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement)	  quite	  literally	  worthless.30	  	   Given	  these	  conditions,	  the	  junky	  in	  particular	  needs	  a	  routine	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  negotiating	  the	  non-­‐junk	  world	  because	  when	  he	  appears	  as	  a	  junky	  there,	  he	  appears	  as	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  state	  and	  for	  capital.	  While	  the	  junk	  economy	  links	  up	  to	  dominant	  sites	  of	  legal	  capitalist	  exchange	  and	  helps	  continue	  the	  flows	  of	  capital,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  regulated	  in	  ways	  that	  legal	  capitalism	  does	  not.	  This	  is	  because	  there	  are	  nodes	  within	  the	  junk	  economy	  through	  which	  capital	  will	  not	  flow:	  junkies.	  The	  difficulty	  of	  the	  junky	  for	  capitalism—the	  reason	  addiction	  itself	  becomes	  disciplined	  as	  morally	  reprehensible	  and	  ultimately	  criminalized,	  in	  need	  of	  treatment	  or	  reform—is	  that	  the	  junky	  is	  the	  end	  of	  a	  flow	  of	  capital.	  As	  Murphy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  In	  1971—the	  same	  year	  as	  Nixon’s	  official	  declaration	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Drugs—the	  United	  States	  abandoned	  the	  international	  Bretton	  Woods	  system,	  thus	  eliminating	  the	  gold	  standard	  for	  currency.	  Money,	  at	  that	  point,	  ceased	  to	  “represent”	  real	  gold	  (or	  be	  exchangeable	  for	  gold	  at	  any	  time),	  and	  instead	  was	  backed	  only	  by	  a	  government	  guarantee.	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notes,	  for	  Burroughs,	  when	  the	  junky	  turns	  the	  practices	  and	  tools	  of	  the	  dominant	  capitalist	  economy	  against	  itself,	  he	  does	  so	  not	  by	  being	  “a	  revolutionary”	  but	  “an	  anti-­‐productive	  agent”	  (55).	  His	  anti-­‐productivity	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  enabled	  by	  his	  need	  and	  willingness	  to	  fabulate	  identities	  with	  which	  he	  does	  not	  identify.	  	  The	  citizen	  of	  the	  state	  and	  good	  capitalist,	  even	  when	  she	  is	  aware	  of	  a	  certain	  element	  of	  performativity	  in	  her	  identity,	  makes	  real	  in	  her	  performance	  of	  that	  identity	  by	  a	  certain	  identification	  with	  it,	  a	  desire	  for	  it	  as	  a	  social	  position	  and	  political	  enabler.	  One	  of	  the	  control	  mechanisms	  of	  capital	  and	  the	  state	  is	  to	  channel	  the	  flows	  of	  
desire	  such	  that	  they	  cathect	  onto	  socially	  “useful”	  and	  appropriate	  identities	  needed	  to	  maintain	  property	  relations;	  this	  ensures	  that	  those	  inhabiting	  those	  identities	  maintain	  an	  appropriate	  distance	  from	  citizen-­‐subject	  norms.	  For	  Burroughs,	  however,	  this	  instability	  will	  lead	  to	  an	  escape	  from	  any	  sort	  of	  engagement	  with	  or	  desire	  for	  capital	  or	  the	  state—it	  will	  lead	  him	  to	  leave	  behind	  the	  subject	  all	  together.	  The	  very	  concept	  of	  subjectivity	  is	  itself	  a	  production	  that	  enables	  the	  capture	  of	  selves	  to	  control	  by	  making	  them	  cohesive	  and	  knowable;	  identity	  gives	  “meaningful”	  form	  to,	  but	  also	  imprisons,	  life.	  Burroughs’s	  observations	  about	  routines	  and	  their	  emergence	  as	  epistemic	  objects	  in	  Junky	  allows	  him	  to	  mobilize	  The	  Routine	  as	  a	  technical	  object	  in	  Queer.	  Off	  his	  addiction	  to	  junk,	  he	  will	  use	  The	  Routine	  a	  practice	  of	  radical	  destabilization	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  free	  up	  desire	  from	  the	  structures	  of	  control.	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Encountering	  the	  Intolerable:	  Escape	  	  	   The	  need	  to	  liberate	  himself	  from	  addiction	  emerged	  for	  Burroughs	  in	  his	  encounter	  with	  the	  intolerable.	  In	  Junky,	  Burroughs	  begins	  to	  experience	  the	  “intolerable”	  of	  junk:	  the	  junk	  economy,	  junk	  addiction,	  junk	  life.	  He	  describes	  the	  intolerable	  experience	  of	  addiction—the	  moment	  when	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  outside	  to	  the	  junk	  economy,	  whether	  he	  is	  on	  or	  off	  junk—when	  he	  is	  taken	  from	  a	  city	  jail	  to	  another	  hospital	  (not	  Narco),	  saying:	  From	  junk	  sickness	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  escape.	  Junk	  sickness	  is	  the	  	  	   reverse	  side	  of	  junk	  kick.	  The	  kick	  of	  junk	  is	  that	  you	  have	  to	  have	  it.	  	  	   Junkies	  run	  on	  junk	  time	  and	  junk	  metabolism.	  They	  are	  subject	  to	  	  junk	  climate.	  They	  are	  warmed	  and	  chilled	  by	  junk.	  The	  kick	  of	  junk	  is	  	  living	  under	  junk	  conditions.	  You	  cannot	  escape	  from	  junk	  sickness	  	  any	  more	  than	  you	  can	  escape	  from	  junk	  kick	  after	  a	  shot.	  	  	   	   I	  was	  too	  weak	  to	  get	  out	  of	  bed.	  I	  could	  not	  lie	  still.	  In	  junk	  sickness,	  	  any	  conceivable	  line	  of	  action	  or	  inaction	  seems	  intolerable.	  A	  man	  	  might	  die	  simply	  because	  he	  could	  not	  stand	  to	  stay	  in	  his	  body.	  (Junky	  81)	  	  For	  Burroughs,	  the	  intolerable	  is	  related	  not	  just	  to	  being	  on	  or	  off	  junk,	  but	  to	  the	  larger	  social	  situation	  revealed	  by	  junk	  –	  the	  whole	  system	  is	  junk.	  The	  intolerable	  is	  experienced	  as	  an	  overabundance	  of	  intensity,	  with	  no	  capacity	  to	  direct	  it.	  It	  appears	  as	  the	  futility	  of	  any	  conceivable	  line	  of	  action	  or	  inaction	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  escape	  one’s	  own	  body.	  When	  conditions	  become	  intolerable,	  when	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  suitable	  for	  aleatory	  life,	  the	  possibility	  emerges	  for	  one	  to	  “crack”	  reality	  (an	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action	  Deleuze	  will	  later	  attribute	  to	  Burroughs’s	  writing).31	  Joan’s	  death,	  which	  occurred	  between	  the	  writing	  of	  Queer	  and	  Junky	  was	  another	  encounter	  with	  the	  intolerable	  for	  Burroughs,	  producing	  a	  break	  in	  reality;	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  the	  mere	  critique	  or	  recognition	  of	  the	  deceptions	  of	  reality	  are	  no	  longer	  enough.	  Disorganized	  and	  broken	  reality	  must	  be	  reconstituted:	  a	  constitution	  that	  begins	  with	  the	  liberated	  self	  producing	  its	  own	  forms	  of	  organization.	  	   Burroughs	  begins	  Queer	  by	  liberating	  himself	  from	  addiction	  to	  the	  “I.”	  The	  novel	  continues	  with	  the	  same	  protagonist	  as	  Junky,	  but	  William	  Lee	  is	  now	  written	  in	  the	  third-­‐person.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Burroughs-­‐Lee	  also	  moves	  from	  sociological-­‐scientific	  observer	  to	  experimental	  assay,	  no	  longer	  writing	  but	  experiencing	  himself	  as	  being	  written	  and	  read.	  He	  “depersonalizes”	  himself	  in	  order	  to	  tap	  into	  the	  “power	  of	  an	  impersonal,”	  a	  power	  Deleuze	  suggests	  is	  the	  beginning	  of	  
literature:	  “It	  is	  not	  the	  first	  two	  persons	  that	  function	  as	  the	  condition	  for	  literary	  enunciation;	  literature	  begins	  only	  when	  a	  third	  person	  is	  born	  in	  us	  that	  strips	  us	  of	  the	  power	  to	  say	  ‘I’”	  (Deleuze,	  “Literature”	  3,	  emphasis	  mine).	  If	  Burroughs	  is,	  as	  he	  suggests,	  being	  written	  in	  Queer,	  it	  is	  another	  Burroughs	  unknown	  to	  himself	  in	  advance:	  another	  person	  born,	  a	  person	  not	  called	  “I.”	  In	  this	  move	  from	  the	  sociological	  to	  the	  literary,	  he	  enables	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  self-­‐experiment.	  He	  experiments	  with	  a	  self	  he	  does	  not	  (cannot)	  know;	  it	  is	  a	  self	  not	  based	  on	  models	  (citizen,	  subject)	  nor	  interested	  in	  unifying	  under	  an	  identity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31For	  Deleuze,	  the	  intolerable	  is	  a	  concept	  often	  linked	  to	  the	  instigation	  of	  action,	  and	  Deleuze	  frequently	  aligns	  it	  with	  Foucault’s	  experiments	  in	  thought.	  In	  “Control	  and	  Becoming,”	  however,	  he	  also	  links	  the	  intolerable	  to	  Burroughs.	  In	  The	  Logic	  of	  
Sense,	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  how	  Burroughs	  writing	  “cracks”	  reality.	  Deleuze,	  Logic,	  160-­‐1.	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   In	  the	  1985	  introduction	  for	  Queer,	  Burroughs	  explains	  that	  Joan’s	  death	  and	  his	  own	  culpability	  in	  it	  was	  an	  encounter	  that,	  for	  him,	  was	  the	  “first	  clear	  indication	  of	  something	  in	  my	  being	  that	  was	  not	  me,	  and	  not	  under	  my	  control”	  (Burroughs,	  Queer	  135).	  From	  then	  on,	  it	  was	  his	  life’s	  mission	  to	  “escape”	  from	  this	  “Ugly	  Spirit,”	  from	  “Control.”	  It	  is	  this	  realization	  that	  something	  else—language	  and	  social	  structures—have	  control	  over	  him	  that	  “maneuver[s	  him]	  into	  a	  lifelong	  struggle,	  in	  which	  [he]	  had	  no	  choice	  except	  to	  write	  [his]	  way	  out”	  (135).	  Importantly,	  however,	  Queer	  is	  less	  a	  diagnostic	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  control	  than	  a	  choice	  to	  write	  his	  way	  out,	  to	  produce	  an	  escape.	  And	  this	  escape	  is	  not	  a	  kind	  of	  dialectical	  counter-­‐control	  or	  self-­‐control	  (subject-­‐production).	  It	  is,	  rather,	  an	  escape	  from	  all	  forms	  of	  control,	  including	  that	  of	  the	  subject.	  In	  abandoning	  control,	  Burroughs	  produces	  not	  just	  a	  self,	  but	  selves.	  	  	   This	  self-­‐experiment,	  this	  production	  of	  selves,	  happens	  in	  the	  form	  of	  The	  Routine.	  As	  in	  Junky,	  Burroughs	  explicitly	  labels	  Lee’s	  performances	  in	  Queer	  “routines,”	  but	  in	  contrast	  to	  Junky,	  the	  routine	  no	  longer	  indicates	  a	  cumulative	  repetition	  that	  tends	  towards	  identity	  or	  stability.	  In	  Queer,	  Lee	  produces	  himself	  as	  a	  series	  of	  routines	  that	  are	  never	  repeated,	  and	  come	  to	  him	  externally,	  “like	  dictation.	  He	  did	  not	  know	  what	  he	  was	  going	  to	  say	  next	  […]”	  (57).	  He	  becomes	  an	  oilman,	  a	  drag	  queen,	  a	  slave	  trader,	  and	  a	  chess	  master	  in	  turn,	  blurting	  out	  uncontrolled	  and	  uncontrollable	  narratives	  that	  do	  not	  precede	  their	  being	  said	  nor	  extend	  beyond	  it.	  These	  routines	  are	  the	  production	  of	  the	  self	  as	  non-­‐cumulative	  and	  non-­‐interior:	  they	  constitute	  a	  pure	  exteriority	  of	  production,	  a	  production	  that	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is	  antagonist	  to	  the	  legal	  structures	  of	  state-­‐based	  capitalism	  precisely	  in	  its	  valuation	  of	  inconsistency	  and	  unknowability.	  	  	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Lee’s	  routines	  are	  often	  productions	  of	  despicable	  characters	  (the	  slave	  trader,	  the	  oil	  man):	  selves	  who,	  despite	  Burroughs	  professed	  hatred	  of	  control,	  are	  the	  epitome	  of	  excessive	  power	  and	  control.	  	  On	  the	  surface,	  these	  routines	  can	  be	  read	  as	  expressive	  of	  his	  desire	  to	  colonize	  or	  control	  others:	  a	  not	  unreasonable	  reading,	  given	  that	  he	  has	  “escaped”	  into	  Mexico,	  where	  his	  money	  gets	  him	  further.	  But	  for	  Burroughs,	  Mexico	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  place	  that	  he	  wants	  to	  colonize	  or	  control,	  as	  a	  place	  where	  he	  can	  escape	  control.	  What	  appeals	  to	  Burroughs	  about	  Mexico	  is	  not	  its	  material	  resources	  or	  people	  that	  he	  can	  take	  advantage	  of,	  but	  the	  poverty	  and	  dirt	  that,	  for	  him,	  enable	  a	  world	  of	  amoralism	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  anti-­‐moralizing).	  In	  Mexico,	  the	  cops	  don’t	  bother	  you,	  don’t	  keep	  a	  regular	  beat,	  and:	  	   	   Boys	  and	  young	  me	  walked	  down	  the	  street	  arm	  in	  arm	  and	  no	  one	  	  paid	  them	  any	  mind.	  It	  wasn’t	  that	  people	  didn’t	  care	  what	  others	  	  thought;	  it	  simply	  would	  not	  occur	  to	  a	  Mexican	  to	  expect	  criticism	  	  from	  a	  stranger,	  nor	  to	  criticize	  the	  behavior	  of	  others.	  (122)	  	  For	  Burroughs,	  moralism	  is	  just	  another	  strategy	  of	  discipline	  and	  control.	  (This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  Burroughs	  isn’t	  interested	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  ethics	  or	  ethical	  sociality	  –	  a	  point	  to	  which	  I	  will	  return.)	  Given	  this	  investment	  in	  anti-­‐moralism,	  and	  Burroughs’s	  frequently	  unexpected	  value	  system,	  his	  racist,	  sexist,	  and	  controlling	  Routine	  fantasies	  might	  not	  be	  straightforward	  expressions	  of	  expected	  white	  male	  desires	  or	  appropriation	  of	  others.	  Instead,	  they	  might	  better	  be	  understood	  as	  explosive	  and	  parodic	  responses	  to	  the	  futility	  of	  the	  models	  of	  desire	  and	  power	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that	  have	  been	  put	  on	  offer	  for	  him:	  these	  are	  the	  men	  he	  is	  encouraged	  to	  produce	  himself	  as;	  they	  are	  also	  undesirable	  and	  ridiculous,	  already	  parodies	  of	  themselves.	  For	  Burroughs,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as,	  for	  example,	  a	  binding	  contract	  between	  equals	  (all	  contracts	  are	  between	  slaves	  and	  masters,	  enforced	  by	  violence	  –	  or	  they	  are,	  like	  the	  junk	  economics	  of	  capitalism,	  merely	  junk	  bonds).	  And	  there	  are	  no	  useable	  models	  for	  openly	  homosexual-­‐social	  relations	  between	  men	  that	  limn	  the	  boundaries	  between	  friend	  and	  lover.32	  	  	   Additionally,	  these	  routines	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  possible	  selves	  that	  expose	  the	  ironic	  and	  parodic	  dialectic	  between	  stereotype	  and	  identity.	  Rather	  than	  moving	  away	  from	  derisive	  and	  politically	  incorrect	  stereotypes,	  Lee	  moves	  into	  them.33	  What	  he	  mocks,	  however,	  seems	  to	  be	  not	  so	  much	  the	  production	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  The	  attempt	  to	  embody	  homosocial-­‐sexual	  relationships	  that	  move	  between	  intensities	  of	  friends	  and	  lovers,	  without	  falling	  into	  completely	  uncommitted	  notions	  of	  free-­‐love	  or	  overly	  committed	  and	  binding	  contracts	  of	  coupledom,	  is	  a	  struggle	  that	  Burroughs	  will	  continue	  throughout	  his	  life.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  struggle	  that	  Michel	  Foucault	  will	  later	  articulate	  explicitly	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  quite	  similar	  to	  Burroughs’s	  experience.	  See	  Michel	  Foucault,	  “Friendship	  as	  a	  Way	  of	  Life,”	  The	  
Essential	  Works	  of	  Foucault	  1954-­‐1984,	  Volume	  One:	  Ethics,	  Subjectivity,	  Truth.	  Ed.	  Paul	  Rabinow.	  Trans.	  Robert	  Hurley.	  (New	  York:	  The	  New	  Press,	  1997):	  135-­‐140.	  33	  For	  this	  reason,	  among	  others,	  Burroughs’s	  work	  is	  often	  considered	  anathema	  to	  many	  feminists	  who	  cite	  his	  misogyny	  as	  a	  major	  flaw	  in	  his	  work.	  But	  his	  abandonment	  of	  meaning-­‐making	  procedures	  and	  embodiment	  of	  writing	  as	  a	  production	  of	  selves	  brings	  his	  writing	  very	  much	  in-­‐line	  with	  Cixous’s	  concept	  of	  
écriture	  féminine.	  Burroughs’s	  relationship	  to	  and	  opinions	  about	  women	  vacillated	  throughout	  his	  lifetime,	  but	  what	  is	  most	  clear	  is	  that	  when	  he	  rejected	  the	  value	  of	  women,	  it	  was	  not	  so	  much	  women	  per	  se	  as	  male-­‐female	  binarism	  that	  he	  took	  as	  an	  enemy.	  Like	  sexual	  difference	  feminists	  Cixous	  and	  Luce	  Irigaray,	  Burroughs	  attempts	  to	  abandon	  binaries	  for	  difference.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  binaries	  might	  be	  biological	  (and	  therefore	  inescapable),	  Burroughs’s	  solution	  was	  most	  in-­‐line	  with	  a	  feminist	  such	  as	  Monique	  Wittig,	  who	  called	  for	  separately	  sexed	  societies.	  Understood	  in	  this	  way,	  Burroughs	  is	  shockingly—if	  invertedly—in	  close	  conversation	  with	  sexual	  difference	  feminists.	  See	  the	  introduction	  to	  Wising	  Up	  the	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stereotypes	  based	  on	  existing	  identities	  as	  the	  inverse:	  the	  production	  of	  the	  self	  as	  a	  coherent	  interiority	  in	  line	  with	  a	  prescribed	  identity,	  a	  stereotype.	  These	  selves	  he	  produces	  are	  also	  absurd	  and	  humorous—identity	  is	  disjunctive	  rather	  than	  producing	  solidarity—which	  breaks	  even	  further	  with	  the	  conditions	  of	  identity	  politics.	  That,	  along	  with	  his	  ambiguous	  relationship	  to	  existing	  models	  for	  solidarity	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  identity—despite	  sharing	  similar	  concerns	  about	  oppression	  and	  control	  as	  with	  many	  identity	  groups—might	  contribute	  to	  his	  general	  inaccessibility	  to	  Queer	  Studies.	  More	  importantly,	  his	  antagonism	  to	  interiority	  makes	  his	  work	  difficult	  to	  submit	  to	  a	  psychoanalytic	  reading;	  psychoanalysis	  remains	  a	  major	  facet	  of	  Queer	  Studies.	  Yet,	  despite	  these	  difficulties,	  he	  shares	  many	  ethical	  concerns	  that	  have	  emerged	  under	  the	  provenance	  of	  Queer	  Studies:	  most	  obviously,	  an	  interest	  in	  non-­‐heteronormative	  social	  arrangements,	  which	  he	  produces	  by	  multiplying	  the	  self.	  	   This	  break	  with	  a	  cohesive	  self	  and	  self-­‐control	  extends	  to	  a	  break	  with	  the	  generic	  conventions	  of	  either	  the	  novel	  or	  autobiography.	  Queer	  has	  only	  the	  most	  minimal	  of	  narrative	  structure.	  As	  Timothy	  Murphy	  points	  out:	  	  	   	   The	  routine	  is	  a	  form	  of	  micronarrative	  that	  operates	  by	  	  multiplication	  and	  juxtaposition,	  but	  no	  set	  of	  these	  proliferating	  routines	  can	  be	  combined	  to	  form	  a	  unified	  macronarrative	  similar	  to	  the	  traditional	  short	  story	  or	  novel.	  In	  Queer,	  these	  routines	  are	  held	  together	  by	  the	  force	  of	  the	  autobiographical	  frame	  which	  only	  “unifies”	  them	  negatively	  by	  grounding	  them	  in	  Lee,	  whom	  they	  traverse	  and	  exceed	  in	  all	  directions.	  (Murphy	  61)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Marks	  for	  a	  more	  thorough	  explication	  of	  Burroughs’s	  conflicted	  life-­‐long	  relationship	  to	  women.	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The	  novel	  ends	  abruptly,	  truncatedly	  (you	  would	  never	  know	  it	  was	  the	  “end”	  if	  it	  weren’t	  for	  turning	  the	  page	  to	  find	  a	  blank	  one,	  and	  then	  an	  epilogue).	  And	  even	  the	  epilogue	  reinforces	  the	  lack	  of	  accumulation	  of	  meaning	  in	  the	  text.	  The	  epilogue	  is	  disjunctive	  from	  the	  novel	  that	  precedes	  it	  by	  suddenly	  switching	  to	  a	  first-­‐person	  narrator.	  It	  ends	  with	  the	  telling	  of	  a	  dream	  in	  which	  Lee	  or	  Burroughs	  produces	  Lee	  again	  as	  a	  new	  Routine,	  one	  that	  exacerbates	  the	  non-­‐cumulative	  sense	  of	  his	  narrative:	  this	  time,	  he	  is	  “the	  skip	  tracer,”	  the	  tracker	  of	  missing	  persons.	  	  	   If	  Burroughs’s	  text	  can	  be	  said	  to	  resemble	  an	  existing	  genre,	  it	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  the	  largely	  abandoned	  picaresque,	  but	  the	  narrative	  disunity	  makes	  it	  even	  more	  radically	  destabilized	  than	  most	  books	  that	  could	  fall	  under	  that	  generic	  heading,	  and	  even	  less	  accessible	  to	  meaning-­‐making.	  This	  inability	  to	  accumulate	  or	  resolve	  makes	  the	  novel	  not	  only	  difficult	  to	  “read”	  in	  any	  conventional	  or	  critical	  sense,	  but	  moreover	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  publish.	  Its	  form,	  rather	  than	  its	  content	  (as	  the	  book	  is,	  in	  reality,	  no	  more	  sexually	  or	  violently	  graphic	  than	  Junky)	  is	  what	  makes	  it	  largely,	  and	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  unavailable	  to	  the	  literary	  market.	  But	  Queer’s	  ambiguous	  relationship	  to	  capital	  extends	  beyond	  generic	  difficulties.	  While	  Junky	  was	  written	  with	  money	  in	  mind,	  Burroughs	  decides	  after	  initial	  rejections	  that	  he	  actually	  doesn’t	  want	  Queer	  published.	  When	  he	  later	  re-­‐reads	  it	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  writing	  the	  1985	  introduction,	  it	  is	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  trepidation.	  He	  says	  he	  doesn’t	  recognize	  the	  self	  he	  sees	  therein.	  If	  Junky	  ‘conned’	  the	  market—not	  so	  much	  diagnosing	  junkies	  as	  expected,	  but	  instead	  diagnosing	  the	  society	  that	  produced	  them—Queer	  does	  something	  entirely	  different.	  Not	  only	  is	  it	  not	  conning	  the	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publishing	  industry	  or	  dominant	  society	  more	  generally,	  it	  has	  abandoned	  any	  interaction	  with	  or	  desire	  for	  them	  at	  all.	  	   All	  these	  indicate,	  then,	  that	  Queer	  was,	  at	  least	  for	  a	  time,	  best	  understood	  as	  part	  of	  another	  economy,	  as	  producing	  another	  economy.	  If	  the	  capitalism	  of	  Junky	  is	  a	  junk	  economy,	  then	  the	  economy	  of	  Queer	  might	  best	  be	  described	  as	  a	  queer	  economy:	  an	  emergent,	  experimental	  economy	  not	  based	  on	  existing	  forms	  or	  models.	  It	  is	  an	  economy	  that	  is	  non-­‐normative	  not	  because	  it	  is	  not	  the	  norm,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  without	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  norm	  at	  all.	  It	  is	  an	  economy	  in	  which,	  at	  least	  temporarily,	  the	  values	  of	  abstract	  equivalence,	  reification,	  and	  exchange—as	  well	  as	  disciplinary	  technologies	  of	  statistics	  and	  norms—give	  way	  to	  embodied,	  erotic,	  biological	  processes	  and	  shared	  (communal)	  experiences.	  Here,	  rather	  than	  mapping	  counter-­‐cartographies	  onto	  capitalist	  spaces	  of	  management	  and	  control	  as	  he	  had	  in	  Junky,	  Lee	  produces	  a	  way	  out,	  a	  line	  into	  unknown	  and	  invented	  lands.	  He	  is	  no	  longer	  mapping	  (which	  even	  in	  producing	  counter-­‐cartographies	  is	  still	  invested	  in	  “knowing”	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  “conquering”	  the	  lands	  it	  maps,	  as	  a	  colonial	  mapping	  project	  might),	  but	  instead	  burrowing	  into	  space,	  extending	  it.	  Similarly,	  here,	  Lee	  produces	  a	  new	  relationship	  to	  time.	  If	  in	  Junky,	  Lee	  moved	  to	  a	  rhythm,	  a	  beat	  syncopated	  to	  the	  downbeat	  of	  the	  police,	  in	  Queer,	  he	  has	  no	  beat	  to	  respond	  to.	  He	  is	  searching	  for	  a	  rhythm—or	  rather,	  he	  is	  seeking	  to	  make	  a	  new	  rhythm:	  an	  arrhythmic	  rhythm.	  His	  timing	  is	  always	  off.	  But	  it	  is	  in	  this	  just-­‐off	  timing	  that	  we	  can	  see	  and	  affirm	  the	  struggle	  of	  the	  experiment:	  what	  a	  struggle	  it	  is	  to	  invent	  new	  forms	  of	  sociality	  appropriate	  to	  new	  economies!	  And	  how	  possible,	  how	  likely	  to	  fail	  to	  produce	  forms	  that	  will	  sustain	  themselves!	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	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becomes	  all	  the	  more	  important	  to	  affirm	  in	  Burroughs’s	  text	  the	  search	  for	  ways	  to	  ask	  questions	  in	  the	  first	  place	  that	  might	  enable	  new	  forms,	  and	  to	  affirm	  the	  struggle	  for	  those	  forms	  most	  when	  they	  fail.	  	  	   The	  production	  of	  the	  skip	  tracer,	  seeking	  missing	  people,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  novel	  points	  retroactively	  to	  the	  second	  experiment	  of	  the	  book:	  the	  production	  of	  social	  forms	  for	  the	  anti-­‐subject,	  multiple	  self	  enabled	  by	  The	  Routine.	  The	  novel	  seeks	  a	  way	  to	  find	  people,	  a	  people.	  The	  routines	  that	  Lee	  invents	  throughout	  Queer	  begin	  as	  attempts	  to	  make	  a	  connection	  with	  Eugene	  Allerton,	  his	  love/friend-­‐interest.	  But	  the	  confluence	  of	  self-­‐sociality	  (a	  self	  as	  multiple)	  and	  external	  sociality	  poses	  a	  special	  problem	  for	  Lee	  and	  Allerton—not	  least	  of	  all	  because	  Allerton	  has	  not	  yet	  experienced	  the	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  shifts	  that	  enable	  him	  to	  enter	  the	  new	  economy.	  He	  is	  still	  operating	  under	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  old	  economy.	  Moreover,	  Lee	  only	  has	  on	  hand	  social	  models	  from	  that	  old	  economy—models	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  his	  non-­‐interiorized,	  non-­‐identified	  self.	  	  	   Lee’s	  routines	  confuse	  Allerton.	  For	  Lee,	  they	  mean	  nothing	  at	  all;	  they	  are	  acts	  aimed	  at	  connection.	  But	  Allerton	  wants	  to	  read	  (and	  read	  into)	  Lee’s	  narratives.	  When	  Allerton	  first	  meets	  Lee,	  he	  senses	  there	  “was	  something	  familiar	  to	  him,”	  a	  familiarity	  that	  “put	  Allerton	  on	  guard.”	  For	  Allerton:	  	   	   When	  Lee	  talked,	  he	  seemed	  to	  mean	  more	  than	  what	  he	  said.	  A	  	  special	  emphasis	  to	  a	  word	  or	  a	  greeting	  hinted	  at	  a	  period	  of	  	  familiarity	  in	  some	  other	  time	  and	  place.	  As	  though	  Lee	  were	  saying,	  	  “You	  know	  what	  I	  mean.	  You	  remember.”	  (Burroughs,	  Queer	  21)	  	  While	  it	  is	  only	  fair	  to	  say	  that,	  at	  a	  minimal	  level,	  Lee	  is	  trying	  to	  communicate	  his	  queerness	  and	  desire	  to	  Allerton,	  it	  is	  not,	  for	  example,	  allegorized	  in	  some	  readable	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way	  in	  his	  routines.	  Lee’s	  queerness—both	  his	  strangeness	  and	  his	  attraction	  to	  men—appear	  to	  be	  part	  of	  another	  time	  and	  place	  because	  he	  exists	  with	  a	  different	  relationship	  to	  time	  and	  place.	  His	  actions,	  then,	  come	  across	  as	  awkward	  and	  ill-­‐timed.	  When,	  for	  example,	  “Lee	  tried	  to	  achieve	  a	  greeting	  at	  once	  friendly	  and	  casual,	  designed	  to	  show	  interest	  without	  pushing	  a	  short	  acquaintance	  [,]	  the	  result	  was	  ghastly.”	  In	  his	  attempts	  to	  communicate	  a	  desire	  for	  friendship,	  Lee	  appears	  simultaneously	  lustful	  and	  painful,	  “mutilated	  and	  hopeless,”	  and	  “shockingly	  out	  of	  time	  and	  place”	  (15).	  His	  routines,	  too,	  require	  a	  kind	  of	  connection	  founded	  on	  disjuncture	  and	  humor,	  not	  on	  “getting	  to	  know”	  someone.	  But	  this	  communication	  is	  frequently	  one-­‐way.	  Lee’s	  absolute	  externalization	  of	  self	  makes	  him	  primarily	  expressive,	  rather	  than	  receptive,	  and	  it,	  at	  times,	  makes	  Allerton	  feel	  “oppressed,”	  and	  “shut	  off”	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  (24).	  The	  routine	  as	  a	  practice	  can	  liberate	  the	  self	  from	  the	  subject,	  but	  a	  new	  practice	  is	  required	  for	  liberating	  social	  organization	  from	  romantic	  love	  and	  the	  couple—for	  producing	  an	  alternative	  sociality	  of	  queer	  sexual-­‐sociality.	  How,	  after	  all,	  can	  a	  multiple	  self	  ever	  conform	  to	  the	  model	  of	  the	  couple?34	  	   Lee	  tries,	  however,	  several	  techniques	  for	  social	  organization	  that	  he	  draws	  from	  the	  old	  capitalist	  economy	  and	  repurposes.	  When	  Lee	  takes	  Allerton	  with	  him	  to	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  in	  search	  of	  a	  powerful	  hallucinogenic	  drug	  called	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Again,	  interestingly,	  Burroughs	  is	  quite	  close	  to	  Cixous	  here.	  In	  recognizing	  the	  oppositional	  binary	  that	  the	  couple	  usually	  embodies,	  Burroughs	  actually	  takes	  the	  couple	  as	  the	  site	  from	  which	  one—in	  attempting	  to	  create	  an	  impossible	  coupling,	  where	  the	  binarism	  falls	  apart—can	  reject	  binarism.	  Cixous	  suggests	  a	  similar	  path,	  from	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  couple,	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  sexual	  binarism	  and	  sexual	  opposition	  in	  her	  early	  essay,	  “Castration	  and	  Decapitation.”	  
	   62	  
yage,	  he	  tries	  to	  get	  Allerton	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  contract	  with	  him:	  sex	  and	  companionship	  in	  exchange	  for	  Lee	  paying	  Allerton’s	  way	  on	  the	  trip.	  This	  contract	  mimics	  the	  form	  of	  heterosexual	  coupledom	  solidified	  through	  the	  marriage	  contract,	  yet	  it	  is	  already	  an	  underground	  or	  “illegal”	  contract	  in	  this	  sense:	  a	  contract	  between	  a	  john	  and	  a	  male	  prostitute.	  When	  Lee	  tries	  to	  register	  a	  complaint	  to	  Allerton	  for	  “breach	  of	  contract”	  (77),	  this	  contract	  comes	  to	  reveal	  (just	  as	  aspects	  of	  the	  junk	  economy	  did)	  the	  coercive	  nature	  of	  all	  contracts:	  without	  a	  legal	  guarantee,	  the	  only	  guarantee	  would	  be	  one	  of	  violence.	  This	  is	  also	  a	  realization,	  then,	  that	  the	  force	  of	  law	  itself	  is	  always	  the	  force	  of	  violence:	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  a	  form	  of	  coercion.35	  Lee	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  exerting	  physical	  force	  over	  Allerton,	  and	  the	  contract	  falls	  apart.	  	   This	  recognition	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  couple	  and	  of	  the	  contract,	  however,	  is	  sometimes	  traversed	  by	  another	  possibility	  that	  is	  not	  predetermined	  or	  scripted	  (as	  relations	  would	  be	  by	  the	  normativity	  of	  coupledom	  of	  the	  strictures	  of	  the	  contract).	  We	  might	  call	  this,	  in	  Deleuzian	  terms,	  “becoming	  animal.”	  Though	  there	  are	  moments	  in	  Junky	  when	  Lee	  might	  be	  said	  to	  “become	  animal,”	  these	  moments	  are	  clearly	  demarcated	  as	  drunk	  imaginings	  or	  junk-­‐induced	  hallucinations.	  For	  example,	  while	  briefly	  in	  Mexico,	  near	  the	  end	  of	  Junky,	  Lee	  closes	  his	  eyes	  and	  imagines	  a	  face	  with	  “dull	  crustacean	  eyes,”	  that	  leads	  him	  “to	  the	  final	  place	  where	  the	  human	  road	  ends,	  where	  the	  human	  form	  can	  no	  longer	  contain	  the	  crustacean	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Burroughs	  recognition	  of	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  coerciveness	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  anticipates	  the	  later	  and	  quite	  compelling	  arguments	  of	  legal	  and	  feminist	  scholars.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Robert	  Cover,	  “Violence	  and	  the	  Word,”	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  95	  (1986);	  and	  Carole	  Pateman,	  The	  Sexual	  Contract	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  1988).	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horror	  that	  has	  grown	  inside”	  (Burroughs,	  Junky	  111).	  But	  what	  begins	  as	  an	  imagined	  “horror”	  in	  Junky	  becomes	  a	  site	  of	  possibility	  in	  Queer.	  	   In	  Queer,	  Lee’s	  “becoming	  animal”	  is	  not	  marked	  off	  as	  an	  event	  of	  the	  cogito,	  the	  thinking-­‐subject.	  It	  is	  an	  event	  of	  embodied	  thinking,	  and	  thinking	  embodiment.	  If	  in	  Junky	  Lee	  was	  both	  hyper-­‐aware	  of	  his	  body	  and	  in	  complete	  control,	  in	  Queer,	  his	  body	  is	  a	  foreign	  element,	  alien	  to	  him.	  And	  this	  new	  and	  unknown	  relationship	  to	  his	  body	  allows	  him	  to	  produce	  new	  forms	  of	  bodily	  social	  encounter.	  Sitting	  next	  to	  Allerton	  in	  a	  movie	  theater,	  Lee	  says	  he:	  	  could	  feel	  his	  body	  pull	  toward	  Allerton,	  an	  amoeboid	  protoplasmic	  	  	   projection,	  straining	  with	  a	  blind	  worm	  hunger	  to	  enter	  the	  other’s	  	  body,	  to	  breathe	  with	  his	  lungs,	  see	  with	  his	  eyes,	  learn	  the	  feel	  of	  his	  viscera	  and	  genitals.	  (Burroughs,	  Queer	  33)	  	  Here,	  the	  self	  is	  not	  only	  multiple	  and	  external,	  but	  extensive	  and	  mutating,	  not	  only	  not	  bound	  by	  the	  “I”	  of	  subjectivity,	  but	  no	  longer	  bound	  by	  the	  skin,	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  body.	  And	  though	  this	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  another	  fantasy	  of	  colonization,	  this	  abandonment	  of	  the	  body	  is	  as	  much	  a	  desire	  to	  receive	  as	  to	  be	  received.	  How	  can	  one	  give	  and	  receive	  without	  colonizing	  the	  other;	  how	  can	  one	  accept	  the	  dangers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  pleasures	  and	  possibilities	  of	  penetration.	  What	  forms	  could	  ethical	  sociality	  take?	  It	  raises	  a	  question	  that	  will	  continue	  to	  preoccupy	  Burroughs	  throughout	  his	  life,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  his	  answer	  to	  questions	  in	  a	  late	  ‘80s	  interview:	  	   	   Interviewer:	  “You	  talk	  about	  keeping	  yourself	  open…this	  idea	  of	  	  	   	   possession,	  is	  this	  something	  you	  don’t	  want	  to	  happen?”	  	  	   	   	  	   	   WSB:	  “Oh	  yes,	  well	  generally	  speaking	  yes,	  well	  there’s	  a	  difficult	  	  	   	   question	  there,	  as	  you’re	  letting	  yourself	  open	  to	  experience	  because	  	  that’s	  the	  only	  way	  you	  can	  experience,	  but	  also	  there’s	  a	  danger	  	  of	  letting	  yourself	  open	  to	  something	  that	  is	  very	  injurious.”	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   Interviewer:	  “How	  do	  you	  know	  that	  in	  advance?”	  	  	  	   	   WSB:	  “You	  don’t.	  That’s	  just	  it,	  you	  don’t.	  […]	  That’s	  always	  been	  a	  	  	   	   problem	  of	  being	  receptive….”	  (Yeyser)	  	  How	  does	  one	  accept	  the	  difficulties	  of	  being	  receptive—the	  danger—while	  maintaining	  that	  receptivity	  is	  the	  form	  of	  experience?	  How	  does	  one	  open	  one’s	  self	  up	  in	  the	  face	  of	  no	  guarantees?	  For	  Burroughs,	  becoming	  animal	  is	  one	  attempt	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  to	  produce	  a	  practice	  of	  receptivity.	  This	  becoming-­‐amoeba	  that	  Lee	  practices	  with	  Allerton	  marks	  the	  beginning	  of	  an	  experimental	  object	  that,	  by	  the	  time	  we	  reach	  Naked	  Lunch	  reaches	  a	  full	  expression:	  a	  complete	  inability	  to	  tell	  whether	  Lee	  is	  human	  or	  centipedal	  animal.	  And	  this	  transformation	  is	  less	  a	  metaphor	  than	  a	  material	  practice:	  just	  as	  command	  and	  control	  epistemologies	  govern	  the	  ontological	  possibilities	  of	  matter,	  Burroughs’s	  new	  epistemology	  enables	  new	  ontological	  possibilities,	  possibilities	  that	  emerge	  in	  his	  extraordinary	  
capacity	  for	  surprise,	  for	  experiencing	  the	  potentials	  of	  life	  that	  could	  not	  be	  predicted.	  	   But	  in	  Queer,	  too,	  despite	  the	  incomplete	  and	  unsuccessful	  nature	  of	  his	  fumbling	  experiments	  towards	  alternative	  sociality,	  there	  is	  some	  element	  of	  fulfillment.	  Just	  before	  Lee	  and	  Allerton	  pass	  through	  unknown	  and	  mythic	  lands	  in	  search	  of	  yage—that	  is,	  in	  search	  of	  freedom	  from	  control	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  transversal	  communication—Lee	  and	  Allerton	  make	  one	  last	  stop	  in	  Guayaquil.	  Without	  even	  realizing	  it,	  without	  cognivizing	  it,	  Lee	  finds	  what	  he	  has	  been	  looking	  for	  all	  along:	  transversal	  communication	  and	  transmigration	  by	  other	  than	  chemical	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means.	  Nearing	  sleep	  he	  enters	  another’s	  body,	  and	  there	  feels	  that	  boy’s	  desire	  for	  a	  woman.	  He	  is	  not	  so	  much	  colonizing	  the	  other—not	  investing	  the	  other	  with	  his	  own	  desires—as	  experiencing	  him.	  “’I’m	  not	  queer,’	  he	  thought,	  ‘I’m	  disembodied’”	  (Burroughs,	  Queer	  86).	  	   Through	  these	  attempts,	  Burroughs	  produces	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  telepathic	  and	  transversal	  community	  of	  bodies	  that	  escapes	  not	  only	  the	  strictures	  of	  the	  contract	  but	  the	  form	  of	  the	  couple.	  In	  loosing	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  subject	  body,	  Lee	  produces	  himself	  here	  not	  as	  “statistically	  unfit	  for	  treatment”	  as	  he	  was	  in	  Junky,	  but	  unfit	  for	  statistics	  all	  together.	  He	  is	  no	  longer	  practicing	  the	  underground	  science	  of	  Junky	  that	  used	  the	  laws	  and	  practices	  of	  capitalism	  against	  themselves	  merely	  for	  another	  capitalism	  (addiction).	  Here,	  he	  invents	  a	  new	  minor	  science	  of	  the	  self	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  life.	  	  
Coda:	  Unknown	  Experiments	  	  The	  authors	  of	  The	  Narcotic	  Farm	  list	  Burroughs	  among	  the	  “famous”	  patients	  who	  were	  once	  treated	  at	  Narco—a	  list	  that	  includes	  several	  writers	  and	  no	  small	  number	  of	  jazz	  musicians.	  It	  also,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  he	  is	  “among	  the	  minority”	  who	  didn’t	  prefer	  detoxing	  there,	  and	  dismisses	  him	  as	  “preternaturally	  tart,”	  suggesting	  that	  his	  resistance	  to	  Narco	  stemmed	  more	  from	  his	  asociality	  than	  his	  addiction	  (Campbell,	  Olsen,	  and	  Walden	  74).	  Yet	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  a	  book	  that	  ultimately	  celebrates	  Narco	  to	  affirm	  Burroughs’s	  depiction.	  The	  Narcotic	  Farm	  seems	  to	  imagine	  that	  the	  best	  intentions	  of	  doctors	  and	  staff	  could	  overcome	  the	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structural	  problems	  of	  the	  prison-­‐medical-­‐industrial	  complex	  and	  their	  programs	  for	  treatment,	  punishment,	  and	  reform.	  Instead,	  Burroughs	  exposes	  that	  those	  best	  intentions	  are	  still	  bad	  intentions	  whose	  solutions,	  grounded	  not	  in	  social	  changes	  but	  disciplining	  of	  the	  will,	  can	  only	  repeat	  the	  same	  problems:	  treating	  addicts	  until	  they	  become	  good	  citizen-­‐subjects,	  or	  keeping	  the	  aberrant	  locked	  away	  behind	  bars.	  	   Outside	  of	  Narco’s	  walls,	  however,	  Burroughs	  produced	  a	  line	  of	  escape	  
through	  literature	  not	  only	  from	  the	  institution	  of	  Narco,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  larger	  structures	  and	  practices	  that	  would	  come	  to	  define	  scientific	  knowledge	  about	  addiction.	  Those	  same	  structures	  would	  continue	  to	  produce	  mass	  incarceration	  in	  this	  country	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Drugs	  and	  pathologization	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  discipline	  social	  difference.	  By	  tracking	  Burroughs’s	  line,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  think	  about	  new	  lines	  of	  escape:	  lines	  that	  will	  always	  be	  dangerous;	  lines	  that	  will	  begin	  with	  questions	  and	  without	  guarantees.	  Experiments	  cannot	  be	  known	  before	  we	  make	  them.	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3.	  Invisible	  Experiments:	  George	  Jackson,	  Ralph	  Ellison,	  Albert	  
Einstein	  and	  the	  Matter	  of	  Thought	  	  
“I’ve	  always	  strived	  to	  see	  the	  indivisible	  thing	  cutting	  across	  the	  artificial	  barricades	  
which	  have	  been	  erected	  to	  an	  older	  section	  of	  our	  brains,	  back	  to	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  
primitive	  commune	  that	  exists	  in	  all	  blacks.”1	  
	  
“The	  function,	  the	  psychology,	  of	  artistic	  selectivity	  is	  to	  eliminate	  from	  art	  form	  all	  
those	  elements	  of	  experience	  which	  contain	  no	  compelling	  significance.	  […This]	  
enables	  man	  to	  conquer	  chaos	  and	  master	  destiny.”2	  	  
“It	  is	  the	  theory	  which	  decides	  what	  we	  can	  observe.”3	  
	  	  
	  
	   After	  the	  1971	  shooting	  death	  of	  Black	  Panther	  George	  Jackson	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  prison	  guard,	  one	  of	  the	  many	  books	  removed	  from	  his	  cell	  was	  Ralph	  Ellison’s	  
Invisible	  Man.4	  In	  1961,	  18-­‐year-­‐old	  Jackson	  was	  convinced	  by	  his	  court-­‐appointed	  lawyer	  to	  plead	  guilty	  to	  charges	  of	  robbery	  and	  was	  given	  an	  indeterminate	  sentence—“one	  year	  to	  life”—which	  would	  end	  up	  encompassing	  the	  entirety	  of	  his	  adult	  life	  (Jackson	  ix).	  During	  his	  decade	  in	  prison,	  seven	  and	  a	  half	  years	  of	  which	  were	  spent	  in	  solitary	  confinement,	  Jackson	  committed	  himself	  to	  a	  rigorous	  analysis	  of	  the	  confined	  conditions	  that	  delimited	  his	  experience,	  and	  ultimately	  evinced	  himself	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  philosopher	  of	  the	  prison.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  Jackson’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Jackson,	  4.	  2	  Ralph	  Ellison,	  “Richard	  Wright’s	  Blues,”	  94.	  3	  Albert	  Einstein,	  quoted	  in:	  Heisenberg,	  Physics	  77.	  4	  In	  addition	  to	  Invisible	  Man,	  Jackson	  also	  had	  a	  copy	  of	  Ellison’s	  Shadow	  and	  Act,	  as	  well	  as	  97	  other	  books	  by	  authors	  ranging	  from	  Eldridge	  Cleaver	  to	  George	  Orwell,	  from	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  to	  C.L.R.	  James.	  A	  complete	  list	  is	  available	  at	  kamasaproject.org/2009/08/22/books-­‐taken-­‐from-­‐george-­‐jacksons-­‐cell	  (accessed	  July	  5,	  2012).	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death,	  Ellison	  had	  fallen	  out	  of	  favor	  with	  the	  black	  radical	  left,	  having	  been	  widely	  criticized	  for	  his	  perceived	  liberalism	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  aesthetic	  practice	  over	  and	  against	  overt	  political	  action	  and	  protest	  (Bradley	  57).	  While	  the	  published	  writings	  of	  Jackson	  contain	  no	  reference	  to	  Ellison,	  Jackson’s	  interest	  in	  the	  novel	  may	  have	  been	  prompted	  by	  black	  radicals’	  criticism	  of	  it	  rather	  than	  the	  novel’s	  popular	  accolades.	  Indeed,	  Ellison’s	  more	  overtly	  leftist	  politics	  (and	  especially	  his	  involvement	  with	  the	  communist	  party)	  waned	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  novel’s	  1952	  publication,	  and	  Barbara	  Foley	  has	  argued	  that	  Ellison	  in	  fact	  put	  his	  own	  early	  radicalism	  under	  erasure	  both	  throughout	  the	  revision	  process	  of	  his	  novel	  and	  in	  his	  public	  self-­‐presentation.5	  	  Yet	  the	  political	  possibilities	  that	  erupt	  within	  Ellison’s	  experimental	  novel	  and	  his	  writing	  practice	  are	  not	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  lasting	  public	  narrative	  nor	  by	  the	  pervasive	  critical	  reading	  of	  the	  novel’s	  epilogue—an	  ending	  which	  critics	  have	  presumed	  ties	  together	  the	  novel’s	  primarily	  picaresque	  form	  into	  a	  closed	  object,	  a	  closed	  hermeneutic	  circle—as	  a	  prescription	  for	  liberal	  individualism.	  In	  fact,	  despite	  Ellison’s	  and	  Jackson’s	  oppositional	  aims	  expressed	  in	  the	  opening	  epigraphs	  to	  this	  chapter—Ellison’s	  to	  erect	  divisions	  that	  might	  allow	  art	  to	  take	  form,	  and	  Jackson’s	  to	  break	  them	  down	  for	  revolutionary	  return—they	  are	  linked,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  by	  their	  mobilization	  of	  invisibility	  within	  confined	  spaces	  (Jackson’s	  solitary	  confinement	  “hole”	  and	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  underground	  hole)	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  political	  thought—thought	  which,	  for	  both,	  revealed	  itself	  over	  and	  over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Barbara	  Foley,	  Wrestling	  with	  the	  Left:	  The	  Making	  of	  Ralph	  Ellison’s	  Invisible	  Man	  (Durham,	  NC:	  Duke	  Univ.	  Press,	  2010).	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again	  in	  its	  most	  material	  and	  aesthetic	  dimensions.	  And	  it	  enabled	  both	  to	  question	  whether	  “proper”	  political	  thought	  (as	  ideology)	  would	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  emancipatory	  action;	  psychology	  separated	  from	  the	  irruptive	  physics	  of	  life	  would	  not	  be	  enough.	  Thus,	  such	  questioning	  led	  them	  to	  invent,	  through	  processes	  of	  experimentation,	  and	  specifically	  the	  thought	  experiment,	  new	  means	  of	  both	  understanding	  and	  engendering	  political	  action.	  Ultimately,	  despite	  overt	  differences	  between	  the	  two,	  both	  were	  especially	  attuned	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
division	  (what	  Ellison	  called	  “selectivity”	  and	  Jackson	  called	  “barricades”)	  had	  been	  the	  productive	  force	  of	  an	  Enlightenment	  epistemology	  that	  suppressed	  ontological	  excess	  and	  made	  it	  invisible,	  non-­‐existent.	  This	  attunement	  to	  and	  affirmation	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  invisible	  experience	  would	  allow	  both	  to	  describe	  anew	  time,	  history,	  and	  experience	  in	  ways	  that	  could	  invent	  open	  ontologies	  that	  could	  respond	  to	  the	  insistent	  materiality	  of	  the	  world.	  And	  such	  inventions	  would	  engender	  new	  capacities	  for	  responding	  to	  the	  specific	  institutionalized	  conditions	  of	  black	  people	  in	  the	  US.	  For	  both,	  a	  recognition	  of	  an	  anoriginal	  world	  prior	  to	  such	  division	  and	  a	  capacity	  to	  return	  “to	  the	  primitive	  commune”	  or	  for	  art	  to	  produce	  entirely	  new	  forms	  of	  thought	  by	  way	  of	  selection	  from	  a	  prior	  and	  existing	  world	  finds	  the	  two	  thinkers	  and	  their	  work	  entangled.	  	  In	  “Reversion	  and	  Diversion,”	  the	  poet	  Édouard	  Glissant	  describes	  “the	  point	  of	  entanglement”	  as	  something	  that	  is	  not	  an	  origin	  exactly	  (Glissant	  14).	  Instead,	  it	  is	  a	  node	  that	  connects	  and	  entangles	  the	  black	  diaspora	  and	  what	  Houston	  Baker,	  explicating	  Glissant,	  calls	  its	  “dispersed	  singularities”	  (Baker	  1).	  Here,	  Glissant	  and	  Baker	  borrow	  from	  the	  language	  of	  quantum	  physics.	  Entanglement	  is	  the	  term	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physicist	  Erwin	  Schrödinger,	  in	  1935,	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  quantum	  phenomenon	  that	  Albert	  Einstein	  observed	  as	  “spooky	  action	  at	  a	  distance”:	  the	  apparent	  capacity	  of	  two	  distant	  particles	  to	  affect	  each	  other	  across	  space-­‐time	  separation	  without	  physical	  causality.	  Impossibly,	  these	  particles	  interact	  faster	  than	  the	  speed	  of	  light,	  which	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  relativity,	  the	  absolute	  limit	  speed	  for	  information	  transfer.	  Because	  the	  technical	  capacity	  to	  conduct	  an	  appropriate	  physical	  experiment	  did	  not	  exist,	  Einstein	  “observed”	  such	  action	  via	  a	  thought	  experiment.6	  His	  development	  of	  the	  “thought	  experiment”	  as	  a	  theoretically	  profitable	  tool	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  one	  of	  his	  most	  important	  contributions	  to	  the	  study	  of	  atomic	  physics,	  and	  his	  observation	  of	  the	  paradox	  of	  entanglement	  fueled	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  thinking	  about	  the	  quantum	  world	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	   Entanglement	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  central	  mysteries	  of	  quantum	  physics:	  any	  two	  objects	  can	  become	  entangled	  simply	  by	  interacting,	  but	  their	  continued	  ability	  to	  affect	  each	  other	  while	  neither	  in	  proximity	  to	  one	  another	  nor	  connected	  by	  some	  other	  medium	  such	  as	  a	  force	  field	  brings	  scientific	  study	  at	  its	  most	  daring	  dangerously	  close	  to	  the	  pre-­‐Enlightenment	  magic	  it	  defined	  itself	  against.	  The	  mysterious	  and	  almost	  magical	  force	  of	  entanglement	  is	  echoed	  in	  Glissant’s	  concept	  of	  “reversion”;	  for	  him,	  the	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  slave	  trade	  is	  a	  point	  of	  entanglement	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  developments	  in	  entanglement	  theory,	  see	  Alexandra	  Witze,	  “75	  Years	  of	  Entanglement,”	  ScienceNews	  178:11	  (2010):	  25.	  For	  more	  detailed	  and	  narrative	  histories	  of	  entanglement,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Amir	  D.	  Aczel,	  
Entanglement	  (2003);	  Brian	  Clegg,	  The	  God	  Effect:	  Science’s	  Strangest	  Phenomenon	  (2009);	  Sameer	  Ketkar,	  Entanglement	  (2011);	  Valerio	  Scarani	  and	  Rachel	  Thew,	  
Quantum	  Physics:	  A	  First	  Encounter:	  Interference,	  Entanglement,	  and	  Reality	  (2006).	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continues	  to	  connect	  those	  who	  are	  part	  of	  the	  black	  diaspora,	  despite	  now	  existing	  across	  the	  globe	  without	  any	  direct,	  local	  connections	  to	  one	  another.	  Reversion	  to	  the	  point	  of	  entanglement	  augments	  epistemological	  recursion,	  disrupting	  notions	  of	  linear	  or	  progressive	  historical	  temporality	  and	  spatial	  division,	  and	  multiplying	  connections,	  producing	  infinite	  series,	  through	  this	  anoriginal	  node.	  	  Glissant’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “entanglement”	  as	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  past	  and	  through	  epistemologically	  constructed	  divisions	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  metaphorical	  appropriation	  of	  the	  language	  of	  physics.	  Rather,	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  Schrödinger-­‐Einstein	  concept	  to	  dispersed	  black	  relationality	  invites	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  quantum	  theory	  itself,	  along	  with	  one	  of	  its	  most	  rigorous	  thinkers,	  Einstein,	  might	  be	  entangled	  in	  a	  history	  of	  blackness.7	  More	  particularly,	  it	  invites	  us	  to	  consider	  how	  he	  might	  be	  entangled	  with	  Ellison	  and	  Jackson,	  even	  though	  their	  work	  seems	  not	  only	  wholly	  separate	  from	  his	  but	  also	  from	  each	  others’.	  While	  Einstein’s	  intellectual	  pursuits	  were	  primarily	  focused	  on	  the	  supposedly	  apolitical	  study	  of	  quantum	  physics,	  Ellison’s	  art	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  racial	  paradoxes	  of	  US	  civic	  life	  that	  promised	  democracy	  while	  denying	  it	  to	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  population,	  and	  Jackson’s	  letters	  are	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  paradoxes	  of	  a	  prison	  correctional	  system	  that	  employed	  “treatment”	  practices	  that	  left	  prisoners	  more	  damaged	  than	  when	  they	  had	  entered.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Fred	  Moten	  argues	  that	  “blackness”	  is	  distinct	  from	  “the	  people	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  more	  generally,	  the	  things)	  that	  are	  called	  black,”	  and	  suggests,	  instead,	  that	  blackness	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  unruly	  being	  that	  “operates	  at	  the	  nexus	  of	  the	  social	  and	  the	  ontological,	  the	  historical	  and	  the	  essential.”	  Moten,	  “Black	  Op,”	  1744;	  and	  “Case,”	  187.	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The	  systems	  they	  confront	  seem	  worlds	  apart,	  but	  their	  struggles	  to	  describe	  a	  world	  that	  affirms	  the	  reality	  and	  agency	  of	  invisible	  objects	  and	  impossible	  connections	  are,	  in	  fact,	  entangled	  in	  an	  irruptive	  counter-­‐history	  of	  blackness	  and	  black	  radical	  possibility	  that	  traverses	  a	  dominant	  scientistic	  history	  of	  the	  Enlightenment.	  Engaged	  in	  their	  specific	  struggles	  with	  the	  quantum	  world,	  civic	  life,	  and	  the	  prison	  system,	  each	  would	  come	  to	  see	  division	  as	  the	  structuring	  feature	  of	  an	  Enlightenment	  epistemology	  that	  takes	  the	  world	  as	  fully	  systematic	  and	  knowable	  through	  a	  given	  understanding	  of	  the	  (divided)	  senses.	  All	  three	  were	  motivated	  in	  their	  struggles	  to	  understand	  the	  epistemological	  function	  of	  division	  itself.	  The	  selections	  and	  barricades	  that	  concerned	  Ellison	  and	  Jackson	  also	  name	  the	  “cut”	  [Schnitt]	  that	  Werner	  Heisenberg	  described	  as	  dividing	  the	  classical	  from	  the	  quantum	  world,	  a	  division	  that	  Einstein	  rejected.	  Einstein,	  Ellison,	  and	  Jackson	  recognized	  that	  division	  was	  a	  method	  of	  isolating,	  totalizing,	  and	  rationalizing	  a	  world,	  making	  it	  inaccessible	  to	  other	  worlds	  and	  the	  irruptive	  forces	  across	  and	  beyond	  it.	  	  Of	  the	  three,	  the	  need	  to	  counter	  a	  positivist	  scientific	  epistemology	  was	  perhaps	  felt	  most	  urgently	  by	  Jackson,	  whose	  imprisonment	  was	  justified	  through	  its	  legacy.	  But	  Ellison	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  it	  with	  great	  clarity	  as	  well,	  despite	  his	  professed	  desire	  for	  “selectivity.”	  As	  scientific	  logics	  had	  been	  translated	  into	  the	  growing	  fields	  of	  criminology,	  psychology,	  and	  sociology,	  they	  served	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  twentieth-­‐century	  civic	  practices	  and	  correctional	  institutions	  that	  tried	  to	  enforce	  systemization	  through	  division.	  Einstein’s	  great	  contribution	  was	  to	  understand	  this	  need	  not	  as	  external	  to	  science—as	  though	  it	  were	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  or	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political	  misuse	  of	  science—but	  internal	  to	  it.	  His	  interventions	  in	  scientific	  practice	  and	  possibility—his	  invention	  of	  new	  perceptive	  practices	  and	  new	  descriptive	  possibilities—provided	  continuity	  with	  Ellison	  and	  Jackson	  for	  an	  epistemological	  revision	  that	  might	  traverse	  the	  whole	  social	  and	  material	  realm	  that	  art,	  science,	  and	  politics	  tries	  to	  think.	  Their	  thought	  experiments	  take	  shape	  as	  new	  forms	  of	  realism—for	  Einstein,	  quantum	  realism,	  and	  for	  Ellison,	  dilated	  realism—that	  invent	  new	  epistemologies	  for	  open,	  undetermined	  ontologies,	  black	  radical	  ontologies,	  constructed	  on	  the	  excessive	  and	  surprising	  relations	  between	  science,	  aesthetics,	  and	  radical	  politics.	  Their	  questioning	  leads	  them	  away	  from	  “explanation”	  and	  allows	  them	  to	  describe	  anew	  time,	  history,	  and	  experience	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  respond	  to	  the	  insistent	  and	  unpredictable	  materiality	  of	  the	  world.	  It	  leads	  them	  beyond	  epistemological	  determinism,	  closed	  ontologies,	  the	  limits	  of	  historical	  causality,	  ideology,	  and	  institutional	  structures	  (especially	  those	  enabled	  by	  racial	  science).	  It	  leads	  them	  all	  to	  a	  recognition	  of	  an	  anoriginal	  world	  prior	  to	  division	  and	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  what	  Ellison	  described	  as	  a	  politics	  of	  love,	  to	  the	  capacity	  to	  actualize,	  through	  “the	  love	  act,”	  Jackson’s	  “primitive	  commune”:	  the	  ongoing	  connection	  and	  material	  and	  political	  force	  of	  those	  scattered	  across	  the	  diaspora.	  
	  
Thought	  Experiments	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Visibility	  	  
	   Because	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  thought	  experiments	  of	  Einstein,	  Ellison,	  and	  Jackson	  are	  for	  engaging	  specific	  conditions	  and	  specific	  
systems—conditions	  which	  are	  not	  identical	  for	  any	  of	  these	  thinkers,	  and	  which	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vary	  greatly	  in	  scope	  and	  magnitude—it	  may	  seem	  dubious	  to	  even	  describe	  the	  tool	  itself	  as	  similar,	  except	  in	  the	  most	  general	  sense.	  Yet,	  I	  argue,	  all	  three	  depart	  from	  the	  more	  vague	  use	  of	  “thought	  experiment”	  (gedankenexperiment)	  proposed	  by	  the	  term’s	  coiner,	  Ernst	  Mach	  in	  1906,	  as	  any	  act	  of	  imagination	  and	  conjecture.	  Instead,	  they	  employ	  it	  in	  the	  way	  developed	  most	  precisely	  by	  Einstein,	  primarily	  through	  an	  imagined	  box	  that	  could	  emit	  a	  single	  quantum	  of	  light.8	  A	  number	  of	  literary	  critics	  have	  sought	  to	  link	  the	  “thought	  experiment”	  of	  physics	  to	  both	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  literature	  (especially	  science	  fiction)	  by	  understanding	  it	  in	  its	  more	  general	  sense:	  thought	  experiments	  act	  as	  “virtual	  laborator[ies	  that]	  serve	  as	  the	  perfect	  testing	  ground	  for	  hypothetical	  scenarios	  that	  predict	  possible	  future(s)”—whether	  those	  be	  the	  futures	  of	  particle	  interactions	  or	  the	  futures	  of	  human	  societies	  (Jakimovska	  and	  Jakimovski	  55).9	  According	  to	  this	  definition,	  thought	  experiments	  stand	  in	  for	  physical	  experiments	  in	  order	  to	  make	  determinations	  and	  predictions	  that	  would	  be	  otherwise	  technically	  impossible,	  fiscally	  implausible,	  or	  unethical.	  For	  Einstein,	  however,	  predicting	  future	  behaviors	  as	  determined	  by	  given	  experimental	  conditions	  was	  rarely	  an	  end	  unto	  itself.	  Instead,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  functions	  of	  the	  thought	  experiment	  as	  he	  developed	  it	  was	  to	  operate	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  “Quantum”	  designates	  the	  smallest	  discrete	  particle	  involved	  in	  any	  physical	  interaction.	  Though	  many	  features	  of	  the	  quantum	  world	  are	  not	  understood	  as	  “discrete	  particles”	  (i.e.	  the	  entire	  “quantum	  world”	  is	  not	  divisible	  into	  quanta)	  the	  name	  derives	  from	  the	  Einstein’s	  observation	  that	  light	  at	  high	  frequencies	  can	  behave	  as	  though	  “mutually	  independent	  energy	  quanta,”	  or	  “atoms	  of	  light,”	  which	  are	  now	  known	  as	  photons.	  See:	  Norbert	  Wiener,	  Differential	  Space,	  Quantum	  
Systems,	  and	  Prediction	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology	  Press,	  1966).	  9	  See	  also:	  Edward	  A.	  Davenport,	  “Literature	  as	  Thought	  Experiment	  (On	  Aiding	  and	  Abetting	  the	  Muse),”	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  13:3	  (1983):	  279-­‐306.	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check	  on	  the	  assumptions	  that	  undergird	  physical	  experiments,	  especially	  those	  that	  concern	  the	  supposedly	  transparent	  relationship	  of	  an	  object	  to	  its	  observer.	  	  For	  Einstein,	  the	  problem	  of	  observation	  was	  a	  central	  conceit	  of	  atomic	  physics,	  which	  he	  acknowledged,	  saying:	  Every	  observation	  […]	  presupposes	  an	  unambiguous	  connection	  known	  to	  us	  between	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  observed	  and	  the	  sensation	  which	  eventually	  penetrates	  our	  consciousness.	  But	  we	  can	  only	  be	  sure	  of	  this	  connection,	  if	  we	  know	  the	  natural	  laws	  by	  which	  it	  is	  determined.	  If,	  however,	  as	  is	  obviously	  the	  case	  with	  modern	  atomic	  physics,	  these	  laws	  have	  to	  be	  called	  into	  question,	  then	  the	  concept	  of	  observation	  loses	  its	  clear	  meaning.	  (Heisenberg,	  
Encounters	  114).	  	  The	  thought	  experiment	  then	  operates	  as	  a	  reminder	  that	  observation	  is	  frequently	  determined	  by	  theoretical	  presumptions.	  Visibility	  is	  neither	  a	  precondition	  nor	  a	  guarantee	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  material	  world;	  greater	  visibility	  simply	  does	  not	  imply	  greater	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  along	  these	  lines	  that	  Ellison’s	  novel	  and	  Jackson’s	  letters,	  collected	  in	  Soledad	  Brother,	  operate	  as	  series	  of	  thought	  experiments	  similar	  to	  those	  found	  in	  quantum	  physics;	  they	  act	  as	  checks	  on	  the	  supposed	  guarantees	  of	  visibility,	  requiring	  and	  enabling	  the	  production	  of	  new	  values	  to	  supplement	  a	  limited	  empirical	  positivism.	  The	  thought	  experiment	  helps	  to	  register	  the	  possibility	  of	  sensorial	  experience	  that	  exceeds	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  sense.	  Experimenting	  with	  thought,	  then,	  is	  not	  merely	  experimenting	  via	  thought,	  but	  also	  experimenting	  with	  how	  thinking	  happens,	  with	  our	  capacity	  to	  experience	  sensations	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  penetrate	  our	  consciousness.	  In	  the	  1984	  introduction	  to	  a	  new	  edition	  of	  Invisible	  Man,	  Ellison	  describes	  his	  novel	  as	  an	  unwilling	  or	  accidental	  work	  of	  “science	  fiction”	  (Ellison	  xv).	  In	  doing	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so,	  he	  seems	  to	  invoke	  H.G.	  Wells’s	  1897	  novella,	  The	  Invisible	  Man,	  upon	  whose	  title	  the	  later	  novel	  signifies.	  Yet	  Ellison’s	  novel	  does	  not	  bear	  out	  the	  conventional	  traits	  that	  dominated	  the	  genre	  of	  the	  science	  fiction	  novel	  by	  midcentury.	  Set	  contemporaneous	  with	  Ellison’s	  own	  life,	  Invisible	  Man	  at	  its	  strangest	  seems	  more	  a	  surreal	  depiction	  of	  his	  present	  moment	  than	  the	  techno-­‐future	  fantasy	  extrapolated	  from	  scientific	  knowledge	  that	  was	  characteristic	  of	  many	  works	  of	  the	  genre	  Wells	  helped	  to	  solidify.	  Wells’s	  narrator’s	  research	  into	  optics	  enables	  him	  to	  change	  his	  own	  “refractive	  index,”	  thereby	  making	  himself,	  as	  subject-­‐observer	  then	  object	  of	  science,	  invisible	  (Wells	  108).	  Ellison’s	  narrator,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  the	  desired	  object	  that	  is	  invisible	  not	  because	  of	  his	  own	  physical	  qualities,	  but	  because	  of	  a	  defect	  in	  the	  observer:	  “[M]y	  invisibility	  [is	  not]	  exactly	  a	  matter	  of	  biochemical	  accident	  to	  my	  epidermis,”	  he	  clarifies.	  “That	  invisibility	  to	  which	  I	  refer	  occurs	  because	  of	  a	  peculiar	  disposition	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  those	  with	  whom	  I	  come	  into	  contact.	  A	  matter	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  their	  inner	  eyes,	  those	  eyes	  with	  which	  they	  look	  through	  their	  physical	  eyes	  upon	  reality”	  (Ellison	  3).	  Overtly,	  then,	  Ellison	  sets	  up	  the	  question	  of	  invisibility	  as	  one	  not	  of	  biology,	  chemistry,	  or	  physics,	  but	  of	  the	  conditions	  for	  social	  recognition	  that	  are	  inhibited	  by	  racialization.	  	  But	  in	  Ellison’s	  moment,	  as	  today,	  it	  was	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  extricate	  the	  social	  and	  political	  effects	  of	  racialization	  and	  racialized	  experience	  from	  scientific	  discourses.	  As	  critic	  Scott	  Selisker	  notes,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  operations	  of	  Invisible	  
Man	  is	  that	  of	  “satirizing	  and	  critiquing	  the	  political	  consequences	  of	  new	  scientific	  discourses	  that	  were	  central	  to	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  racism	  in	  the	  United	  States”	  (Selisker	  573).	  Selisker	  argues	  that	  such	  centrality	  can	  be	  gleaned	  not	  only	  from	  the	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myriad	  parodies	  of	  scientific	  practices	  (most	  significantly,	  sociology)	  within	  the	  novel,	  but	  also	  and	  perhaps	  more	  so	  from	  the	  novel’s	  penultimate	  scene,	  in	  which	  all	  of	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  enemies	  are	  linked	  under	  the	  nomination	  “scientist”	  (571).	  	  The	  novel	  proper	  ends—just	  before	  the	  epilogue—with	  a	  fantasy	  sequence	  in	  which	  the	  narrator,	  having	  had	  his	  eyes	  (and	  perhaps	  his	  testicles)	  cut	  out,	  is	  asked,	  “How	  does	  it	  feel	  to	  be	  free	  of	  one’s	  illusions?"	  (Ellison	  569,	  italics	  original).	  To	  the	  men	  who’ve	  mutilated	  him,	  he	  yells:	  “Still	  […]	  there’s	  your	  universe,	  and	  that	  drip-­‐
drop	  upon	  the	  water	  you	  hear	  is	  all	  the	  history	  you’ve	  made,	  all	  you’re	  going	  to	  make.	  
Now	  laugh,	  you	  scientists.	  Let’s	  hear	  you	  laugh!”	  (570).	  The	  group	  he	  calls	  “scientists”	  consists	  of	  all	  the	  leaders—Brother	  Jack,	  Bledsoe,	  Norton,	  Ras,	  Emerson—who	  have	  tried	  to	  inculcate	  him	  into	  their	  nominally	  anti-­‐racist	  ideologies.	  Their	  ideologies,	  however,	  are	  compromised	  by	  the	  men’s	  overarching	  desires	  for	  money	  or	  power,	  and	  those	  desires	  play	  out	  not	  in	  the	  service	  of	  racial	  equality,	  but	  instead	  through	  the	  instrumentalization	  of	  black	  people	  for	  the	  leaders’	  own	  moral	  agendas,	  which	  they	  back	  via	  scientific	  rhetoric.	  Given	  this	  gruesome	  ending	  and	  the	  expansive	  cast	  of	  despicable	  characters	  labeled	  “scientists,”	  it	  is	  difficult	  not	  to	  read	  the	  novel	  as	  a	  chilling	  indictment	  of	  science	  itself	  and	  the	  increasing	  purchase	  of	  scientific	  logic	  on	  US	  social	  and	  political	  life	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Indeed,	  Ellison’s	  rejection	  of	  racial	  science	  anticipates	  the	  specific	  effects	  on	  black	  life	  it	  will	  manifest	  in	  the	  combining	  of	  the	  prison	  and	  psychiatric	  hospital	  only	  a	  few	  years	  later.	  Those	  effects	  will	  also	  lead	  George	  Jackson	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  first	  step	  in	  a	  revolutionary	  practice	  would	  be	  “to	  extinguish	  forever	  the	  light	  of	  a	  perverted	  science”	  that	  grounds	  American	  “ideals,	  moralities,	  and	  institutions”	  (Jackson	  100).	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Scientific	  Racism	  and	  the	  Psychocarceral	  System	  	  	  	   Both	  Invisible	  Man	  and	  Soledad	  Brother	  are	  extended	  analyses	  of	  the	  peculiar	  and	  mutating	  systems	  of	  social	  control	  that	  continue	  to	  impinge	  on	  black	  life	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  which	  operate	  as	  or	  interact	  with	  the	  legacies	  of	  the	  “peculiar	  institution”	  of	  slavery.	  While	  Ellison	  does	  not	  specifically	  investigate	  the	  site	  of	  the	  prison,	  his	  novel	  understands	  criminalization	  of	  black	  life	  as	  bound	  up	  with	  its	  pathologization.	  In	  Ellison’s	  novel,	  being	  diagnosed	  as	  “mad”	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  “crazy,”	  yet	  critically	  astute	  and	  prescient	  black	  doctor	  at	  the	  Golden	  Day)	  or	  labeled	  a	  “criminal”	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  Rinehart)	  effects	  a	  political	  disappearance	  of	  black	  thought	  and	  life	  that	  criticized	  or	  produced	  alternatives	  to	  (white)	  civil	  society;	  these	  diagnoses	  also	  attempt	  to	  neutralizes	  any	  political	  efficacy	  that	  such	  “outsides”	  might	  enable,	  leaving	  them	  mere	  noise	  at	  best	  (the	  doctor)	  or	  opportunistic	  and	  cannibalistic	  at	  worst	  (Rinehart).	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  his	  dual	  self-­‐diagnosis	  as	  mad	  and	  criminal	  that	  leads	  the	  narrator	  (who,	  near	  the	  novel’s	  end	  accidentally	  becomes	  a	  double	  for	  the	  criminal	  Rinehart	  and	  struggles	  with	  the	  possibility	  that	  he	  is	  no	  longer	  sane)	  into	  the	  hole,	  into	  years	  of	  self-­‐imposed	  solitary	  confinement.	  His	  self-­‐reflexive	  inhabitation	  of	  a	  mad,	  criminal	  subjectivity	  acts	  as	  a	  pivot	  that	  allows	  him	  to	  access	  a	  new	  standpoint,	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  object.	  For	  Jackson,	  his	  position	  as	  “criminal”	  oscillates	  between	  signifying	  madness	  to	  the	  state	  and	  threatening	  to	  produce	  it.	  Jackson	  knew	  that	  the	  state	  could	  and	  would	  levy	  a	  charge	  of	  insanity	  to	  extend	  his	  sentence	  and	  keep	  him	  confined	  without	  due	  process.	  But	  Jackson,	  too,	  came	  to	  find	  that	  the	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state’s	  imposition	  of	  his	  position	  as	  object	  gave	  him	  special	  insight	  into	  the	  workings	  of	  a	  psycho-­‐carceral	  system	  gone	  mad	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  and	  necessity	  in	  intervening	  against	  it.	  Between	  the	  time	  of	  Invisible	  Man’s	  publication	  and	  Jackson’s	  death,	  national	  carceral	  and	  psychotherapeutic	  control	  strategies	  underwent	  major	  revisions,	  revisions	  which	  tended	  toward	  increased	  psychological	  torture	  in	  the	  prison,	  largely	  in	  the	  form	  of	  extended	  solitary	  confinement,	  and	  toward	  increased	  bodily	  torture	  and	  manipulation	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  psychosurgery.10	  Simultaneously,	  psychotherapeutic	  “treatment”	  came	  increasingly	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  prison	  as	  the	  dissolution	  of	  mental	  hospitals,	  the	  rise	  of	  psychiatric	  prisons,	  and	  changes	  in	  diagnoses—especially	  that	  of	  schizophrenia—led	  to	  greater	  use	  of	  psychiatric	  diagnostics	  for	  imprisoning	  those	  who	  rejected,	  protested	  against,	  or	  sometimes	  simply	  described	  their	  experience	  of	  the	  oppressive	  racial	  conditions	  of	  the	  US.	  Jonathan	  Metzl’s	  provocative	  study,	  The	  Protest	  Psychosis	  (2010),	  documents	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  After	  several	  decades	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  in	  which	  solitary	  confinement	  was	  prevalent	  as	  a	  supposedly	  therapeutic	  penal	  practice,	  the	  early	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  saw	  a	  drastic	  reduction	  in	  its	  use.	  In	  the	  1950s,	  concurrent	  with	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  dissolution	  of	  many	  psychiatric	  hospitals	  and	  asylums,	  solitary	  confinement	  was	  reinstituted	  in	  many	  prisons,	  though	  without	  any	  imagined	  therapeutic	  applications.	  The	  numbers	  of	  prisoners	  in	  some	  form	  of	  solitary	  confinement	  increased	  drastically,	  and	  most	  often	  those	  who	  had	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  mental	  illnesses	  or	  who	  were	  perceived	  to	  be	  mentally	  ill	  were	  the	  victims	  of	  isolation	  practices.	  From	  1983	  to	  the	  present,	  with	  the	  birth	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  “Supermax”	  prison,	  the	  number	  of	  prisoners	  in	  solitary	  confinement	  has	  risen	  by	  40	  percent.	  Most	  human	  rights	  groups	  consider	  solitary	  confinement	  to	  be	  torture.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  these	  changes,	  see:	  Peter	  Scharff	  Smith,	  “Solitary	  Confinement:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Istanbul	  Statement	  on	  the	  Use	  and	  Effects	  of	  Solitary	  Confinement,”	  Torture	  Journal	  18:1	  (2008):	  56-­‐62,	  and	  the	  “Solitary	  Watch:	  News	  from	  a	  Nation	  in	  Lockdown”	  website:	  http://solitarywatch.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/solitary-­‐confinement-­‐faq-­‐short-­‐version.pdf	  [accessed	  February	  9,	  2012].	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changes	  to	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  schizophrenia	  and	  its	  effects,	  especially	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  convergence	  of	  the	  psychiatric	  hospital	  and	  the	  prison.	  He	  notes	  that	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  some	  psychiatrists	  began	  to	  associate	  Black	  Power	  rhetoric	  with	  insanity,	  and	  the	  symptomatology	  of	  “protest	  psychosis”	  entered	  into	  the	  diagnostic	  criteria	  for	  schizophrenia	  (Metzl	  100).	  This	  was	  but	  one	  way—and	  a	  particularly	  egregious	  one	  at	  that—in	  which	  diagnosis	  is	  shaped	  by	  racial	  politics,	  allowing	  it	  to	  be	  mobilized	  for	  social	  control.	  Metzl	  demonstrates	  that	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  mental	  illness	  diagnoses	  were	  often	  wielded	  to	  incarcerate	  black	  men	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  and	  in	  the	  continued	  and	  highly	  visible	  racial	  turmoil	  that	  followed	  in	  its	  wake	  (xiii-­‐xvi).	  	  In	  his	  own	  moment,	  Jackson	  is	  aware	  of	  this	  imbrication	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  prison	  and	  the	  asylum,	  noting	  that	  the	  prison	  had	  begun	  “operat[ing]	  under	  the	  heading	  Department	  of	  Corrections”	  (Jackson	  25).	  For	  Jackson,	  simply	  coming	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  prison	  makes	  one	  vulnerable	  to	  being	  diagnosed	  as	  “mad,”	  and	  enables	  the	  mobilization	  of	  a	  disingenuous	  discourse	  of	  “therapeutics”	  to	  justify	  systemic	  prisoner	  abuse	  and	  its	  psychological	  effects.	  Based	  on	  his	  experience,	  he	  writes:	   Penologists	  regard	  prisons	  as	  asylums.	  […]	  But	  what	  can	  we	  say	  about	  these	  asylums	  since	  none	  of	  the	  inmates	  are	  ever	  cured?	  Since	  in	  every	  instance	  they	  are	  sent	  out	  of	  the	  prison	  more	  damaged	  physically	  and	  mentally	  than	  when	  they	  entered.”	  (Jackson	  25).	  	  Ironically	  emphasizing	  this	  point,	  the	  only	  form	  of	  “therapy”	  practiced	  in	  the	  prison,	  he	  says,	  is	  “club”	  or	  “oak-­‐stick	  therapeutics”:	  being	  beaten	  (10).	  	  This	  double	  move,	  in	  which	  psychiatric	  diagnoses	  were	  used	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  penal	  incarceration	  
	   81	  
and	  incarceration	  readily	  implied	  madness,	  meant	  that	  psychiatric	  rhetoric	  made	  invisible	  the	  political	  events	  that	  brought	  people	  into	  the	  prison	  and	  nullified	  any	  political	  stand	  they	  might	  take	  from	  inside.	  The	  systematic	  wielding	  of	  the	  state’s	  power,	  especially	  to	  diagnose	  radical	  and	  resistant	  politics	  as	  forms	  of	  insanity,	  led	  to	  the	  massive	  production	  of	  political	  prisoners	  in	  this	  period—especially	  among	  those	  involved	  with	  the	  Black	  Panther	  Party—which	  neutralized	  real	  political	  dissent	  under	  the	  name	  “mental	  illness.”11	  	  This	  particular	  history	  of	  incarceration	  and	  its	  removal	  of	  troublesome	  black	  bodies	  from	  the	  civil	  population	  in	  the	  US	  is	  evidence	  of	  but	  one	  way	  that	  psychiatry	  was	  mobilized	  for	  social	  control.	  While	  Jackson	  describes	  how	  prisons	  used	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  mental	  illness,	  Ellison’s	  novel	  offers	  a	  critical	  anticipation	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  psychiatry	  would	  use	  criminality	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  the	  violent	  and	  racialized	  trajectory	  of	  psychosurgery	  that	  was	  to	  follow	  in	  the	  next	  several	  decades.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  scenes	  in	  Invisible	  Man,	  the	  narrator,	  after	  being	  knocked	  out	  by	  an	  explosion	  at	  Liberty	  Paint	  Factory,	  comes	  to,	  groggily,	  in	  the	  factory	  hospital.	  He	  hears	  his	  grandmother’s	  voice	  singing	  to	  him,	  punctuated	  by	  the	  voices	  of	  two	  men.	  As	  fully	  awakens,	  he	  beings	  to	  realize	  that	  these	  men	  are	  debating	  the	  best	  way	  to	  “treat”	  him	  for	  his	  injuries:	  a	  lobotomy?	  castration?	  or—as	  they	  finally	  decide—a	  new,	  experimental,	  non-­‐surgical	  lobotomy?	  (Ellison	  236).	  The	  non-­‐surgical	  lobotomy	  is,	  in	  fact,	  electroshock	  therapy.	  This	  scene	  points	  to	  the	  ever-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See:	  Dylan	  Rodriguez,	  Forced	  Passages:	  Imprisoned	  Radical	  Intellectuals	  and	  the	  
U.S.	  Prison	  Regime	  (Minneapolis:	  Univ.	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2006)	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  US	  state	  makes	  invisible	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  holds	  many	  political	  prisoners.	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expanding	  range	  of	  medical	  strategies	  used,	  post	  “emancipation,”	  both	  to	  experiment	  on	  black	  bodies	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  “scientific	  knowledge”	  and	  improvement	  of	  largely	  white	  medicine,	  psychology,	  and	  psychiatry,	  and	  to	  discipline	  and	  control	  black	  bodies,	  their	  reproduction,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  their	  thought—a	  history	  that	  points	  to	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  “emancipation”	  or	  “liberation”	  within	  a	  civic	  context	  as	  political	  end-­‐goals.	  	  The	  conversation	  begins	  with	  an	  ironic	  portrayal	  of	  the	  racist	  presumptions	  about	  the	  statistical	  utility	  of	  a	  black	  person	  for	  knowledge	  about	  human	  psychology	  more	  generally.	  As	  one	  doctor	  says:	  I	  believe	  it	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  that	  solutions—cures,	  that	  is—apply	  in,	  uh.	  .	  .	  more	  primitive	  instances,	  are,	  uh.	  .	  .	  equally	  effective	  when	  more	  advanced	  conditions	  are	  in	  question.	  Suppose	  it	  were	  a	  New	  Englander	  with	  a	  Harvard	  background.	  (Ellison	  236).	  	  The	  doctor’s	  claim	  might	  seem	  to	  imply	  a	  social-­‐constructionist	  view	  of	  psychology—suggesting	  that	  a	  “New	  Englander”	  might	  have	  a	  different	  psychological	  experience	  than	  that	  of	  the	  narrator—yet	  the	  invocation	  of	  the	  word	  “primitive”	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  rejection	  of	  psychological	  universalism,	  but	  rather,	  of	  the	  narrator’s	  capacity	  to	  be	  a	  statistically	  valid	  “human.”	  His	  data	  is	  inapplicable	  not	  because	  of	  his	  differing	  circumstances	  and	  experiences,	  but	  because	  of	  his	  partial	  humanity.	  	  Vital	  work	  has	  been	  done	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  done	  to	  document	  the	  host	  of	  scientific-­‐medical	  experiments	  on	  black	  people	  in	  the	  US,	  many	  of	  which	  were	  performed	  under	  government	  control:	  from	  the	  laboratory	  of	  the	  eighteenth-­‐	  and	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nineteenth-­‐century	  plantation	  to	  contemporary	  experiments	  on	  prisoners.12	  	  Ellison	  refers	  to	  such	  a	  history	  when	  his	  narrator	  fears	  that	  the	  experimental	  treatment	  being	  performed	  on	  him	  might	  be	  castration,	  a	  longstanding	  tool	  of	  racial	  eugenics.	  Ellison	  also	  puts	  castration	  alongside	  psychosurgical	  methods,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  two	  might	  be	  similarly	  used	  for	  race-­‐based	  social	  control.	  Such	  a	  pairing	  is	  somewhat	  surprising	  and	  particularly	  prescient.	  Though	  Ellison	  would	  have	  been	  familiar	  with	  lobotomy	  and	  shock	  therapy,	  especially	  through	  his	  relationship	  with	  they	  psychologist	  Frederic	  Wertham,	  little	  documentation	  exists	  to	  suggest	  that	  in	  that	  moment	  black	  people	  were	  the	  primary	  recipients	  of	  these	  therapies.	  Given	  the	  prevalence	  of	  racialized	  medical	  experimentation	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  virtual	  absence	  of	  early	  psychosurgical	  experimentation	  on	  black	  people	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  ‘40s—at	  least	  as	  was	  considered	  scientifically	  meaningful	  enough	  to	  record—is	  worth	  noting:	  it	  manifests	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  institutional	  psychiatry	  considered	  black	  minds	  to	  “primitive”	  to	  be	  comparable	  with	  white	  minds	  or	  similarly	  “treated.”13	  However,	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  An	  extensive	  account	  of	  the	  long	  history	  of	  race-­‐based	  scientific	  experimentation	  in	  the	  US	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Harriet	  Washington’s	  Medical	  Apartheid:	  The	  Dark	  History	  
of	  Medical	  Experimentation	  on	  Black	  Americans	  from	  Colonial	  Times	  to	  the	  Present	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Doubleday,	  2008).	  See	  also,	  Britt	  Rusert,	  “’A	  Study	  in	  Nature’:	  The	  Tuskegee	  Experiments	  and	  the	  new	  South	  Plantation,”	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Humanities	  (2009).	  Despite	  a	  brief	  tightening	  of	  regulations	  that	  slowed	  (or	  hid)	  much	  prisoner	  experimentation	  post-­‐1978,	  the	  laws	  have	  since	  been	  relaxed	  again	  (in	  2008)	  and	  coercive	  prison	  experiments	  are	  again	  on	  the	  rise.	  13	  Several	  histories	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  psychosurgery—including	  Elliott	  Valenstein’s	  
Great	  and	  Desperate	  Cures:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Decline	  of	  Psychosurgery	  and	  other	  Radical	  
Treatments	  for	  Mental	  Illness	  (eBooks:	  CreateSpace,	  2010)	  and	  Jack	  D.	  Pressman’s	  
Last	  Resort:	  Psychosurgery	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Medicine	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  Univ.	  Press,	  1998)—bear	  no	  mention	  of	  race	  in	  their	  pages.	  Vanessa	  Johnson,	  however,	  points	  out	  that	  in	  the	  few	  black-­‐run	  and	  –populated	  psychiatric	  hospitals,	  lobotomy	  and	  shock	  treatment	  were	  used	  for	  treatment	  at	  similar	  rates	  as	  those	  for	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institutional	  psychotherapy	  began	  to	  take	  more	  and	  more	  black	  people	  under	  its	  auspices,	  the	  racial	  dynamics	  of	  testing	  changed.	  Fulfilling	  the	  prophesy	  of	  Ellison’s	  suggestive	  scene,	  by	  the	  1960s	  and	  ‘70s,	  black	  men	  were	  the	  primary	  targets	  of	  experimental	  psychosurgery.14	  	  Knowledge	  of	  such	  a	  trajectory	  complicates	  the	  dialogue	  between	  the	  white	  doctors	  in	  this	  scene,	  which	  parodies	  the	  racist	  presumptions	  of	  psychiatric	  discourse	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  parody	  of	  the	  doctors	  operates	  not	  merely	  at	  the	  level	  of	  their	  racism,	  however,	  but	  also	  goes	  on	  to	  mock	  the	  misapplication	  of	  descriptive	  psychological	  theory	  to	  neurosurgery.	  The	  doctors	  continue:	   “You	  see,	  instead	  of	  severing	  the	  prefrontal	  lobe,	  a	  single	  lobe,	  that	  is,	  we	  might	  apply	  pressure	  in	  the	  proper	  degrees	  to	  the	  major	  centers	  of	  nerve	  control—our	  concept	  is	  Gestalt—and	  the	  result	  is	  as	  complete	  a	  change	  of	  personality	  as	  you’ll	  find	  in	  your	  famous	  fairy-­‐tale	  cases	  of	  criminals	  transformed	  into	  amiable	  fellows	  after	  all	  that	  bloody	  business	  of	  brain	  operation.	  And	  what’s	  more,”	  the	  voice	  went	  on	  triumphantly,	  “the	  patient	  is	  both	  physically	  and	  neurologically	  whole.”	  (236)	  	  The	  doctor	  here	  conflates	  Gestalt,	  or	  whole-­‐perception,	  psychology	  with	  a	  “whole”	  conception	  of	  the	  neurological	  brain.	  Gestalt	  psychology	  is	  less	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  brain	  and	  its	  structures	  than	  of	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  perception;	  it	  holds	  that	  the	  mind	  perceives	  objects	  in	  their	  totality,	  yet	  the	  component	  parts	  of	  such	  a	  whole	  are	  other	  than	  the	  total	  object	  (Humphrey	  401).	  The	  doctor’s	  misuse	  and	  misunderstanding	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  white	  patients	  in	  white	  hospitals.	  See:	  Vanessa	  Johnson,	  Separate	  and	  Unequal:	  The	  
Legacy	  of	  Racially	  Segregated	  Mental	  Hospitals	  (2005).	  14	  See,	  in	  particular,	  “Part	  Two:	  The	  Usual	  Subjects”	  in	  Washington’s	  aforementioned	  book.	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Gestalt	  principles	  suggests	  major	  themes	  of	  the	  novel—those	  of	  the	  disjuncture	  between	  parts	  and	  wholes	  and	  between	  perception	  and	  prescriptions—as	  well	  as	  an	  ad	  hoc	  or	  hodgepodge	  justification	  for	  bodily	  invasion.	  Moreover,	  the	  doctor	  here	  conflates	  “criminality”	  and	  “insanity.”	  Criminal	  behavior	  is	  equivalent	  to	  psychological	  disease.	  The	  lack	  of	  differentiation	  among	  types	  of	  criminal	  behaviors	  and	  psychological	  states	  belies	  the	  problem	  of	  generalizing	  “aberrance”	  as	  surgically	  treatable—especially	  when,	  as	  the	  first	  quotation	  from	  this	  scene	  reveals,	  to	  be	  black	  was	  already	  to	  be	  statistically	  aberrant	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  psychology.	  To	  be	  black	  for	  American	  psychology	  in	  this	  period	  was	  to	  be	  insane	  (but	  without	  any	  psychological	  depth)	  and	  also	  to	  be	  criminal.	  	  	  	   This	  paradoxical	  “treatment”	  of	  the	  untreatable	  black	  mind	  tended	  to	  amount	  to	  nothing	  less	  than	  racial	  criminalization,	  bodily	  punishment,	  and	  abuse,	  which	  only	  intensified	  in	  the	  years	  following	  Invisible	  Man’s	  publication.	  Ellison’s	  engagements	  with	  psychotherapeutic	  practice	  outside	  the	  novel—and	  especially	  his	  support	  of	  LaFargue	  Clinic,	  the	  first	  psychotherapeutic	  clinic	  for	  black	  people	  in	  the	  US—suggest	  that	  Ellison	  had	  a	  more	  complex	  relationship	  to	  psychiatric	  practice	  than	  the	  merely	  critical	  one	  offered	  in	  this	  scene,	  yet	  his	  suspicions	  about	  universalizing	  psychological	  explanations	  and	  justifications	  for	  indictments	  of	  black	  social	  experience,	  especially	  those	  produced	  along	  statistical	  lines,	  remained	  consistent.15	  For	  Ellison,	  statistically-­‐based	  critiques	  of	  black	  social	  organization	  helped	  to	  guarantee	  the	  particular	  paradoxes	  that	  governed	  black	  civic	  life;	  blacks	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  Ellison’s	  work	  with	  LaFargue	  Clinic,	  see:	  Shelley	  Eversley,	  “The	  Lunatic’s	  Fancy	  and	  the	  Work	  of	  Art.”	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were	  promised	  democracy	  while	  being	  systematically	  denied	  it	  because	  they	  were	  constantly	  being	  designated	  and	  produced	  (through	  the	  use	  of	  statistics	  in	  psychology,	  criminology,	  and	  sociology)	  as	  unfit.	  	  	  
Invisible	  Politics	  	  	   Ellison’s	  concern	  with	  civic	  paradoxes,	  and	  specifically	  the	  national	  promise	  of	  democracy	  constantly	  denied	  to	  black	  citizens,	  led	  him	  to	  affirm	  the	  psychological	  struggle	  experienced	  by	  many	  black	  people	  as	  both	  real	  and	  socio-­‐politically	  produced,	  which	  he	  highlighted	  in	  an	  essay	  about	  LaFargue,	  “Harlem	  Is	  Nowhere.”16	  However,	  his	  investment	  in	  national	  life	  as	  the	  determining	  factor	  of	  psychological	  experience	  also	  led	  him,	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  to	  erase,	  make	  invisible,	  or	  simply	  not	  see	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  an	  irruptive	  black	  aesthetic	  within	  his	  novel	  already	  provided	  not	  a	  meditation	  on	  how	  to	  live	  within	  such	  a	  paradox	  (i.e.	  how	  to	  live	  within	  a	  theoretically	  “good”	  system—American	  democracy—through	  psychiatric	  treatment),	  but	  a	  way	  out	  of	  it,	  a	  political	  alternative.	  If	  one	  reads	  not	  for	  the	  “meaning”	  of	  his	  text,	  but	  for	  what	  it	  makes	  possible,	  then	  a	  set	  of	  material	  encounters	  and	  irruptions	  within	  his	  novel	  offer	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  disjuncture	  between	  the	  promise	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  reality	  of	  racial	  oppression	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  a	  systematized	  epistemology	  that	  claimed	  knowledge	  of	  totality,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See:	  Ralph	  Ellison,	  “Harlem	  is	  Nowhere,”	  Shadow	  and	  Act	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Signet,	  1966).	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which	  would	  never	  in	  fact	  be	  total,	  which	  could	  never	  deal	  with	  the	  material	  that	  exceeded	  ideology.	  The	  event	  that	  brought	  the	  invisible	  man	  under	  psychiatric	  treatment	  operates	  as	  an	  especially	  important	  node	  within	  the	  novel	  in	  that	  it	  highlights	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  political	  action	  is	  managed	  within	  the	  political	  system	  of	  the	  nation	  when	  the	  system	  is	  understood	  as	  total,	  and	  thus	  political	  disruptions	  understood	  as	  “treatable”	  via	  psychiatric	  means.	  However,	  that	  node	  also	  provides	  a	  point	  from	  which	  to	  expand	  the	  field	  of	  politics	  and	  political	  agency	  within	  the	  novel.	  The	  invisible	  man,	  having	  ambivalently	  succeeded	  at	  his	  first	  task	  at	  the	  Liberty	  Paint	  Factory	  (a	  scene	  in	  which	  he	  is	  instructed	  to	  put	  one	  drop	  of	  black	  in	  each	  bucket	  of	  white	  paint),	  is	  moved	  to	  the	  engine	  room	  to	  assist	  Lucius	  Brockway	  in	  making	  the	  paint	  base	  and	  controlling	  the	  machinery	  of	  the	  plant	  (206-­‐207).	  From	  there	  he	  encounters	  a	  group	  of	  men	  striking	  at	  the	  factory,	  and	  learns	  that	  he	  has	  been	  hired	  as	  a	  scab.	  While	  the	  invisible	  man	  attempts	  to	  process	  what	  he	  has	  learned	  about	  the	  strike,	  Mr.	  Brockway	  accuses	  him	  of	  being	  a	  striker	  (and	  therefore	  a	  threat	  to	  Brockway’s	  own	  access	  to	  income).	  A	  fight	  ensues,	  and,	  with	  neither	  man	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  machinery,	  a	  pipe	  bursts	  and	  explodes	  the	  section	  of	  the	  factory	  that	  makes	  the	  paint	  base,	  thus	  stopping	  all	  production	  (229-­‐230).	  	  The	  explosion	  accidentally	  instantiates	  what	  the	  strikers	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  accomplish:	  a	  stoppage	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  to	  the	  desired	  ends).	  This	  unintentional	  disorganization	  of	  the	  factory	  seems	  to	  be	  perceived	  by	  the	  factory	  owners	  and	  its	  doctors	  as	  an	  act	  of	  sabotage,	  hence	  the	  narrator	  being	  treated	  for	  his	  “criminal”	  mind.	  Yet	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  incident	  in	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which	  an	  “accident”—an	  unexpected	  encounter	  with	  material	  forces	  or	  disruptive	  embodiment—has	  real	  political	  effects,	  and	  in	  which	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  political	  agency	  does	  not	  pass	  through	  proper	  political	  consciousness.	  (A	  similar	  event	  happens	  in	  the	  early	  pages	  of	  the	  novel,	  when	  the	  narrator’s	  accidental	  “belch”	  starts	  a	  train	  of	  events	  that	  lead	  him	  to	  embarrass	  his	  school’s	  headmaster	  in	  front	  of	  the	  school’s	  white	  benefactor,	  exposing	  their	  covertly	  racist	  arrangement,	  for	  which	  the	  narrator	  is	  kicked	  out	  of	  school.)	  However,	  the	  political	  effects	  of	  these	  material	  and	  bodily	  excesses	  are	  not	  fully	  controllable	  or	  controlled	  by	  a	  willful	  agency,	  nor	  do	  disruptive	  political	  events	  automatically	  engender	  fully	  realized	  political	  counter-­‐consciousness.	  	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  despite	  readings	  of	  the	  novel’s	  politics	  as	  merely	  advancing	  liberal	  individualist	  ideology,	  within	  the	  novel	  itself	  politics	  is	  not	  a	  total	  symbolic	  field	  governed	  by	  a	  closed	  ideology.	  It	  is,	  rather,	  an	  open,	  material	  field	  in	  which	  various	  forces	  (such	  as	  the	  steam	  and	  electricity	  coursing	  through	  the	  factory)	  and	  unpredictable	  forms	  of	  embodiment	  (the	  belch)	  interact	  with	  and	  are	  caught	  up	  in	  an	  ideological	  politics	  that	  seeks	  to	  reduce	  and	  direct	  them.	  The	  irrational	  coursing	  through	  even	  the	  most	  rational	  systems,	  then,	  provides	  the	  means	  for	  the	  short-­‐circuiting	  and/or	  freeing	  of	  energy	  for	  an	  improvisatory	  politics	  that	  is	  both	  more	  and	  less	  than	  legible	  in	  any	  conventional	  political	  sense.	  But	  it	  is,	  nonetheless,	  effective	  for	  engendering	  another	  realm,	  another	  space	  of	  political	  potential	  that	  must	  be	  realized	  in	  concert	  its	  material	  substrate	  rather	  than	  imposed	  upon	  it.	  The	  electricity	  that	  short-­‐circuits	  factory	  production	  is	  the	  same	  electricity	  that	  courses	  through	  the	  invisible	  man	  in	  his	  shock	  treatment,	  and	  it	  is	  that	  same	  electricity	  that	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the	  invisible	  man	  will	  siphon	  off	  in	  his	  battle	  against	  “Monopolated	  Light	  and	  Power,”	  letting	  loose	  “a	  hell	  of	  a	  lot	  of	  free	  current	  somewhere	  in	  the	  jungle	  of	  Harlem”	  (3).	  	  	  Such	  events	  suggest	  that	  the	  stagnating	  effects	  of	  the	  civic	  paradox	  Ellison	  describes	  in	  his	  essays	  are	  reinforced	  by	  an	  incapacity	  to	  imagine	  a	  social	  formation	  beyond	  the	  nation	  and	  to	  fully	  encounter	  and	  improvise	  on	  the	  outside	  that	  is	  inside,	  the	  irrational	  traversing	  reason,	  which	  he	  nevertheless	  makes	  available	  within	  the	  pages	  of	  Invisible	  Man.	  His	  novel	  repeatedly	  gives	  evidence	  of	  the	  disruptive	  potential	  of	  that	  which	  is	  excessive	  to	  any	  system	  when	  viewed	  from	  an	  expanded	  political	  field	  through	  his	  technique	  of	  “dilated	  realism.”	  Yet	  Ellison,	  at	  least	  publicly,	  remained	  committed	  to	  a	  narrower	  vision	  of	  political	  desire:	  the	  aspiration	  to	  democratic	  citizenship	  within	  the	  nation.	  Still,	  Ellison’s	  relentless	  struggle	  to	  map	  the	  contours	  of	  what	  he	  perceived	  as	  a	  national	  paradox	  through	  dilated	  realism—that	  surreal	  realism	  that	  “gives	  one	  a	  slightly	  different	  sense	  of	  time,”	  in	  which	  “the	  swift	  and	  imperceptible	  flowing	  of	  time”	  gives	  way	  to	  “points	  where	  time	  stands	  still	  or	  from	  which	  it	  leaps	  ahead	  [,	  and]	  you	  slip	  into	  the	  breaks	  and	  look	  around”	  (Ellison	  8)—found	  him	  strangely	  in	  line	  with	  Einstein’s	  struggles	  with	  the	  quantum.	  Einstein’s	  struggles	  also	  resisted	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  statistics	  would	  “solve”	  and	  totalize	  quantum	  theory,	  papering	  over	  its	  supposedly	  irresolvable	  paradoxes,	  nullifying	  their	  epistemological	  force.	  He	  refused,	  again	  and	  again,	  to	  accept	  the	  limited	  statistical	  methods	  by	  which	  the	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation—and	  Heisenberg	  and	  Bohr	  specifically—had	  laid	  claim	  to	  a	  complete	  quantum	  theory	  that	  rejected	  the	  possibility	  of	  quantum	  realism,	  or,	  rather,	  a	  description	  of	  the	  quantum	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world.	  But	  it	  would	  be	  Jackson	  who	  would	  not	  merely	  make	  the	  possibility	  of	  epistemological	  excess	  and	  its	  effects	  sensible	  but	  would	  also	  actualize	  a	  way	  of	  acting	  on	  such	  excesses	  that	  did	  not	  fully	  depend	  on	  visibility	  as	  the	  total	  horizon	  of	  political	  possibility.	  	   Interestingly,	  despite	  wielding	  devastating	  critiques	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  scientific	  practices	  that	  engendered	  racial	  science,	  neither	  Jackson	  nor	  Ellison	  found	  scientific	  pursuit	  irredeemable.	  For	  Jackson,	  the	  scientific	  study	  of	  criminology	  had	  erred	  in	  taking	  the	  mad	  criminal	  as	  its	  object,	  thus	  making	  invisible	  the	  madness	  of	  a	  larger	  system;	  criminological	  rationality	  makes	  the	  criminal	  hypervisible	  as	  an	  isolated	  object	  of	  study	  but	  invisible	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  experience	  of	  social	  reality	  by	  refusing	  to	  take	  the	  system	  itself	  under	  investigation.	  	  He	  describes	  a	  useful	  science	  as	  one	  that	  would	  recognize	  that	  racism,	  “stamped	  unalterably	  onto	  the	  present	  nature	  of	  Amerikan	  sociopolitical	  and	  economic	  life”	  produced	  “criminals	  and	  crime”	  that	  “arise	  from	  material,	  economic,	  and	  sociopolitical	  causes”	  (Jackson	  18).	  For	  him,	  an	  inverted	  criminology	  that	  instead	  diagnoses	  the	  system,	  its	  perpetrators,	  and	  the	  “long	  chain	  of	  corruption”	  that	  enables	  it,	  is	  necessary:	  “You	  have	  to	  examine	  these	  people	  from	  director	  down	  to	  guard	  before	  you	  can	  logically	  examine	  their	  product”	  (Jackson	  19).	  	   Ellison’s	  life	  similarly	  evinced	  an	  ambivalent,	  and	  even	  hopeful	  relationship,	  not	  merely	  to	  psychology,	  but	  to	  scientific	  methods	  and	  their	  visual	  technologies—if	  and	  when	  they	  are	  transformed	  and	  used	  against	  the	  dominant	  history	  of	  racially	  oppressive	  practices.	  Shelly	  Eversley	  has	  documented	  his	  work	  with	  the	  psychiatrist	  Frederic	  Wertham	  and	  Richard	  Wright	  to	  establish	  LaFargue	  Clinic	  in	  Harlem,	  
	   91	  
where	  he	  advocated	  for	  a	  “social	  psychiatry”	  approach	  that	  diagnosed	  the	  psychological	  turmoil	  of	  black	  people	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  racist	  conditions	  of	  the	  US’s	  supposed	  democracy	  (Eversley	  445).	  Similarly,	  Sara	  Blair	  argues	  that	  despite	  his	  clear	  indictment	  of	  photography’s	  use	  within	  sociological	  and	  “documentary”	  disciplines	  for	  producing	  racial	  types	  and	  stereotypes,	  Ellison	  was	  a	  life-­‐long	  photographer,	  producing	  portrait,	  documentary,	  and	  avant-­‐garde	  photography	  (Blair	  113).	  Even	  the	  documentary	  approach	  of	  sociological	  writing	  or	  “realism”	  that	  Ellison	  seemed	  to	  reject	  in	  favor	  of	  parody	  and	  irony	  finds	  itself	  reappearing	  in	  the	  mutated	  form	  of	  “dilated	  realism.”	  	  	   What	  Ellison	  seems	  to	  reject	  in	  each	  of	  the	  sciences	  he	  criticizes	  is	  its	  supposedly	  transparent	  relationship	  to	  and	  knowledge	  of	  its	  objects—often	  guaranteed	  through	  technologies	  of	  vision—and	  especially	  what	  Selisker	  suggests	  is	  the	  “more	  general”	  tendency	  of	  these	  science,	  implicated	  in	  “mid-­‐century	  technocracy	  […]	  to	  define	  and	  solve	  social	  problems	  by	  manipulating	  them	  from	  afar”	  (Selisker	  572).	  Another	  way	  to	  describe	  these	  technocratic	  sciences	  might	  be	  to	  say	  that	  they	  necessarily	  magnify	  the	  distinction	  between	  subject	  and	  object,	  placing	  even	  greater	  distance	  between	  them,	  and	  emphasizing	  the	  subject’s	  value	  as	  being	  its	  capacity	  for	  disinterested	  knowledge	  of	  the	  object.	  The	  epistemological	  separation	  between	  the	  subject-­‐scientist-­‐observer	  and	  his	  racialized	  object	  seems	  to	  increase	  at	  this	  moment	  precisely	  because	  increasingly	  visible	  racial	  unrest	  threatens	  to	  collapse	  such	  a	  distinction.	  	  	   Ellison’s	  novel,	  in	  exposing	  the	  violence	  of	  a	  purportedly	  disinterested	  scientific	  observer,	  hardly	  seems	  to	  make	  a	  claim	  for	  the	  narrator’s	  potential	  status	  
	   92	  
as	  a	  subject	  who	  could,	  in	  turn,	  assert	  mastery	  or	  knowledge	  over	  other	  objects.	  Recognition	  can	  hardly	  be	  the	  desired	  end,	  for	  as	  the	  invisible	  man	  notes,	  “It’s	  sometimes	  advantageous	  to	  be	  unseen”	  (Ellison	  3).	  Instead,	  Ellison’s	  novel—albeit	  with	  ambivalent	  results—takes	  seriously	  the	  question	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  both	  epistemologically	  and	  ontologically	  on	  the	  side	  of	  impossible	  unseen	  objects—objects	  that	  in	  their	  hypervisibility	  and	  transmogrification	  into	  what	  Mark	  Seltzer	  has	  called	  “statistical	  persons”	  (Seltzer	  5)—have	  been	  rendered	  and	  are	  invisible,	  inaccessible	  in	  their	  reality.	  To	  think	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  object	  would	  require	  accepting	  that	  the	  subjugating	  production	  of	  regimes	  of	  visibility	  affects	  objects,	  but	  also	  and	  more	  importantly	  that	  it	  does	  not	  fully	  determine	  them.	  Being	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  object	  allows	  for	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  forces	  that	  affect	  an	  object	  beyond	  vision—which	  are	  also	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  a	  political	  agency	  that	  expands	  the	  field	  of	  the	  political,	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  visibility.	  It	  also	  allows	  one	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  unknowable	  being	  of	  the	  object	  that,	  in	  its	  invisibility,	  experiences	  and	  improvises	  on	  the	  epistemological	  and	  material	  excesses	  that	  structural	  scientism’s	  reification	  of	  vision	  seeks	  to	  eliminate.	  This	  is	  one	  way	  that	  Ellison’s	  novel	  participates	  in	  what	  Fred	  Moten	  has	  described	  as	  “the	  history	  of	  blackness,”	  a	  history	  that	  is	  “a	  testament	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  objects	  can	  and	  do	  resist”	  (Moten	  Break	  1).	  Such	  participation	  begins	  to	  link	  Ellison’s	  work	  to	  the	  larger	  “aesthetics	  of	  the	  black	  radical	  tradition”	  that	  Moten	  theorizes,	  despite	  the	  conventional	  interpretation	  of	  Ellisonian	  politics.	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The	  Desire	  for	  Realism:	  Physics	  and	  Standpoint	  	  	  	   The	  question	  not	  so	  much	  of	  what	  it	  means,	  but	  how	  to	  be	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  object,	  what	  is	  possible	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  object,	  also	  links	  Ellison’s	  novel,	  his	  formal	  concerns,	  and	  his	  writing	  practice	  to	  the	  internal	  debates	  of	  quantum	  theory	  that	  traversed	  Ellison’s	  lifetime.	  Quantum	  physics	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  scientific	  investigation	  of	  the	  world	  at	  the	  limits	  of	  its	  knowability,	  across	  its	  strangest,	  tiniest,	  fastest,	  and	  most	  distant	  features.	  The	  field	  is	  largely	  considered	  an	  esoteric	  discipline	  in	  that	  much	  of	  the	  quantum	  world	  is	  non-­‐intuitive,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  sensibility	  and	  descriptive	  possibility—it	  requires	  interpretation	  in	  order	  to	  speak	  about	  the	  non-­‐obvious	  features	  of	  the	  world.	  And	  quantum	  theory	  of	  the	  world	  exposes	  its	  interpretive	  limits	  when	  it	  meets	  entanglement.	  Interactions	  between	  objects	  that	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  causality	  represent	  a	  great	  challenge	  to	  science	  itself,	  which,	  from	  Kant	  to	  the	  present,	  has	  been	  founded	  on	  the	  investigation	  of	  causal	  connections.	  Einstein	  cautioned,	  “Abandonment	  of	  causality,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle,	  should	  be	  permitted	  only	  in	  the	  most	  extreme	  emergency”	  (Pais	  420).	  	   The	  golden	  age	  of	  quantum	  theory	  was	  constituted	  by	  a	  series	  of	  debates	  about	  precisely	  such	  an	  emergency.	  They	  were	  largely	  fueled	  by	  a	  disagreement	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  Niels	  Bohr,	  Werner	  Heisenberg,	  and	  what	  would	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation,	  and	  Albert	  Einstein,	  Erwin	  Schrödinger,	  and	  the	  challenges	  of	  the	  EPR	  (Einstein-­‐Podolsky-­‐Rosen)	  paradox	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation	  insisted	  that	  there	  was	  a	  split	  between	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the	  quantum	  world	  of	  matter	  (such	  as	  subatomic	  particles	  and	  light	  quanta),	  which	  could	  not	  be	  perceived	  directly,	  and	  the	  classical	  world	  of	  larger	  objects	  (such	  as,	  to	  use	  Schrödinger’s	  example,	  cats),	  which	  could.	  While	  the	  classical	  system,	  which	  is	  always	  the	  side	  of	  the	  observer,	  could	  be	  known	  and	  described	  with	  a	  form	  of	  scientific	  realism,	  the	  quantum	  world	  is	  ontologically	  determined	  and	  epistemologically	  accessible	  only	  through	  statistics	  and	  probability,	  and	  then	  only	  incompletely,	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  observer.	  The	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation	  holds	  that	  quantum	  realism	  is	  impossible.	  But	  Einstein	  was	  dissatisfied	  with	  an	  interpretation	  that	  explained	  away	  its	  internal	  paradoxes	  as	  mere	  epistemological	  effects	  of	  an	  “uncertain”	  ontology	  determined	  by	  observation.17	  He	  evinced	  an	  insistent	  belief	  in	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  object	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  observation	  and	  spent	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  life	  striving	  to	  describe	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  quantum	  object	  and	  attempting	  to	  link	  the	  classical	  to	  the	  quantum	  world.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  Einstein,	  like	  Ellison,	  struggled	  to	  produce	  the	  “dilated	  realism”	  that	  would	  connect,	  describe,	  and	  create	  worlds	  that	  both	  are	  from	  and	  are	  this	  world,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  he	  affirmed	  his	  belief	  in	  the	  world	  beyond	  his	  own	  knowledge	  of	  it.	  Philosopher	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  suggests	  that	  the	  philosophical	  advent	  of	  
empiricism	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  turn	  away	  from	  “knowledge,”	  and	  turn	  toward	  “belief	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  within	  Heisenberg’s	  theory	  of	  quantum	  uncertainty,	  the	  “observer”	  does	  not	  name	  a	  subject	  position	  nor	  does	  it	  imply	  cognition,	  but	  instead	  names	  any	  element	  of	  the	  classical	  world	  that	  interacts	  with	  the	  quantum	  world;	  according	  to	  Bohr	  and	  Heisenberg,	  such	  interaction	  is	  required	  to	  give	  variables	  to	  the	  wave	  function	  (a	  mathematical	  formula)	  that	  explains	  an	  uncertain	  quantum	  particle,	  thereby	  determining	  it	  and	  make	  it	  known.	  Ultimately,	  “observer”	  is	  defined	  tautologically	  as	  “that	  which	  collapses	  the	  wave	  function.”	  Heisenberg,	  
Physics	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the	  world”	  (Deleuze,	  Cinema	  172).	  For	  Deleuze,	  belief	  in	  the	  world	  enables	  the	  possibility	  of	  fundamentally	  undermining	  existing	  values	  (those	  imagined	  be	  the	  results	  of	  progressivist	  knowledge)	  and	  producing	  new	  ones	  in	  the	  continual	  and	  disruptive	  hope	  of	  describing	  the	  world	  “as	  it	  is.”	  Belief	  in	  the	  world	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  responding	  to	  intolerable	  conditions	  of	  this	  world	  by	  recognizing	  that	  man	  is	  in	  and	  of	  the	  world,	  not	  separable	  from	  it	  via	  cognition	  or	  transcendence;	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  restoring	  a	  connection	  to	  the	  world	  across	  and	  by	  way	  of	  “the	  cut”	  between	  self	  and	  world,	  and	  affirming	  thought	  as	  a	  thing	  in	  and	  of	  the	  world	  (Deleuze,	  Cinema	  170).	  The	  move	  from	  classical	  to	  quantum	  physics	  (which	  Heisenberg	  also	  described	  as	  happening	  across	  “the	  cut”)	  already	  indicates	  the	  possibilities	  of	  empiricism	  that	  Deleuze	  signals.	  Einstein’s	  persistent	  push	  for	  a	  full	  description	  of	  the	  quantum	  world,	  and	  his	  dissatisfaction	  with	  statistical	  approximation,	  evidences	  a	  pursuit	  in	  which	  “thought	  itself	  [is	  understood]	  as	  an	  act	  of	  belief,	  an	  experiment,	  a	  force	  to	  create	  new	  values”	  (Deleuze,	  Empiricism	  xx).	  But,	  importantly,	  this	  invokes	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  empiricism	  not	  synonymous	  with	  positivism,	  but	  one	  that	  nevertheless	  affirms	  sense	  perception	  as	  the	  form	  of	  experience,	  and	  affirms	  it	  all	  the	  more	  strongly	  by	  suggesting	  that	  even	  our	  sense	  of	  sense	  perception	  itself	  is	  not	  fully	  intuitive,	  transparent,	  or	  known.	  Einstein’s	  belief	  in	  the	  world	  and	  its	  capacity	  to	  engender	  new	  forms	  of	  agency	  was	  not	  deterred	  by	  his	  repeated	  failure	  to	  complete	  the	  description	  he	  hoped	  would	  join	  the	  classical	  and	  quantum	  worlds—although	  that	  desire	  and	  its	  failure	  would	  hinder	  both	  the	  narrator	  of	  Invisible	  Man	  and	  Ellison	  himself	  from	  recognizable	  political	  action.	  Instead,	  Einstein	  spent	  the	  last	  twenty-­‐three	  years	  of	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his	  life,	  after	  his	  immigration	  to	  the	  US,	  involved	  in	  an	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  struggle	  for	  racial	  liberty—an	  involvement	  that	  has,	  in	  the	  records	  of	  Einstein’s	  life,	  been	  made	  invisible.18	  Fred	  Jerome	  and	  Rodger	  Taylor,	  authors	  of	  the	  only	  book	  detailing	  Einstein’s	  deep	  and	  varied	  engagement	  with	  racial	  struggle,	  Einstein	  on	  Race	  and	  
Racism,	  point	  out:	  More	  than	  one	  hundred	  biographies	  and	  monographs	  about	  Albert	  Einstein	  have	  been	  published,	  yet	  not	  one	  of	  them	  mentions	  the	  name	  Paul	  Robeson,	  let	  alone	  Einstein’s	  friendship	  with	  him;	  or	  the	  name	  W.E.B.	  Du	  Bois,	  let	  alone	  Einstein’s	  support	  for	  him.	  Nor	  does	  one	  find	  in	  any	  of	  these	  works	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Congress	  whose	  campaigns	  Einstein	  actively	  supported.	  Finally,	  nowhere	  in	  all	  the	  ocean	  of	  published	  Einsteiniana—anthologies,	  bibliographies,	  biographies,	  summaries,	  articles,	  videotapes,	  calendars,	  posters	  and	  postcards—will	  one	  find	  even	  an	  islet	  of	  information	  about	  Einstein’s	  visits	  and	  ties	  to	  the	  people	  in	  Princeton’s	  African-­‐American	  community	  around	  a	  street	  called	  Witherspoon.	  (ix)	  	  Even	  though	  Einstein,	  in	  his	  flight	  from	  Nazi	  Germany	  in	  1931,	  might	  be	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  Jewish	  diaspora,	  Jerome’s	  and	  Taylor’s	  detailing	  of	  his	  American	  life,	  lived	  largely	  in	  and	  with	  Princeton’s	  black	  neighborhoods,	  finds	  Einstein	  further	  entangled	  by	  way	  of	  the	  node	  in	  the	  black	  diaspora	  that	  is	  Witherspoon	  Street,	  Princeton,	  New	  Jersey.	  And	  Einstein	  encouraged	  rather	  than	  rejected	  such	  entanglement.	  In	  fact,	  Jerome	  and	  Taylor	  note,	  Einstein’s	  entire	  FBI	  file—compiled	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Echoing	  Ellison’s	  narrator’s	  claim	  that	  the	  invisibility	  of	  black	  people	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  defect	  of	  the	  white	  (liberal)	  observer,	  Einstein	  stated	  publicly	  that	  segregation	  “is	  not	  a	  disease	  of	  colored	  people,	  but	  a	  disease	  of	  white	  people”	  (Jerome	  and	  Taylor	  88).	  Significantly,	  however,	  for	  Einstein	  the	  register	  changes	  to	  that	  of	  biology	  and	  epidemiology,	  thus	  eliminating	  even	  a	  metaphoric	  reference	  to	  the	  problems	  within	  physics.	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by	  J.	  Edgar	  Hoover	  to	  track	  Einstein’s	  communist	  activities—consists	  almost	  entirely	  of	  documents	  of	  his	  anti-­‐racist	  activism.19	  	  But	  just	  as	  texts	  detailing	  Einstein’s	  accomplishments	  in	  physics	  put	  his	  anti-­‐racist	  engagements	  under	  erasure,	  Jerome’s	  and	  Taylor’s	  monograph	  discusses	  his	  physics	  work	  only	  peripherally,	  and	  suggests	  no	  link	  between	  Einstein’s	  scientific	  inquiries	  and	  his	  anti-­‐racism.	  Though	  they	  do	  not	  cite	  Einstein’s	  own	  perception	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  his	  scientific	  work	  and	  political	  activism,	  their	  decision	  may	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  it.	  He	  once	  stated,	  “My	  love	  for	  justice	  and	  striving	  to	  contribute	  towards	  the	  improvement	  of	  human	  conditions	  are	  quite	  independent	  from	  my	  scientific	  interests’	  (Dukas	  and	  Hoffman	  18).	  But,	  although	  Einstein	  overtly	  rejected	  a	  continuity	  between	  his	  scientific	  work	  and	  his	  struggles	  for	  social	  justice,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  his	  contributions	  to	  rejecting	  pure	  positivism	  for	  quantum	  physics—both	  in	  his	  affirmation	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  hidden	  (invisible)	  variables	  and	  his	  heuristic	  refusal	  of	  the	  statistical	  treatment	  of	  electrons—has	  implications	  for	  the	  positivist	  assumptions	  that	  undergird	  and	  give	  power	  to	  racial	  science	  as	  science,	  bringing	  its	  foundational	  assumptions	  into	  question.	  Moreover,	  his	  reflexive	  understanding	  of	  scientific	  practice—one	  that	  led	  him	  to	  claim	  that	  “the	  theory	  determines	  what	  we	  can	  see”—has	  implications	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  science	  more	  generally,	  especially	  as	  it	  bumps	  against	  and	  attempts	  to	  determine	  lived	  experience	  by	  way	  of	  moral	  prescription.	  For	  Einstein,	  invisibility	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Jerome	  and	  Taylor	  suggest	  that	  one	  irony	  of	  J.	  Edgar	  Hoover’s	  racism	  and	  his	  tendency	  to	  equate	  anti-­‐racism	  with	  communism	  (which	  were,	  for	  him,	  both	  national	  enemies)	  is	  that	  Einstein’s	  FBI	  dossier	  contains	  the	  only	  detailed	  documentation	  of	  his	  anti-­‐racist	  activities,	  many	  of	  which	  would	  have,	  otherwise,	  disappeared	  completely	  (Jerome	  and	  Taylor	  103).	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particular	  theoretical	  standpoint;	  it	  is	  not	  the	  material	  world	  that	  is	  the	  limit,	  but	  theory,	  especially	  a	  theory	  that	  does	  not	  make	  a	  place	  for	  or	  acknowledge	  the	  possibility	  and	  reality	  of	  invisible	  objects	  and	  forces.	  And	  it	  is	  the	  theory	  that	  must	  be	  revised	  and	  improvised	  to	  accommodate	  material	  disruptions	  that	  such	  preemptive	  erasure	  threatens	  to	  make	  inaccessible.	  The	  possibility	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  quantum	  theory	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  Max	  Planck,	  who	  in	  1900,	  developed	  a	  “black	  box”	  technology—a	  container	  with	  black	  inner	  walls	  through	  which	  light	  of	  various	  frequencies	  could	  pass	  and	  be	  absorbed—that	  enabled	  him	  to	  count	  the	  energy	  carried	  by	  light.	  Using	  the	  same	  technology,	  and	  building	  on	  Planck’s	  formulations,	  five	  years	  later,	  Einstein	  was	  able	  to	  show	  that	  light	  at	  especially	  high	  frequencies	  behaved	  as	  though	  “’mutually	  independent	  energy	  quanta,’”	  or	  “atoms	  of	  light”	  which	  would	  become	  known	  as	  
photons	  (Gilder	  27).	  “Quanta”	  is	  the	  word	  for	  the	  smallest	  discrete	  particle	  involved	  in	  any	  physical	  interaction.	  This	  mediated	  observation	  that	  light	  might	  be	  separable	  into	  discrete	  entities	  enabled	  an	  investigation	  of	  matter	  at	  even	  more	  infinitesimal	  sizes—at	  levels	  that	  were	  otherwise,	  and	  prior	  to	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  light	  quantum,	  invisible.	  The	  investigation	  of	  the	  quantum	  led	  to	  “observations”	  (and,	  again,	  the	  term	  becomes	  especially	  porous	  for	  quantum	  physics,	  often	  indicating	  effects,	  thought	  experiments,	  or	  mathematical	  extrapolations)	  about	  matter	  that	  were	  not	  only	  invisible	  but	  could	  not	  even	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  that	  could	  be	  
visualized.	  For	  example,	  the	  electron	  (a	  subatomic	  particle	  that	  carries	  an	  atom’s	  charge)	  was	  observed	  to	  require	  two	  spins	  to	  complete	  a	  single	  rotation—an	  unvisualizable	  phenomenon	  (how	  could	  you	  spin	  twice	  to	  go	  once	  around?)	  that	  led	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to	  the	  particle	  being	  given,	  temporarily,	  the	  unwieldy	  name,	  “spin-­‐one-­‐half-­‐particle”—even	  in	  language	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  represent,	  and	  “spin”	  itself	  was	  only	  a	  poor	  approximation	  of	  the	  electron’s	  actions.	  Such	  non-­‐intuitive	  features	  of	  the	  quantum	  world	  meant,	  as	  science	  historian	  Louisa	  Gilder	  notes	  in	  The	  Age	  of	  Entanglement:	  When	  Quantum	  Physics	  Was	  Reborn,	  that	  quantum	  theory	  signaled	  “a	  drastic	  break	  with	  the	  past	  history	  of	  science”	  in	  that	  it	  required	  a	  theory	  and	  interpretation	  in	  order	  “to	  speak	  about	  the	  natural	  world.”	  In	  “a	  classical	  (i.e.	  pre-­‐quantum)	  equation,	  after	  its	  terms	  were	  defined,	  [it]	  essentially	  explained	  itself,”	  whereas	  for	  the	  quantum,	  “equations	  fell	  silent”	  (Gilder	  4).	  The	  quantum	  physical	  theory	  of	  the	  world	  exposes	  its	  own	  limits	  when	  it	  meets	  entanglement,	  thus	  making	  a	  continued	  mystery	  of	  entanglement	  as	  a	  non-­‐causal	  phenomenon—which	  brings	  science	  at	  its	  most	  daring	  dangerously	  close	  to	  pre-­‐Enlightenment	  magic—and	  thus	  making	  entanglement	  a	  site	  of	  scientific	  and	  lay	  curiosity.	  	  Gilder’s	  text	  joins	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  popular	  histories	  of	  quantum	  physics	  told	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  entanglement,20	  but	  hers	  is	  especially	  useful	  in	  that,	  while	  it	  is	  constructed	  in	  narrative/progressive	  form	  (with	  entanglement	  being	  the	  connecting	  thread),	  it	  is	  told	  almost	  exclusively	  in	  the	  language	  and	  words	  of	  the	  scientists	  involved,	  taken	  directly	  from	  their	  own	  writing,	  and	  places	  the	  developments	  of	  quantum	  physics	  within	  the	  social	  and	  affective	  contexts	  of	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See:	  Amir	  D.	  Aczel,	  Entanglement	  (2003);	  Brian	  Clegg,	  The	  God	  Effect:	  Science’s	  
Strangest	  Phenomenon	  (2009);	  Sameer	  Ketkar,	  Entanglement	  (2011);	  Valerio	  Scarani	  and	  Rachael	  Thew,	  Quantum	  Physics:	  A	  First	  Encounter:	  Interference,	  
Entanglement,	  and	  Reality	  (2006),	  etc.	  etc.	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lives.	  Their	  debates,	  and	  specifically	  the	  struggle	  to	  make	  thinkable	  both	  entanglement	  and	  the	  behavior	  of	  electrons,	  highlight	  the	  discontinuity	  among	  observation,	  description,	  and	  meaning	  that	  were	  often	  presumed	  to	  be	  continuous	  and	  transparent	  within	  positivist	  science,	  and	  thus	  they	  speak	  back	  to	  those	  sciences	  that	  would	  depend	  on	  such	  presumptions.	  	  After	  the	  Solvay	  Conference	  in	  1927,	  what	  was	  known	  as	  the	  “Copenhagen	  Interpretation”	  (developed	  by	  Niels	  Bohr	  and	  Werner	  Heisenberg	  among	  others)	  became	  the	  orthodox	  interpretation	  of	  quantum	  theory.	  The	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation	  holds	  that	  quantum	  systems	  are	  fully	  described	  by	  a	  wave	  function	  (a	  mathematical	  formula),	  not	  fully	  measurable	  (uncertain),	  and	  contingent	  upon	  the	  observer.	  While	  much	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation	  would	  eventually	  hold	  up	  to	  physical	  experimental	  testing,	  Bohr’s	  and	  Heisenberg’s	  assumptions	  that	  the	  quantum	  theory	  was	  “complete”	  in	  their	  hands	  because	  it	  had	  reached	  the	  point	  at	  which	  quantum	  epistemology	  and	  “objective	  reality”	  became	  incompatible—it	  simply	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  think	  further	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  world—would	  not.	  	  Bohr	  and	  Heisenberg	  held	  that	  neither	  images	  nor	  language,	  which	  were	  tools	  of	  the	  “classical”	  world,	  was	  adequate	  to	  a	  description	  of	  the	  quantum	  world	  (Gilder	  5,	  42),	  yet	  because	  the	  classical	  world	  was	  the	  side	  of	  the	  apparatus	  (the	  observer),	  any	  description	  of	  the	  quantum	  world	  was	  only	  possible	  by	  making	  the	  quantum	  world	  interact	  with	  the	  classical	  world	  (by,	  for	  example,	  observation).	  For	  Heisenberg,	  this	  meant	  that	  a	  quantum	  theory	  that	  could	  cohere	  with	  classical	  theory	  is	  impossible.	  He	  describes	  this	  impossibility,	  saying:	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Both	  on	  the	  quantum	  mechanical	  side,	  with	  the	  object,	  and	  on	  the	  classical	  side,	  with	  the	  apparatus,	  […]	  the	  laws	  of	  that	  side	  hold	  precisely.	  The	  statistics	  come	  in	  here	  […]	  at	  the	  Schnitt [the	  Cut].	  You	  can’t	  measure	  a	  particle	  without	  disturbing	  its	  causal	  course.	  	  	   Now,	  if	  you	  were	  going	  to	  hope	  for,	  as	  you	  said,	  ‘new	  formulas	  and	  rules’	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  quantum	  theory	  and	  bring	  causality	  back	  to	  it,	  they	  have	  to	  enter	  along	  the	  Schnitt.	  But	  the	  Schnitt	  can	  always	  be	  moved—you	  can	  always	  describe	  something	  quantum	  mechanically	  which	  you	  were	  describing	  classically	  before;	  you	  can	  always	  include	  a	  little	  more	  of	  your	  apparatus	  in	  the	  quantum	  mechanical	  system,	  as	  long	  as	  some	  part	  of	  the	  apparatus	  remains	  classical.	  But	  when	  the	  
Schnitt	  moves,	  a	  contradiction	  between	  the	  law-­‐like	  consequences	  of	  the	  new	  hidden	  properties	  and	  the	  more	  fluid	  relationships	  of	  quantum	  theory	  will	  be	  unavoidable.	  (Gilder	  152-­‐153)21	  	  The	  quantum	  theory,	  then,	  had	  to	  be	  considered	  complete	  without	  being	  able	  to	  bridge	  the	  Schnitt,	  the	  cut.	  For	  Heisenberg,	  then,	  what	  Einstein	  exposed	  as	  a	  paradox	  was	  not	  an	  ontological	  reality,	  but	  merely	  an	  effect	  of	  an	  epistemological/observational	  problem.	  This	  effect	  that	  could	  be	  resolved	  through	  statistics,	  but	  any	  attempt	  to	  describe	  what	  would	  happen	  across	  the	  cut	  would	  have	  to	  be	  abandoned.	  His	  and	  Bohr’s	  dependence	  on	  statistics	  and	  mathematical	  formulations	  (especially	  those	  of	  John	  Von	  Neumann)	  led	  them	  to	  suggest	  that	  quantum	  physics	  does	  not	  deal	  with	  an	  objective	  reality,	  but	  only	  with	  the	  
probabilities	  that	  are	  related	  to	  classical	  formulations	  such	  as	  “measurement”	  or	  “observation.”	  Epistemology	  then	  gives	  ontology	  as	  data,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  this	  way,	  according	  to	  Heisenberg’s	  Uncertainty	  Principle	  (in	  which	  position	  and	  momentum	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Gilder	  here	  draws	  from	  both	  an	  unpublished	  paper	  by	  the	  physicist	  Gretta	  Hermann,	  who	  details	  her	  conversation	  with	  Heisenberg	  in	  it,	  and	  from	  Heisenberg’s	  1935	  speech	  in	  Vienna,	  given	  in	  response	  to	  the	  EPR	  paper.	  See	  also:	  David	  C.	  Cassidy,	  Uncertainty:	  The	  Life	  and	  Science	  of	  Werner	  Heisenberg	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  W.H.	  Freeman	  &	  Co.,	  1991).	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are	  not	  simultaneously	  knowable,	  and	  knowledge	  of	  one	  affects	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  other),	  that	  the	  observer	  creates	  the	  world	  by	  collapsing	  any	  given	  set	  of	  possibilities	  and	  determining	  ontology.22	  For	  Heisenberg	  and	  Bohr,	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  eliminates	  ontological	  multiplicity.	  It	  was	  precisely	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation—the	  turn	  away	  from	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  “objective	  reality”	  and	  thought	  and	  an	  embrace	  of	  a	  probabilistic	  explanation	  of	  the	  world—that	  Einstein,	  with	  his	  belief	  in	  the	  world,	  challenged.	  He	  felt	  that	  quantum	  physics	  had	  taken	  “an	  exaggerated	  turn	  towards	  formalism,”	  which	  obscured	  any	  connection	  between	  form	  and	  its	  expression	  in	  the	  world	  (115).	  This	  propelled	  his	  continued	  attempts	  to	  develop	  a	  thought	  experiment	  that	  would	  convince	  Bohr	  and	  Heisenberg	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  “spooky	  action	  at	  a	  distance.”	  These	  attempts	  found	  their	  most	  refined	  expression	  in	  a	  thought	  experiment	  described	  in	  the	  Einstein-­‐Podolsky-­‐Rosen	  paper,	  “Can	  Quantum-­‐Mechanical	  Description	  of	  Physical	  Reality	  Be	  Considered	  Complete?”	  and	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  EPR	  paradox.	  Building	  on	  the	  possibilities	  of	  a	  box	  containing	  light	  that	  had	  marked	  the	  inception	  of	  quantum	  physics,	  Einstein,	  with	  two	  of	  his	  students,	  Podolsky	  and	  Rosen,	  wrote	  up	  both	  the	  thought	  experiment	  and	  its	  implications.	  They	  invoke	  two	  ‘systems’	  (be	  they	  particles	  or	  boxes),	  which	  interact	  and	  then	  separate.	  From	  a	  measurement	  of	  momentum	  on	  one	  system,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  within	  physics,	  the	  “observer”	  is	  not	  a	  subject	  position	  and	  does	  not	  imply	  cognition,	  but	  rather	  names	  any	  element	  of	  the	  classical	  world	  with	  which	  the	  quantum	  world	  interacts,	  thereby	  bringing	  it	  into	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  classical	  world—the	  only	  site	  at	  which	  (according	  to	  Bohrn	  and	  Heisenberg)	  it	  could	  be	  known.	  Ultimately,	  “observer”	  is	  defined	  tautologically	  as	  “that	  which	  collapses	  the	  wave	  function”	  (Heisenberg,	  Physics	  and	  Philosophy	  137).	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experimenter	  can	  learn	  the	  momentum	  of	  the	  far	  away,	  untouched	  system.	  But	  if	  the	  experimenter	  decided	  to	  measure	  the	  position,	  instead,	  the	  position	  of	  the	  faraway	  system	  could	  be	  computed	  from	  the	  quantum-­‐mechanical	  wave	  function	  of	  the	  nearby	  one.	  They	  write:	  
If,	  without	  in	  any	  way	  disturbing	  the	  system,	  we	  can	  predict	  with	  
certainty	  the	  value	  of	  a	  physical	  quantity,	  then	  there	  exists	  an	  element	  of	  
physical	  reality	  corresponding	  to	  this	  physical	  quantity.	  […]	  One	  would	  not	  arrive	  at	  our	  conclusion	  if	  one	  insisted	  that	  two	  or	  more	  physical	  quantities	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  simultaneous	  elements	  of	  reality	  only	  
when	  they	  can	  be	  simultaneously	  measured	  or	  predicted.	  […]	  This	  makes	  the	  reality	  of	  P	  and	  Q	  [position	  and	  momentum]	  depend	  on	  the	  process	  of	  measurement	  carried	  out	  on	  the	  first	  system,	  which	  does	  not	  disturb	  the	  second	  system	  in	  any	  way.	  No	  reasonable	  definition	  of	  reality	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  permit	  this.	  […]	  While	  we	  have	  thus	  shown	  that	  the	  wave	  function	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  the	  physical	  reality,	  we	  have	  left	  open	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  a	  description	  exists.	  We	  believe,	  however,	  that	  such	  a	  theory	  is	  possible.	  (Einstein,	  Podolsky,	  and	  Rosen	  777-­‐778)	  	  Importantly,	  like	  the	  thought	  experiment	  of	  Schrödinger’s	  Cat,	  the	  paradox	  of	  spooky	  action	  at	  a	  distance	  demonstrated	  by	  EPR	  (in	  which	  physical	  interactions	  could	  exceed	  the	  limits	  of	  information	  transfer	  given	  in	  Einstein’s	  Special	  Relativity	  formulation)	  was	  not	  meant	  as	  an	  affirmation	  of	  that	  spooky	  action,	  but	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  completeness	  of	  the	  theory:	  if	  such	  a	  paradox	  was	  possible	  within	  the	  theory,	  then	  something	  was	  amiss	  with	  the	  theory	  itself;	  epistemology	  and	  ontology	  were	  not	  coextensive.	  For	  Einstein,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  problems	  of	  physics,	  while	  depending	  on	  a	  belief	  in	  ontological	  reality,	  were	  themselves	  epistemological,	  but,	  in	  opposition	  to	  Heisenberg	  and	  Bohr,	  it	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  that	  one	  ceased	  to	  talk	  about	  (or	  ceased	  trying	  to	  talk	  about)	  real	  phenomena.	  As	  Gilder	  describes	  it,	  Einstein	  found	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  position	  “ludicrous”:	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“’Do	  you	  really	  believe	  that	  the	  moon	  is	  not	  there	  if	  nobody	  looks?’”	  (3).	  And	  he	  rejected	  Heisenberg’s	  and	  Bohr’s	  abandonment	  of	  causality—the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  scientific	  thinking—as	  too	  easily	  accepted.	  	  The	  EPR	  paper	  also	  prompted	  the	  most	  famous	  thought	  experiment	  in	  all	  of	  physics:	  Schrödinger’s	  Cat.	  While	  Einstein’s	  formulation	  was	  designed	  to	  highlight	  the	  possibilities	  of	  spooky	  action	  at	  a	  distance	  that	  the	  Copenhagen	  Theory	  had	  yet	  to	  contend	  with,	  doing	  so	  also	  meant	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  completeness	  of	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  wave	  function	  explanation	  that	  Heisenberg’s	  principle	  implied.	  Schrödinger	  focused	  explicitly	  on	  the	  paradox	  produced	  if	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  wave	  function	  was	  applied	  to	  macro	  (classical)	  systems.	  Light	  can	  be	  observed	  (by	  its	  effects)	  to	  behave	  as	  both	  a	  wave	  and	  a	  particle,	  but	  while	  the	  epistemological	  effect	  of	  Heisenberg’s	  theory	  is	  that	  position	  and	  momentum	  of	  a	  wave/particle	  cannot	  be	  simultaneously	  known.	  The	  explanation	  for	  why	  that	  is	  so	  is	  that,	  prior	  to	  being	  observed,	  a	  quantum	  wave	  exists	  in	  a	  state	  known	  as	  “superposition”—in	  which	  all	  its	  possible	  states	  are	  simultaneously	  existent—and	  “observation”	  (which	  here,	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  means	  interaction	  with	  the	  classical	  system)	  collapses	  the	  superposition,	  transforming	  it	  into	  a	  discrete,	  linear	  system	  (e.g.	  knowing	  position	  makes	  position	  discrete	  rather	  than	  multiple).	  	  For	  Schrödinger,	  this	  interpretation	  established	  a	  false	  disjuncture	  between	  the	  classical	  (macro)	  world	  and	  the	  quantum	  (micro)	  world.	  Schrödinger	  rejected	  this	  separation	  because	  the	  classical	  world	  is	  made	  of	  the	  same	  elements	  as	  the	  quantum	  world.	  He	  describes	  his	  objection	  thusly:	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A	  cat	  is	  penned	  up	  in	  a	  steel	  chamber,	  along	  with	  the	  following	  device	  (which	  must	  be	  secured	  against	  direct	  interference	  by	  the	  cat):	  in	  a	  Geiger	  counter,	  there	  is	  a	  tiny	  bit	  of	  radioactive	  substance,	  so	  small	  that	  perhaps	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  hour,	  one	  of	  the	  atoms	  decays,	  but	  also,	  with	  equal	  probability,	  perhaps	  none;	  if	  it	  happens,	  the	  counter	  tube	  discharges,	  and	  through	  a	  relay	  releases	  a	  hammer	  that	  shatters	  a	  small	  flask	  of	  hydrocyanic	  acid.	  If	  one	  has	  left	  his	  entire	  system	  to	  itself	  for	  an	  hour,	  one	  would	  say	  that	  the	  cat	  still	  lives	  if	  meanwhile	  no	  atom	  had	  decayed.	  The	  psi-­‐function	  [the	  mathematical	  expression]	  of	  the	  entire	  system	  would	  express	  this	  by	  having	  in	  it	  the	  living	  and	  dead	  cat	  (pardon	  the	  expression)	  mixed	  or	  smeared	  out	  in	  equal	  parts.	  It	  is	  typical	  in	  these	  cases	  that	  an	  indeterminacy	  originally	  restricted	  to	  the	  atomic	  domain	  becomes	  transformed	  into	  macroscopic	  indeterminacy,	  which	  can	  then	  be	  resolved	  by	  direct	  observation.	  That	  prevents	  us	  from	  so	  naively	  accepting	  as	  valid	  a	  ‘blurred	  model’	  for	  representing	  reality.	  In	  itself,	  it	  would	  not	  embody	  anything	  unclear	  or	  contradictory.	  There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  a	  shaky	  or	  out-­‐of-­‐focus	  photograph	  and	  a	  snapshot	  of	  clouds	  and	  fog	  banks.”	  (Schrödinger	  328).	  	  For	  Schrödinger,	  it	  was	  obvious	  that	  the	  cat	  was	  either	  dead	  or	  alive,	  and	  not	  “smeared	  out	  in	  equal	  parts.”	  The	  impossibility	  of	  translating	  the	  mathematical	  expression	  of	  the	  micro	  world	  to	  that	  of	  the	  macro	  implied,	  for	  Schrödinger,	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation	  to	  describe	  not	  only	  the	  macro	  world,	  but	  also	  the	  micro	  world.	  Moreover,	  even	  as	  the	  experiment	  points	  to	  the	  obvious	  power	  and	  
potential	  for	  danger	  inherent	  in	  quantum	  experimentation	  (that	  of	  using	  a	  decaying	  atom	  to	  release	  a	  radioactive	  substance—and	  at	  great	  distance	  from	  the	  experimenter),	  it	  also	  expresses	  the	  ethical	  violence	  inherent	  in	  acting	  based	  on	  a	  statistical	  model,	  as	  though	  it	  accurately	  and	  transparently	  described	  reality,	  when	  in	  fact	  what	  the	  statistical	  model	  expresses	  is	  “blurry”	  and	  probabilistic.	  Schrödinger	  suggested,	  over	  and	  over	  again,	  that	  perhaps	  “position”	  and	  “momentum”	  were	  not	  accurate	  variables	  for	  describing	  the	  quantum	  world—they	  did	  not	  exhaust	  the	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possibilities	  for	  a	  description	  of	  reality—and	  therefore	  resulted	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  “blurry”	  picture,	  when	  in	  fact,	  what	  one	  might	  be	  looking	  at	  was	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  cloud	  bank.	  	  It	  was	  in	  the	  course	  of	  developing	  this	  experiment	  that	  Schrödinger	  conceived	  of	  and	  gave	  the	  name	  “entanglement”	  to	  Einstein’s	  spooky	  action,	  which	  began	  to	  gesture	  to	  new	  descriptive	  possibilities	  for	  seeing	  the	  cloud.	  Entanglement	  would	  engender	  multiple	  alternatives	  and	  supplements	  to	  the	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation,	  including	  that	  of	  “hidden	  variables”	  theory.	  Though	  the	  phrase	  “hidden	  variables”	  wouldn’t	  emerge	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  quantum	  theory	  until	  the	  work	  of	  David	  Bohm	  several	  decades	  later,	  Einstein’s	  and	  Schrödinger’s	  thought	  suggested	  the	  possibility	  of	  hidden	  variables,	  the	  possibility	  of	  something	  beyond	  “position”	  and	  “momentum,”	  for	  which	  the	  supposedly	  indisputable	  mathematical	  formulations	  of	  Von	  Neumann—whose	  work	  had	  been	  used	  to	  guarantee	  the	  Copenhagen	  interpretation—did	  not	  account.	  	  Von	  Neumann’s	  formulations	  had	  helped	  to	  totalize	  or	  close	  the	  epistemology	  of	  quantum	  systems	  by	  closing	  systematic	  possibilities,	  limiting	  them	  to	  position	  and	  momentum.	  It	  produced	  a	  statistical	  totality	  and	  descriptive	  limit	  that	  could	  not	  account	  for	  a	  total	  world	  that	  exceeded	  it.	  As	  it	  would	  turn	  out,	  then,	  uncertainty	  was	  an	  effect	  of	  treating	  “nonseparable	  things	  as	  separable”	  (Gilder	  113).	  Importantly,	  the	  mathematician	  Gretta	  Hermann	  demonstrated	  this	  mathematically	  (thus	  refuting	  Von	  Neumann	  directly)	  to	  Heisenberg	  in	  the	  1930s.	  She	  argued—primarily	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  recover	  Kantian	  causality	  for	  science—that	  either	  position	  or	  momentum	  of	  a	  light	  quanta	  could	  not	  be	  known	  because	  light	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existed	  as	  a	  wave	  and	  particle	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  thus,	  would	  not	  have	  the	  quality	  of	  position	  and	  momentum	  at	  the	  same	  time—“uncertainty”	  was	  merely	  an	  epistemological	  misnomer	  for	  an	  undescribed	  quality	  of	  the	  object	  (Gilder	  151-­‐153).	  Ultimately,	  Einstein’s	  insistent	  invocation	  of	  the	  epistemological	  implications	  of	  “spooky	  action	  at	  a	  distance,”	  and	  his	  repeated	  skepticism	  about	  the	  ontological	  existence	  of	  such	  noncausal	  interaction,	  which	  Schrödinger	  named	  “entanglement,”	  led,	  again	  and	  again,	  to	  an	  empirical	  investigation	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  just	  such	  a	  phenomenon.	  Entanglement	  would	  turn	  out	  not	  to	  be	  a	  paradoxical	  feature	  of	  the	  theory	  that	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  its	  epistemological	  limitations,	  but	  instead,	  a	  spontaneous	  and	  inexplicable	  ontological	  feature	  of	  the	  quantum	  world	  as	  described	  by	  quantum	  physics.	  Physical	  experiments	  eventually	  eliminated	  the	  possibility	  of	  
local	  hidden	  variables	  that	  might	  explain	  away	  the	  apparent	  non-­‐causality	  of	  entanglement;	  yet	  the	  insistent	  presence	  of	  the	  paradox—one	  that	  was	  eventually	  shown	  to	  exist	  empirically—produced	  a	  world	  whose	  causality	  might	  be	  inexplicably	  non-­‐local,	  a	  kind	  of	  diasporic	  scattering	  of	  objects	  affecting	  each	  other	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  historical	  causality.	  “Entanglement”	  persisted	  as	  a	  concept	  that	  named	  the	  invisible,	  non-­‐local	  causality,	  the	  impossible	  bond	  that	  links	  objects	  scattered	  in	  space	  and	  time.	  And	  although	  the	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation	  remains	  the	  most	  widely	  accepted	  theory	  of	  the	  quantum	  today,	  its	  most	  serious	  contender—and	  the	  only	  theory	  that	  reconciles	  “spooky	  action	  at	  a	  distance”	  with	  relativity—only	  became	  thinkable	  through	  the	  persistent	  epistemological	  and	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ontological	  disruption	  of	  entanglement:	  multiple	  worlds	  interpretation.23	  Thus,	  it	  is	  precisely	  through	  Einstein’s	  objections,	  through	  his	  desires	  for	  a	  causal	  and	  more	  fully	  systematic	  description	  of	  the	  world,	  that	  the	  non-­‐causal,	  unpredictable	  descriptions	  of	  the	  world	  could	  become	  visible,	  and	  that	  an	  ontological	  multiplicity	  of	  worlds,	  and	  the	  ontological	  non-­‐determination	  of	  this	  world	  becomes	  epistemologically	  possible	  for	  science.	  	  
Beyond	  Visibility:	  Reading	  and	  the	  Matter	  of	  Sense	  	  	   I	  am	  less	  concerned	  here	  with	  what	  is	  (or	  might	  be)	  ultimately	  “proven”	  for	  and	  by	  quantum	  physics.	  After	  all,	  it	  took	  more	  than	  30	  years	  from	  the	  time	  of	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation	  (1927)	  to	  John	  Bell’s	  re-­‐invigoration	  of	  the	  EPR	  problem	  (1964)	  for	  the	  real	  implications	  of	  Einstein’s	  objections	  to	  become	  visible	  for	  quantum	  investigation,	  and	  even	  today,	  the	  theory	  still	  today	  struggles	  to	  cohere	  with	  classical	  physics.	  Rather,	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  presumption	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  coherent	  systems	  limits	  both	  the	  possibility	  of	  observing	  the	  “impossible”	  and	  makes	  invisible	  the	  incoherent,	  forming	  objects	  that	  constitute	  and	  traverse	  them.	  I	  am	  particularly	  interested	  in	  is	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  multiple	  worlds	  interpretation	  is	  largely	  enabled	  by	  the	  Schrödinger’s	  Cat	  thought	  experiment.	  The	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation	  glosses	  over	  Schrödinger's	  paradox,	  assuming	  that	  the	  wavefunction	  and	  its	  collapse	  are	  statistical	  explanations	  of	  the	  quantum,	  but	  not	  the	  classical,	  world.	  Multiple	  Worlds	  Theory,	  by	  contrast,	  holds	  that	  wavefunction	  has	  an	  objective	  reality,	  and	  so,	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  wavefunction	  is	  not	  actual	  or	  total.	  Therefore,	  it	  does	  not	  determine	  and	  produce	  the	  only	  possible	  world;	  instead,	  all	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  wavefunction	  play	  out	  in	  multiple	  pasts,	  futures,	  worlds,	  and	  universes.	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both	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  possibilities	  are	  opened	  up	  by	  a	  scientific	  perspective	  that	  insists	  on	  the	  “reality”	  of	  invisible	  objects	  and	  the	  potential	  reality	  of	  invisible	  worlds:	  How	  did	  theoretical	  physics	  open	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  world	  
being	  other	  than	  it	  is	  precisely	  be	  being	  as	  it	  is?	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  how	  thought	  becomes	  possible,	  and	  how	  the	  thought	  of	  the	  unknown	  and	  unknowable,	  rather	  than	  total	  knowledge,	  might	  contribute	  to	  not	  only	  our	  understanding	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  politics,	  but	  also	  to	  their	  ontological	  possibilities.	  I’m	  interested	  in	  how	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  were	  and	  are	  actualized,	  and	  what	  that	  says	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  epistemology	  and	  ontology	  (especially	  insofar	  as	  it	  actually	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  fantasy	  that	  ontology	  could	  ever	  be	  fully	  determined	  by	  epistemology)—both	  of	  which	  speak	  to	  the	  possibilities	  for	  scientific	  processes	  to	  help	  explicate	  humanistic,	  aesthetic,	  and	  political	  ones.	  But	  an	  understanding	  of	  these	  scientific	  possibilities	  would	  not	  contribute	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  politics	  by	  explaining	  their	  meaning;	  it	  would	  do	  so	  instead	  by	  expanding	  the	  field	  of	  continuity	  and	  comparison,	  highlighting	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  all	  three	  are	  
processes	  that	  involve	  each	  other.	  	  Such	  potentials	  bear	  heavily	  on	  understanding	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Ellison’s	  and	  Jackson’s	  “failures,”	  like	  Einstein’s,	  are	  actually	  the	  site	  of	  ontological	  possibility,	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  opening	  up	  ontology.	  Many	  concepts,	  including	  “entanglement”	  and	  “the	  cut,”	  and	  metaphors	  of	  visibility	  (such	  as	  Schrödinger’s	  blurry	  photograph)	  developed	  within	  quantum	  physics,	  also	  traverse	  and	  are	  central	  to	  discourses	  that	  seem	  unrelated,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  the	  black	  diaspora.	  Bringing	  them	  together	  helps	  to	  explicate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  processes	  of	  both	  Ellison’s	  and	  Jackson’s	  writings	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operate	  as	  thought	  experiments.	  They	  act	  as	  checks	  on	  visibility	  and	  opportunities	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  values	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  those	  of	  theoretical	  physics	  (rather	  than	  those	  of	  the	  social	  science).	  It	  also	  highlights	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  what	  Einstein	  makes	  possible	  for	  physics	  relates	  to	  what	  Fred	  Moten	  claims	  that	  certain	  events	  that	  constitute	  the	  black	  radical	  tradition	  do	  for	  politics:	  They	  show	  that	  “Something	  real—in	  that	  it	  might	  have	  been	  otherwise—happened”	  (Moten	  196).	  And	  perhaps	  something	  real	  that	  is	  otherwise	  also	  happened.	  Importantly,	  they	  show	  how	  writing	  about	  experiments—such	  as	  that	  of	  much	  scientific	  practice	  and	  of	  Ellison—can	  through	  their	  organization	  and	  meaning-­‐making	  work	  to	  erase	  both	  their	  own	  experimentation	  and	  the	  appearance	  of	  an	  “otherwise.”	  Conversely,	  other	  experimental	  writing—such	  as	  those	  of	  Jackson—can	  work	  towards	  actualizing	  and	  multiplying	  experimentation	  and/with	  the	  otherwise.	  	  If,	  as	  Einstein	  believed,	  theory	  does	  not	  determine	  reality,	  but	  it	  does	  determine	  what	  we	  can	  see,	  then	  the	  affirmation	  of	  ontological	  multiplicity	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  unseen	  unseeable	  within	  physics	  is	  not	  divorced	  from	  politics,	  but	  imbued	  with	  and	  instructive	  of	  political	  possibility.	  This	  is	  all	  tied	  up	  with	  the	  aesthetic	  determinations	  and	  suppressions	  that	  constitute	  visibility,	  and	  which	  traverse	  physics—including	  the	  struggles	  over	  formalism	  and	  realism—thus	  demonstrating	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  quantum	  theoretical	  determinations	  are	  largely	  aesthetic:	  they	  deal	  with	  organizations	  of	  the	  sensorium.	  The	  important	  thing,	  then,	  is	  not	  that	  physics	  somehow	  proves	  ontological	  multiplicity,	  but	  rather,	  that	  it	  makes	  possible	  for	  thought	  within	  science—as	  politics	  and	  through	  aesthetics—the	  
material	  reality	  of	  being	  other	  than	  what	  is,	  even	  if	  such	  an	  “is”	  remains	  unknown	  
	   111	  
(or	  because	  it	  remains	  unknown),	  except	  as	  possibility.	  It	  refuses	  the	  very	  certainty	  of	  what	  “is.”	  It	  produces,	  to	  put	  it	  in	  Foucault’s	  terms,	  “the	  thought	  from	  Outside,”	  which	  serves	  as	  the	  grounds	  for	  political	  possibility,	  without	  knowing	  or	  thinking	  the	  particular	  “is”	  that	  such	  an	  outside	  might	  constitute	  (Foucault,	  “Thought”	  16).	  And	  this	  matters	  because	  the	  social	  sciences	  that	  have	  operated	  as	  guarantor	  for	  social	  and	  political	  policy	  have	  adapted	  their	  empirical	  methods	  from	  a	  science	  that	  has	  largely	  grounded	  itself	  in	  a	  closed	  conception	  of	  ontology.	  Such	  a	  thought	  from	  the	  outside,	  then,	  such	  a	  theory,	  can	  make	  visible	  an	  entirely	  different	  possibility	  for	  politics,	  a	  politics	  that	  would	  not	  depend	  on	  a	  totalization	  through	  ideology	  (a	  “closed”	  theory)	  or	  on	  a	  determinate	  and	  closed	  ontology,	  but	  would	  instead	  depend	  on	  an	  engagement	  with	  unpredictable	  materiality	  and	  excess	  (that	  irrationality	  which	  is	  an	  interior	  outside	  to	  any	  supposed	  ideological	  totality)	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  not	  determined	  in	  advance.	  And	  this	  excess	  and	  irrationality	  would	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  problem	  to	  contend	  with,	  but	  would	  instead	  constitute	  an	  opportunity	  and	  potential	  for,	  in’s	  terms,	  improvisation,	  or	  “speech	  without	  foresight”	  that	  is	  simultaneously	  “a	  kind	  of	  foreshadowing,	  if	  not	  prophetic,	  description”	  (Moten,	  Break	  63).	  Physics	  becomes,	  in	  this	  moment,	  like	  the	  biology	  described	  by	  Richard	  Doyle	  (in	  Chapter	  1):	  science	  “at	  its	  best,”	  open	  to	  its	  own	  “extraordinary	  capacity	  for	  surprise,”	  through	  practices	  of	  open	  description	  rather	  than	  systemic	  explanation	  (Doyle	  105).	  For	  Moten,	  evidence	  that	  “something	  real—in	  that	  it	  might	  have	  been	  otherwise—happened”	  actually	  leads	  to	  “the	  possibility	  and	  project	  of	  a	  utopian	  politics	  outside	  ontology”	  (197).	  Here,	  ontology,	  as	  Moten	  uses	  and	  rejects	  it,	  names	  something	  different	  than	  what	  ontology	  becomes	  through	  entanglement	  (open	  and	  
	   112	  
multiple);	  instead,	  it	  names	  the	  determinate	  isness	  that	  is	  totalized	  and	  reified	  and	  made	  known	  as	  science	  and	  history,	  Knowledge,	  and	  which	  refutes	  other	  possibilities.	  However,	  this	  material	  reality—a	  “powerfully	  material	  resistance”—operates	  against,	  critiques,	  and	  cuts	  any	  such	  supposedly	  Enlightened	  “knowledge”	  that	  would	  operate	  in	  “those	  authoritarian	  modes	  of	  (false)	  differentiation	  and	  (false)	  universalization	  (ultimately	  the	  same	  thing)	  that	  seem	  to	  have	  ontology	  or	  the	  ontological	  impulse	  as	  their	  condition	  of	  possibility	  and	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  impulse	  or	  activity	  could	  never	  have	  ended	  up	  any	  other	  way”	  (196).	  And	  for	  Moten,	  one	  way	  of	  getting	  at	  this	  ontological	  questioning	  is	  remarkably	  similar	  to	  that	  last	  important	  gesture	  of	  Schrödinger’s	  thought	  experiment:	  through	  the	  photograph.	  For	  both,	  such	  ontological	  questioning	  requires	  a	  special	  attunement	  to	  ways	  of	  reading	  that	  can	  experience	  the	  photograph	  through	  reading	  and	  also	  to	  the	  photograph	  beyond	  reading.	  This	  leads	  Moten	  to	  describe	  a	  kind	  of	  “reading”	  not	  wholly	  dependent	  on	  vision	  and	  semantics,	  a	  practice	  of	  “critical	  reading”	  that	  is	  more	  like	  creative	  reading,	  in	  which	  reading	  itself	  doesn’t	  seek	  inside	  the	  object	  only	  for	  signifiers	  and	  meaning	  as	  knowledge,	  but	  adds	  to	  and	  improvises	  on	  the	  excesses	  inherent	  in	  and	  made	  possible	  by	  such	  an	  object.	  His	  description	  of	  this	  practice	  suggests	  that	  for	  us	  to	  read	  and	  improvise	  on	  these	  texts,	  we,	  as	  critical	  readers,	  have	  to	  be	  open	  to	  their	  opening	  of	  ontology—both	  within	  and	  onto	  the	  outside	  of	  their	  writing.	  For	  Moten,	  the	  privileging	  of	  the	  visual	  as	  the	  knowable	  as	  ontology	  (“what	  is”)	  leads	  to	  a	  reading	  practice	  that	  privileges	  hermeneutic	  knowledge	  and	  evacuates	  the	  materiality	  and	  material	  possibilities	  of	  objects.	  And,	  as	  he	  makes	  clear	  through	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an	  analysis	  of	  photography—a	  technology	  that	  was	  largely	  implicated	  in	  the	  development	  of	  racial	  science	  as	  a	  guarantee	  of	  its	  objectivity—such	  a	  privileging	  comes	  to	  have	  pernicious	  consequences	  with	  regards	  to	  black	  experience	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  in	  particular	  to	  black	  radical	  politics	  and	  its	  sense-­‐ability	  (rather	  than	  its	  visibility)	  in	  the	  emergence	  and	  continuation	  of	  a	  black	  radical	  tradition	  that	  is	  actualized	  via	  an	  attunement	  to	  the	  sensorial	  beyond	  sight	  (to	  that	  which	  is	  constructed	  as	  nonexistent	  in	  a	  systematic	  theory	  of	  politics	  and	  ontology	  that	  defers	  to	  sight	  alone).	  It	  also	  has	  consequences	  for	  the	  sensibility	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  
Invisible	  Man,	  politics	  that	  I	  will	  suggest	  are	  not	  analogous	  to	  the	  late-­‐life	  dogmatic	  nationalism	  and	  anti-­‐radicalism	  of	  Ralph	  Ellison	  that	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  his	  speeches	  and	  essays.	  	  The	  title	  of	  Moten’s	  book,	  In	  the	  Break:	  The	  Aesthetics	  of	  the	  Black	  Radical	  
Tradition,	  is	  also	  given	  in	  the	  prologue	  of	  Invisible	  Man.	  “Invisibility,”	  the	  narrator	  explains:	   gives	  one	  a	  slightly	  different	  sense	  of	  time,	  you’re	  never	  quite	  on	  the	  beat.	  Sometimes	  you’re	  ahead	  and	  sometimes	  you’re	  behind.	  Instead	  of	  the	  swift	  and	  imperceptible	  flowing	  of	  time,	  you	  are	  aware	  of	  its	  nodes,	  those	  points	  where	  time	  stands	  still	  or	  from	  which	  it	  leaps	  ahead.	  And	  you	  slip	  into	  the	  breaks	  and	  look	  around.	  (Ellison	  8)	  	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  break	  is	  part	  of	  Moten’s	  primary	  concept	  for	  understanding	  black	  radical	  aesthetics:	  the	  cut.	  This	  cut	  resembles	  Heisenberg’s	  Schnitt,	  but	  for	  Moten,	  one	  doesn’t	  skip	  from	  incommensurable	  side	  to	  incommensurable	  side,	  but	  lingers	  in	  it.	  Unlike	  Heisenberg’s	  “cut,”	  which	  Heisenberg	  insists	  is	  impossible	  to	  get	  at,	  impossible	  to	  get	  inside,	  for	  Moten	  the	  cut	  produces	  a	  break,	  invaginates	  any	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totality;	  it	  doesn’t	  split	  worlds,	  but	  connects	  and	  expands	  worlds	  as	  it	  cuts,	  making	  an	  excess	  of	  differentiation,	  augmenting	  any	  totality	  with	  difference,	  with	  the	  impossibility	  of	  totalization.	  It	  is	  the	  cut	  that	  produces	  a	  break,	  the	  impossible	  “between”	  of	  time;	  and	  getting	  inside	  it	  opens	  up	  new	  possibilities	  for	  ontology	  (in	  the	  same	  sense	  entanglement	  opens	  up)	  and	  for	  politics.	  	  For	  Moten,	  “the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  visual”	  (Moten	  198)	  that	  structures	  Enlightenment	  thought	  is	  enabled	  by	  “authoritarian	  modes	  of	  (false)	  differentiation	  and	  (false)	  universalization”	  (196)	  that	  divide	  the	  senses	  from	  an	  anoriginary	  synaesthesia	  into	  sight,	  hearing,	  smell,	  touch,	  taste,	  and	  reduces	  the	  others	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  one.	  With	  regards	  to	  photography,	  he	  is	  particularly	  interested	  in	  “the	  reduction	  of	  the	  phonic	  substance”	  of	  the	  photograph,	  and	  specifically	  the	  photograph	  of	  Emmett	  Till’s	  open	  casket	  as	  his	  funeral	  (201).	  But,	  Moten	  suggests,	  that	  “(false)	  differentiation	  and	  (false)	  universalization”	  is	  constantly	  being	  “cut”	  by	  the	  sensorial	  experiences	  that	  have	  been	  reduced;	  “the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  visual”	  is	  cut	  by	  the	  sound	  of	  “various	  shrieks,	  hums,	  hollers,	  shouts,	  and	  moans”	  that	  can	  be	  heard	  if	  one	  “really	  listen[s]	  to	  the	  photograph”	  (201-­‐2).	  The	  photograph	  has	  a	  phonographic	  content	  as	  well,	  and	  that	  phonographic	  content	  can	  move	  us	  towards	  understanding	  the	  potentials	  for	  collectivity	  that	  inhere	  in	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  the	  unseen	  (unseeable)	  of	  visual	  objects.	  	  Moten’s	  identification	  of	  a	  tendency	  towards	  the	  “reduction	  of	  the	  phonic	  materiality”	  of	  the	  photograph	  allows	  him	  to	  level	  a	  devastating	  critique	  of	  Roland	  Barthes’s	  Camera	  Lucida,	  a	  text	  that	  is	  a	  touchstone	  for	  many	  analyses	  of	  photography,	  and	  which	  helped	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  a	  hermeneutic	  method	  of	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photographic	  reading	  that	  places	  itself	  in	  opposition	  to	  a	  documentary	  tradition,	  and	  locates	  the	  site	  of	  politics	  in	  an	  always	  only	  personal	  experience	  of	  reading	  for	  meaning.	  	  “Blackness,”	  as	  a	  concept	  and	  in	  the	  form	  of	  photographed	  black	  subjects,	  runs	  throughout	  Barthes’s	  work.	  Moten	  suggests	  that	  within	  Camera	  Lucida:	  Blackness	  is	  the	  site	  or	  mark	  of	  the	  ideal	  object,	  the	  ideal	  spectator	  (and	  these	  are	  everything	  for	  Barthes’s	  analytic	  since	  the	  doing	  or	  operation	  of	  photography	  is	  bracketed	  and	  set	  aside	  early	  in	  Camera	  
Lucida).	  Blackness	  is	  the	  embodiment	  of	  a	  naiveté	  that	  would	  move	  Barthes,	  the	  self-­‐styled	  essential	  phenomenologist,	  back	  before	  culture	  to	  some	  pure	  and	  unalloyed	  looking.	  (203)	  	  The	  bracketing	  out	  of	  “the	  doing	  […]	  of	  photography”	  is	  worth	  some	  attention,	  and	  I	  will	  return	  to	  that	  later.	  But	  here,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  Moten’s	  interest	  in	  Barthes’s	  interest	  in—and	  desire	  for—“pure	  and	  unalloyed	  looking.”	  This	  desire	  leads	  Barthes	  to	  reject	  news	  photographs	  as	  “unary,”	  or	  unified,	  lacking	  the	  “punctum”—the	  prick—that	  would	  give	  meaning	  to	  the	  photograph	  for	  the	  viewer.	  “In	  these	  images,”	  Barthes	  says,	  “no	  punctum:	  a	  certain	  shock	  but	  no	  disturbance;	  the	  photograph	  can	  ‘shout,’	  but	  not	  wound”	  (quoted	  in	  Moten	  204).	  Barthes	  separates	  these	  photographs	  from	  the	  essence	  of	  Photography	  that	  his	  book	  is	  written	  in	  search	  of.	  And,	  Moten	  argues,	  “Barthes’s	  critique	  of	  the	  unary	  photograph	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  the	  unary	  sensuality	  of	  photography.	  And	  this	  is	  a	  prescriptive	  assumption—photography	  ought	  to	  be	  sensually	  unary,	  ought	  not	  shout	  so	  that	  it	  can	  prick.	  Wounding	  photography	  is	  absolutely	  visual”	  (204-­‐5,	  emphases	  mine).	  It	  is	  precisely	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  the	  sensual	  and	  sensory	  in	  the	  supposedly	  unary	  photograph	  that	  Barthes	  shuts	  out	  in	  his	  desire	  for	  the	  unary—which	  is	  to	  say	  visual—sensation	  of	  the	  wound.	  Barthes	  search	  for	  an	  originary	  photographic	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essence	  requires	  “the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  sound/shout	  of	  the	  photograph”	  (205),	  a	  move	  that	  Moten	  accuses	  of	  mirroring	  “the	  fundamental	  methodological	  move	  of	  what-­‐has-­‐been-­‐called-­‐enlightenment	  [wherein]	  we	  see	  the	  invocation	  of	  a	  silenced	  difference,	  a	  silent	  black	  materiality,	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  a	  suppression	  of	  difference	  in	  the	  name	  of	  (a	  false)	  universality.”	  Reading	  the	  photograph	  for	  meaning	  or	  essence	  shuts	  down	  sensorial	  excess	  beyond	  the	  visual	  that	  inheres	  in	  the	  photograph.	  To	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  noise,	  to	  hear	  it,	  would	  be	  to	  disrupt	  our	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  produce	  meaning	  from	  a	  photograph,	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  “read”	  for	  meaning	  and	  politics,	  a	  way	  to	  move	  away	  from	  explanation	  (which	  depends	  on	  knowledge	  of	  a	  working	  totality),	  and	  towards	  description:	  a	  way	  to	  think	  reading	  as	  an	  affirmation	  of	  difference,	  an	  additive	  act,	  rather	  than	  privileging	  a	  distillation	  of	  meaning	  and	  production	  of	  Knowledge.	  In	  positing	  that	  this	  photo	  and	  photographs	  in	  general	  bear	  a	  phonic	  substance,	  I	  want	  to	  challenge	  not	  only	  the	  ocularcentricism	  that	  generally—perhaps	  necessarily—shapes	  theories	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  photography	  and	  our	  experience	  of	  photography	  but	  that	  mode	  of	  semiotic	  objectification	  and	  inquiry	  that	  privileges	  the	  analytic-­‐interpretive	  reduction	  of	  phonic	  materiality	  and/or	  nonmeaning	  over	  something	  like	  a	  mimetic	  improvisation	  of	  and	  with	  that	  materiality	  that	  moves	  in	  excess	  of	  meaning.	  […]	  These	  challenges	  are	  […]	  something	  of	  a	  preface	  to	  a	  theory	  [of	  black	  performance]	  and	  an	  attempt	  to	  work	  out	  a	  couple	  of	  that	  theory’s	  most	  crucial	  elements:	  the	  anti-­‐interpretive	  nonreduction	  of	  nonmeaning	  and	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  opposition	  between	  live	  performance	  and	  mechanical	  reproduction.	  All	  this	  by	  way	  of	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  augmentation	  of	  mourning	  by	  the	  sound	  of	  moaning,	  by	  a	  religious	  and	  political	  formulation	  of	  morning	  that	  animates	  the	  photograph	  with	  a	  powerfully	  material	  resistance.	  (197-­‐8)	  	  In	  moving	  away	  from	  a	  valuation	  of	  “meaning”	  that	  is	  produced	  through	  interpretation	  and	  towards	  an	  embrace	  of	  the	  excess	  and	  nonmeaning	  (the	  “noise,”	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the	  shout,	  the	  moan	  that	  interpretation	  and	  hermeneutics	  shy	  from),	  Moten	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  start	  to	  get	  at	  the	  materiality	  of	  resistance,	  which	  is	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  “opening”	  of	  ontology	  that	  the	  cut	  names.24	  	   Interestingly,	  critic	  Sara	  Blair	  has	  argued	  that	  photography	  is	  a	  site	  within	  
Invisible	  Man	  that	  demonstrates	  that	  Ellison’s	  novel	  is	  not	  as	  closed	  down	  to	  the	  excessive	  possibilities	  that	  accompany	  visualization	  and	  visual	  technologies	  as	  it	  might	  at	  first	  appear.	  In	  Harlem	  Crossroads:	  Black	  Writers	  and	  the	  Photograph	  in	  the	  
Twentieth	  Century,	  Blair	  takes	  up	  the	  challenge	  of	  rescuing	  the	  aesthetic—and	  consequently	  political—possibilities	  of	  the	  visual,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  photographic—in	  Ralph	  Ellison’s	  Invisible	  Man,	  but	  her	  affirmation	  of	  the	  excesses	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  its	  political	  possibilities	  operates	  at	  a	  very	  different	  register	  than	  Moten’s.	  Her	  work	  speaks	  to	  the	  difficulties	  of	  extracting	  a	  reading	  practice	  that	  can	  be	  attuned	  to	  excess	  and	  absence	  if	  one	  is	  caught	  up	  in	  a	  tradition	  that	  reads	  the	  visual	  and	  the	  aural	  as	  aesthetically	  distinct	  rather	  than	  constitutive	  of—cutting	  and	  supplementing—each	  other.	  It	  is	  therefore	  useful	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  her	  reading.	  As	  she	  notes,	  Ellison’s	  novel	  contains	  a	  deep	  critique	  of	  political	  power	  of	  in/visibility,	  and	  by	  most	  accounts,	  the	  novel	  indicts	  technologies	  of	  the	  visual,	  locating	  recuperative	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  aural—specifically	  jazz—and	  the	  literary.	  “Ellison’s	  work	  is	  […]	  taken	  to	  exemplify	  the	  apercu	  that,	  throughout	  their	  history	  and	  in	  response	  to	  the	  social	  conditions	  of	  their	  emergence,	  all	  black	  arts	  aspire	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Although	  I	  do	  not	  address	  it	  here,	  for	  Moten,	  the	  materiality	  of	  resistance	  is	  all	  tied	  up	  with	  the	  mother,	  maternity,	  natality—hence	  the	  italicization	  of	  “mater”	  in	  materiality.	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the	  condition	  of	  music	  […]”	  (Blair	  56).	  The	  few	  critics	  who	  have	  engaged	  with	  photography	  in	  Ellison’s	  novel	  have	  “written	  [it]	  off	  […]	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  the	  very	  logic	  of	  invisibility	  his	  novel	  seeks	  to	  probe”	  (58);	  that	  is,	  they	  have	  written	  it	  off	  as	  a	  sociological	  tool	  that	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries	  helped	  to	  naturalize	  race	  and	  class	  conditions	  through	  its	  supposedly	  evidentiary	  and	  documentary	  functions.	  Against	  such	  dismissals	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  resistant	  possibilities	  of	  photography,	  Blair	  offers	  an	  exacting	  account—backed	  by	  extensive	  archival	  research—of	  Ellison’s	  lifelong	  engagement	  with	  photography.	  For	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  life,	  he	  supported	  himself	  through	  his	  portrait	  and	  journalistic	  photography,	  produced	  a	  vast	  archive	  of	  avant-­‐garde	  photos,	  and	  had	  a	  “penchant	  for	  self-­‐presentation	  as	  a	  photographer,”	  rarely	  being	  himself	  photographed	  without	  camera	  in	  hand	  (61).	  She	  goes	  on	  to	  show	  that	  for	  Ellison	  photography	  did	  not	  operate	  in	  opposition	  to	  jazz,	  but	  rather,	  like	  jazz,	  “photography	  serve[d]	  Ellison	  powerfully	  as	  a	  resource	  for	  the	  transformation	  of	  lived	  experience	  into	  narrative,	  of	  social	  fact	  into	  aesthetic	  possibility—and	  vice	  versa”	  (59).	  But,	  in	  her	  photographic	  rescue-­‐mission,	  Blair	  also	  reveals	  something	  about	  the	  politics	  of	  hermeneutic	  practice.	  In	  particular,	  two	  statements—one	  offhand,	  and	  one	  a	  pointed	  thesis—make	  clear	  what	  gets	  elevated	  and	  what	  gets	  denigrated	  in	  the	  theory	  that	  undergirds	  her	  hermeneutic	  practice.	  This	  hierarchical	  revelation	  begins	  to	  point	  to	  the	  difference	  that	  another	  kind	  of	  reading	  practice	  could	  make.	  In	  particular,	  she	  says,	  offhandedly,	  “As	  a	  body	  of	  work,	  these	  images	  [in	  Ellison’s	  personal	  archive]	  are	  scattershot	  and	  often	  experimental	  in	  the	  pejorative	  sense	  –	  that	  is,	  tentative	  or	  technically	  unrealized”	  (Blair	  63).	  And,	  more	  pointedly:	  “For	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Ellison,	  photography	  was	  no	  less	  than	  an	  interpretive	  instrument,	  a	  resource	  for	  critical	  reflection	  on	  American	  cultural	  practices	  and	  norms”	  (Blair	  57).	  I	  take	  these	  statements	  to	  be	  to	  some	  degree	  “true,”	  which	  is	  to	  say,	  I	  neither	  doubt	  that	  Ellison	  used	  photography	  as	  a	  critical	  instrument,	  nor	  do	  I	  doubt	  that	  his	  photographs	  were	  themselves	  experimental	  and	  exploratory	  with	  regards	  to	  form.	  However,	  taken	  together,	  these	  two	  statements	  reveal	  certain	  now	  naturalized	  critical	  trends	  regarding	  how	  we	  “read”	  photography	  and	  understand	  its	  relationship	  to	  literature,	  trends	  that	  have	  embedded	  in	  them	  assumptions	  that	  make	  the	  cognitivized	  (which	  is	  to	  say	  semiotic)	  aspects	  of	  the	  visual	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  political	  possibilities	  of	  aesthetics,	  and	  which	  denigrate	  the	  experimental—at	  least	  in	  its	  “pejorative	  sense”—a	  sense	  that	  we	  might	  take	  to	  indicate	  the	  process	  of	  artistic	  production	  and/as	  aesthetic	  experience.	  	  There	  is	  something	  in	  this	  valuation	  of	  the	  critical	  hermeneutic—its	  understanding	  as	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  photographic	  possibility	  (“no	  less”!)—and	  this	  denigration	  of	  experiment	  that,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  leads	  Blair	  to	  posit	  photography	  as	  “another”	  art	  that	  influenced	  Ellison’s	  writing,	  an	  art	  whose	  influence	  must	  be	  traced	  separately	  from	  his	  interest	  in	  music.	  	  But	  this	  isolation	  of	  the	  visual	  from	  the	  aural,	  this	  sectioning	  of	  the	  sensory,	  is	  something	  that	  if	  gotten	  around	  it	  will	  enable	  us	  to	  think	  the	  relationship	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  politics	  with	  regards	  to	  visuality	  and	  knowledge-­‐production	  (especially	  as	  science)	  differently.	  	  At	  the	  center	  of	  Blair’s	  chapter	  on	  Ellison,	  she	  offers	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  
Invisible	  Man’s	  eviction	  scene	  (Chapter	  13),	  a	  scene	  that	  Blair	  calls	  the	  narrator’s	  “encounter	  with	  the	  documentary.”	  This	  scene	  follows	  closely	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  the	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narrator’s	  escape	  from	  the	  Liberty	  Paint	  Factory	  Hospital,	  where	  he	  was	  sent	  after	  the	  factory	  explosion,	  and	  in	  which	  the	  doctors	  experimented	  on	  him	  with	  a	  	  “nonsurgical	  lobotomy”	  rather	  than	  healing	  his	  wounds.	  Still	  disoriented,	  the	  narrator	  hurries	  down	  the	  street	  where	  he	  stumbles	  upon	  an	  older	  black	  couple	  being	  evicted	  from	  their	  home.	  In	  Blair’s	  reading,	  as	  the	  narrator	  struggles	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  scene,	  his	  eyes	  scan	  the	  couple’s	  belongings	  scattered	  on	  the	  street	  and	  land	  on	  “a	  nineteenth-­‐century	  portrait	  of	  the	  couple	  being	  dispossessed”	  and	  “’a	  fragile	  paper,	  coming	  apart	  with	  age’:	  the	  free	  paper’s	  of	  the	  woman’s	  husband”	  (Blair	  68).	  She	  goes	  on	  to	  explain,	  “Photograph	  and	  text;	  image	  and	  testifying	  narrative:	  what	  the	  narrator	  encounters,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  these	  framing	  objects,	  is	  the	  twinned	  elements	  of	  documentary—specifically,	  the	  photo-­‐text	  form	  so	  dear	  to	  progressive	  New	  Deal	  reformers	  and	  black	  post-­‐war	  writers	  alike.”	  This	  encounter	  with	  a	  photograph	  engenders	  “recognition,”	  or	  a	  kind	  of	  critical	  knowledge,	  which	  then	  “spurs	  social	  action	  […]	  a	  spontaneous	  oration	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  evictees.”	  Here,	  Blair	  departs	  from	  a	  number	  of	  critics	  who	  have	  suggested	  that	  Ellison’s	  text	  operates	  by	  modeling	  “proper”	  reading	  practices,	  training	  both	  the	  narrator	  and	  the	  reader	  to	  recognize	  visual	  and	  aesthetic	  grammars.25	  Instead,	  she	  argues	  that	  this	  scene	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  narrator	  rejects	  the	  logic	  of	  “exposure”	  that	  was	  the	  intended,	  “transparent”	  reading	  practice	  for	  documentary	  images	  intended	  to	  reveal	  the	  (racialized)	  “naturalness”	  of	  “the	  hapless,	  the	  forgotten,	  the	  marginal,	  and	  unselfconscious”	  (69).	  Instead,	  she	  claims	  that	  “Ellison’s	  text	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See,	  for	  example,	  Lena	  M.	  Hill,	  “The	  Visual	  Art	  of	  Invisible	  Man:	  Ellison’s	  Portrait	  of	  Blackness,”	  American	  Literature	  81:4	  (December	  2009).	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emphasizes	  the	  power	  of	  the	  documentary	  stance	  to	  evoke	  powerful	  yet	  ambiguous	  responses”	  that	  occur	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  overwhelming	  presence	  of	  “’more	  meaning	  than	  there	  should	  have	  been’”	  (69).	  When	  Blair	  highlights	  Ellison’s	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  “more	  meaning	  than	  there	  should	  have	  been,”	  her	  interest	  in	  the	  scene	  seems	  to	  resonate	  with	  Moten’s	  embrace	  of	  nonmeaning.	  And	  yet,	  there	  is	  something	  about	  her	  reading	  that,	  to	  my	  mind,	  fails	  to	  recognize	  the	  political	  experience—the	  black	  radical	  aesthetic—that	  plays	  out	  in	  the	  scene.	  	  As	  I	  understand	  Blair’s	  reading,	  the	  narrator’s	  encounter	  with	  the	  photo-­‐text	  brings	  him	  into	  fully	  formed	  critical-­‐political	  consciousness.	  Though	  the	  narrator	  himself	  does	  not	  close-­‐read	  the	  photo-­‐text,	  Blair	  is	  able	  to	  extrapolate	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  along-­‐the-­‐grain	  meaning	  of	  photo-­‐text	  and	  an	  instantaneous	  ideology	  critique	  that	  spurs	  the	  narrator	  to	  action.	  For	  her,	  deciphering	  the	  conventions	  of	  the	  visual	  and	  the	  revelation	  of	  a	  submerged	  hermeneutic	  knowledge	  are,	  in	  fact,	  the	  privileged	  political	  acts.	  Yet,	  if	  we	  return	  to	  the	  scene	  in	  the	  novel,	  we	  find	  that	  this	  is	  not	  exactly	  how	  the	  scene	  plays	  out.	  The	  narrator	  does,	  indeed,	  encounter	  a	  photo-­‐text,	  but	  far	  from	  coming	  into	  political	  consciousness,	  he	  is	  thrown	  into	  a	  state	  of	  questioning,	  into	  an	  aesthetically-­‐inspired	  confusion	  that	  resembles	  that	  of	  the	  prologue:	  shocked	  by	  how	  little	  “removed	  in	  time”	  the	  date	  on	  old	  man’s	  free	  paper	  is,	  the	  narrator	  experiences	  time	  itself	  as	  slowing	  or	  altering,	  opening	  up,	  just	  as	  it	  does	  in	  the	  break	  of	  the	  prologue.	  And	  he	  “look[s…]	  inwardly,	  outwardly,	  around	  a	  corner	  into	  the	  dark,	  far-­‐away-­‐and-­‐long-­‐ago,	  [at]	  not	  so	  much	  of	  my	  own	  memory	  as	  of	  remembered	  words,	  of	  linked	  verbal	  echoes,	  images,	  heard	  even	  when	  not	  listening	  at	  home”	  (Ellison	  273).	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This	  synaesthesia	  engendered	  by	  the	  photograph,	  and	  experienced	  as	  a	  supposedly	  impossible	  looking	  at	  listening	  and	  sound,	  gives	  way	  not	  to	  a	  political	  consciousness	  that	  the	  narrator	  can	  then	  express	  via	  oration,	  but	  to	  a	  series	  of	  events	  and	  disruptions	  that	  materially	  move	  the	  narrator,	  spinning	  him	  around.	  The	  old	  woman	  screams	  and	  returns	  inside	  to	  the	  apartment	  from	  which	  she’s	  been	  evicted;	  onlookers	  begin	  to	  fight	  with	  the	  cops	  to	  let	  her	  back	  inside.	  In	  the	  moment,	  for	  the	  narrator,	  “beneath	  it	  all	  boiled	  up	  all	  the	  shock-­‐absorbing	  phrases	  that	  I	  had	  ever	  learned	  in	  my	  life”	  (275).	  So,	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  absorbing	  shock,	  the	  narrator	  is	  led	  not	  to	  political	  action	  nor	  political	  resistance,	  but	  a	  kind	  of	  accomodationism,	  or	  worse,	  an	  insistence	  on	  the	  very	  politics	  of	  respectability	  that	  had	  oppressed	  him	  in	  novel’s	  opening	  chapters:	  “That’s	  not	  the	  way,”	  he	  yells	  at	  those	  who	  aid	  the	  woman,	  “We’re	  law	  abiding.	  	  We’re	  a	  law-­‐abiding	  people	  and	  a	  slow-­‐to-­‐anger	  people.”	  	  When	  the	  narrator	  does	  eventually	  emerge	  into	  political	  action	  and	  oration,	  it	  happens	  not	  through	  a	  prior	  coming	  to	  political	  consciousness	  enabled	  by	  a	  critical	  reading,	  but	  through	  an	  improvisation	  made	  available	  through	  his	  synaesthetic	  encounter	  and	  confusion.	  Not	  sure	  what	  is	  happening,	  not	  sure	  what	  he	  thinks,	  the	  narrator	  speaks	  without	  foresight	  which	  becomes	  precisely	  a	  kind	  of	  foresight,	  changing	  his	  answers	  and	  positions	  in	  response	  to	  the	  crowd,	  performing	  with	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  crowd,	  the	  surge	  of	  the	  crowd	  back	  into	  the	  apartment,	  the	  looming	  violence	  of	  the	  police.	  His	  speech	  in	  improvisatory	  response,	  eventually	  becomes	  not	  a	  call	  to	  abide	  the	  law,	  but	  a	  call	  to	  carry	  the	  dispersed	  belongings	  back	  into	  the	  house	  and	  a	  mocking	  of	  the	  police	  (279-­‐280).	  The	  effects	  of	  the	  photo-­‐text,	  then,	  weren’t	  limited	  to	  meaning	  but	  rather	  engender	  experience	  and	  improvisation,	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a	  way	  of	  making	  the	  world	  in	  process	  in	  response	  to	  the	  changing	  material	  conditions—what	  Moten	  calls	  “black	  performance”—conditions	  that	  neither	  ideology	  (critique)	  nor	  political	  consciousness	  can	  alone	  predict	  or	  instigate.	  A	  response	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  racist	  violence	  requires	  not	  (only)	  a	  reading	  of	  it,	  not	  (merely)	  an	  understanding	  of	  its	  logic,	  but	  an	  attunement	  to	  the	  sensorial	  that	  exceeds	  it,	  that	  can	  be	  moved	  on	  and	  with—a	  capacity	  to	  remake	  the	  world	  on	  the	  fly	  that	  expands	  rather	  than	  contracts	  the	  possibilities	  for	  resistance.	  A	  capacity	  to	  be	  open	  to	  the	  opening	  that	  the	  cut	  makes—an	  attunement	  to	  the	  cut—also	  suggests	  another	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  experimental	  that	  Blair	  dismissed	  “in	  the	  pejorative	  sense.”	  In	  describing	  Ellison’s	  photographic	  archive,	  Blair	  notes	  that	  his	  use	  of	  several	  different	  kinds	  of	  camera	  “allowed	  Ellison	  to	  pursue	  a	  different	  relationship	  to	  the	  photographic	  subject:	  that	  of	  studio	  professional,	  producing	  author	  portraits;	  of	  participant-­‐observer,	  recording	  the	  daily	  facts	  of	  Harlem	  life;	  of	  avant-­‐gardist,	  testing	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  medium;	  of	  sympathetic	  outsider,	  witnessing	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  marginalized”	  (63).	  Yet,	  if	  she	  initially	  affirms	  his	  “conducting	  of	  experiments”	  with	  the	  camera,	  she	  affirms	  them	  primarily	  for	  their	  eventual	  effect:	  giving	  him	  a	  set	  of	  critical-­‐interpretive	  tools.	  Speaking	  only	  of	  the	  “avant-­‐gardist”	  photos,	  Blair	  makes	  her	  statement:	  “As	  a	  body	  of	  work,	  these	  images	  are	  scattershot	  and	  often	  experimental	  in	  the	  pejorative	  sense—that	  is,	  tentative	  or	  technically	  unrealized.”	  	  While	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  to	  me	  what	  the	  “non-­‐pejorative”	  sense	  of	  experimental	  would	  be—something	  that	  Blair	  seems	  to	  think	  is	  obvious	  enough	  to	  go	  unsaid—I	  am	  assuming	  she	  is	  linking	  the	  valuable	  form	  to	  the	  “conceptual”	  strain	  
	   124	  
of	  avant-­‐garde	  art:	  art	  that	  realizes	  a	  concept	  that	  both	  inspired	  and	  preceded	  it.	  It	  is	  useful,	  here,	  to	  turn	  to	  David	  Galenson’s	  distinction	  between	  conceptual	  and	  experimental	  artists.	  According	  to	  Galenson,	  the	  “basic	  characteristic”	  of	  conceptual	  artists	  “is	  certainty	  about	  some	  aspect	  of	  their	  work	  —	  their	  method,	  their	  goals,	  or	  both.	  Their	  certainty	  often	  allows	  them	  to	  work	  methodically,	  according	  to	  some	  system,	  toward	  their	  goals”	  (51).	  By	  contrast,	  an	  experimental	  artist	  operates	  not	  from	  an	  answer,	  but	  from	  a	  question,	  from	  an	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  world	  that	  is	  answered	  not	  through	  critical	  thought	  alone,	  but	  through	  encounter	  and	  interaction	  with	  the	  material	  world,	  through	  experience.	  This	  distinction	  links	  the	  experimental	  artist	  to	  the	  valuable	  experimenter	  in	  science	  (rather	  than	  the	  normal	  scientist)	  I	  discussed	  in	  my	  opening	  chapter.	  The	  valuable	  experiment	  requires	  the	  production	  of	  thought,	  concepts,	  and	  description	  immanent	  to	  rather	  than	  preceding	  the	  experiment,	  all	  of	  which	  shape	  without	  fully	  determining	  the	  material	  under	  investigation.	  Indeed,	  like	  Ellison’s	  narrator,	  who	  describes	  himself	  as	  a	  “thinker-­‐tinker”	  (7),	  Ellison	  himself	  thought	  through	  the	  doing	  of	  photography,	  music,	  and	  writing.	  	  Eschewing	  Barthes’s	  bracketing	  of	  the	  “doing	  of	  photography,”	  and	  valuing	  rather	  than	  dismissing	  the	  partial	  products	  of	  the	  process,	  can	  open	  up	  new	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  politics	  not	  only	  of	  the	  novel,	  but	  also	  of	  Ellison	  himself.	  Moten	  suggests	  that	  “black	  photography	  and	  black	  performance”	  are	  privileged	  sites	  for	  locating	  and	  affirming	  the	  “ongoing	  universality	  of	  […]	  absolute	  singularity”	  (PG).	  They	  engender	  an	  opening	  for	  difference	  rather	  than	  reducing	  it	  in	  the	  name	  of	  an	  essential	  or	  single	  universality.	  Yet,	  it	  seems	  a	  little	  difficult	  to	  posit	  Ellison’s	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photography	  or	  his	  writing	  as	  exemplary	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  aesthetic	  blackness—a	  blackness	  not	  reducible	  to	  identity—given	  his	  own	  commitment	  to	  nationalism	  and	  universal	  brotherhood,	  commitments	  to	  a	  reduction	  of	  difference	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  universal	  same	  (the	  empty	  liberal	  subject).	  But	  if	  you	  take	  Moten’s	  example,	  and	  disrupt	  time	  to	  affirm	  the	  political	  act	  not	  for	  its	  telos—not	  for	  its	  longevity	  or	  endpoint—but	  for	  its	  struggle	  in	  time,	  then	  you	  can	  see	  and	  hear	  Ellison	  a	  little	  differently.	  	  Which	  is	  all	  to	  say,	  paying	  attention	  to	  excess	  and	  nonmeaning	  makes	  space	  for	  another	  kind	  of	  “critical”	  reading	  and	  writing	  practice	  that	  doesn’t	  operate	  by	  way	  of	  critique	  precisely,	  but	  rather	  by	  way	  of	  “a	  mimetic	  improvisation	  of	  and	  with	  that	  materiality	  that	  moves	  in	  excess	  of	  meaning.”	  It	  indicates	  the	  need	  for	  a	  reading	  method	  that	  doesn’t	  depend	  on	  the	  “isness”	  of	  literature	  as	  an	  interpretive	  totality	  or	  closed	  ontology,	  but	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  events,	  nodes,	  singularities	  that	  cannot	  be	  fully	  totalized	  either	  through	  form	  or	  critical	  interpretation.	  A	  commitment	  to	  an	  improvisatory,	  connective	  reading	  practice	  can	  open	  up	  new	  political	  possibilities,	  engendering	  effects,	  and	  entangling	  itself	  with	  a	  world	  that	  it	  does	  not	  represent	  but	  is,	  rather,	  in.	  In	  this	  practice,	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  excesses,	  absences,	  cuts	  and	  folds	  of	  literature	  that	  become	  material	  nodes	  to	  link	  up	  with	  the	  world.	  	  Realism,	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  reading,	  then,	  would	  not	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  mimesis.	  In	  a	  traditional	  account	  of	  literary	  realism,	  realist	  novels	  operate	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  quite	  similar	  to	  how	  the	  classical	  world	  is	  presumed	  to	  operate.	  As	  Ian	  Watt	  has	  it	  in	  his	  influential	  account,	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Novel:	  Studies	  in	  Defoe,	  Richardson,	  Fielding,	  the	  realist	  novel	  produces	  a	  “causal	  connection	  operating	  through	  time	  [that]	  replaces	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the	  reliance	  of	  earlier	  narratives	  on	  disguises	  and	  coincidences”	  (Watt	  22).	  For	  Georg	  Lukacs,	  the	  political	  aim	  of	  the	  social	  realist	  novel	  is	  to	  produce	  a	  totality	  from	  the	  social,	  of	  making	  of	  social	  interactions	  a	  comprehensible	  and	  causal	  system,	  which	  can	  then	  be	  explained,	  and	  in	  being	  explained,	  understood	  in	  ways	  that	  will	  allow	  political	  consciousness	  to	  emerge.	  In	  a	  sense,	  for	  Watt	  realism	  brings	  to	  the	  novel	  the	  scientific	  virtue	  of	  causality,	  freeing	  it	  from	  mystifications	  of	  pre-­‐Enlightenment	  magic	  (and	  the	  possibilities	  of	  non-­‐causal	  entanglement);	  for	  Lukacs	  it	  takes	  totality	  as	  its	  aim	  (despite	  having	  lost	  a	  relationship	  to	  a	  given	  totality),	  and	  uses	  abstract	  concepts	  to	  make	  systemic	  totality	  visible—and	  hence	  causality	  within	  that	  totality	  comprehensible	  (Lukacs	  70).	  For	  both,	  the	  realist	  novel	  is	  transparently	  mimetic	  of	  reality	  while	  also	  offering	  aesthetic	  tools	  to	  make	  it	  comprehensible;	  the	  novel	  is	  an	  interpretive	  tool	  in	  the	  sense	  described	  earlier	  by	  Blair.	  	  Ellison’s	  dilated	  realism	  brings	  all	  these	  assumptions	  and	  values	  into	  question,	  rejecting	  the	  value	  of	  a	  scientistic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  novel	  as	  well	  as	  assumptions	  about	  knowable	  reality.	  As	  Ellison	  describes	  it,	  mimesis	  is	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  scientistic	  total	  ontology,	  the	  “distorting	  mirror”	  that	  causes	  “a	  defect	  of	  the	  inner	  eye”	  of	  the	  observer;	  mimesis	  allows	  a	  model	  or	  representation	  to	  stand	  in	  for	  the	  ontological	  and	  thus	  closes	  it	  off	  (Ellison	  3).	  Realism,	  instead—whether	  dilated	  or	  quantum	  physical—would	  have	  everything	  to	  do	  with	  affirming	  the	  reality	  of	  literature,	  as	  with	  that	  of	  the	  quantum	  world,	  as	  connected	  up	  with	  and	  interacting	  with	  this	  world	  via	  ontological	  continuity	  and	  material	  practices,	  rather	  than	  understanding	  literature	  as	  offering	  an	  external	  standpoint,	  an	  interpretive	  tool.	  
	   127	  
Highlighting	  the	  role	  of	  realism	  is	  important	  for	  understanding	  the	  confluences	  between	  Einstein’s	  thinking	  and	  Ellison’s.	  Ellison	  describes	  “dilated	  realism”	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  realism’s	  subgenre,	  naturalism’s	  “sometimes	  slavish	  adherence	  to	  mimetic	  representation,”	  its	  “willing[ness]	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  camera	  and	  the	  tape	  recorder”	  (Quoted	  in	  Bradley	  172,	  176);	  dilated	  realism,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  “a	  realism	  dilated	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  almost	  surreal	  state	  of	  our	  everyday	  American	  life”	  (Bradley	  171).	  In	  rejecting	  “mimesis”	  as	  the	  purview	  of	  his	  realism,	  Ellison	  proposes	  a	  different	  possibility	  for	  aesthetic	  engagement	  with	  the	  real.	  As	  Adam	  Bradley	  describes	  it,	  “It	  is	  no	  simple	  matter	  of	  semantics	  that	  Ellison	  displaces	  surrealism	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  artistic	  technique	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  experience	  itself.	  Dilated	  realism	  as	  Ellison	  would	  come	  to	  understand	  it	  was	  not	  a	  representational	  choice	  of	  the	  artist	  but	  a	  state	  of	  being	  in	  a	  world	  gone	  topsy-­‐turvy”	  (173).	  Ellison’s	  desire	  to	  produce	  an	  account	  of	  the	  real	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  object—a	  point	  of	  view	  not	  available	  via	  “slavish	  adherence	  to	  mimetic	  representation”	  nor	  the	  transparent	  readability	  of	  inscription	  technologies—required	  a	  realism	  that	  affirms	  experience	  over	  mimesis	  and	  understands	  writing	  and	  reading	  as	  experiences.	  The	  capacity	  to	  produce	  such	  a	  realism—especially	  one	  that	  cannot	  be	  guaranteed	  by	  technologies	  of	  vision	  nor	  recourse	  solely	  to	  vision—is	  a	  central	  concern	  in	  Einstein’s	  search	  for	  quantum	  realism.	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Another	  Realism:	  Unruly	  Perception	  	  	   In	  a	  strict	  sense,	  in	  physics,	  “the	  abandonment	  of	  objectivity”	  would	  also	  be	  “an	  abandonment	  of	  realism”	  (Hemmick	  and	  Shakur	  1).	  Yet	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  quantum	  realism,	  and	  how	  it	  might	  relate	  to	  literary	  realism,	  raises	  interesting	  questions	  about	  what	  precisely	  “objectivity”	  itself	  would	  mean	  when	  not	  linked	  to	  the	  subject’s	  capacity	  to	  be	  objective	  and	  therefore	  know	  reality,	  but	  rather,	  to	  the	  reality—which	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  existence—of	  objects	  themselves.	  Physicists	  Douglas	  Hemmick	  and	  Asif	  M.	  Shakur	  define	  realism	  for	  physics	  negatively,	  stating,	  “If,	  in	  fact,	  the	  best	  one	  can	  do	  is	  to	  discuss	  the	  responses	  of	  physical	  entities	  to	  certain	  measurement	  procedures,	  then	  quantum	  theory	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  reality	  of	  any	  physical	  entity	  is	  dependent	  upon	  human	  scrutiny.	  This	  is	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  realism	  or	  objectivity	  in	  the	  theory”	  (1).	  Einstein’s	  pursuit	  of	  quantum	  realism,	  then,	  has	  much	  in	  common	  with	  Ellison’s	  production	  of	  a	  dilated	  realism	  in	  that	  it	  aims	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  world	  that	  would	  constantly	  keep	  the	  irrational	  in	  play,	  rather	  than	  subjugating	  materiality	  and	  force	  to	  a	  full	  determination	  via	  observation.	  Their	  pursuit	  of	  realism	  extends	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  irrational	  in	  order	  to	  see	  what	  it	  can	  produce.	  The	  more	  than	  thirty	  years	  that	  Einstein	  would	  figure	  and	  refigure	  his	  thought	  experiments	  about	  light	  in	  a	  box,	  the	  almost	  two	  decades	  that	  the	  invisible	  man	  would	  spend	  underground	  in	  a	  hole	  filled	  with	  1,369	  light-­‐bulbs,	  and	  the	  eleven	  years	  that	  Jackson	  would	  spend	  “liv[ing]	  in	  a	  constant	  half-­‐light”	  in	  his	  prison	  cell	  extend	  the	  time	  of	  the	  irrational,	  keeping	  excess	  and	  its	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possibilities	  open	  for	  thought—and	  eventually,	  according	  to	  the	  invisible	  man,	  open	  for	  action.	  Importantly,	  in	  order	  to	  see	  the	  possibilities	  that	  come	  from	  both	  the	  excesses	  of	  novel	  writing	  and	  the	  excesses	  of	  science	  writing,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  read	  them	  against	  the	  will	  to	  totalizing	  closure,	  whether	  it	  is	  produced	  through	  critical	  assumptions	  about	  the	  formal	  implications	  of	  the	  novel’s	  pro-­‐	  and	  epilogues,	  or	  the	  published	  essays	  of	  the	  physicists	  in	  question.	  As	  the	  opening	  epigraph	  from	  Ellison	  makes	  clear,	  as	  do	  his	  later	  explications	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  novelist,	  his	  goal	  as	  a	  writer	  was	  to	  master	  what	  he	  understood	  as	  the	  underlying	  chaos	  of	  the	  real	  and	  to	  shape	  his	  material	  so	  that	  only	  those	  things	  which	  are	  significant—which	  is	  to	  say,	  those	  things	  which	  give	  way	  to	  meaning—remain.	  Yet,	  even	  as	  Ellison	  asserted	  this	  as	  his	  goal,	  and	  at	  times	  would	  publicly	  claim	  to	  have	  succeeded,	  his	  newly	  written	  introduction	  to	  the	  1981	  version	  of	  the	  novel	  paints	  a	  somewhat	  different	  picture	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  novelist	  and	  novel.	  This	  newly	  described	  relationship	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  novelist’s	  capacity	  to	  master	  his	  material	  and	  instead	  affirms	  the	  insistent,	  disruptive	  materiality	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  writing	  process,	  and	  the	  novel	  itself.	  He	  writes:	  [For	  the	  novelist]	  the	  task	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  process	  involved	  in	  putting	  [words	  on	  the	  page]	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  commanding	  a	  smoky	  genie	  to	  make	  an	  orderly	  retreat—not	  simply	  back	  into	  the	  traditional	  bottle,	  but	  into	  the	  ribbon	  and	  keys	  of	  a	  by	  now	  defunct	  typewriter.	  And	  in	  this	  particular	  instance,	  all	  the	  more	  so,	  because	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  unexpected	  inception	  this	  has	  been	  a	  most	  self-­‐willed	  and	  self-­‐generating	  piece	  of	  fiction.	  For	  at	  a	  time	  when	  I	  was	  struggling	  with	  a	  quite	  different	  narrative	  it	  announced	  itself	  in	  what	  were	  to	  become	  the	  opening	  words	  of	  its	  prologue,	  moved	  in,	  and	  proceeded	  to	  challenge	  my	  imagination	  for	  some	  seven	  years.	  (Ellison	  vii)	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  Here,	  Ellison	  describes	  the	  difficulty	  of	  reigning	  in	  disorderly	  synaptic	  materiality	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  the	  labor	  of	  typing,	  of	  writing	  (highlighting	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  process),	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  a	  willed	  production	  of	  order	  is	  always	  countered	  and	  interrupted	  by	  the	  productive	  excesses	  of	  that	  labor.	  He	  cites	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  self-­‐willing	  and	  self-­‐generating	  capacities	  of	  the	  novel	  his	  own	  inability	  to	  master	  the	  supposed	  “meaning”—or	  reign	  in	  the	  excesses	  of	  meaning—that	  it	  continues	  to	  generate:	  “[T]he	  proof	  of	  that	  statement,”	  he	  writes,	  “is	  witnessed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  here,	  thirty	  astounding	  years	  later,	  it	  has	  me	  writing	  about	  it	  again”	  (xxiii).	  	  Taken	  at	  his	  word,	  Ellison	  evinces	  the	  extraordinary	  capacity	  for	  surprise	  that	  characterizes	  experimental	  “science	  at	  its	  best”	  (Doyle	  105)—and	  perhaps	  experimental	  literature	  at	  its	  best:	  when	  it	  is	  attuned	  to	  the	  unknowable	  and	  therefore	  unpredictable	  potentialities	  of	  life	  and	  literature.	  It	  also	  suggests	  an	  invitation	  to	  read	  Ellison’s	  novel,	  from	  Ellison	  himself,	  with	  and	  through	  its	  excesses	  and	  absences	  (absences	  as	  excesses,	  pulsing	  absences,	  ghostly	  hauntings),	  even	  for	  its	  seeming	  impossibilities.	  Despite	  Ellison’s	  claims	  to	  mastery	  and	  to	  the	  meaningful	  totality	  of	  his	  narrative,	  several	  critics	  have	  taken	  up	  just	  such	  an	  invitation—among	  them	  Moten	  and	  Bradley—seeking	  not	  so	  much	  to	  produce	  “meaning”	  from	  the	  novel,	  as	  to	  expand	  its	  possibilities	  beyond	  meaning	  precisely	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  excess,	  absence,	  and	  presumed	  impossibility.	  For	  Moten,	  this	  possibility	  is	  most	  apparent	  in	  Ellison’s	  prologue,	  in	  which	  all	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  inquiries	  into	  the	  promises	  and	  violence	  of	  vision	  are	  cut	  by	  hearing.	  In	  the	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revelation	  of	  such	  interrelation	  between	  sight	  and	  sound,	  aesthetic	  experience	  comes	  to	  have	  a	  new	  and	  expanded	  valence	  for	  the	  narrator,	  one	  that	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  political	  action	  to	  emerge	  from	  and	  as	  aesthetic	  experience	  (Moten	  62).	  For	  Bradley,	  it	  is	  most	  apparent	  in	  Ellison’s	  process	  of	  writing,	  which	  remains	  evident	  in	  and	  through	  the	  open	  multiplicity	  of	  Ellison’s	  unfinished,	  forever	  unfinished,	  second	  novel.	  The	  second	  novel,	  Three	  Days	  before	  the	  Shooting.	  .	  .	  remains	  a	  series	  of	  drafts	  with	  multiple	  versions	  of	  the	  same	  scene	  coexisting	  and	  simultaneously	  functioning	  in	  the	  open	  novel:	  it	  endures	  as	  a	  multiple	  is-­‐ness	  and	  ontological	  coexistence	  of	  what	  (might	  have)	  occurred.26	  In	  Ralph	  Ellison	  in	  Progress:	  From	  Invisible	  Man	  to	  Three	  Days	  Before	  the	  Shooting.	  .	  .	  ,	  Adam	  Bradley	  reads	  Ellison’s	  writing-­‐life	  backwards,	  beginning	  with	  his	  death	  in	  1994,	  and	  working	  his	  way	  back	  through	  the	  forty-­‐years	  that	  Ellison	  spent	  struggling,	  writing,	  and	  re-­‐writing	  a	  novel	  always	  in-­‐process	  that	  he’d	  hoped	  would	  be	  the	  follow-­‐up	  to	  Invisible	  Man.	  Bradley’s	  major	  innovation	  is	  to	  “read”	  the	  unfinished	  novel	  not	  in	  its	  most	  complete	  or	  unified	  form,	  but	  as	  it	  existed	  in	  multiple	  and	  disconnected,	  episodic	  drafts.	  He	  presents	  it	  as	  necessarily	  indeterminate	  with	  multiple	  versions	  of	  the	  same	  scene	  or	  even	  multiple	  plots	  existing	  simultaneously.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  keeps	  the	  second	  novel	  linked	  to	  Invisible	  
Man,	  as	  early	  drafts	  drew	  on	  characters	  from	  the	  first	  novel,	  and	  in	  that	  sense,	  allow	  it,	  too,	  to	  be	  re-­‐opened	  and	  read	  as	  an	  on-­‐going	  revision.	  He	  notes	  that	  one	  major	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ellison’s	  second	  novel	  was	  published	  posthumously	  in	  partial	  form	  (a	  single,	  long,	  mostly	  completed	  section)	  as	  Juneteenth.	  Recently,	  Bradley	  and	  John	  F.	  Callahan	  have	  published	  a	  more	  expansive	  version	  under	  the	  title	  Three	  Days	  before	  the	  
Shooting.	  .	  .	  .	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inhibition	  to	  the	  completion	  of	  Ellison’s	  second	  novel	  was	  that	  he	  liked	  to	  work	  episodically,	  yet	  his	  ambition	  was	  to	  write	  a	  novel	  capable	  of	  producing	  an	  “aura	  of	  summing	  up	  the	  American	  experience”	  (Bradley	  12-­‐13).	  Ellison	  felt	  that	  for	  all	  his	  work	  he	  was	  “routinely	  thwarted	  by	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  which	  would	  render	  his	  best	  efforts	  to	  capture	  the	  historical	  moment	  insufficient	  once	  the	  moment	  had	  passed”	  (17).	  He	  wanted	  to	  transform	  history	  and	  literary	  tradition	  into	  a	  suitable	  vehicle	  for	  navigating	  these	  kinds	  of	  temporal	  obstacles,	  to	  “achieve	  a	  liberated	  form	  that	  better	  accounts	  for	  the	  varieties	  of	  lived	  experience”	  (97).	  Each	  episode	  or	  scene	  was	  being	  constantly	  augmented	  to	  speak	  to	  politics,	  and	  especially	  racial	  politics,	  as	  they	  were	  changing	  on	  the	  ground	  from	  1952	  to	  1994.	  The	  need	  for	  constant	  improvisation	  made	  writing	  the	  “seams”	  that	  could	  link	  the	  episodes	  and	  totalize	  the	  novel	  virtually	  impossible.	  For	  Ellison,	  it	  was	  almost	  as	  though	  these	  scenes	  were	  “cut”	  from	  one	  another,	  and	  he	  couldn’t	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  bridge	  the	  “cut,”	  even	  as	  he	  struggled	  to,	  constantly	  working	  in	  the	  break.	  	  The	  episodes	  in	  their	  indeterminacy	  give	  a	  way	  of	  tracing	  Ellison’s	  artistic	  struggles—and	  for	  Ellison,	  “art	  is	  a	  form	  of	  political	  action”	  (95)—and	  help	  to	  disrupt	  the	  caricature	  that	  now	  characterizes	  his	  political	  reputation.	  Episodes	  that	  were	  removed	  from	  the	  Invisible	  Man	  or	  still	  in	  progress	  in	  the	  Three	  Days	  show	  that	  Ellison	  had	  a	  much	  deeper	  and	  more	  conflicted	  engagement	  with	  questions	  of	  nationalism,	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam,	  Pan-­‐African	  solidarity,	  women,	  and	  individualism	  than	  characterize	  his	  reputation	  today.	  But	  even	  as	  the	  ground	  was	  always	  changing	  underneath	  him,	  he	  kept	  returning	  to	  artistic	  praxis—a	  praxis	  that	  limned	  writing,	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photography,	  and	  music,	  all	  of	  which	  informed	  each	  other—to	  generate	  his	  questions.	  	   Reading	  Ellison	  in	  this	  way,	  through	  his	  own	  self-­‐evaluation	  and	  invitations	  to	  see	  or	  hear—to	  experience—these	  excesses,	  gives	  a	  new,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  precise,	  valence	  to	  the	  myriad	  claims	  that	  Invisible	  Man	  is	  an	  “experimental	  novel.”	  Ellison’s	  suggestion	  that	  what	  the	  novelist	  as	  self-­‐critic	  does	  is	  “account	  for	  the	  process	  involved”	  in	  the	  double	  mediations	  of	  the	  world	  via	  thought	  and	  thought	  via	  writing	  (in	  which	  both	  processes	  are	  cut	  by	  the	  materiality	  and	  worldliness	  of	  their	  own	  labor)	  brings	  him	  quite	  close	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  sociologists	  of	  science	  Bruno	  Latour	  and	  Steve	  Woolgar	  in	  Laboratory	  Life:	  The	  Construction	  of	  Scientific	  Facts	  to	  account	  for	  the	  practices,	  erasures,	  and	  excesses	  to	  be	  found	  in	  science	  writing	  that	  reports	  on	  experiments.	  Latour’s	  and	  Woolgar’s	  ethnography	  of	  laboratory	  life	  focuses	  on	  a	  particular	  biology	  laboratory,	  yet	  they	  turn	  to	  an	  example	  drawn	  from	  astrophysics—a	  field	  that	  relies	  heavily	  on	  quantum	  theory—to	  make	  most	  clearly	  their	  point	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  valuable	  experiments	  (“science	  at	  its	  best”)	  come	  from	  the	  extraordinary	  capacity	  for	  surprise,	  the	  capacity	  not	  merely	  to	  see,	  but	  to	  hear	  what	  is	  beyond	  the	  meaningful.	  They	  write:	  Sometime	  in	  late	  1967,	  Jocelyn	  Bell,	  a	  research	  student	  at	  Cambridge	  radio	  astronomy	  laboratories,	  noted	  the	  persistent	  appearance	  of	  a	  strange	  section	  of	  ‘scruff’	  on	  the	  recorded	  output	  from	  [an]	  apparatus	  designed	  to	  produce	  a	  sky	  survey	  of	  quasars.	  [.	  .	  .	  ]	  In	  this	  particular	  example,	  it	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  if	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  recording	  had	  been	  automated,	  or	  if	  Bell	  had	  been	  sufficiently	  socialized	  into	  realizing	  that	  the	  persistent	  recurrence	  of	  scruff	  was	  impossible,	  and	  hence	  unnoticeable,	  the	  discovery	  of	  pulsars	  would	  have	  been	  much	  longer	  in	  coming.	  (32)	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As	  Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  imply,	  Bell	  made	  the	  observation	  of	  “a	  bit	  of	  scruff”	  against	  the	  given	  scientific	  impossibility	  of	  that	  scruff,	  against	  the	  technical	  and	  theoretical	  imperceptibility	  of	  an	  invisible	  pulsar.	  The	  special	  and	  protective	  conditions	  of	  the	  lab	  allowed	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  improper	  perception	  that	  would	  have	  profound	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  matter,	  and	  the	  conditions	  that	  enabled	  such	  perception	  begin	  to	  speak	  back	  to	  Ellison’s	  own	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  would	  mean	  to	  be	  “in	  the	  break,”	  to	  be	  held	  in	  time	  in	  order	  to	  engender	  the	  improper	  miscegenation’s	  of	  sensory	  perception	  that	  are	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  his	  experiment	  with	  aesthetico-­‐politics.	  	  But	  rather	  than	  simply	  affirm	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  unruly	  perception	  and	  thought	  are	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  experiment	  and	  experimental	  conditions—that	  is,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  experience	  is	  experiment—Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  continue	  by	  analyzing	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  unruliness	  is	  ordered	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  knowledge	  production.	  They	  highlight	  how	  scientific	  publishing	  practices	  privilege	  to	  the	  production	  of	  meaning	  over	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  experiment,	  and	  thus	  how	  they	  have	  to	  track	  backwards	  to	  understand	  how	  such	  perception	  even	  became	  possible:	   Technical	  events,	  such	  as	  Bell’s	  observations,	  are	  thus	  much	  more	  than	  mere	  psychological	  operations;	  the	  very	  act	  of	  perception	  is	  constituted	  by	  prevalent	  social	  forces.	  Our	  interest,	  however,	  would	  be	  in	  the	  details	  of	  the	  observation	  process.	  In	  particular,	  we	  should	  like	  to	  know	  the	  method	  by	  which	  Bell	  made	  sense	  of	  a	  series	  of	  figures	  such	  that	  she	  could	  produce	  the	  account:	  “There	  was	  a	  recurrence	  of	  a	  bit	  of	  scruff.”	  The	  processes	  which	  inform	  the	  initial	  perception	  can	  be	  dealt	  with	  psychologically.	  However,	  our	  interest	  would	  be	  with	  the	  use	  of	  socially	  acceptable	  procedures	  for	  constructing	  an	  ordered	  account	  out	  of	  the	  apparent	  chaos	  of	  perceptions.”	  (33)	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  The	  scientist’s	  task	  mirrors	  that	  of	  Ellison’s:	  producing	  order	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  meaning)	  out	  of	  chaos.	  This	  means	  eliminating	  the	  virtual	  multiplicity	  that	  always	  undergirds	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  actualize	  a	  particular	  meaning,	  altering	  description	  into	  explanation.	  They	  continue,	  “The	  observer	  has	  to	  base	  his	  analysis	  on	  shifting	  ground.	  He	  is	  faced	  with	  the	  task	  of	  producing	  an	  ordered	  version	  of	  observations	  and	  utterances	  when	  each	  of	  his	  readings	  of	  observations	  and	  utterances	  can	  be	  counterbalanced	  with	  an	  alternative.”	  Physical	  experiments,	  then,	  contend	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  presumed	  order,	  which	  retrospectively	  places	  limits	  on	  the	  description	  of	  experience	  (or	  makes	  a	  meaning	  visible	  while	  reducing	  the	  rest).	  The	  thought	  experiment,	  in	  questioning	  the	  presumption	  of	  order	  as	  immanent	  to	  life	  and	  the	  material	  world,	  can	  reopen	  the	  field	  of	  experience	  to	  new	  descriptive	  possibilities.	  This	  also	  opens	  up	  a	  thinking	  of	  aesthetic	  determinations	  and	  reductions	  as	  that	  which	  is	  the	  producer	  of	  order	  and	  form,	  but	  also	  that	  of	  sense	  experience	  beyond	  and	  before	  it,	  constantly	  altering	  aesthetic	  productions:	  aesthetics	  as	  on	  an	  improvisatory	  process.	  	   Deleuze	  clarifies	  what	  this	  would	  mean	  for	  art.	  In	  The	  Logic	  of	  Sense	  he	  writes:	   Aesthetics	  suffers	  from	  a	  wrenching	  duality.	  On	  one	  hand,	  it	  designates	  the	  theory	  of	  sensibility	  as	  the	  form	  of	  possible	  experience;	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  designates	  the	  theory	  of	  art	  as	  the	  reflection	  of	  real	  experience.	  For	  these	  two	  meanings	  to	  be	  tied	  together,	  the	  conditions	  of	  experience	  in	  general	  must	  become	  conditions	  of	  real	  experience;	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  work	  of	  art	  would	  appear	  as	  experimentation.	  (260)	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It	  is	  via	  the	  linking	  of	  sensorial	  experience	  as	  perception	  and	  the	  doubling	  of	  that	  experience	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  art	  that	  art	  is	  experimental.	  Art	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  experience	  in	  that	  it	  is	  a	  repetition	  of	  experience,	  but	  instantiated	  as	  a	  particular	  and	  real	  experience—an	  experiment	  with	  experience	  itself.	  By	  manifesting	  sensibility,	  which	  is	  “the	  condition[]	  of	  experience	  in	  general”	  as	  the	  “condition[]	  of	  [a]	  real	  experience”	  had	  in	  an	  encounter	  with	  the	  novel	  through	  reading,	  Ellison	  does	  not	  
represent	  experience	  but	  repeats	  it,	  doubles	  it,	  in	  dilated	  form,	  making	  it	  experiment.	  	  	  
An	  Improperly	  Scientific	  Standpoint	  	  
	   A	  reading	  practice	  that	  would	  attune	  itself	  to	  literature	  as	  the	  condition	  of	  real	  experience,	  and	  which	  would	  read	  it	  “by	  mov[ing]	  in	  the	  excess	  of	  meaning”	  (Moten,	  Break	  197),	  would	  not	  encounter	  literature	  as	  a	  total	  object	  or	  closed	  ontology,	  but	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  events,	  nodes,	  and	  singularities	  that	  cannot	  be	  fully	  totalized	  either	  through	  its	  own	  formal	  conventions	  or	  critical	  interpretation.	  With	  regards	  to	  Ellison’s	  novel,	  reading	  in	  this	  way	  can	  open	  up	  new	  political	  possibilities	  not	  just	  for	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  novel,	  but	  also	  for	  engendering	  effects	  and	  entangling	  the	  novel	  with	  a	  world	  that	  it	  does	  not	  represent	  but	  rather	  is	  in.	  In	  this	  practice,	  the	  excesses,	  absences,	  cuts,	  and	  folds	  of	  literature	  become	  material	  nodes	  for	  linking	  literature	  to	  the	  world,	  and	  criticism	  becomes	  one	  mode	  of	  producing	  these	  links.	  Reading	  dilated	  realism,	  then,	  would	  not	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  interpreting	  representations,	  and	  certainly	  not	  as	  though	  representations	  mapped	  a	  referent	  thus	  closing	  off	  ontology	  or	  totalizing	  it.	  Dilated	  or	  quantum	  realism,	  instead,	  affirms	  the	  reality	  of	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literature	  and	  the	  doing	  of	  physics	  as	  connected	  up	  with	  and	  interacting	  with	  this	  world.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  an	  improperly	  scientific	  standpoint—one	  that,	  like	  Jocelyn	  Bell,	  is	  not	  properly	  conditioned	  either	  for	  making	  meaning	  out	  of	  observation	  or	  encountering	  reading	  as	  a	  hermeneutic	  enterprise—becomes	  a	  vital	  contribution	  of	  Einstein’s,	  Ellison’s,	  and	  Jackson’s	  work.	  This	  improper	  scientific	  standpoint	  is	  both	  produced	  within	  and	  from	  their	  work	  in	  connection	  with	  experience	  beyond	  it.	  This	  open	  standpoint	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  irrational	  within	  and	  across	  literature	  and	  the	  world	  could	  be	  described	  as	  an	  experimental	  standpoint	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  valuable	  experiment:	  it	  is	  an	  experiment	  that	  allows	  new	  values	  can	  emerge.	  Understanding	  these	  works	  as	  producing	  an	  experimental	  standpoint	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  disrupt	  an	  idea	  of	  politics	  that	  would	  understand	  causality	  and	  knowledge	  of	  that	  causal	  history	  as	  determining	  political	  possibility.	  This	  improperly	  scientific	  standpoint	  is	  what	  I	  have	  earlier	  described	  as	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  object.	  	  Beginning	  not	  with	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world,	  but	  belief	  in	  it—in	  its	  
objective	  reality	  beyond	  the	  knowability	  of	  such	  reality—enables	  thought	  that	  affirms	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  object	  beyond	  knowledge	  of	  such	  experience,	  and	  which	  therefore	  implies	  the	  possibility	  of	  unseen	  realities:	  other	  worlds,	  both	  virtual	  and	  actualized,	  in	  this	  world.	  And	  it	  does	  so	  by	  thought	  experiments	  that	  isolate	  the	  object	  for	  investigation—whether	  in	  the	  light	  box,	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  hole,	  or	  Jackson’s	  cell—in	  order	  to	  describe	  such	  experience,	  not	  as	  given	  fact,	  but	  as	  ontological	  reality	  that	  engenders	  new	  possibilities.	  Thought	  experiments	  then	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become	  technologies	  of	  vision	  in	  the	  most	  material	  sense—shaping	  both	  the	  materiality	  of	  perception	  and	  engendering	  and	  expanding	  its	  potential	  effects—not	  merely	  by	  offering	  up	  new	  forms	  of	  vision,	  but	  by	  experimenting	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  invisible	  real,	  of	  feeling	  and	  responding	  to	  invisible,	  impossible	  effects.	  In	  this	  way,	  thought	  experiments	  are	  not	  merely	  experiments	  conducted	  through	  thought,	  but	  experiments	  with	  thought	  and	  its	  possibilities,	  engendering	  both	  new,	  amorphous	  perceptions	  (perceptions	  of	  material	  possibility	  as	  reality)	  and	  also	  new	  values	  that	  such	  perceptions	  enable	  and	  require.	  It	  also	  highlights	  the	  materiality	  of	  thought	  as	  inextricable	  from	  its	  embodiment	  and	  effects—thought	  itself	  as	  material.	  We	  might	  call	  this	  material	  thought	  black	  thought	  in	  opposition	  to	  a	  dualism	  that	  conceives	  of	  Enlightenment	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  light,	  white)	  thought	  as	  disembodied,	  a	  product	  of	  a	  Cartesian	  split.	  	  The	  radical	  science	  that	  Einstein,	  Ellison,	  and	  Jackson	  develop,	  then,	  is	  both	  radical	  in	  its	  complete	  revision	  of	  scientific	  or	  perceptive	  values,	  but	  also	  in	  its	  being	  imbued	  thoroughly	  by	  the	  materiality	  of	  politics	  that	  a	  historical	  division	  of	  science	  (and	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  material)	  from	  “interest”	  (thought-­‐as-­‐desire)	  would	  deny.	  It	  is	  a	  thoroughly	  interested	  science,	  grounded	  in	  an	  affirmation	  of	  belief—belief	  in	  the	  world—and	  in	  the	  possibilities	  of	  black	  radicalism	  that	  could	  understand	  the	  links	  between	  aesthetics,	  science,	  and	  politics;	  links	  made	  apparent	  when	  any	  theory/system	  isn’t	  seen	  as	  total,	  but	  rather	  traversed	  by	  the	  irrational.	  And	  any	  failure	  to	  fully	  resolve	  or	  “solve”	  a	  systemic	  problem	  by	  completing	  the	  system(ic	  understanding)—a	  failure	  experienced	  by	  both	  Einstein	  and	  Ellison—must	  be	  seen	  not	  as	  political	  failure,	  but	  rather,	  as	  a	  political	  possibility	  that	  is	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grounded	  in	  that	  irrational	  that	  traverses	  the	  systematized,	  the	  rational.	  	  Such	  failures	  point	  not	  to	  an	  incommensurability	  between	  ontology	  and	  epistemology,	  but	  to	  an	  ontological	  quality,	  a	  being	  that	  is	  open,	  multiply	  determined,	  and	  infinitely	  available	  for	  actualization.	  This	  question	  of	  a	  different	  scientific-­‐cum-­‐political	  standpoint—the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  object—becomes	  especially	  clear	  if	  we	  oppose	  it	  to	  an	  ideological	  standpoint,	  one	  in	  which,	  according	  to	  Louis	  Althusser,	  the	  real	  relations	  of	  production	  are	  obscured	  by	  a	  representational	  imaginary	  enabled	  by	  the	  capitalist	  state.27	  In	  Althusser’s	  account,	  a	  revolutionary	  or	  experimental	  standpoint	  becomes	  impossible	  because	  ideology	  is	  total,	  and	  any	  position	  taken	  against	  it	  is	  always	  already	  duped,	  always	  implicated	  in	  ideology	  itself.28	  A	  long	  history	  of	  materialist	  thinking,	  however,	  has	  struggled	  with	  the	  question	  of	  the	  standpoint	  from	  which	  one	  might	  see	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  unseeable	  that	  could	  extricate	  one	  from	  the	  grips	  of	  ideology.	  This	  question	  of	  standpoint	  has,	  within	  a	  Marxist	  historiography,	  sometimes	  appeared	  as	  a	  desire	  for	  a	  properly	  scientific	  position,	  one	  that	  could	  be	  opposed	  to	  ideology	  and	  enable	  a	  revolutionary	  position.29	  Science	  itself	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See:	  Louis	  Althusser,	  “Ideology	  and	  Ideological	  State	  Apparatuses:	  Notes	  Towards	  an	  Investigation,”	  in	  Lenin	  and	  Philosophy	  and	  Other	  Essays	  (Monthly	  Review	  Press,	  1971);	  accessed	  from	  http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm	  (March	  10,	  2012).	  28	  See:	  Michelle	  Koerner,	  “Lines	  of	  Escape:	  Gilles	  Deleuze’s	  Encounter	  with	  George	  Jackson,”	  Genre	  44:2	  (2011):	  157-­‐180	  for	  a	  more	  thorough	  account	  of	  some	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  Althusser’s	  position	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  standpoint,	  especially	  with	  regards	  to	  Jackson.	  29	  See,	  for	  example:	  Nancy	  Hartsock,	  “The	  Feminist	  Standpoint:	  Developing	  the	  Ground	  for	  a	  Specifically	  Feminist	  Historical	  Materialism”	  (1983)	  in	  Discovering	  
Reality:	  Perspectives	  on	  Epistemology,	  Metaphysics,	  Methodology,	  and	  Philosophy	  of	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ideological,	  however,	  when	  it	  uses	  vision	  to	  totalize	  the	  world	  and	  claims	  a	  determinate	  ontology	  limited	  to	  positivist	  knowledge.	  But	  what	  if	  the	  “objects”	  of	  science	  might	  have	  agency	  not	  by	  becoming	  subjects	  who	  “master”	  knowledge	  of	  ontology	  and	  therefore	  master	  the	  world	  historical,	  but	  rather	  by	  interacting	  with	  the	  unknowable,	  by	  assuming	  their	  object	  position	  in	  play	  with	  the	  unknowable	  reality	  of	  the	  world.	  We	  might	  understand	  Ellison’s	  novel,	  then,	  as	  a	  search	  for	  this	  improperly	  scientific	  standpoint,	  a	  position	  that	  would	  not	  be	  an	  objective	  outside,	  but	  would	  rather	  be	  the	  position	  of	  the	  object	  as	  an	  internal	  outside,	  an	  unknowable	  opacity	  within.	  This	  possibility	  becomes	  especially	  clear	  if	  we	  take	  seriously	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Brotherhood’s	  economic	  science	  is	  understood	  as	  an	  ideology	  that,	  against	  its	  professed	  materialism,	  obscures	  not	  only	  the	  real	  relations	  of	  production,	  but	  also	  the	  social	  relations	  with	  and	  beyond	  material	  relations.	  Critic	  Barbara	  Foley	  has	  made	  much	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  most	  prominent	  and	  vicious	  “scientist”	  in	  the	  violent	  penultimate	  scene	  of	  Invisible	  Man	  is	  Brother	  Jack,	  the	  promulgator	  of	  “communist	  science.”	  Foley	  reads	  the	  Brotherhood	  as	  a	  representation	  the	  Communist	  Party	  USA,	  and	  the	  novel’s	  portrayal	  of	  it	  as	  an	  indictment	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  racial	  politics.	  Foley’s	  point	  has	  some	  salience:	  the	  Communist	  Party	  in	  the	  US	  had	  a	  more	  nuanced	  relationship	  to	  race	  than	  one	  would	  perceive	  if	  one	  were	  to	  read	  Ellison’s	  description	  as	  a	  form	  of	  historical	  fidelity.	  Yet,	  reading	  Ellison’s	  novel	  as	  an	  attempt	  at	  historical	  mimesis	  misses	  much	  of	  what	  becomes	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possible	  if	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  kind	  of	  historical	  determinism	  invoked	  by	  the	  fictional	  brotherhood	  and	  at	  how	  that	  comes	  to	  relate	  to	  larger	  questions	  of	  scientism	  or	  scientific	  logic.	  	  The	  Brotherhood	  understands	  their	  dialectical-­‐materialist	  epistemology	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  their	  ideology)	  as	  coextensive	  with	  ontology:	  science	  is	  mimetic	  of	  ontology	  and	  ontology	  is	  historically	  determined.	  Political	  action	  for	  the	  Brotherhood	  means	  inculcation	  in	  this	  particular	  view	  of	  historical	  determinism,	  and	  political	  action	  is	  limited	  to	  an	  unveiling	  of	  false	  consciousness	  and	  a	  bringing	  to	  “proper”	  (ideological)	  consciousness	  of	  the	  people.	  The	  invisible	  man	  begins	  to	  realize	  that	  such	  ideological	  indoctrination	  is	  often	  happening	  at	  the	  expense	  (quite	  literally,	  with	  regards	  to	  monetary	  donations,	  and	  also	  donations	  of	  labor-­‐time	  to	  the	  party)	  of	  the	  people	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  help—and,	  indeed,	  it	  eventually	  leads	  to	  the	  death	  of	  the	  black	  Brother	  Tod	  Clifton,	  who	  has	  been	  a	  totem	  for	  the	  Brotherhood.	  	  Thrown	  into	  a	  state	  of	  confusion	  and	  political	  despair	  after	  Clifton’s	  death,	  the	  invisible	  man	  asks:	  “At	  what	  point	  do	  we	  stop?”	  Hambro	  (a	  leader	  of	  the	  Brotherhood)	  responds,	  “At	  the	  proper	  moment,	  science	  will	  stop	  us”	  (Ellison	  505).	  Science,	  then,	  appears	  as	  the	  total	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  ontology	  in	  such	  a	  formulation,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  possibility	  for	  an	  outside	  to	  its	  ideology.	  By	  describing	  the	  its	  ideology	  as	  a	  “science”	  and	  aspiring	  to	  scientific	  determinism,	  the	  Brotherhood	  limits	  political	  action	  to	  merely	  being	  scientific;	  “the	  brotherhood	  had	  both	  science	  and	  history	  under	  control”	  (381).	  It	  is	  his	  doubt	  about	  the	  particular	  determination	  the	  Brotherhood	  has	  outlined	  that	  leads	  the	  narrator	  to	  ask,	  “What	  if	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history	  was	  a	  gambler	  instead	  of	  a	  force	  in	  a	  laboratory	  experiment?”	  (441).	  What	  if	  there	  might	  be	  a	  history	  that	  bet	  against	  statistics,	  probability,	  and	  knowledge,	  and	  profited	  from	  doing	  so,	  rather	  than	  being	  determined	  by	  them?	  This	  thought	  leads	  the	  invisible	  man	  to	  wonder	  what	  it	  might	  mean,	  what	  might	  become	  possible,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  “plunge	  out	  of	  history,”	  to	  leave	  behind	  “the	  futile	  game	  of	  ‘making	  history’”	  all	  together	  (447,	  575).	  	  
The	  Outside	  of	  History:	  Love	  and	  the	  Not	  Yet	  	  	  
Invisible	  Man’s	  invention	  of	  a	  mechanism	  to	  for	  getting	  “outside”	  of	  history	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  liberatory	  potentials	  of	  the	  past	  and	  future	  that	  continually	  irrupt	  into	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  present	  against	  his	  will	  (499).	  Critic	  Timothy	  Murphy	  cites	  the	  famous	  scene	  in	  which	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  desire	  to	  eat	  a	  roasted	  yam	  on	  the	  street	  cuts	  against	  his	  desire	  for	  propriety,	  arguing	  that	  the	  experience	  and	  pleasure	  of	  eating	  links	  him	  to	  an	  agrarian	  past	  from	  which	  he	  has	  been	  running	  and	  giving	  him	  his	  first	  taste	  of	  freedom.	  Murphy’s	  reading	  casts	  doubt	  on	  claims	  that	  the	  novel	  advocates	  a	  politics	  premised	  on	  the	  “bringing	  to	  modernity”	  of	  black	  people.	  Interestingly,	  those	  critics	  interested	  in	  Ellison’s	  relationship	  to	  psychiatry	  and	  his	  affiliation	  with	  LaFargue	  have	  been	  especially	  invested	  in	  claiming	  modernity	  as	  the	  determining	  force	  of	  the	  novel.	  J.	  Bradford	  Campbell,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  the	  novel	  evinces	  black	  people’s	  potential	  to	  be	  neurotic,	  which	  psychiatry	  has	  denied	  by	  assuming	  that	  blacks	  were	  not	  affected	  by	  modernity.	  Yet,	  Campbell’s	  reading	  understands	  “modernity”	  as	  a	  fixed	  and	  inescapable	  historical	  end	  to	  a	  problematic	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but	  real	  historical	  progression,	  a	  progress	  narrative	  that	  black	  people	  can	  now	  be	  a	  part	  of,	  no	  longer	  relegated	  to	  the	  primitive	  (Campbell	  460).	  Ellison’s	  exploration	  of	  “plung[ing]	  out	  of	  history”	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  engendering	  political	  action	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  novel	  is	  not	  invested	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  progress	  or	  “bringing	  to	  modernity.”	  Instead,	  it	  has	  more	  in	  common	  with	  the	  dangerous	  edge	  that	  quantum	  physical	  entanglement	  treads,	  cutting	  close	  to	  and	  circling	  back	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  pre-­‐Enlightenment	  magic,	  to	  non-­‐causal	  connectivity	  that	  traverses	  supposedly	  linear	  and	  progressive	  understandings	  of	  time:	  cutting	  close	  and	  circling	  back	  to	  what	  George	  Jackson	  later	  described	  as	  “the	  mind	  of	  the	  primitive	  commune	  that	  exists	  in	  all	  blacks”	  (Jackson	  4).	  Such	  entanglement	  appears	  as	  the	  impossibly	  sensible,	  the	  sensation	  and	  sensorial	  experience,	  aesthesis,	  which	  emerges	  and	  communicates	  beyond	  and	  in	  excess	  of	  historical	  knowledge	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  impossible	  aesthetic	  experience	  of	  the	  past,	  linking	  Ellison	  to	  Jackson.	  The	  invisible	  man	  abandons	  the	  false	  pursuit	  of	  propriety	  and	  instead	  critiques	  the	  proper	  (which	  is,	  according	  to	  Moten,	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  black	  radical	  tradition)	  through	  the	  sensorial	  irruption	  of	  the	  pleasure	  of	  taste	  that	  links	  him	  to	  a	  past	  before	  and	  beyond	  him.30	  Similarly,	  for	  Jackson,	  the	  past	  irrupts	  through	  feeling	  and	  a	  doubling	  of	  experience	  that	  constitutes	  the	  aesthetic	  as	  experiment.	  In	  a	  particularly	  poetic	  passage	  of	  one	  of	  his	  letters,	  Jackson	  writes:	  My	  recall	  is	  nearly	  perfect,	  time	  has	  faded	  nothing.	  I	  recall	  the	  very	  first	  kidnap.	  I've	  lived	  through	  the	  passage,	  died	  on	  the	  passage,	  lain	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Moten	  states	  that	  radicalism,	  and	  especially	  black	  radicalism,	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  “the	  performance	  of	  a	  general	  critique	  of	  the	  proper”	  (Moten	  “Case”	  177).	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the	  unmarked,	  shallow	  graves	  of	  the	  millions	  who	  fertilized	  the	  Amerikan	  soil	  with	  their	  corpses;	  cotton	  and	  corn	  growing	  out	  of	  my	  chest,	  "unto	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  generation,"	  the	  tenth,	  the	  hundredth.	  My	  mind	  ranges	  back	  and	  forth	  through	  the	  uncounted	  generations,	  and	  I	  feel	  all	  that	  they	  ever	  felt,	  but	  double.	  I	  can't	  help	  it;	  there	  are	  too	  many	  things	  to	  remind	  me	  of	  the	  23½	  hours	  that	  I'm	  in	  this	  cell.	  Not	  ten	  minutes	  pass	  without	  a	  reminder.	  (Jackson	  233)	  	  Here,	  it	  is	  the	  impossible	  feeling	  or	  experience	  of	  history—cotton	  and	  corn	  growing	  through	  his	  chest—that	  links	  Jackson	  to	  such	  a	  past,	  that	  doubles	  his	  experience	  of	  prison	  conditions	  into	  a	  feeling	  that	  collapses	  the	  temporal	  gap	  between	  him	  and	  those	  who	  lived	  and	  died	  on	  the	  passage.	  It	  enables	  him	  to	  understand	  his	  intervention	  in	  history	  as	  a	  return,	  a	  disruption	  of	  a	  progressive	  causality,	  that	  makes	  a	  way	  out.	  The	  “primitive	  commune”	  Jackson	  invokes	  in	  the	  opening	  epigraph	  is	  not	  a	  relic	  of	  the	  past;	  it	  is	  a	  community	  that	  continues	  to	  exist	  in	  the	  minds	  and	  bodies	  of	  black	  diasporic	  experience	  that	  continually	  encounters	  historical	  repetition.	  	   Jackson	  spent	  almost	  a	  decade	  of	  his	  life	  in	  the	  company	  of	  only	  books	  and	  letters.	  What	  reading	  became	  for	  him,	  then,	  was	  quite	  different	  than	  a	  critical	  sensibility	  in	  which	  critique	  is	  itself	  a	  political	  end.	  Instead,	  this	  way	  of	  doubling	  history	  while	  tearing	  it	  from	  its	  context—tearing	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  generations	  from	  both	  the	  Biblical	  exodus	  and	  the	  Middle	  Passage	  simultaneously—to	  make	  use	  of	  it	  in	  his	  own	  moment,	  to	  experiment	  with	  it	  in	  the	  now,	  produces	  a	  reading	  practice	  that	  is	  also	  a	  writing	  practice,	  and	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  use	  of	  literature,	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which	  Deleuze	  describes	  as	  “reading	  with	  love.”31	  Deleuze	  suggests	  that	  a	  more	  conventional	  method	  of	  critical	  reading	  would	  entail	  “looking	  [for]	  signifiers”	  (Deleuze	  Negotiations	  9).	  He	  rejects	  that	  hermeneutic	  practice	  for	  an	  “intensive”	  mode	  of	  reading.	  This	  second	  mode,	  he	  says,	  relates	  a	  book	  directly	  to	  what’s	  Outside.	  A	  book	  is	  one	  flow	  among	  others,	  with	  no	  special	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  others,	  that	  comes	  into	  relations	  of	  current,	  countercurrent,	  and	  eddy	  with	  other	  flows—flows	  of	  shit,	  sperm,	  words,	  action,	  eroticism,	  money,	  politics,	  and	  so	  on.	  […]	  This	  intensive	  way	  of	  reading,	  in	  contact	  with	  what’s	  outside	  the	  book,	  as	  a	  flow	  meeting	  other	  flows,	  one	  machine	  among	  others,	  as	  a	  series	  of	  experiments	  for	  each	  reader	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  events	  that	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  books,	  as	  tearing	  the	  book	  into	  pieces,	  getting	  it	  to	  interact	  with	  other	  things,	  absolutely	  anything,	  is	  reading	  with	  love.	  (Deleuze	  Negotiations	  9)	  	  Love,	  as	  the	  underlying	  impetus	  of	  this	  reading	  practice,	  names	  a	  violent	  force	  of	  possibility	  that	  takes	  on	  a	  decidedly	  political	  valence,	  linking	  those	  things	  divided	  and	  separated	  by	  disciplinary	  practice	  (literature	  from	  economics	  from	  erotics,	  etc.);	  it	  names	  a	  method	  for	  entangling	  and	  revealing	  entanglement.	  Jackson	  would	  continually	  mobilize	  love	  not	  just	  as	  a	  method	  of	  connecting	  literature	  to	  life	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  of	  making	  political	  connections	  and	  communities	  beyond	  the	  capacities	  granted	  to	  him	  by	  the	  state,	  allowing	  him	  to	  actualize	  the	  politics	  that	  continually	  irrupted	  as	  possibility	  for	  Ellison.	  	   For	  Ellison,	  love	  was	  a	  mysterious	  force	  whose	  potential	  he	  could	  not	  quite	  grasp,	  but	  which	  he	  imagined	  could	  be	  something	  with	  and	  in	  excess	  of	  individual	  love:	  as	  a	  radical	  politics.	  After	  the	  death	  of	  Clifton,	  the	  invisible	  man	  wonders,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  The	  line,	  “unto	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  generation,”	  that	  Jackson	  cites	  is	  taken	  from	  
Exodus	  20:5.	  See:	  The	  Holy	  Bible,	  New	  International	  Version	  (Grand	  Rapids,	  MI:	  Zondervan,	  1989):	  68.	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“could	  politics	  ever	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  love?”	  (452).	  But	  even	  to	  the	  novel’s	  end,	  he	  remains	  incapable	  of	  harnessing	  such	  a	  force,	  and	  he	  is	  thrown	  into	  a	  kind	  of	  reactive	  violence.	  The	  prologue	  of	  the	  novel	  contains,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  pre-­‐epilogue	  fantasy,	  some	  of	  the	  strongest	  accounts	  of	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  anger	  and	  violence:	  invisible,	  he	  is	  finally	  free	  to	  be	  improper	  and	  experience	  anger	  about	  his	  particular	  structural	  position	  and	  the	  ideologies	  that,	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  liberation,	  have	  consistently	  reinscribed	  his	  oppression.	  However,	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  drawing	  on	  Audre	  Lorde’s	  account	  of	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  and	  Lorde’s	  feelings	  of	  anger	  about	  racism,	  offers	  a	  different	  way	  of	  comprehending	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  anger.	  Rather	  than	  understanding	  anger	  as	  a	  reactionary	  force	  of	  negation,	  Ahmed	  writes:	   Here,	  [for	  Lorde]	  anger	  is	  constructed	  in	  different	  ways:	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  injustice	  of	  racism;	  as	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  future;	  as	  a	  translation	  of	  pain	  into	  knowledge;	  as	  being	  ‘loaded	  with	  information	  and	  energy’.	  Crucially,	  anger	  is	  not	  simply	  defined	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  past	  but	  as	  opening	  up	  the	  future.	  In	  other	  words,	  being	  against	  something	  does	  not	  end	  with	  ‘what	  one	  is	  against’	  (it	  does	  not	  become	  ‘stuck’	  on	  the	  object	  of	  either	  the	  emotion	  or	  the	  critique,	  though	  that	  object	  remains	  sticky	  and	  compelling).	  Being	  against	  something	  is	  also	  being	  for	  something	  that	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  articulated	  or	  is	  not	  yet.	  (Ahmed	  248)	  	  The	  invisible	  man’s	  retreat	  to	  the	  hole	  and	  his	  unchecked	  rage	  in	  the	  prologue	  have	  long	  been	  read	  as	  the	  abandonment	  of	  political	  possibility,	  but	  by	  taking	  Ahmed’s	  and	  Lorde’s	  revision	  of	  anger	  we	  are	  given	  a	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  inventive	  possibility	  and	  political	  engagement	  that	  the	  invisible	  man	  experiences:	  to	  be	  against	  a	  history	  of	  racist	  science	  and	  its	  material	  effects	  is	  also	  to	  maintain	  a	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relationship	  to	  political	  futurity.	  The	  invisible	  man’s	  anger	  and	  rage	  can	  then	  be	  understood	  as	  “being	  for	  something	  that	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  articulated	  or	  is	  not	  yet.”	  	   Anger	  that	  is	  also	  a	  becoming	  “for”	  the	  not	  yet	  disorganizes	  the	  relationship,	  both	  conceptually	  and	  practically,	  between	  what	  is	  and	  what	  can	  be.	  In	  the	  final	  lines	  of	  the	  novel,	  the	  strange	  and	  dream-­‐like	  perceptions	  that	  pervade	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  experience	  of	  the	  hole	  produce	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  new	  and	  different	  plan	  for	  living,	  a	  plan	  for	  living	  that	  can	  only	  be	  accessed	  by	  abandoning	  the	  historical	  narrative	  of	  modernization	  and	  progress,	  and	  returning	  to	  the	  conceptual	  and	  ontological	  priority	  of	  a	  chaos	  on	  which	  to	  build	  new	  forms	  of	  organization.	  He	  concludes	  the	  epilogue,	  stating:	  The	  mind	  that	  has	  conceived	  a	  plan	  of	  living	  must	  never	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  chaos	  against	  which	  that	  pattern	  was	  conceived.	  That	  goes	  for	  societies	  as	  well	  as	  for	  individuals.	  Thus,	  having	  tried	  to	  give	  pattern	  to	  the	  chaos	  which	  lives	  within	  the	  pattern	  of	  your	  certainties,	  I	  must	  come	  out.	  I	  must	  emerge.	  (Ellison	  580)	  	  This	  complicated	  formulation	  acknowledges	  that	  within	  the	  patterns	  of	  certainty—perhaps	  especially	  the	  certainty	  of	  scientific	  knowledge—there	  resides	  chaos,	  irrationality.	  The	  narrator’s	  goal	  is	  to	  make	  a	  new	  pattern,	  a	  life,	  on	  and	  with	  such	  chaos.	  His	  attempt	  to	  pattern	  chaos	  results	  in	  an	  emergence	  filled	  with	  the	  political	  charge	  of	  a	  plan	  for	  living	  that	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  new	  ideology,	  a	  new	  governing	  epistemology,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  plan	  to	  live	  itself,	  a	  plan	  to	  construct	  new	  forms	  of	  organization	  that	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  known,	  but	  that	  can	  respond	  to	  the	  irruptive	  material	  conditions	  that	  have	  conditioned	  him.	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In	  the	  final	  line	  the	  narrator	  begins	  to	  imagine	  producing	  a	  community	  of	  his	  own.	  Responding	  to	  a	  question	  that	  has	  animated	  the	  final	  searching	  of	  the	  novel—“Can	  politics	  ever	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  love?”—he	  says	  finally,	  “Who	  knows	  but	  that,	  on	  the	  lower	  frequencies,	  I	  speak	  for	  you?”	  Here,	  rather	  than	  reading	  “speaking	  for”	  as	  a	  standing	  in	  place	  of,	  or	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of,	  the	  seeking	  and	  yearning	  of	  the	  narrator,	  his	  hope	  for	  a	  “plan	  for	  living”	  that	  will	  lead	  him	  out	  of	  the	  hole,	  seems	  not	  to	  indicate	  an	  authoritative	  “speaking	  for”	  so	  much	  as	  a	  speaking	  to,	  speaking	  for	  as	  a	  gift	  to	  be	  received	  and	  reciprocated,	  to	  be	  spoken	  back	  to.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  transmission,	  on	  the	  lower	  frequencies,	  that	  finds	  the	  novel	  engaged	  with	  and	  animating	  a	  strain	  of	  black	  radical	  thought	  that	  will	  extend	  the	  line	  of	  materio-­‐philisophical	  thought-­‐action,	  of	  thinking-­‐tinkering,	  into	  particular	  activist	  struggles—struggles	  that	  mirror	  and	  extend	  the	  invisible	  man’s	  own	  struggles	  and	  potentials	  developed	  in	  “the	  hole.”	  Beyond	  not	  merely	  physical	  space-­‐time	  separation,	  but	  also	  juridically	  imposed	  space-­‐time	  separation,	  Ellison	  and	  his	  narrator	  make	  possible	  an	  unacknowledged	  community	  with	  Jackson.	  The	  desire	  to	  make	  a	  radical	  and	  resistant	  community,	  a	  community	  that	  could	  plan	  to	  live	  against	  imposed	  and	  systematic	  plans	  for	  life,	  was	  central	  to	  Jackson’s	  own	  writing.	  Unlike	  Ellison,	  however,	  who	  in	  writing	  Invisible	  Man	  was	  limited	  by	  his	  attempts	  to	  master	  what	  it	  would	  mean	  to	  be	  a	  proper	  novelist,	  Jackson	  struggled	  against	  prison	  conditions	  that	  limited	  his	  capacity	  to	  write	  at	  all.	  Ellison	  felt	  that	  one	  had	  to	  narrow	  experience	  and	  produce	  coherence	  out	  of	  chaos;	  Jackson,	  by	  contrast,	  had	  to	  produce	  excess	  that	  could	  communicate	  above	  and	  beyond	  his	  writing.	  As	  the	  editor	  of	  Soledad	  Brother	  comments	  in	  a	  footnote:	  “All	  of	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Jackson’s	  correspondence	  had	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  rigors	  of	  prison	  censorship.	  Much	  of	  it	  was	  completely	  destroyed	  or	  mutilated.	  Only	  his	  last	  letters	  to	  his	  lawyer	  passed	  through	  uncensored”	  (Jackson	  57).	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  restraints	  imposed	  on	  his	  communication	  with	  the	  world	  outside	  the	  prison,	  his	  access	  to	  books	  was	  limited	  to	  particular	  sizes	  and	  editions	  approved	  by	  the	  prison,	  which	  he	  relied	  on	  those	  outside	  to	  send	  him	  and	  which	  were	  often	  difficult	  to	  get.	  	  	   Jackson	  was	  intensely	  aware,	  and	  often	  angry—angry	  in	  ways	  that	  pulsed	  with	  a	  desire	  for	  the	  not	  yet—that	  his	  access	  to	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  was	  hampered	  by	  both	  the	  prison	  system	  that	  contained	  him	  and	  a	  failed	  and	  misguided	  educational	  system	  that	  preceded	  it.	  He	  recognized	  that	  the	  dominant	  epistemologies	  that	  governed	  the	  systems	  constraining	  him	  were	  constituted	  through	  the	  elision	  of	  black	  life	  and	  black	  thought;	  their	  absence	  was	  its	  condition	  of	  possibility.	  But	  he	  also	  understood	  that	  full	  knowledge,	  in	  or	  out	  of	  the	  prison,	  was	  impossible—the	  world	  would	  always	  exceed	  any	  attempts	  at	  total	  rationalization.	  Any	  given	  ontology,	  founded	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  epistemologically	  totalizing	  being	  in	  the	  world,	  would	  be,	  in	  Moten’s	  phrasing,	  “inadequate	  to	  blackness”	  (Moten	  “Case”	  187).	  Jackson	  therefore	  has	  to	  invent	  a	  relationship	  to	  the	  world	  beyond	  ontology	  itself,	  a	  relationship	  that	  improvises	  its	  own	  relations	  on	  the	  fly,	  in	  ways	  that	  affirm	  and	  make	  use	  of	  the	  excesses	  that	  emerge	  most	  significantly	  in	  the	  prison’s	  attempts	  to	  suppress	  them.	  	   Jackson’s	  attempts	  to	  produce	  a	  community	  of	  being	  through	  his	  correspondence	  had	  to	  operate	  at	  levels	  quite	  different	  from	  that	  of	  information	  transfer	  or	  signification.	  He	  often	  feared,	  rightly,	  that	  his	  letters	  had	  not	  gotten	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through.	  He	  therefore	  expressed	  things	  indirectly,	  often	  punctuating	  his	  letters	  with	  “you	  dig?”	  Given	  the	  necessary	  opacity	  of	  his	  letters,	  the	  phrase	  seems	  to	  indicate	  something	  more	  than	  a	  colloquial	  query	  about	  understanding;	  it	  indicates	  a	  materiality	  that	  had	  to	  be	  dug	  into	  beyond	  what	  he	  could	  write	  “directly”	  (Jackson	  57).	  For	  him,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  his	  letters	  were	  cut	  out	  and	  censored	  is	  another	  means	  of	  enforcing	  divisions	  that	  hamper	  the	  political	  potentials	  of	  love.	  He	  writes:	  It	  is	  terrible	  that	  we	  have	  all	  been	  so	  divided.	  The	  social	  order	  is	  set	  up	  so	  as	  to	  encourage	  this.	  The	  powers	  that	  be	  don’t	  want	  any	  loyal	  loving	  groups	  forming	  up.	  So	  they	  discourage	  it	  in	  subtle	  ways.	  And	  as	  it	  is	  said,	  when	  poverty	  comes	  in	  the	  door,	  love	  leaves	  by	  the	  window!	  (Jackson	  151)	  	  The	  barricades	  produced	  by	  poverty,	  while	  seemingly	  metaphorical,	  are	  as	  real	  for	  Jackson	  as	  the	  prison	  walls;	  division	  is	  a	  real	  social	  and	  ontological	  effect	  of	  an	  always	  material	  epistemology.	  For	  Jackson,	  the	  prison	  operates	  means	  of	  guaranteeing	  a	  national	  community	  of	  proper	  citizen-­‐subjects	  through	  the	  eradication	  of	  that	  which	  is	  irrational	  to	  and	  in	  excess	  of	  it.	  More	  forcefully,	  it	  is	  a	  means	  to	  eradicate	  alternative	  social	  formations,	  any	  actually	  existing	  loving	  groups	  that	  might	  form	  out	  of	  shared	  interest	  and	  need,	  groups	  whose	  composition	  was	  another	  name	  for	  black	  life.	  The	  prison	  is	  but	  a	  last,	  stopgap	  measure	  for	  enforcing	  the	  divisions	  already	  formed	  by	  economic	  inequality,	  racialization,	  and	  (as	  he	  comes	  to	  realize	  in	  his	  final	  letters	  to	  Angela	  Davis)	  hierarchical	  gendering.	  	  	   But	  Jackson	  understood	  love	  as	  a	  force	  that,	  despite	  being	  under	  attack,	  was	  not	  only	  necessary	  but	  also	  resilient,	  immanently	  produced	  in	  the	  autonomous	  formation	  of	  shared	  communities—whether	  they	  be	  communities	  of	  any	  two	  people	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with	  similar	  struggles	  or	  communities	  of	  global	  millions	  across	  the	  third	  world.	  So,	  though	  he	  would	  speak	  of	  love	  under	  attack,	  it	  would	  also	  be	  in	  speaking	  of	  love,	  and	  the	  possibilities	  of	  love—love	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  dug	  into—that	  he	  could	  articulate	  his	  own	  improvisational	  politics	  that	  did	  not	  depend	  on	  a	  given	  ontology	  or	  originate	  with	  systematic	  organization	  (though	  it	  might	  try	  to	  form	  it).	  	  In	  fact,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  he	  articulates	  a	  science	  that	  abandons	  ontology	  all	  together,	  which	  makes	  a	  space	  for	  what	  Moten	  earlier	  called	  “the	  possibility	  and	  project	  of	  a	  utopian	  politics	  outside	  ontology”	  (Moten,	  Break	  197).	  Although	  Einstein	  and	  Ellison	  both	  sought	  an	  epistemology	  that	  might	  be	  open	  to	  the	  invisible	  and	  irrational	  that	  traverses	  the	  systematization	  of	  objects,	  systemized	  and	  given	  coherence	  out	  of	  chaos,	  Jackson’s	  concept	  of	  political	  reality	  evinces	  an	  understanding	  of	  materiality	  that	  is	  itself	  always	  in	  formation	  and	  deformation;	  in	  which	  a	  system	  itself	  cannot	  even	  be	  thought	  as	  given.	  	  Indeed,	  even	  as	  his	  writing	  attends	  to	  the	  contributions	  of	  systemic	  critiques	  of	  US	  governance	  and	  capitalism	  that	  inform	  his	  thought—especially	  those	  provided	  by	  Marxism—he	  rejects	  historical	  determinism	  in	  favor	  of	  undetermined	  production	  on	  ever-­‐changing	  and	  unanticipatable	  grounds.	  He	  writes:	  My	  life	  is	  so	  disrupted,	  so	  precarious,	  my	  inclinations	  so	  oriented	  to	  struggle	  that	  anyone	  who	  would	  love	  me	  would	  have	  to	  be	  bold	  indeed—or	  out	  of	  their	  head.	  But	  if	  you’re	  saying	  what	  I	  think	  you	  are	  saying,	  I	  like	  it.	  (If	  I	  have	  flattered	  myself	  please	  try	  to	  understand.)	  I	  like	  the	  way	  you	  say	  it	  also;	  over	  the	  next	  few	  months	  we’ll	  discuss	  the	  related	  problems.	  By	  the	  time	  I’ve	  solved	  these	  minor	  ones	  that	  temporarily	  limit	  my	  movements,	  we’ll	  have	  also	  settled	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  selfish	  for	  us	  to	  seek	  gratification	  by	  reaching	  and	  touching	  and	  holding,	  does	  the	  building	  of	  a	  bed	  precede	  the	  love	  act	  itself?	  Or	  can	  we	  ‘do	  it	  in	  the	  road’	  until	  the	  people’s	  army	  has	  satisfied	  our	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territory	  problem?	  That	  is	  important	  to	  me,	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  are	  willing	  to	  ‘do	  it	  in	  the	  road.’	  You	  dig…	  (Jackson	  272)	  	  For	  Jackson,	  the	  prison	  is	  a	  “minor”	  problem	  that	  “temporarily	  limit[s]”	  his	  movement.	  The	  prison	  is	  not	  a	  fully	  planned	  system	  at	  all,	  but	  an	  ad	  hoc	  response	  to	  the	  constant	  emergence	  of	  life;	  the	  prison’s	  capacities	  are	  temporary	  in	  that	  it	  is	  simply	  trying	  to	  plug	  the	  holes	  of	  a	  leaking,	  constantly	  constructing	  system.	  The	  difference	  between	  an	  epistemology	  that	  would	  see	  society	  and	  the	  world	  as	  “systems”	  or	  as	  something	  else	  marks	  a	  difference	  that	  also	  concerned	  Deleuze,	  which	  he	  articulated	  by	  posing	  his	  understanding	  in	  apposition	  to	  Foucault’s:	  	  Michel	  [Foucault]	  was	  always	  amazed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  despite	  all	  their	  underhandedness	  and	  their	  hypocrisy,	  we	  can	  still	  manage	  to	  resist.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  I	  am	  amazed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  everything	  is	  leaking,	  and	  the	  government	  manages	  to	  plug	  the	  leaks.	  In	  a	  sense,	  Michel	  and	  I	  addressed	  the	  same	  problem	  from	  opposite	  ends.	  .	  .	  .	  For	  me	  society	  is	  a	  fluid—or	  even	  worse,	  a	  gas.	  For	  Michel	  it	  was	  an	  architecture.	  (Deleuze,	  “Intellectual”	  21).	  	  Jackson’s	  vision	  of	  the	  prison	  as	  an	  ad	  hoc	  construction	  of	  barricades	  resonates	  with	  Deleuze’s	  description	  of	  plugging	  leaks.	  This	  is	  precisely	  what	  would	  be	  revealed	  if	  science	  turned	  its	  inquiry	  to	  the	  system	  itself	  as	  Jackson	  demanded:	  it	  is	  not	  a	  system	  but	  a	  reaction	  to	  irrationality,	  a	  delirium,	  desperately	  trying	  to	  prevent	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  society	  rather	  than	  maintain	  the	  social	  order.	  Jackson’s	  interest	  then	  is	  in	  not	  only	  the	  possibility	  for	  but	  also	  the	  necessity	  of	  action—the	  act	  of	  love—that	  would	  precede	  the	  establishment	  of	  “proper”	  conditions	  for	  it.	  To	  “do	  it	  in	  the	  road”	  would	  be	  to	  act	  in	  the	  improper	  place:	  in	  the	  “road”	  that	  has	  been	  constructed	  for	  traffic	  and	  transport,	  not	  for	  “love.”	  But	  more	  to	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the	  point,	  it	  eradicates	  any	  sense	  of	  propriety	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  act	  of	  love	  will	  
produce	  the	  territory.	  The	  act	  composes	  materiality.	  In	  a	  mix	  of	  literary,	  scientific,	  and	  political	  writing,	  Jackson	  develops	  a	  mode	  of	  composition	  that	  evinces	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  literature,	  science,	  and	  politics	  all	  operate	  to	  compose	  chaos	  through	  forces,	  at	  least	  one	  of	  which	  is	  love,	  forming	  and	  deforming	  against	  the	  supposed	  imaginary	  of	  a	  system,	  total	  or	  not.	  The	  understanding	  of	  politics	  he	  evinces	  here	  is	  one	  that	  both	  affirms	  a	  larger	  and	  directed	  struggle	  against	  what	  consistently	  appears	  as	  a	  system;	  but	  more	  forcefully,	  it	  also	  operates	  and	  acts	  on	  the	  materiality	  that	  is	  prior	  to	  such	  a	  struggle.	  Action	  that	  waits	  for	  the	  proper	  time	  to	  confront	  a	  systemic	  totality	  is	  a	  false	  hope,	  and	  could	  likely	  never	  be	  enacted	  at	  all.	  	   Immediately	  following	  that	  passage	  in	  the	  letter,	  Jackson	  continues,	  emphasizing	  the	  excessive	  historical	  and	  physical	  capacities	  of	  the	  force	  of	  love:	  the	  capacity	  of	  love	  to	  disrupt	  historical	  and	  physical	  determinations	  and	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  ontological	  determination.	  He	  writes:	  I’ll	  love	  you	  till	  the	  wings	  fly	  off	  at	  least,	  perhaps	  beyond.	  My	  love	  could	  burn	  you,	  however,	  it	  runs	  hot	  and	  I	  have	  nearly	  half	  a	  millennium	  stored	  up.	  Mine	  is	  a	  perfect	  love,	  soft	  to	  the	  touch	  but	  so	  hot,	  hard,	  and	  dense	  at	  its	  center	  that	  its	  weight	  will	  soon	  offset	  this	  planet.	  (272)	  	  Here,	  love	  becomes	  a	  dense	  physical	  force,	  a	  way	  of	  describing	  a	  productive	  desire	  and	  its	  potential	  to	  offset	  the	  planet.	  It	  has	  a	  capacity—an	  unsettling	  and	  unruly	  reality—	  that	  can	  disrupt	  ontology	  itself	  with	  physical	  and	  political	  consequences	  that	  exceed	  even	  Ellison’s	  greatest	  hopes	  for	  it.	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Love	  names	  the	  excessive	  force	  of	  composition	  beyond	  both	  epistemology	  and	  ontology,	  which	  has	  been	  carrying,	  above	  and	  beyond	  his	  letters,	  the	  connective	  tissue	  the	  prison	  sought	  to	  sever.	  That	  is,	  for	  Jackson,	  love	  names	  the	  very	  force	  generated	  and	  made	  invisible	  in	  that	  anoriginal	  entanglement,	  the	  force	  that	  continues,	  impossibly,	  to	  connect	  those	  who	  have	  been	  dispersed	  and	  divided	  in	  the	  scattering	  of	  the	  black	  diaspora	  as	  they	  continue	  to	  constitute	  themselves,	  constantly	  forming	  and	  reforming.	  	  And	  it	  is	  this	  love—this	  violent,	  caring,	  connecting	  force—that	  makes	  his	  letters	  something	  far	  in	  excess	  of—more	  politically	  powerful,	  aesthetically	  inventive,	  and	  scientifically	  vital—than	  information	  transmission	  that	  we	  might	  call	  knowledge	  or	  meaning	  (transmission	  that	  would	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  physical	  and	  juridical	  limits	  of	  space-­‐time	  separation).	  Through	  the	  excessive	  materiality	  of	  his	  letters	  and	  of	  writing	  itself,	  Jackson	  produces	  the	  community	  he	  has	  imagined,	  the	  community	  otherwise	  denied	  to	  him	  by	  the	  epistemology	  that	  founds	  the	  prison	  as	  a	  necessary	  and	  dividing	  force	  and	  instantiates	  it	  as	  an	  ontological	  reality.	  For	  Jackson,	  thought	  itself	  becomes	  a	  physical	  experiment.	  And,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  physically-­‐	  and	  juridically-­‐imposed	  space-­‐time	  separation	  from	  Einstein	  and	  Ellison,	  he	  forges	  a	  seemingly	  impossible	  connection	  with	  them,	  too,	  by	  actualizing	  the	  real	  possibilities	  of	  the	  generative	  dissolution	  of	  ontology	  immanent	  to	  the	  open	  ontology	  they	  sought	  to	  make.	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4.	  Minor	  Empiricism:	  The	  Revolutionary	  Time	  of	  Carson	  
McCullers,	  Margaret	  Mead	  and	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  	  
“Chaos	  is	  defined	  not	  so	  much	  by	  its	  disorder	  as	  by	  the	  infinite	  speed	  with	  which	  every	  
form	  taking	  shape	  in	  it	  vanishes.	  […]	  In	  the	  case	  of	  science	  it	  is	  like	  a	  freeze-­‐frame.	  It	  is	  
a	  fantastic	  slowing	  down,	  and	  it	  is	  by	  slowing	  down	  that	  matter,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
scientific	  thought	  able	  to	  penetrate	  it	  with	  propositions,	  is	  actualized.	  […]	  To	  slow	  
down	  is	  to	  set	  a	  limit	  in	  chaos	  to	  which	  all	  speeds	  are	  subject.	  […]	  Science	  is	  haunted	  
not	  by	  its	  own	  unity	  but	  by	  the	  plane	  of	  reference	  constituted	  by	  all	  the	  limits	  or	  
borders	  through	  which	  it	  confronts	  chaos.”1	  
	  
“To	  ‘replace	  knowledge	  with	  belief’	  is	  the	  great	  achievement	  of	  empiricism.	  […To]	  
undermine	  all	  principles	  of	  knowledge,	  all	  foundations,	  all	  values,	  one	  must	  
understand	  thought	  itself	  as	  an	  act	  of	  belief,	  an	  experiment,	  a	  force	  to	  create	  new	  
values.”2	  	  	   This	  chapter	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  trace	  a	  discontinuous	  and	  irruptive	  genealogy	  of	  the	  study	  of	  interlocking	  oppression	  under	  conditions	  of	  interlocking	  oppression.	  This	  alternative	  account	  simultaneously	  supplements	  and	  cuts	  against	  a	  history	  of	  black	  feminist	  thought	  that	  would	  see	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective’s	  claim	  that	  their	  “particular	  task”	  was	  to	  develop	  an	  “integrated	  analysis	  and	  practice	  based	  upon	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  major	  systems	  of	  oppression	  are	  interlocking”	  (1977)	  as	  culminating	  in	  the	  sociological	  analytic	  method	  of	  “intersectionality”	  articulated	  by	  Kimberle	  Crenshaw	  and	  Patricia	  Hill	  Collins	  over	  a	  decade	  later	  (Combahee	  13).3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Philosophy:	  118-­‐119.	  2	  Deleuze,	  Empiricism	  xx.	  3	  See:	  Kimberle	  Crenshaw,	  “Demarginalizing	  the	  Intersection	  of	  Race	  and	  Sex:	  A	  Black	  Feminist	  Critique	  of	  Antidiscrimination	  Doctrine,	  Feminist	  Theory,	  and	  Antiracist	  Politics,”	  in	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Legal	  Forum	  (1989);	  and	  Patricia	  Hill	  Collins,	  Black	  Feminist	  Thought:	  Knowledge,	  Consciousness	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Empowerment	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Routledge,	  2000	  (1990)).	  
	   156	  
One	  limit	  of	  this	  more	  commonly	  accepted	  history	  is	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  valorize,	  implicitly	  and	  unconsciously,	  an	  understanding	  of	  “scientific”	  analysis	  and	  practice	  that	  is	  arguably	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  most	  interesting	  aspects	  of	  intersectionality.	  Although	  “intersectionality”	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  an	  intensification	  of	  and	  microtaxonomization	  of	  identity	  (and	  is	  not	  essentialist),	  its	  utility	  within	  a	  sociological	  context—which	  is	  to	  say,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  empirically-­‐based	  analysis—has	  frequently	  operated	  to	  still	  and	  solidify	  identity	  at	  the	  margins,	  finding	  those	  who	  have	  been	  multiply	  identified	  (and	  consequently	  pathologized)	  bearing	  the	  burden	  of	  idealized	  maximal	  oppression.	  This	  maximal	  site	  is	  often	  located	  in	  and	  on	  the	  bodies	  of	  those,	  who,	  like	  the	  members	  of	  Combahee,	  identify	  as	  black,	  woman,	  and	  lesbian.	  Although	  intersectionality	  highlights	  the	  differential	  experience	  of	  interlocking	  oppressions,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  analytic	  method	  or	  interpretive	  framework	  as	  a	  means	  to	  produce	  and	  evaluate	  empirical	  research	  is	  implicated	  in	  a	  specifically	  twentieth-­‐century	  valuation	  of	  a	  “scientific	  approach,”	  which	  in	  turn	  erases	  something	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  producing	  the	  analytic	  evinced	  by	  Combahee	  and	  of	  an	  understanding	  of	  “study”	  as	  an	  ongoing	  means	  for	  producing	  new	  and	  changing	  modes	  of	  thought	  in	  response	  to	  specific	  conditions.	  	   While	  not	  discounting	  the	  important	  work	  that	  has	  been	  enabled	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  development	  of	  “intersectionality,”	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  might	  trace	  a	  different	  trajectory	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  more	  amorphous	  concept	  of	  “study”	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  inquiry	  in	  order	  to	  magnify	  a	  very	  different	  and	  important	  intervention	  Combahee	  makes	  possible	  against	  empirical	  positivism	  and	  its	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practices	  and	  technologies	  of	  oppression.	  	  Drawing	  on	  Hortense	  Spillers’s	  insight	  that	  twentieth	  century	  indictments	  of	  black	  women	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  imbrication	  of	  science,	  law,	  and	  economy	  which	  operates	  to	  still	  what	  she	  describes	  as	  the	  time	  and	  flesh	  of	  experience,	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  can	  expand	  the	  value	  of	  Combahee’s	  Statement	  beyond	  the	  production	  of	  a	  counter-­‐method.	  	  The	  Combahee	  Statement	  is	  evidence	  of	  a	  counter-­‐method,	  but	  one	  that	  evinces	  an	  understanding	  of	  science	  as	  field	  of	  multiple	  methods	  and	  political	  investments	  that	  can	  both	  be	  countered	  on	  its	  own	  level	  through	  strategic	  counter-­‐practices,	  but	  also,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  through	  the	  immanent	  study	  of	  experience	  and	  how	  experience	  is	  perceived.	  I	  call	  this	  alternative	  practice	  of	  liberatory	  knowledge	  production	  “minor	  empiricism.”	  This	  practice	  wrests	  empiricism	  from	  the	  grips	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  positivism	  and	  returns	  to	  it	  the	  productive	  force	  of	  belief	  that	  grounded	  its	  earlier	  manifestations.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  rejecting	  the	  value	  of	  stilled	  and	  progressive	  or	  incremental	  time	  for	  reformist	  knowledge	  and	  instead	  inhabits	  the	  immanent	  duration	  of	  experience	  and	  its	  study	  as	  the	  production	  of	  a	  social	  alternative.	  I	  call	  this	  reconfigured	  time	  “revolutionary	  time.”	  	  This	  different	  practice	  of	  study	  highlights	  the	  interrelations	  among	  aesthetic	  determinations	  (or	  sensorial-­‐temporal	  arrangements),	  scientific	  authority,	  and	  political	  possibility.	  In	  order	  to	  put	  into	  relief	  this	  alternative	  understanding	  of	  Combahee’s	  Statement	  and	  its	  intervention,	  I	  put	  Combahee	  into	  conversation	  with	  a	  literary	  writer,	  Carson	  McCullers,	  and	  a	  scientist,	  Margaret	  Mead—both	  of	  whom	  were	  deeply	  concerned	  with	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  understand	  divided	  or	  interlocking	  oppression.	  This	  constellation	  of	  authors	  allows	  us	  to	  trace	  a	  set	  of	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alternative	  practices	  that	  have	  struggled	  against	  the	  stillings	  of	  a	  dominant	  and	  positivist	  science	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century	  through	  the	  aesthetic	  disruption	  and	  rearrangement	  of	  organizations	  of	  knowledge,	  turning	  the	  force	  of	  microtaxonomizations	  of	  identity	  that	  result	  in	  an	  idealized	  site	  of	  maximal	  oppression	  against	  themselves.	  Instead,	  they	  embody	  the	  ongoing	  potentials	  of	  the	  “minor,”	  not	  as	  a	  denigrated	  category	  of	  identity,	  but	  as	  a	  differential	  mode	  of	  thought	  and/as	  experience	  from	  which	  to	  produce	  alternative,	  experimental	  knowledges	  and	  practices.	  Mead	  offers	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  this	  alternative	  as	  itself	  scientific,	  while	  McCullers’s	  offers	  a	  mode	  of	  aesthetic	  practice	  that	  can	  inhabit	  the	  experience	  to	  which	  Mead	  and	  Combahee	  allude;	  Combahee	  then	  demonstrates	  the	  intimate	  linkages	  between	  these	  elements,	  reflecting	  and	  magnifying	  the	  often	  erased	  subversive	  political	  implications	  of	  both	  Mead	  and	  McCullers.	  The	  mutating	  forms	  of	  minor	  empiricism	  that	  make	  up	  this	  alternative	  genealogy	  struggle	  continuously	  and	  strategically	  against	  oppressive	  forces,	  while	  being	  immanently	  successful	  in	  their	  collective	  constitution	  through	  study.	  	  	  
The	  Times	  of	  Empiricisms	  	   In	  the	  long,	  slow	  summer	  of	  Frankie	  Addams’s	  twelfth	  year,	  everything	  is	  left	  incomplete,	  half-­‐finished.	  A	  piano	  tuner	  plays	  a	  scale,	  stopping	  repeatedly	  on	  the	  seventh	  note	  (McCullers,	  Member	  108).	  The	  blues	  play	  from	  a	  distant	  horn,	  telling	  the	  story	  of	  the	  summer,	  “that	  long	  season	  of	  trouble,”	  only	  to	  break	  off	  “just	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  tune	  should	  be	  laid”	  (44).	  For	  the	  entire	  summer,	  as	  Frankie	  awaits	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her	  brother’s	  impending	  wedding,	  “the	  things	  she	  saw	  and	  heard	  seemed	  to	  be	  left	  somehow	  unfinished,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  tightness	  in	  her	  that	  would	  not	  break”	  (25).	  The	  strange,	  unresolved	  time	  of	  summer	  that	  pervades	  Carson	  McCullers’s	  third	  novel,	  The	  Member	  of	  the	  Wedding	  (1946)	  is	  the	  time	  of	  its	  protagonist’s	  unbelonging.	  Frankie	  is	  “an	  unjoined	  person”	  who,	  as	  a	  minor	  who	  has	  not	  yet	  come	  of	  age,	  has	  “for	  a	  long	  time	  […]	  belonged	  to	  no	  club	  and	  was	  a	  member	  of	  nothing	  in	  the	  world”	  (3).	  In	  her	  liminality,	  her	  old	  identifications	  disappear,	  and	  she	  begins	  to	  see	  herself	  as	  abnormal,	  pathological.	  	   Without	  identity,	  not	  belonging	  to	  anything,	  Frankie	  begins	  wonders	  how	  or	  if	  others	  would	  know	  who	  she	  is.	  Her	  black	  caretaker	  Berenice	  suggests	  that	  she	  still	  belongs	  to	  her	  school,	  that	  she	  has	  an	  identity	  as	  a	  “student,”	  “finished	  with	  the	  B	  section	  of	  seventh	  grade”	  (113).	  But	  Frankie	  no	  longer	  feels	  a	  part	  of	  the	  closed,	  neat	  world	  of	  school.	  Suddenly,	  there	  is	  a	  world	  beyond	  it,	  and	  that	  world	  is	  not	  “a	  school	  globe	  with	  all	  the	  countries	  neat	  and	  different	  colored”;	  instead,	  it	  is	  “huge	  and	  cracked	  and	  loose	  and	  turning	  at	  a	  thousand	  miles	  an	  hour”	  (23).	  Against	  the	  imperatives	  of	  propriety,	  Frankie	  abandons	  any	  given	  identity	  and	  moves	  towards	  pathology,	  imagining	  her	  house	  as	  an	  asylum	  and	  feeling	  herself	  a	  freak	  and	  a	  criminal,	  worrying	  that	  she’ll	  be	  put	  in	  the	  freak	  show	  as	  she	  continues	  to	  sprout	  endlessly	  taller,	  or	  that	  she’ll	  be	  put	  in	  jail	  as	  her	  restlessness	  turns	  to	  petty	  crime	  and	  a	  fascination	  with	  the	  violence	  inside	  her.	  	  	  	   The	  confluence	  of	  concerns	  that	  pervade	  McCullers’s	  novel—those	  of	  temporal	  (in)determination,	  the	  authority	  of	  scientific	  taxonomy	  over	  bodies,	  the	  parallel	  diagnostics	  of	  pathology	  and	  crime,	  negotiations	  between	  the	  imposition	  of	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and	  desire	  for	  identity,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  all	  these	  in	  the	  epistemo-­‐ontological	  organization	  of	  the	  world—are	  given	  a	  precise	  relation	  in	  a	  surprisingly	  different	  register	  more	  than	  forty	  years	  later	  in	  Hortense	  Spillers	  influential	  essay,	  “Mama’s	  Baby,	  Papa’s	  Maybe:	  An	  American	  Grammar	  Book.”	  Spillers’s	  text,	  brought	  into	  contact	  with	  McCullers’s,	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  same	  forces	  that	  regulate	  and	  determine	  minor	  life	  also	  operate	  with	  regards	  to	  race	  and	  gender,	  making	  of	  their	  difference	  another	  iteration	  of	  minority.	  Spillers	  is	  concerned	  with	  how	  the	  anoriginal	  flux	  of	  “flesh”	  of	  blackness	  is	  stilled	  into	  the	  taxonomized	  and	  commodified	  body	  as	  part	  of	  the	  global	  slave	  trade,	  and	  with	  the	  ongoing	  implications	  in	  the	  US	  for	  black	  femininity,	  which	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  continuously	  wielded	  pathologizing	  and	  punishing	  force	  of	  scientifico-­‐legal	  policy-­‐making	  (of	  which	  she	  cites	  the	  Moynihan	  Report	  as	  a	  prime	  example)	  (65-­‐67).	  Here,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  Spillers’s	  essay—which	  in	  the	  last	  instance	  draws	  on	  literature	  as	  an	  alternative	  epistemological	  force—provides	  a	  diagnostic	  that	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  analyze	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  these	  imbrications	  for	  those	  who	  are	  oppressed	  by	  them.	  This	  diagnostic	  that	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  return	  to	  McCullers’s	  writing	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  the	  specific	  ways	  in	  which	  McCullers	  encounters	  and	  responds	  to	  such	  a	  confluence	  of	  forces.	  Indeed,	  Spillers’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  organization	  of	  time	  is	  the	  central	  mechanism	  of	  these	  combined	  institutions	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  see	  how	  McCullers’s	  texts	  actualize	  Spillers’s	  political	  desire	  to:	  strip	  down	  through	  the	  layers	  of	  attenuated	  meaning	  [imposed	  on	  black	  feminine	  flesh],	  made	  an	  excess	  in	  time,	  over	  time,	  assigned	  by	  a	  particular	  historical	  order,	  and	  there	  await	  whatever	  marvels	  of	  my	  own	  inventiveness.	  (Spillers	  65).	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How	  can	  and	  has	  time	  been	  produced	  against	  “a	  particular	  historical	  order”—one	  that	  has	  stilled	  life	  into	  identity-­‐commodity-­‐taxonomy	  and	  operates	  on	  such	  stilling	  (72,	  78)—in	  order	  to	  combat	  the	  insistent	  force	  of	  seemingly	  inextricable	  law,	  science,	  and	  economy?	  How	  can	  new	  arrangements	  of	  time	  compose	  alternative	  possibilities	  for	  social	  organization?	  	  The	  counter-­‐force	  of	  a	  different	  conception	  of	  time	  than	  that	  of	  the	  historical	  order	  that	  concerns	  Spillers	  is	  what	  I	  call	  “revolutionary	  time,”	  and	  this	  revision	  of	  temporal	  arrangements	  enables	  a	  counter-­‐practice	  of	  understanding	  ,	  imagining,	  and	  producing	  the	  world,	  which	  I	  call	  “minor	  empiricism.”	  By	  way	  of	  Spillers’s	  text,	  I	  bring	  McCullers	  into	  contact	  with	  both	  the	  history	  of	  anthropology—which	  Spillers	  names	  as	  one	  of	  the	  central	  forces	  for	  producing	  ethnicity	  and	  sex	  as	  a	  taxonomic	  stillings	  (72)—and	  with	  Spillers’s	  ongoing	  investment	  in	  black	  feminism.	  The	  same	  legacies	  that	  concern	  Spillers	  show	  up	  in	  McCullers’s	  work,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  character	  of	  Berenice,	  who	  bears	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  stilling	  of	  black	  flesh,	  but	  also,	  first,	  by	  way	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Freak	  Show,	  which	  gives	  her	  the	  taxonomic	  grammar	  of	  self-­‐pathologization.	  The	  freak	  show	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  anthropological	  displays	  of	  racialized	  bodies	  and	  medical	  demonstrations	  of	  pathology.	  Its	  displays	  of	  primitivized	  black	  bodies,	  “hermaphrodites,”	  and	  exceptional	  physiognomies	  categorized	  and	  caged	  brings	  together	  the	  identity	  concerns	  that	  pervade	  the	  rest	  of	  McCullers’s	  novel.4	  As	  Rachel	  Adams	  notes,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  McCullers’s	  final	  novel,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See:	  Robert	  Bogdan,	  Freak	  Show:	  Presenting	  Human	  Oddities	  for	  Amusement	  and	  
Profit	  (Chicago,	  IL,	  Univ.	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1990).	  He	  shows	  that	  the	  freak	  show	  dream	  from	  the	  practices	  of	  natural	  science	  and	  late	  Victorian	  anthropology,	  putting	  new	  species	  and	  races	  on	  display,	  and	  often	  used	  quotes	  from	  doctors	  or	  natural	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Clock	  without	  Hands	  (1953),	  she	  too	  is	  increasingly	  concerned	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  social	  science	  on	  legal	  and	  juridical	  policy,	  which	  shows	  up	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Kinsey	  Report	  (1948).5	  Through	  Spillers,	  then,	  I	  suggest	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  link	  McCullers	  and	  her	  specific	  form	  of	  minor	  literary	  production	  not	  only	  to	  a	  group	  of	  black	  feminists	  who	  come	  after	  her—the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective—but	  also	  to	  a	  scientist,	  an	  anthropologist,	  who	  precedes	  her—Margaret	  Mead—in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  descriptive	  force	  of	  the	  minor	  as	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  time.	  And	  it	  is	  by	  way	  of	  Deleuze’s	  concept	  of	  empiricism	  that	  I	  suggest	  that	  such	  a	  produced	  relationship	  might	  be	  understood	  and	  made	  useful.	  By	  reading	  them	  together,	  a	  practice	  of	  study	  and	  analysis	  that	  understands	  the	  real	  relations	  among	  aesthetics,	  science,	  and	  politics	  emerges	  in	  as	  counter-­‐mode	  of	  thinking	  and	  engaging	  the	  world:	  minor	  empiricism.	  Deleuze	  describes	  empiricism	  as	  a	  way	  of	  organizing	  perceptions	  that	  
intensifies	  rather	  than	  “stills”	  time	  and	  produces	  subjectivity	  (Deleuze,	  Empiricism	  16).	  Although	  twentieth-­‐century	  positivism,	  as	  the	  current	  instantiation	  of	  scientific	  “empiricism”	  that	  grounds	  corporate	  science	  in	  relentless	  data-­‐production,	  is	  primarily	  understood	  to	  name	  a	  conception	  of	  science	  that	  is	  non-­‐reflexive	  about	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  scientists	  in	  the	  exhibits	  (6,	  9).	  He	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  relationship	  between	  freak	  exhibits	  and	  medical	  science	  inquiry,	  and	  notes	  that	  the	  exhibits	  would	  sometimes	  be	  accompanied	  by	  medical	  pamphlets	  about	  the	  pathologies	  they	  spectacularized	  (230).	  5	  In	  “’A	  Mixture	  of	  Freak	  and	  Delicious’:	  The	  Queer	  Fiction	  of	  Carson	  McCullers,”	  Adams	  work	  details	  the	  historically	  specific	  use	  of	  the	  figures	  of	  the	  freak	  and	  queer,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  figures	  map	  with	  contemporary	  queer	  theory.	  She	  is	  largely	  responsible	  for	  bringing	  McCullers,	  who	  had	  fallen	  out	  of	  critical	  purview	  shortly	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  her	  last	  novel,	  back	  into	  critical	  interest	  both	  for	  queer	  studies	  and	  disability	  studies.	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own	  origins	  and	  methods,	  Deleuze	  actually	  affirms	  positivism	  in	  that	  it	  names	  science	  as	  a	  positive	  practice	  of	  creating	  real	  relations	  among	  objects	  in	  a	  determined	  plane	  of	  reference.	  Science	  slows	  down	  the	  formation	  of	  objects	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  visible,	  objects	  that	  are	  always	  taking	  form	  out	  of	  and	  disappearing	  into	  chaos	  (Deleuze,	  Philosophy	  119-­‐121).	  But	  he	  only	  affirms	  it	  insofar	  as	  science	  makes	  objects	  by	  creating	  a	  plane	  of	  reference;	  those	  references	  or	  relations	  are	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  set	  of	  limits	  or	  borders	  that	  make	  from	  ongoing	  chaos	  a	  field	  to	  be	  ordered	  or	  rationalized	  in	  order	  to	  make	  action	  possible.	  	  Science	  here	  does	  not	  appear	  as	  a	  particular	  method.	  Instead,	  science,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  organizing	  knowledge	  and	  life	  that	  is	  immanent	  to	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  it	  appears,	  is	  but	  one	  way	  of	  producing	  relations,	  of	  creating	  a	  positive	  organization	  by	  cutting	  a	  region	  out	  of	  the	  irrational	  and	  rationalizing	  or	  organizing	  it.6	  This	  is	  a	  neutral,	  or	  even	  positive	  description	  of	  science’s	  ideal	  capacities,	  but	  it	  is	  one	  that	  can	  be	  perverted,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  intensive	  and	  institutionalized	  stillings	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  positivism.	  Twentieth-­‐century	  positivism—in	  both	  its	  practice	  and	  popular	  perception—erases	  the	  originary	  moment	  of	  the	  production	  of	  rationality	  out	  of	  the	  irrational;	  rationality	  is	  not	  given,	  but	  produced,	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  organization.	  Such	  organization	  can	  be	  disrupted	  through	  disorganization,	  but	  such	  disorganization	  requires	  both	  a	  disruption	  of	  the	  conventional	  understandings	  of	  sensorial	  perception,	  which	  we	  might	  call	  aesthetic	  disruptions,	  and	  the	  force	  of	  belief—belief	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See	  the	  previous	  chapter	  of	  this	  dissertation	  for	  a	  longer	  discussion	  of	  debates	  over	  chaos	  and	  rationality—and	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  fully	  rational	  world	  or	  a	  fully	  rational	  description	  of	  the	  world—by	  way	  of	  science,	  especially	  as	  it	  plays	  out	  in	  quantum	  and	  classical	  physics.	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in	  the	  world—as	  the	  grounds	  for	  producing	  a	  new	  frame	  of	  reference	  or	  plane	  of	  composition.7	  It	  is	  via	  this	  reconfiguration/minoritization	  of	  what	  empiricism	  has	  become	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  art,	  science,	  and	  politics	  becomes	  available	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  often	  masked	  by	  its	  twentieth-­‐century	  iteration.	  	  It	  might	  seem	  strange	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  novel	  operates	  via	  an	  empirical	  practice,	  and	  even	  more	  so	  because	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  the	  minor	  empiricism	  of	  McCullers,	  along	  with	  Combahee,	  and	  Mead	  is	  used	  to	  critique	  and	  challenge	  scientific	  practices	  and	  popular	  perceptions	  of	  science.	  “Science”	  had	  come	  to	  denote	  a	  field	  unified	  by	  a	  method	  and	  characterized	  by—providing	  the	  hallmark	  for—technical	  proficiency	  and	  expertise.	  However,	  the	  power	  of	  science,	  as	  a	  series	  of	  methodologically	  mutating,	  reflexive	  and	  immanent	  practices,	  for	  making	  the	  world	  comprehensible	  and	  for	  altering	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  world—in	  fact,	  making	  
another	  world	  of	  and	  from	  this	  world—is	  a	  repeated	  if	  understated	  theme	  of	  McCullers’s	  fiction	  that	  also	  shows	  up	  in	  Combahee’s	  influential	  Statement	  (1977)	  and	  Mead’s	  first	  publication,	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Samoa	  (1928).	  I	  suggest,	  then,	  that	  all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  As	  with	  my	  other	  chapters,	  I	  am	  using	  aesthetics	  in	  both	  an	  older	  and	  contemporary	  sense:	  in	  the	  Greek	  sense	  of	  perception	  and	  feeling	  and	  the	  current	  scientific	  connotation	  of	  the	  study	  of	  sensori-­‐emotional	  values	  and	  their	  production.	  While	  I	  am	  not	  excluding	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  comes	  from	  a	  German	  aesthetic	  tradition	  (beauty,	  taste,	  moral	  good),	  such	  a	  definition	  is	  only	  part	  of	  much	  more	  complex	  field	  of	  sensorial	  experience	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  talking	  about	  the	  interrelationships	  among	  art	  (including	  literature),	  science,	  and	  politics.	  In	  fact,	  the	  German	  aesthetic	  definition	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  a	  privileging	  of	  particular	  values	  and	  denigration	  of	  a	  larger	  field	  of	  sensorial	  value-­‐production—which	  values	  only	  part	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  and	  erases	  the	  multiple	  ways	  in	  which	  aesthetic	  determinations	  structure	  epistemology—some	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  which	  this	  chapter	  aims	  to	  investigate.	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of	  their	  writing,	  as	  practices	  of	  descriptive	  experimentation,	  not	  only	  affirm	  aspects	  of	  science	  as	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  rather	  than	  a	  unified	  field,	  but	  also	  share	  something	  with	  productive	  rather	  than	  fatalizing	  or	  fully	  determined	  scientific	  experimentation.	  Specifically	  they	  participate	  in	  those	  experimental	  practices	  I	  explored	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  under	  the	  name	  “valuable	  experiments.”	  These	  operate	  not	  so	  much	  to	  reveal	  the	  given	  to	  knowledge,	  but	  instead	  produce	  descriptive	  practices,	  via	  the	  aesthetic,	  that	  can	  reconfigure	  the	  frame	  in	  which	  a	  codified	  and	  supposedly	  unified	  twentieth-­‐century	  science	  came	  to	  operate.	  They	  reconfigure	  and	  cut	  aesthetic	  forms	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  new	  sensorial	  arrangements	  from	  which	  to	  begin	  new	  arrangements	  of	  thought.	  	  Such	  reconfigurations	  require	  breaking	  from	  the	  twentieth-­‐century	  conception	  of	  science	  as	  “objective”—in	  which	  objective	  means	  “value	  free”—and	  affirming	  the	  personal	  (subjective),	  political,	  and	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  of	  scientific	  practice.	  Making	  such	  a	  break	  is	  done	  through	  a	  return	  to	  and	  disruption	  of	  the	  frames	  and	  limits	  within	  which	  science	  makes	  its	  determinations	  (and,	  via	  “objectivity”	  codes	  as	  telos).	  These	  disruptions	  are	  enacted	  by	  using	  the	  violent,	  creative,	  disorganizing	  and	  organizing	  capacities	  of	  aesthetics	  in	  order	  to	  resist	  the	  stilling	  of	  temporal	  flux	  that	  occurs	  in	  the	  particularly	  damaging	  temporal	  incrementalizations	  and	  biological	  taxonomizations	  of	  human	  social	  life	  that	  are	  the	  legacies	  of	  what	  Auguste	  Comte	  called	  the	  moral	  sciences,	  and	  which	  gained	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increasing	  power	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  as	  social	  science.8	  These	  social	  sciences	  increasingly	  borrowed	  an	  already	  disingenuous	  rhetoric	  of	  “disinterest”—a	  specifically	  twentieth	  century	  invention—from	  the	  natural	  and	  physical	  sciences.	  Such	  rhetoric,	  even	  when	  aimed	  at	  social	  justice,	  often	  operated	  as	  a	  way	  of	  enforcing	  a	  dominant	  civil	  order,	  the	  very	  order	  that	  had	  produced	  the	  currents	  of	  the	  science	  it	  named.	  The	  enforced	  order	  was	  (is)	  that	  of	  white,	  patriarchal	  capitalism.	  As	  an	  effect	  of	  contemporary	  and	  especially	  popular	  understandings	  of	  science,	  this	  order	  appears	  as	  the	  rational	  and	  given	  means	  for	  ordering	  social	  life—rather	  than	  as	  one	  chosen	  rationalism,	  the	  epistemological	  determinations	  of	  which	  are	  neither	  coextensive	  with	  nor	  prescriptive	  of	  ontology.	  The	  presentation	  of	  science	  as	  unified,	  transparent,	  descriptive	  of	  a	  given	  (natural)	  order,	  and	  fully	  accessible	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  life	  through	  a	  shared	  rational	  method	  in	  turn	  papered	  over	  the	  moralizing	  injunctions	  of	  such	  a	  science	  imagined	  as	  merely	  and	  necessarily	  natural.	  	   In	  what	  follows,	  I	  bring	  McCullers	  into	  conversation	  with	  Margaret	  Mead	  and	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  in	  order	  to	  illuminate	  the	  history	  and	  repercussions	  of	  the	  invention	  of	  value-­‐free	  science—which	  was	  largely	  enabled	  through	  the	  pedagogical	  invention	  of	  the	  “scientific	  method”	  as	  part	  of	  changes	  to	  secondary	  education—in	  order	  to	  show	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  three	  thinkers	  participated	  in	  ongoing/repeated	  valuable	  experiments.	  Their	  experiments	  are	  correctives	  to	  the	  separation	  or	  erasure	  of	  both	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  political	  dimensions	  of	  institutional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	  previous	  chapter	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  this	  conception	  of	  “objective”	  and	  a	  conception	  of	  it	  as	  a	  way	  of	  speaking	  about	  real	  objects,	  but	  not	  one	  that	  would	  take	  the	  description	  itself	  as	  transparent	  or	  neutral	  or	  given.	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and	  everyday	  (as	  well	  as	  techno-­‐)	  science.	  They	  also	  work	  together	  to	  show	  the	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  minority—beginning	  with	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  adolescent	  minor—has	  come	  to	  be	  exerted	  with	  great	  force	  to	  link	  the	  pathologies	  of	  race	  and	  gender	  as	  irrational.	  Minor	  empiricism	  operates	  by	  a	  constant	  reintegration	  of	  or	  renegotiation	  with	  the	  irrational	  that	  traverses	  the	  rational.	  McCullers,	  Mead,	  and	  Combahee,	  at	  different	  moments	  and	  in	  different	  ways,	  find	  themselves	  needing	  to	  intervene	  against	  the	  political	  effects	  of	  a	  science	  that	  rhetorically	  divorces	  itself	  from	  politics;	  and	  they	  do	  so	  through	  the	  development	  of	  a	  disruptive	  and	  experimental	  descriptive	  practice	  that	  can	  reveal	  the	  relations	  papered	  over	  by	  this	  rhetoric	  of	  disinterest.	  	  	   All	  three	  thinkers	  are	  interested	  in	  “minority”	  in	  multiple	  senses,	  including	  childhood	  as	  well	  as	  racial,	  class,	  and	  gender	  minority.	  These	  are	  linked	  historically	  through	  the	  production	  of	  irrationality.	  As	  Holly	  Brewer	  writes	  in	  By	  Birth	  or	  
Consent:	  Children,	  Law,	  and	  the	  Anglo	  American	  Revolution	  in	  Authority,	  the	  minor	  child	  is	  first	  invented	  as	  irrational	  and	  therefore	  not	  capable	  of	  participating	  in	  democracy,	  or	  political	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  in	  need	  of	  a	  rigid	  paternalism	  for	  Anglo-­‐American	  culture	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century.9	  And	  then	  the	  same	  rhetoric	  was	  repeatedly	  applied	  to	  other	  minorities	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  colonial	  control.	  Their	  collective	  irrationality	  was	  then	  frequently	  and	  conveniently	  “proven”	  through	  science,	  including	  anthropology.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See:	  Holly	  Brewer,	  By	  Birth	  or	  Consent:	  Children,	  Law,	  and	  the	  Anglo	  American	  
Revolution	  in	  Authority	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC:	  Univ.	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2007).	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By	  reading	  Mead,	  a	  scientist,	  McCullers,	  an	  author,	  and	  Combahee,	  a	  political	  and	  social	  collective,	  together,	  I	  show	  how	  the	  practices	  of	  a	  dominant	  empiricism	  emerge	  from	  a	  set	  of	  aesthetic	  determinations	  that	  allow	  science	  to	  dictate	  a	  given	  or	  natural.	  But,	  without	  the	  reflexivity	  inherent	  in	  the	  origins	  of	  empiricism	  (the	  recognition	  of	  belief),	  the	  political	  repercussions	  are	  dire.	  By	  beginning	  not	  from	  disinterest,	  but	  from	  interest,	  need,	  and	  a	  political	  position,	  all	  three	  produce	  minor	  empiricisms—which	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  practice	  of	  study—that	  can	  intervene	  against	  the	  particular	  forms	  of	  science	  that	  are	  increasingly	  oppressing	  them.	  In	  particular,	  their	  investment	  in	  study	  as	  an	  ongoing	  form	  not	  invested	  in	  mastery	  allows	  them	  to	  change	  their	  understanding	  of	  time,	  rejecting	  progressive	  or	  teleological	  time	  for	  revolutionary	  time.	  Revolutionary	  time	  does	  not	  see	  rationality	  or	  a	  fully-­‐ordered	  society	  as	  its	  end-­‐goal,	  but	  instead	  is	  invested	  in	  the	  ongoing	  struggle	  to	  organize	  chaos	  in	  ways	  that	  do	  not	  ever	  form	  a	  totality	  the	  related	  institutionalized	  structures	  that	  separate	  people	  from	  each	  other.	  They	  invent	  new	  ways	  of	  breaking	  down	  those	  barriers	  and	  becoming	  or	  staying	  half-­‐formed,	  always	  becoming,	  or	  crossing	  from	  one	  to	  the	  other,	  via	  strategic	  practices.	  They	  refuse	  the	  very	  desirability	  of	  coming	  into	  recognizable	  and	  dominant	  form	  (majority)	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  minor	  people	  Deleuze	  describes	  as	  “eternally	  minor,	  becoming	  revolutionary”	  (Deleuze,	  “Literature”	  228).	  They	  relink	  experience	  and	  experiment:	  two	  major	  facets	  of	  empiricism	  historically,	  which	  had	  been	  separated	  or	  erased	  through	  the	  production	  of	  twentieth	  century	  positivism.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  refuse	  the	  need	  for	  a	  unified	  counter-­‐program	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  actualization	  of	  collectives	  that	  struggle	  together.	  In	  doing	  so,	  produce	  their	  own	  revolutionary-­‐being,	  as	  an	  ongoing	  process	  of	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becoming-­‐revolutionary,	  rather	  than	  deferring	  actualization	  to	  the	  “after”	  of	  revolution.	  	  	   Even	  as	  the	  writers	  I	  name—McCullers,	  Mead,	  and	  Combahee—may	  seem	  to	  bear	  only	  the	  slightest	  relation	  to	  one	  another,	  one	  that	  may	  seem	  “merely”	  conceptual,	  I	  want	  to	  here	  affirm	  again	  the	  larger	  reading	  practice	  of	  my	  dissertation,	  which	  consists	  of	  collapsing	  temporal	  separations—sidestepping	  a	  one	  kind	  of	  historicist	  practice	  that	  begins	  from	  a	  causal	  or	  progressive	  narrative—and	  placing	  seemingly	  unrelated	  figures	  in	  parataxis.	  This	  method	  is,	  in	  part,	  what	  I	  would	  call	  my	  own	  practice	  of	  empiricism.	  Although	  I	  have	  at	  times	  throughout	  the	  dissertation	  equated	  empiricism	  with	  the	  crass	  positivism	  I	  outlined	  earlier,	  I	  hope	  I	  have	  been	  clear	  that	  that	  is	  a	  particularly	  twentieth	  century	  version	  of	  empiricism,	  which	  does	  not	  totalize	  the	  field	  of	  empirical	  possibility.	  Empiricism,	  as	  it	  emerges	  out	  of	  David	  Hume	  and,	  more	  precisely	  (for	  my	  interests),	  as	  it	  is	  articulated	  in	  Gilles	  Deleuze’s	  minor	  and	  revisionary	  reading	  of	  Hume,	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  philosophical	  practice—one	  that	  grounds	  science—of	  the	  production	  of	  external	  relations,	  relations	  that	  “are	  external	  to	  their	  terms.”	  These	  relations	  are	  both	  real	  and	  external	  to	  those	  things	  that	  are	  associated,	  unable	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  or	  reduced	  to	  the	  terms	  that	  constitute	  them	  (Deleuze,	  Empiricism	  99-­‐100).	  Once	  made,	  these	  relations	  become	  real	  things,	  at	  another	  level,	  not	  fully	  attributable	  to	  the	  orders	  that	  were	  the	  grounds	  of	  their	  creation.	  Empiricism	  as	  a	  productive	  and	  descriptive	  practice	  that	  prodes	  relations	  that	  also	  precede	  their	  production	  and	  offer	  new	  ways	  for	  making	  determinations	  offers	  a	  more	  fruitful	  way	  of	  thinking	  empiricism	  as	  valuable	  experiment	  than	  does	  a	  twentieth-­‐century	  positivist	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empiricism.	  For	  that	  positivist	  empiricism,	  experiments	  are	  understood	  to	  reveal	  already	  existing	  structures	  rather	  than	  making	  them,	  erasing	  the	  real	  productions	  of	  subjectivity.	  By	  making	  relations	  among	  Mead,	  McCullers,	  and	  Combahee,	  I	  hope	  to	  affirm	  the	  associations	  they	  make	  among	  science,	  politics,	  and	  aesthetics	  as	  a	  reality	  with	  consequences	  for	  disrupting	  the	  ongoing	  bad	  faith,	  disbelieving	  science	  and/as	  politics	  that	  continue(s)	  to	  pathologize	  difference	  and	  evacuate	  those	  deemed	  pathological	  of	  their	  political	  effectivity,	  enabling	  them	  to	  produce	  autonomous	  alternatives	  through	  their	  minor	  sciences.	  
Disrupting	  Bildung:	  Eternally	  Minor	  	  	  	   Told	  in	  close	  third-­‐person	  narration	  that	  moves	  in	  an	  out	  of	  free	  indirect	  discourse,	  McCullers’s	  The	  Member	  of	  the	  Wedding	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  parts	  with	  each	  revealing	  the	  story	  of	  a	  different	  version	  of	  its	  white,	  working-­‐class,	  female	  protagonist:	  Frankie	  Addams,	  F.	  Jasmine,	  and	  finally,	  Frances.	  In	  the	  second	  and	  longest	  section,	  which	  takes	  place	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  single	  day,	  Frankie	  experiences	  a	  sudden	  and	  strange	  new	  feeling	  that	  prompts	  her	  to	  become	  F.	  Jasmine,	  “grown	  and	  free”	  and	  able	  to	  enter—as	  she	  imagines	  it—into	  a	  marriage	  contract	  with	  her	  brother	  and	  his	  bride,	  to	  marry	  the	  wedding	  itself	  (58).	  This	  theme	  of	  the	  passage	  from	  student	  to	  autonomous	  adult	  suggests	  that	  the	  novel	  might	  be	  read	  as	  a	  bildungsroman	  in	  the	  sense	  described	  by	  Franco	  Moretti,	  tracing	  the	  development	  of	  a	  youthful	  life	  into	  adult	  rationality	  and	  proper	  socialization.10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See:	  Franco	  Moretti,	  The	  Way	  of	  the	  World:	  The	  Bildungsroman	  in	  European	  
Culture	  (London,	  UK:	  Verson,	  1987).	  In	  Moretti’s	  account,	  the	  bildungsroman	  takes	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Unsurprisingly,	  such	  a	  genre	  emerged	  not	  long	  after	  childhood	  had	  itself	  been	  constituted	  as	  a	  period	  of	  irrationality.	  Prior	  to	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  children	  were	  considered	  the	  same	  as	  adults	  under	  the	  law;	  able,	  for	  example,	  to	  enter	  into	  legal	  contracts.	  The	  bildungsroman	  offered	  a	  way	  of	  narrating	  the	  change	  in	  identity	  from	  childhood	  to	  adulthood,	  irrationality	  to	  rationality.11	  But	  there	  is	  a	  duality	  to	  the	  narration	  of	  Member,	  in	  which	  a	  gap	  exists	  between	  Frankie’s	  self-­‐perception	  of	  her	  coming-­‐of-­‐age	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  almost-­‐Frankie	  narrator	  that	  confuses	  this	  trajectory.	  The	  gap	  widens	  in	  the	  final	  section,	  and	  Frances-­‐nee-­‐Frankie	  is	  depicted	  from	  a	  point	  of	  distance	  and	  closure,	  as	  though	  the	  narrator	  is	  now	  fully	  outside	  the	  world	  of	  the	  story	  and	  can,	  from	  an	  external	  standpoint,	  totalize	  the	  novel	  into	  a	  coherent	  whole	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  Frances	  Addams’s	  eventual	  proper	  adulthood.	  No	  longer	  the	  autonomous,	  self-­‐proclaimed	  adult	  of	  F.	  Jasmine,	  Frances	  has	  returned	  to	  school	  and	  has	  been	  normalized,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  true	  ending—the	  true	  coming-­‐of-­‐age	  and	  the	  generic	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  novel—is	  yet	  to	  come.	  	   If	  we	  see	  the	  narrative	  as	  having	  a	  dual	  ending—one	  in	  which	  F.	  Jasmine	  comes	  into	  adulthood	  (Section	  2),	  and	  the	  other	  in	  which	  Frances	  remains	  a	  school-­‐girl	  on	  her	  way	  to	  adulthood	  (Section	  3)—neither	  of	  which	  offers	  a	  true	  ending	  or	  proper	  generic	  closure—it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  if	  the	  novel	  is	  a	  bildungsroman,	  it	  is	  a	  strange,	  queer	  one.	  Unlike	  Goethe’s	  Wilhelm	  Meister,	  Frankie’s	  relentless	  drive	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  youth	  as	  its	  central	  theme	  and	  coming-­‐of-­‐age	  through	  education	  as	  its	  central	  mode	  for	  producing	  a	  dialectical	  resolution	  of	  life	  experiences	  culminating	  in	  autonomous	  individuality	  or	  proper	  socialization	  in	  adulthood.	  Goethe’s	  The	  Apprenticeship	  of	  
Wilhem	  Meister	  is	  given	  as	  the	  foundational	  exemplar.	  11	  See:	  Brewer,	  By	  Birth	  or	  Consent.	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come	  of	  age	  happens	  not	  over	  the	  narrative	  arc	  of	  a	  lifetime	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  space	  of	  a	  single	  summer—or	  more	  accurately,	  a	  summer	  day—as	  she	  passes	  from	  Frankie	  to	  F.	  Jasmine.	  Foregoing	  the	  progress	  tale	  of	  “education,”	  she	  makes	  a	  leap	  that	  collapses	  the	  temporal	  requirements	  of	  the	  bildungsroman.	  And	  this	  leap,	  however	  temporary,	  tenuous,	  fantastical,	  and	  ultimately	  thwarted	  it	  may	  be,	  is	  not	  the	  story	  of	  passing	  into	  proper	  professionalization	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  write	  capital	  H	  history	  (of	  her	  own	  life	  or	  any	  other)	  that	  Wilhelm	  accomplishes	  when	  he	  joins	  the	  Tower	  Society;	  it	  is,	  instead,	  the	  story	  of	  queer	  desire	  and	  improper	  belonging,	  the	  dream	  ending	  of	  which	  would	  find	  her	  in	  a	  three-­‐way	  marriage	  with	  her	  brother	  and	  his	  bride.	  Frankie,	  in	  the	  fantastical	  adulthood	  of	  F.	  Jasmine,	  is	  an	  unsuitable	  adult	  who	  can	  only	  be	  read	  as	  either	  a	  child	  who	  irrationally	  believes	  she	  is	  an	  adult	  or	  an	  adult	  who	  is	  irrational,	  childish.	  She	  is—as	  McCullers’s	  biographer	  would	  later	  say	  of	  the	  writer	  herself—a	  “’woman	  still	  a	  child’	  […]	  a	  frightening	  chimera,	  foreign	  to	  the	  world	  as	  it	  should	  be,	  a	  ceaselessly	  improper,	  permanently	  unacceptable	  personality”	  (Savigneau	  6).	  Frankie’s	  coming-­‐of-­‐age	  actualizes	  her	  inbetweenness,	  making	  a	  claim	  to	  it	  not	  as	  a	  temporary	  moment	  of	  disidentification	  from	  given	  states,	  but	  as	  an	  ongoing	  process	  that	  refuses	  to	  resolve,	  which	  requires	  traversing	  multiple	  ill-­‐formed	  and	  illegitimate	  identities	  in	  order	  to	  appear.	  The	  queer,	  freakish,	  mad,	  and	  criminal	  identities	  she	  has	  associated	  with	  herself	  throughout	  the	  first	  section	  of	  the	  novel—identities	  that,	  like	  childhood,	  have,	  historically,	  been	  assigned	  an	  irrational	  character—are,	  in	  the	  figure	  of	  F.	  Jasmine,	  no	  longer	  experienced	  as	  pathological,	  but	  instead	  as	  useful.12	  As	  a	  self-­‐proclaimed	  adult,	  she	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  chapter	  4,	  “Subjects	  or	  Citizens:	  Inherited	  Right	  versus	  Reason,	  Merit,	  and	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authorizes	  herself	  to	  make	  her	  own	  claim	  to	  (a	  different)	  rationality.	  It	  is	  only	  the	  practical	  failure	  to	  continue	  this	  strange	  adulthood	  she	  has	  started,	  to	  make	  it	  into	  a	  permanent	  majority,	  that	  returns	  Frankie	  to	  her	  minority	  again	  at	  the	  novel’s	  end,	  to	  childhood	  forever,	  now	  normalized.	  	   But	  in	  another	  light,	  we	  might	  read	  the	  novel	  less	  as	  a	  failed	  bildungsroman,	  and	  more	  as	  a	  resistance	  to	  the	  form	  itself,	  a	  resistance	  to	  the	  value	  the	  generic	  conventions	  place	  on	  the	  solidification	  of	  a	  life-­‐narrative	  in	  a	  recognizable	  and	  proper	  adulthood	  produced	  through	  education-­‐qua-­‐identity-­‐training.	  In	  Member,	  Frankie	  does	  not	  fail	  to	  come	  into	  majority,	  but	  refuses	  the	  desirability	  of	  majority,	  of	  the	  major.	  What	  Frankie	  has	  been	  resisting	  all	  along	  in	  feeling	  not	  a	  member	  with	  the	  girls	  in	  her	  working-­‐class	  town	  a	  few	  years	  older	  than	  she	  is	  the	  version	  of	  the	  girl	  she	  becomes	  as	  Frances.	  She	  resists	  the	  becoming	  the	  girl	  whose	  circumstances	  determine	  a	  coming	  into	  majority	  that	  will	  mean	  not	  access	  to	  dominant	  citizen-­‐subjectivity,	  but	  instead	  a	  thwarting	  of	  her	  queer	  desires	  and	  a	  future	  trapped	  by	  the	  conventions	  of	  midcentury	  femininity,	  endless	  working	  class	  waged	  labor,	  and	  domestic	  chores.	  In	  rejecting	  the	  desirability	  and	  false	  promises	  of	  majority—both	  in	  terms	  of	  age	  and	  as	  a	  subject	  position	  that	  would	  name	  a	  rational	  citizen-­‐subject	  against	  the	  irrationality	  of	  childhood	  and	  minority	  more	  generally—she	  makes	  a	  temporal	  leap	  that	  actualizes	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  irrational,	  the	  minor.	  The	  novel	  becomes	  an	  occasion	  for	  tapping	  into	  the	  power	  of	  the	  minor—found	  not	  only	  in	  Frankie	  but	  also	  in	  her	  black	  caretaker	  Berenice	  and	  her	  younger,	  gender-­‐bending	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Virtue”	  in	  Brewer’s	  By	  Birth	  or	  Consent	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  invention	  of	  childhood	  irrationality	  was	  then	  applied	  to	  women	  and	  colonial	  subjects	  through	  rhetoric	  that	  equated	  them	  with	  children.	  
	   174	  
cousin	  John	  Henry.	  It	  becomes	  an	  occasion	  for	  enacting	  what	  philosopher	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  suggests	  is	  the	  function	  of	  minor	  literature,	  “to	  invent	  a	  people	  […not]	  called	  upon	  to	  dominate	  the	  world,”	  but	  a	  “minor	  people,	  eternally	  minor,	  taken	  up	  in	  becoming	  revolutionary”	  (Deleuze,	  “Literature,”	  228).	  Disrupting	  the	  taxonomizing	  and	  pathologizing—which	  is	  to	  say,	  dividing	  and	  denigrating—organizational	  force	  of	  the	  “freak	  show,”	  the	  mad	  house,	  and	  the	  prison,	  McCuller’s	  uses	  the	  long	  center	  section	  of	  the	  novel	  to	  experiment	  with	  a	  collective	  descriptive	  practice,	  joined	  by	  those	  who	  share	  her	  minority,	  disrupting	  the	  progressive	  time	  of	  science,	  law,	  and	  History	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  leap	  that	  will	  enable	  her	  to	  make	  of	  and	  from	  this	  world	  a	  new	  world,	  antithetical	  to	  the	  dividing	  and	  normalizing	  forces	  of	  the	  law	  that	  would	  see	  her	  de	  facto	  queer	  community	  as	  criminals	  and	  to	  the	  scientific	  rhetoric	  that	  would	  make	  them	  abnormal	  and	  pathological,	  freaks.	  The	  world	  previously	  neat	  and	  connected	  has	  become	  cracked	  and	  loose—and	  this	  new	  (de)formation	  of	  the	  world	  becomes	  an	  occasion	  for	  world-­‐making.	  The	  descriptive	  practice	  does	  so	  by	  producing	  a	  “minor	  empiricism,”	  that	  not	  only	  describes	  and	  makes	  perceptions	  available	  to	  thought,	  but	  also	  reflects	  on	  that	  very	  process	  in	  order	  to	  constantly	  refuse	  its	  naturalization	  and	  enable	  new	  arrangements.	  	  This	  is	  a	  practice	  that	  wrests	  empiricism	  from	  the	  grips	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  positivism	  and	  returns	  to	  it	  the	  force	  of	  belief,	  of	  choice—made	  available	  through	  new	  sensorial,	  aesthetic	  arrangements—as	  the	  grounds	  for	  producing	  and	  organizing	  knowledge	  differently.	  It	  affirms	  the	  production	  of	  “the	  identity	  of	  thought	  with	  choice	  as	  determination	  of	  the	  indeterminable	  [.	  .	  .	  ]	  the	  simple	  belief	  of	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the	  one	  who	  chooses	  to	  choose	  (and	  restores	  the	  world	  and	  life)”	  (Deleuze,	  Cinema	  177).	  Minor	  empiricism	  produces	  description	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  composition	  that	  experiments	  with	  the	  experience	  that	  is	  the	  very	  grounds	  of	  its	  possibility,	  and	  does	  so	  by	  prolonging	  the	  immanent	  time	  of	  experience,	  emphasizing	  duration	  rather	  than	  progress,	  incrementalization	  or	  periodization,	  all	  of	  which	  would	  be	  determined	  teleologically.	  Time	  instead	  operates	  instead	  as	  flux,	  or	  what	  Spillers	  calls	  flesh:	  corporeal	  experience	  unstilled	  by	  the	  time	  of	  a	  juridico-­‐scientific	  economy	  (Spillers	  67,	  78).	  	  	   Although	  “science”	  as	  a	  powerful	  force	  in	  producing	  divisions	  wouldn’t	  appear	  explicitly	  in	  McCullers’s	  work	  until	  her	  final	  novel,	  Clock	  without	  Hands	  (1953),	  a	  more	  general	  concern	  with	  the	  divisions	  among	  people—and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  seemingly	  competing	  narratives	  of	  oppression	  divide	  understandings	  of	  experience—is	  already	  central	  to	  her	  first	  novel.	  The	  characters	  who	  move	  through	  
The	  Heart	  Is	  a	  Lonely	  Hunter	  (1940)	  share	  intense	  feelings	  of	  oppression	  and	  desires	  to	  effect	  social	  change	  in	  the	  world	  to	  which	  they	  belong.	  Yet	  they	  never	  seem	  less	  alone	  than	  when	  they	  are	  together,	  never	  seem	  less	  connected	  than	  when	  they	  are	  close	  enough	  to	  wall	  each	  other	  out.	  Despite	  this,	  they	  still	  form	  something	  of	  a	  de	  facto	  community	  made	  up	  of	  a	  black	  Marxist	  doctor,	  a	  white	  adolescent	  girl,	  a	  gender-­‐curious	  business	  owner,	  and	  a	  drunken	  labor	  organizer,	  who	  all	  gather	  together	  around	  and	  through	  a	  deaf	  mute	  of	  illegible	  origin,	  Singer.	  	  Late	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  novel,	  Singer	  describes	  this	  motley	  crew	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  his	  friend	  Antonapoulos,	  also	  a	  deaf	  mute	  who	  has	  been	  put	  in	  an	  asylum	  in	  lieu	  of	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being	  imprisoned	  for	  petty	  crimes.	  In	  the	  letter,	  Singer	  writes	  of	  these	  characters’	  disjoined	  and	  passionate	  conversations	  with	  him,	  saying:	  This	  is	  the	  way	  they	  talk	  when	  they	  come	  to	  my	  room.	  These	  words	  in	  their	  heart	  do	  not	  let	  them	  rest,	  so	  they	  are	  always	  very	  busy.	  Then	  you	  would	  think	  when	  they	  are	  together	  they	  would	  be	  like	  those	  of	  the	  [deaf	  mute]	  Society	  who	  meet	  at	  the	  convention	  in	  Macon	  this	  week.	  But	  that	  is	  not	  so.	  They	  all	  came	  to	  my	  room	  at	  the	  same	  time	  today.	  They	  sat	  like	  they	  were	  from	  different	  cities.	  They	  were	  even	  rude,	  and	  you	  know	  how	  I	  have	  always	  said	  that	  to	  be	  rude	  and	  not	  attend	  to	  the	  feelings	  of	  others	  is	  wrong.	  So	  it	  was	  like	  that.	  I	  do	  not	  understand,	  so	  I	  write	  to	  you	  because	  I	  think	  you	  will	  understand.	  I	  have	  queer	  feelings.	  For	  I	  have	  written	  of	  this	  matter	  enough	  and	  I	  know	  you	  are	  weary	  of	  it.	  I	  am	  also.	  (McCullers,	  Heart	  184)	  	  Singer—who	  is	  looking	  unsuccessfully	  to	  Antonapoulos,	  just	  as	  the	  four	  others	  look	  to	  him,	  to	  be	  understood—clarifies	  that	  by	  “busy”	  he	  does	  “not	  mean	  that	  they	  work	  at	  their	  jobs	  all	  day	  and	  night	  but	  that	  they	  have	  much	  business	  on	  their	  minds”	  (182).	  Each	  is	  preoccupied	  with	  a	  personal	  but	  forceful	  dissatisfaction	  about	  his/her	  existing	  social	  situation,	  which	  each	  intermittently	  recognizes	  as	  the	  product	  of	  larger	  political	  forces,	  they	  all	  have	  difficulty	  expressing	  these	  oppressive	  feelings	  in	  any	  comprehensible	  way	  to	  those	  who	  do	  (or	  might)	  listen.	  But	  these	  seemingly	  disconnected	  dissatisfactions	  also	  compel	  them	  together,	  to	  Singer	  as	  a	  point	  of	  identification	  or	  intersection.	  Singer’s	  “queer	  feelings,”	  like	  those	  that	  later	  pervade	  
Member,	  indicate	  the	  liminal,	  interstitial,	  or	  undetermined	  (becoming)	  relationships	  that	  occur	  at	  the	  margin.	  Despite	  overt	  differences	  in	  the	  social	  manifestations	  of	  their	  affective	  turmoil,	  they	  come	  to	  Singer	  in	  a	  way	  that	  resembles	  what	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  would	  say,	  several	  decades	  later,	  of	  their	  own	  coming	  together	  as	  a	  means	  for	  overcoming	  their	  socially-­‐imposed	  feelings	  of	  craziness,	  which	  enabled	  the	  birth	  of	  their	  “identity	  politics”	  (15).	  When	  they	  came	  together,	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each	  “came	  out	  of	  a	  strongly-­‐felt	  need	  for	  some	  level	  of	  possibility	  that	  did	  not	  previously	  exist	  in	  her	  life”	  (Combahee	  19).	  	   In	  1977,	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective,	  a	  group	  of	  black	  lesbian	  feminists	  operating	  in	  the	  Boston	  area,	  composed	  a	  statement	  as	  part	  of	  an	  ongoing	  “process	  of	  defining	  and	  clarifying	  [their]	  politics”	  (13).	  In	  it,	  they	  detailed	  their	  political	  beliefs	  and	  the	  specific	  “herstory”	  of	  their	  self-­‐organization.	  Their	  Statement,	  which	  is	  today	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  texts	  of	  black	  feminism,	  is	  largely	  lauded—especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  academic	  feminism—for	  its	  articulation	  of	  “interlocking”	  oppressions,	  which	  Kimberle	  Crenshaw	  and	  Patricia	  Hill	  Collins	  would	  later	  formalize	  and	  institutionalize	  in	  an	  analytic	  practice	  of	  “intersectionality”	  a	  decade	  later.	  The	  Collective	  writes:	  	  The	  most	  general	  statement	  of	  our	  politics	  at	  the	  present	  time	  would	  be	  that	  we	  are	  actively	  committed	  to	  struggling	  against	  racial,	  sexual,	  heterosexual,	  and	  class	  oppression,	  and	  see	  as	  our	  particular	  task	  the	  development	  of	  integrated	  analysis	  and	  practice	  based	  upon	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  major	  systems	  of	  oppression	  are	  interlocking.	  (Combahee	  13)	  	  Departing	  from	  an	  insistence	  on	  patriarchy	  as	  the	  sole	  foundational	  locus	  of	  women’s	  oppression	  espoused	  by	  much	  second-­‐wave	  radical	  (and	  predominantly	  white)	  feminism,	  the	  Collective	  asserts	  that	  oppression	  has	  multiple	  origins	  and	  “the	  synthesis	  of	  these	  oppressions	  creates	  the	  conditions	  of	  our	  lives.”	  They	  understand	  that	  radical	  movements	  which	  fully	  identify	  with	  and	  ground	  themselves	  in—as	  the	  term	  “radical”	  implies—a	  singular	  root	  fail	  to	  fully	  account	  for	  the	  oppressions	  of	  group	  members,	  whose	  interests	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  multiple	  and	  whose	  access	  to	  power	  differentially	  arranged.	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   Although	  the	  Collective	  is	  credited	  with	  “coining	  the	  term	  identity	  politics,”	  historian	  Michelle	  Murphy	  points	  out	  that	  for	  them,	  identity	  politics	  “does	  not	  affirm	  a	  single	  epistemically	  privileged	  identity	  or	  name	  an	  authentically	  revolutionary	  subject	  position”	  (39).	  Instead,	  in	  her	  book	  Seizing	  the	  Means	  of	  Reproduction:	  
Entanglements	  of	  Feminism,	  Health,	  and	  Technoscience,	  Murphy	  notes	  that	  their	  “identity	  politics”	  “draws	  out	  the	  contradictions	  formed	  at	  the	  axis	  of	  race,	  class,	  sexuality,	  and	  gender,	  as	  well	  as	  logics	  of	  capitalism	  and	  state	  violence,	  that	  require	  
disidentification	  from	  any	  singular	  identity	  and	  thus	  the	  recognition	  of	  contradictory	  difference.”	  Perhaps	  a	  more	  precise	  way	  of	  describing	  the	  role	  of	  disidentification	  that	  Murphy	  recognizes	  as	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  Combahee’s	  identity	  politics	  would	  be	  to	  say	  that	  intersectional	  identity	  politics	  is	  a	  practice	  that	  operates	  in	  a	  series	  of	  epistemologically	  reflexive	  and	  politically	  strategic	  relays	  between	  identification	  and	  disidentification.	  Such	  relays	  allow	  the	  Collective	  to	  account	  for	  the	  amalgamations	  and	  negotiations	  of	  non-­‐totalizing	  identities	  they	  call	  their	  “whole	  life	  situation”	  (Combahee	  14).	  	  Murphy’s	  book	  is	  interested	  in	  a	  broad	  field	  of	  US-­‐based	  feminist	  activism	  in	  the	  1970s	  that	  was	  engaged	  in	  debates	  about	  health,	  reproduction,	  and	  technoscience.	  Her	  analysis	  of	  Combahee	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  how	  their	  identity	  politics’	  reliance	  on	  disidentification	  helps	  to	  illuminate	  their	  particular	  contributions	  to—and	  breaks	  from—this	  feminist	  landscape	  that	  often	  attempted	  to	  unify	  feminists	  under	  the	  universalizing	  and	  deracinated	  umbrella	  of	  “woman.”	  Undoubtedly,	  the	  intersectional	  analytic	  developed	  by	  the	  group	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  identity	  politics	  it	  enabled	  are	  vital	  contributions	  to	  ongoing	  attempts	  to	  make	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visible,	  understand,	  and	  struggle	  against	  specific,	  seemingly	  competing,	  and	  often	  mutating	  forms	  of	  oppression	  that	  traverse	  lives	  and	  cannot	  be	  fully	  subsumed	  by	  static	  or	  singular	  identity	  categories.	  Moreover,	  Murphy’s	  attention	  to	  the	  centrality	  of	  science	  and	  technoscience,	  especially	  as	  they	  were	  imbricated	  in	  methods	  of	  legal	  and	  economic	  control,	  to	  Combahee’s	  concerns	  is	  especially	  insightful.	  	  By	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  desire	  to	  make	  a	  possibility	  that	  did	  not	  exist—the	  compulsion	  of	  the	  not	  yet—that	  brought	  McCullers’s	  characters	  and	  Combahee’s	  members	  together,	  had	  emerged	  in	  a	  very	  different	  way	  in	  US	  technoscience.	  It	  appeared	  not	  merely	  as	  a	  social	  possibility	  but	  as	  a	  moral	  imperative	  in	  the	  drive	  to	  knowledge	  and/as	  control	  that	  was	  to	  be	  found	  in	  increasing	  corporatization	  of	  technologically	  guided	  science	  and	  its	  mobilization	  in	  policy	  decisions.	  	  This	  seemingly	  rational	  and	  unstoppable	  force	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  as	  the	  not-­‐yet—which	  Kodwo	  Eshun	  would	  eventually	  term	  “the	  futures	  industry”—was	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  shared	  desire	  of	  community	  making	  that	  fueled	  McCullers’s	  novels	  and	  Combahee’s	  collectivization.	  That	  the	  omnipresent	  force	  of	  this	  technoscience	  imperative	  was	  exerted	  most	  strongly	  on	  women	  and/as	  people	  of	  color,	  whose	  experience	  attested	  to	  the	  personal	  and	  political	  interest	  of	  science,	  made	  its	  attack	  a	  necessary	  avenue	  of	  resistance	  for	  Combahee.13	  As	  historian	  of	  science	  Theodore	  M.	  Porter	  documents,	  the	  idea	  of	  science	  as	  “disengaged”	  and	  of	  empiricism—or	  the	  study	  of	  evidence	  gained	  through	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  “the	  futures	  industry”	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  race,	  especially	  as	  depicted	  in	  the	  genre	  of	  literature	  now	  called	  “Afrofuturism,”	  see:	  Kodwo	  Eshun,	  “Further	  Considerations	  on	  Afrofuturism,”	  CR:	  The	  New	  Centennial	  
Review	  3:2	  (Summer	  2003):	  287-­‐302.	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experimentation	  and	  observation—as	  methodical	  and	  disinterested	  is	  a	  twentieth-­‐century	  historical	  invention	  that	  insists	  on	  the	  separation	  of	  scientific	  questions	  from	  the	  conditions	  of	  politics	  or	  personal	  life	  (Porter	  292).	  Paradoxically,	  this	  pervasive	  view	  of	  science’s	  imagined	  political	  neutrality	  has,	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  policy-­‐makers,	  “become	  one	  of	  the	  key	  supports	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  science	  in	  regard	  to	  practical,	  contested	  decisions	  about	  public	  investment,	  medicine,	  public	  health,	  and	  environmental	  questions”	  (305).	  Often,	  in	  both	  popular	  and	  professional	  understandings	  of	  science,	  its	  construction	  and	  historicity	  are	  put	  under	  erasure;	  the	  authority	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  empiricism	  is	  tied	  to	  its	  perceived	  universality	  and	  transparent	  facticity,	  to	  its	  supposed	  revelation	  of	  nature	  given	  readily	  as	  “data.”	  As	  a	  result,	  civic	  political	  processes	  demand	  “the	  authority	  of	  objectivity,”	  and	  empirical	  data	  and	  scientific	  answers	  become	  inseparable	  from	  policy	  decisions.	  So	  it	  continues	  that	  “the	  currents	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  overflow	  everywhere	  the	  boundary	  between	  ought	  and	  is”	  (308).14	  And	  “objectivity,”	  now	  synonymous	  with	  value-­‐neutrality,	  ironically	  gives	  science	  its	  insistent	  moral	  force.	  Of	  course,	  many	  practicing	  scientists	  recognize	  their	  positionality	  and	  interests,	  but	  they	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  In	  the	  contemporary	  US	  political	  landscape,	  especially	  from	  liberal	  factions,	  often	  the	  objection	  is	  lodged	  that	  science	  does	  not	  have	  a	  strong	  enough	  hold,	  and	  policy	  decisions	  around	  crucial	  issues—such	  as,	  for	  example,	  climate	  change—ignore	  rather	  than	  adhere	  to	  the	  recommendations	  of	  scientists.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  what	  is	  often	  meant	  by	  such	  statements	  is	  that	  policy	  decisions	  are	  being	  based	  on	  conservative	  or	  bad	  science	  over	  and	  against	  different	  data	  sets	  and,	  presumably,	  more	  rigorous	  empirical	  and	  interpretive	  practices.	  But	  regardless,	  
science—whether	  reputable	  or	  not—is	  still	  the	  primary	  evidentiary	  factor	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  Debates	  rage	  over	  what	  counts	  as	  science,	  but	  not	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  “science”	  is	  the	  best	  means	  for	  making	  decisions.	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still	  compelled	  by	  empiricism	  as	  a	  perhaps	  imperfect	  but	  more	  objective	  approach	  to	  knowledge.	  Objectivity	  is	  still	  imagined	  as	  an	  ideal.	  The	  projects	  and	  policies	  referenced	  in	  Combahee’s	  Statement	  indicate	  that	  they	  are	  burdened	  not	  only	  by	  the	  proliferation	  of	  technoscientific	  imperatives,	  but	  also	  by	  a	  longer	  history	  of	  scientific	  taxonomization	  and	  hierarchization	  that	  produced	  identities	  and	  pathologized	  them.	  For	  Combahee,	  “science”	  in	  both	  its	  popular	  and	  policy	  deployments	  operated	  not	  to	  produce	  value-­‐neutral	  information	  but	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  moralism	  that	  could	  wield	  variable	  strategies	  grounded	  in	  different	  sciences	  to	  alienate	  communities	  from	  one	  another	  and	  produce	  social	  control.	  This	  built	  on	  a	  history	  of	  scientific	  politics	  that	  first	  emerged	  in	  the	  taxonomies	  of	  royal	  science	  and	  was	  perpetuated	  in	  the	  microfascisms	  of	  scientific	  technocracy.	  Scientific	  moralism,	  often	  coded	  as	  “health,”	  and	  its	  political	  deployment	  have	  a	  long	  history,	  which	  originates	  in	  what	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari	  call	  “royal	  science”	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Plateaus	  360-­‐366)—that	  science	  which	  produces	  taxonomies	  of	  genus	  and	  species,	  well	  and	  ill,	  around	  norms—which	  Georges	  Canguilhem	  describes	  as	  a	  foundational	  organizing	  principle	  of	  modern	  Western	  culture:	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  normal	  from	  the	  pathological.15	  	  The	  explosion	  of	  technoscience	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  allowed	  the	  continued	  moralism	  of	  science,	  which	  had	  long	  operated	  through	  the	  denigration	  of	  the	  pathological	  and	  valorization	  of	  the	  normal,	  to	  take	  on	  more	  intimate	  and	  pervasive	  roles	  in	  the	  politics	  and	  procedures	  of	  every	  day	  life.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See:	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus	  362;	  and	  Georges	  Canguilhem,	  The	  
Normal	  and	  the	  Pathological.	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truism	  (detached	  from	  any	  specific	  object)	  that	  more	  knowledge	  is	  better,	  and	  knowledge	  unmediated	  by	  opinion—which	  is	  to	  say,	  empirical,	  objective	  knowledge;	  “having	  the	  facts”—is	  the	  best	  means	  of	  making	  decisions	  helped	  validate	  personal	  data	  collection,	  increased	  surveillance,	  and	  the	  naturalization	  of	  data-­‐driven	  prescriptions	  for	  personal,	  social,	  and	  civic	  health	  at	  even	  the	  most	  microscopic	  levels.	  However,	  as	  the	  prescriptive	  translations	  of	  “objective”	  science	  were	  increasingly	  coded	  as	  inevitable	  and	  fully	  determined,	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  of	  this	  highly	  masculinized,	  militarized,	  and	  universalizing	  science	  continued	  to	  multiply	  and	  intensify,	  appearing	  as	  new	  strategies	  for	  population	  control.	  “Science”—supposedly	  unified	  by	  a	  rational,	  methodical	  process	  known	  as	  “the	  scientific	  method”—wielded	  a	  colonizing	  force	  that	  could	  not	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  primarily	  white	  male	  institution	  and	  the	  state	  and	  capitalists	  interests	  funding	  it,	  which	  were	  developing	  practices	  and	  technologies	  aimed	  at	  invading	  and	  proscribing	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  urban	  and	  rural	  poor,	  women,	  youth,	  gays	  and	  lesbians,	  and	  communities	  of	  color.	  	  Although	  science	  does	  not	  appear	  as	  an	  explicit	  theme	  of	  McCullers’s	  fiction	  until	  her	  fourth	  and	  final	  novel,	  Clock	  without	  Hands	  (1953),	  her	  writing,	  beginning	  with	  Heart	  (1940)	  traverses	  the	  same	  period	  covered	  by	  the	  other	  authors	  of	  my	  dissertation—William	  Burroughs	  and	  Ralph	  Ellison—and	  also	  encounters	  the	  changing	  face	  of	  science	  and	  its	  increasing	  use	  in	  intensifying	  psychological	  pathologization	  and	  criminalization	  along	  raced,	  classed	  and	  gendered	  lines	  through	  the	  middle	  decades	  of	  the	  century.	  As	  I	  have	  already	  detailed	  in	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters,	  in	  this	  period,	  beginning	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  continuing	  through	  the	  1970s,	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the	  ongoing	  scientification	  of	  psychology	  and	  criminology	  produced	  an	  insistent	  legal	  force	  that	  pathologized	  difference	  in	  highly	  codified	  ways	  and	  punished	  its	  political	  manifestations.	  Although	  I	  primarily	  focused	  in	  those	  earlier	  chapters	  on	  how	  these	  changes	  played	  out	  in	  the	  psycho-­‐carceral	  system,	  McCullers	  and	  Combahee	  help	  us	  to	  see	  how	  these	  changes	  also	  had	  effects	  on	  those	  for	  whom	  it	  was	  not	  useful	  for	  the	  law	  to	  pathologize	  as	  criminals,	  and	  who	  were	  differently	  policed	  and	  regulated	  through	  the	  related	  scientification	  of	  the	  entire	  legal-­‐juridical	  apparatus	  and	  the	  invasive	  capacities	  of	  militarized	  and	  corporate	  technoscience.	  Reading	  McCullers	  and	  Combahee—and	  eventually	  Mead—in	  combination	  with	  those	  writers	  and	  scientists	  I	  considered	  in	  my	  earlier	  chapters,	  helps	  to	  map	  the	  various	  strategies	  by	  which	  “rationality”—expressed	  most	  fully	  in	  a	  unified	  “science”—was	  mobilized	  to	  totalize	  the	  field	  of	  the	  social	  (qua	  political),	  and	  produced	  as	  an	  inescapable	  and	  fated	  force,	  which	  made	  it	  incredibly	  difficult	  for	  those	  who	  were	  pathologized	  through	  longstanding	  scientific	  and	  legal	  legacies	  as	  
irrational	  to	  intervene	  politically	  unless	  they	  capitulated	  to	  the	  (false)	  pure	  rationality	  of	  science	  and	  empirical	  imperatives.16	  And	  then,	  usually	  at	  best	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Throughout	  this	  chapter,	  I	  make	  difference	  between	  being	  “determined”—which	  names	  the	  conditions	  of	  being	  actual,	  having	  a	  material	  existence	  that	  constrains	  invention—and	  being	  “fully	  determined”	  or	  fated,	  which	  would	  name	  a	  condition	  of	  having	  the	  material	  determinations	  of	  real	  existence	  prescribe	  fully	  a	  future	  (telos).	  This	  distinction	  is,	  I	  think,	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  experimentalism,	  both	  in	  and	  outside	  of	  science;	  such	  a	  distinction—between	  determinism	  and	  fatalism—in	  relation	  to	  science	  and	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  literary	  understanding	  is	  made	  by	  Emile	  Zola	  in	  his	  first	  explication	  of	  experimental	  literature	  in	  “The	  Experimental	  Novel.”	  See:	  Emile	  Zola,	  The	  Experimental	  Novel	  and	  Other	  Essays	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Haskell	  House,	  1964):	  22-­‐23,	  29.	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were	  embattled	  in	  lengthy	  reform	  measures	  that	  only	  offered	  patches	  for	  a	  leaking	  system.	  	  
Science	  and/as	  Law	  	   By	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  1970s,	  when	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  became	  operational,	  the	  prison	  system	  was	  several	  decades	  established	  as	  a	  bad-­‐faith	  mental	  health	  and	  “correctional”	  facility,	  as	  was	  its	  use	  of	  mental	  health	  diagnoses—both	  formal	  and	  informal—to	  pathologize	  anti-­‐	  or	  non-­‐normative	  life	  and	  evacuate	  the	  associated	  practices	  of	  these	  lives	  of	  any	  political	  effectivity.17	  Simultaneously,	  the	  discursive	  and	  practical	  changes	  in	  prison	  practice	  were	  enabled	  and	  reinforced	  by	  the	  increasing	  dependence	  of	  the	  judicial	  system	  on	  scientific	  and	  social	  scientific	  evidence	  and	  spatio-­‐temporal	  organization—a	  change	  that	  found	  “technoscience”	  to	  be	  increasingly	  the	  primary	  and	  most	  authoritative	  form	  of	  evidence	  acceptable	  in	  juridical	  proceedings.18	  By	  the	  time	  of	  Combahee’s	  writing,	  the	  scientification	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  had	  taken	  on	  a	  spectacular	  force,	  with	  almost	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  judicial	  and	  prison	  system	  imbued	  with	  and	  structured	  by	  highly	  technical,	  supposedly	  objective,	  and	  thoroughly	  obscuring	  and	  abstracting	  scientific	  demands.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  See	  both	  of	  my	  previous	  chapters	  for	  details	  regarding	  this	  transition	  in	  the	  prison	  system	  and	  psychiatric	  practice.	  18	  See:	  Steven	  Shapin	  and	  Simon	  Schaffer,	  Leviathan	  and	  the	  Air	  Pump:	  Hobbes,	  Boyle,	  
and	  the	  Experimental	  Life	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  Univ.	  Press,	  2011);	  also,	  Thomas	  Keenan	  and	  Eyan	  Weizman,	  “Mengele’s	  Skull,”	  Cabinet	  43	  (Fall	  2011);	  and	  Simon	  A.	  Cole,	  “Forensic	  Culture	  as	  Epistemic	  Culture:	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Forensic	  Science,”	  Studies	  in	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Biological	  and	  Biomedical	  Sciences,	  44:1	  (2013):	  36-­‐46.	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The	  answer	  to	  these	  demands	  for	  empirical,	  data-­‐driven	  accounts	  of	  social	  life,	  which	  appeared	  in	  forms	  such	  as	  the	  Moynihan	  report,	  were	  often	  commissioned	  by	  the	  government	  or	  corporations	  and	  were	  so	  influential	  in	  producing	  legal	  and	  state	  policy	  as	  to	  be	  virtually	  inseparable	  from	  policy	  itself.	  Living	  at	  a	  great	  distance	  from	  the	  white,	  male,	  heterosexual	  norm	  of	  citizen-­‐subjectivity,	  the	  members	  of	  Combahee	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  intensified	  and	  naturalized	  imbrication	  of	  scientific,	  medical,	  and	  judicial	  authority	  that	  mobilized	  psychological	  diagnostics	  and	  technoscience	  forensics	  in	  order	  to	  imprison	  men	  and	  women	  of	  color	  and	  handicap	  their	  communities.	  They	  were	  also	  aware	  of	  the	  continued	  rhetorical	  prevalence	  of	  biological	  determinism	  and	  differential	  access	  to	  and	  enforcement	  of	  medical	  and	  health	  care	  practices	  that	  took	  its	  toll	  most	  strongly	  on	  black	  female	  bodies	  and	  black	  families.	  Because	  science	  had	  taken	  on	  such	  a	  powerful	  role	  in	  everyday	  life,	  Combahee’s	  political	  project	  necessarily	  operates	  with	  and	  through	  scientific	  practices	  rather	  than	  rejecting	  them.	  While	  Combahee’s	  Statement	  undoubtedly	  takes	  a	  critical	  tack	  with	  regards	  to	  some	  of	  the	  instantiations	  of	  science	  and	  technoscience	  in	  their	  lives	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  with	  whom	  they	  professed	  solidarity,	  it	  also	  expresses	  a	  more	  positive	  hope	  for	  the	  possibilities	  of	  empirical	  inquiry,	  thus	  making	  their	  relationship	  to	  “science”	  in	  any	  general	  sense	  far	  less	  clear.	  In	  fact,	  given	  that	  they	  reference	  a	  number	  of	  major	  technoscience	  and	  juridico-­‐scientific	  problems,	  but	  primarily	  in	  indirect	  and	  allusive	  ways—as	  lists	  of	  court	  cases	  or	  pieces	  of	  broader	  struggles	  in	  which	  they	  are	  involved—“science”	  appears	  already	  in	  their	  work	  as	  less	  of	  a	  unified	  field	  and	  more	  of	  a	  set	  of	  strategies	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mobilized	  in	  multiple	  and	  competing	  ways	  for	  or	  against	  particular	  political	  interests.	  	  Science	  and	  its	  uses	  are	  already	  divorced	  from	  the	  popular	  vision	  of	  a	  unified	  science	  or	  the	  pervasive	  conceptions	  of	  it	  as	  apolitical;	  sciences	  are,	  instead,	  first	  and	  foremost	  political	  problems	  and	  potential	  strategic	  nodes.	  Combahee’s	  complex	  investment	  in	  the	  utility	  of	  science	  is	  evinced	  by	  the	  list	  of	  political	  projects	  with	  which	  they	  find	  themselves	  involved—from	  the	  trials	  of	  Joan	  Little	  and	  Inez	  Garcia	  to	  “sterilization	  abuse	  [and]	  abortion	  rights”	  campaigns	  to	  concerns	  about	  the	  legacies	  of	  “biological	  determinism”	  (20-­‐21,	  17).	  For	  example,	  they	  protested	  in	  support	  of	  Joan	  Little	  who	  had	  killed	  her	  rapist	  and	  was	  compelled	  by	  her	  first	  lawyer—to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  many	  feminists—to	  use	  an	  “insanity”	  defense.	  The	  defense	  failed,	  and	  in	  a	  subsequent	  trial,	  Little	  was	  found	  innocent	  on	  grounds	  of	  “self-­‐defense.”	  Although	  the	  pathologization	  of	  a	  feminized	  victimhood	  (as	  “insanity”)	  was	  unsuccessful,	  it	  reflected	  an	  ongoing	  trend	  within	  the	  judicial	  system	  to	  evacuate	  the	  political	  force	  from	  responses	  to	  gendered	  or	  racial	  violence	  through	  the	  name	  of	  “mental	  illness.”	  Combahee	  was	  also	  involved	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Inez	  Garcia,	  but	  in	  this	  instance,	  they	  were	  on	  the	  side	  that	  advocated	  for	  scientific	  jury	  selection.	  Although	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Garcia—who	  had	  also	  killed	  her	  rapist—the	  name	  of	  science	  was	  used	  to	  choose	  a	  more	  favorable	  jury	  that	  might	  exonerate	  her,	  its	  use	  also	  marks	  an	  important	  moment	  in	  which	  scientificity	  appeared	  as	  the	  hallmark	  of	  fairness	  and	  justice.	  	   Presciently,	  these	  concerns	  were	  also	  central	  to	  Carson	  McCullers’s	  writing	  two	  decades	  before	  Combahee’s	  formation.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  writing	  of	  her	  fourth	  and	  final	  novel,	  the	  previously	  proximate	  themes	  of	  indeterminate	  (undetermined)	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time,	  the	  authority	  of	  science,	  the	  value	  and	  limits	  of	  medicine,	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  race-­‐based	  criminalization,	  the	  ongoing	  reality	  of	  gender	  and	  sexual	  pathologization,	  and	  the	  relays	  between	  intersecting	  and	  competing	  identities—all	  of	  which	  had	  paratactically	  pervaded	  her	  earlier	  novels—are	  brought	  into	  sharp,	  clear	  relation.	  As	  with	  her	  first	  novel,	  The	  Heart	  Is	  a	  Lonely	  Hunter,	  McCullers’s	  last	  novel,	  Clock	  
without	  Hands	  (1953)	  is	  also	  told	  from	  the	  close	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  of	  several	  central	  characters.	  (Member,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  primarily	  told	  through	  the	  close	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  of	  a	  single	  character.)	  Clock	  is	  continuous	  with	  both	  Heart	  and	  
Member	  in	  that	  it	  concerns	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  who	  dwell	  in	  a	  small	  working-­‐class	  Southern	  town	  and	  the	  movements	  of	  its	  adolescent	  and	  black	  characters.	  But,	  in	  a	  stark	  departure	  from	  the	  earlier	  two	  novels,	  the	  queer	  adolescent	  presence	  threatened	  by,	  resisting,	  and	  teetering	  tenuously,	  tremulously	  on	  the	  precipice	  of	  majority	  is	  male	  rather	  than	  female.	  	  By	  1953,	  the	  women	  in	  McCullers’s	  novel	  seem	  to	  have	  little	  of	  the	  (albeit	  ambivalent	  and	  constantly	  thwarted)	  political	  potentials	  and	  desires	  they	  had	  evinced	  in	  her	  earlier	  novels;	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  either	  dead	  or	  disappeared	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  patriarchal	  and	  legal	  control,	  the	  women	  of	  Clock	  seem	  to	  have	  suffered	  the	  fates	  that	  Mick	  in	  Heart	  and	  Frankie	  in	  Member	  feared	  would	  be	  theirs	  if	  forced	  to	  adopt	  the	  trappings	  of	  midcentury	  femininity:	  the	  boredom	  of	  repetitive	  domestic	  or	  shop	  labor	  and	  a	  scripted	  (prescribed,	  circumscribed)	  relationship	  to	  world	  engagement,	  which,	  when	  depicted	  as	  success	  or	  privilege,	  left	  them	  little	  capacity	  to	  articulate	  their	  experience	  in	  political	  terms.	  Unlike	  Mick	  and	  Frankie,	  seventeen-­‐year-­‐old	  Jester	  Clane,	  grandson	  of	  the	  town	  judge,	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  being	  of	  legal	  age	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is	  poised	  to	  fulfill	  the	  true	  promises—or	  threats—of	  majority:	  a	  place	  as	  a	  full	  subject-­‐citizen,	  and—as	  is	  clear	  to	  Jester—an	  almost	  unavoidable	  role,	  whether	  witting	  or	  unwitting	  as	  an	  oppressor.	  	  	   In	  Clock,	  the	  town	  of	  Milan,	  Georgia	  experiences	  increasing	  racial	  turmoil	  as	  
Brown	  v.	  the	  Board	  of	  Education	  heads	  towards	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  On	  the	  dawn	  of	  school	  integration,	  Jester	  himself	  experiences	  newly	  burgeoning	  sexual	  desire	  and	  psychological	  turmoil.	  He	  has	  fallen	  in	  love	  with	  Sherman	  Pew,	  a	  young,	  male,	  mixed-­‐race	  employee	  of	  his	  grandfather’s	  with	  a	  “golden	  […]	  once-­‐in-­‐a-­‐century	  [singing]	  voice”	  (McCullers	  Clock	  80).	  As	  a	  result,	  although	  Brown	  was	  central	  to	  legal	  struggles	  for	  rejecting	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  racial	  science	  that	  justified	  segregation—a	  feat	  largely	  accomplished	  through	  the	  counter-­‐findings	  of	  more	  than	  thirty	  social	  scientists	  enlisted	  by	  Thurgood	  Marshall	  to	  detail	  the	  pernicious	  effects	  of	  segregation	  on	  both	  black	  and	  white	  children—the	  case	  is	  not	  central	  to	  concerns	  about	  science	  in	  Clock.	  Instead,	  the	  questions	  raised	  about	  the	  power	  of	  science,	  its	  production	  of	  pathology,	  and	  the	  enlistment	  of	  such	  pathologization	  in	  practices	  of	  criminalization,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  potentials	  for	  shared	  identification	  or	  disidentification	  within	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  novel	  relate	  primarily	  to	  the	  recently	  published	  Kinsey	  Report:	  Sexual	  Behavior	  in	  the	  Human	  Male	  (1948).	  Almost	  twenty	  years	  after	  Kinsey’s	  publication,	  the	  Moynihan	  Report	  would	  eclipse	  Kinsey	  as	  perhaps	  the	  most	  influential	  social	  science	  findings	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  US	  culture,	  and	  it	  would	  do	  so	  in	  large	  part	  because	  its	  pathologization	  of	  black	  maternity	  and	  black	  male	  homosexuality	  was	  linked	  so	  explicitly	  to	  national	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policy	  decisions.19	  But	  the	  potential	  force	  of	  science	  and	  its	  intimate	  ties	  to	  juridical	  procedures	  was	  already	  apparent	  to	  McCullers,	  which	  she	  highlights	  through	  a	  conversation	  Jester	  has	  with	  his	  judge	  grandfather	  about	  the	  Kinsey	  Report.	  Jester,	  politically	  and	  socially	  impassioned	  by	  Sherman’s	  golden	  voice	  and	  tales	  of	  the	  Golden	  Nigerians—a(n	  invented)	  radical	  black	  activist	  group—has	  the	  previous	  night,	  gone	  to	  a	  prostitute	  and	  lost	  his	  virginity.	  .	  .	  while	  picturing	  the	  face	  of	  Sherman	  Pew.	  Returning	  home,	  angry	  at	  his	  grandfather’s	  questioning	  as	  well	  as	  the	  judge’s	  virulent,	  righteous	  segregationism	  and	  self-­‐congratulatory	  access	  to	  knowledge-­‐power,	  Jester	  bates	  him:	  “’[H]ave	  you	  ever	  read	  the	  Kinsey	  Report?’”	  he	  asks	  (McCullers	  Clock	  92).	  His	  grandfather	  replies,	  “’It’s	  just	  tomfoolery	  and	  filth.’”	  Jester	  rebuts,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  bolster	  his	  newfound	  claim	  to	  “manhood”	  and	  therefore	  his	  right	  to	  autonomy	  and	  his	  own	  knowledge	  about	  both	  race	  and	  sex,	  which	  he	  believes	  himself	  to	  have	  gained	  through	  his	  sexual	  encounter:	  “’It’s	  a	  scientific	  survey.’”	  For	  Jester,	  the	  Report,	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  scientificity	  cannot	  be	  “filth”;	  it	  is	  value-­‐neutral—a	  scientific	  survey—and	  his	  appeal	  to	  its	  “scientific”	  validity	  is	  an	  appeal	  to	  valid	  knowledge	  that	  he	  has	  in	  excess	  of	  his	  grandfather’s.	  The	  judge	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  who	  has	  (like	  Jester)	  been	  titillated	  by	  the	  report,	  which	  he	  read	  “with	  salacious	  pleasure,”	  rejects	  not	  the	  value	  of	  science	  for	  revealing	  human	  nature,	  but	  the	  scientificity	  of	  the	  study	  itself,	  and	  his	  grandson’s	  claims.	  “Science,	  my	  foot,”	  he	  says.	  That	  the	  report	  produces	  a	  set	  of	  feelings,	  an	  experience	  of	  one’s	  own	  sexuality,	  indicates	  for	  the	  judge	  both	  implicit	  (im)moral	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See:	  Mumford,	  “Untangling	  Pathology.”	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values	  within	  the	  report	  itself	  and	  his	  need	  to	  make	  value	  judgments	  about	  it.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  has	  it	  banned	  from	  the	  Milan	  library.	  In	  their	  ensuing	  debate	  over	  whether	  the	  Report	  is	  indeed	  science	  or,	  instead,	  pornography,	  Jester	  uses	  the	  report	  to	  validate	  his	  sexual	  encounter	  from	  the	  previous	  night	  as	  not	  merely	  normal	  but	  necessary.	  He	  says,	  “’It	  proves	  that	  boys	  my	  age	  have	  sexual	  affairs,	  boys	  even	  younger,	  but	  at	  my	  age	  it’s	  a	  necessity—if	  they’re	  passionate,	  I	  mean’”	  (92).	  But	  it	  is	  quickly	  revealed	  that	  Jester’s	  greatest	  fear	  is	  that	  he	  is	  not	  normal,	  not	  because	  he	  had	  sex,	  but	  because	  he	  had	  never	  before	  had	  sexual	  urges	  for	  women.	  The	  word	  “normal”	  becomes	  central	  to	  his	  internal	  vocabulary,	  and	  fear	  of	  the	  scientized,	  medicalized	  pathology	  of	  homosexuality	  takes	  on	  an	  insistent	  psychological	  force:	  “If	  it	  turned	  out	  he	  was	  homosexual	  like	  the	  men	  in	  the	  Kinsey	  Report,	  Jester	  had	  vowed	  he	  would	  kill	  himself”	  (94).	  	  Here,	  the	  Kinsey	  Report	  operates	  as	  a	  complex	  node,	  in	  which	  the	  cultural	  power	  of	  “science”—and	  the	  reports’	  value	  as	  scientific	  or	  not—prevents	  it	  from	  appearing	  as	  an	  empty	  cipher	  onto	  which	  Jester	  and	  his	  grandfather	  can	  project	  their	  erstwhile	  fears	  and	  passions,	  and	  makes	  it	  instead	  as	  a	  site	  that	  highlights	  and	  reveals	  a	  longer,	  value-­‐laden	  history	  of	  scientific	  reportage	  and	  interpretation.	  This	  history	  reveals	  scientific	  writing,	  and	  the	  Kinsey	  Report	  as	  an	  example	  of	  it,	  as	  already-­‐charged	  texts	  and	  practices	  that	  bear	  on	  sex,	  love,	  object-­‐choice,	  moral	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  legal	  determinations.	  These	  personal	  and	  political	  concerns	  inhere	  not	  only,	  but	  also,	  in	  the	  report	  and	  are	  revealed	  in	  circulating	  determinations	  of	  its	  value	  as	  “good”	  or	  “bad”	  science.	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In	  particular,	  the	  judge—fabulated	  as	  a	  functionary	  of	  the	  juridico-­‐legal	  apparatus—offers	  keen	  insight	  into	  the	  specific	  situation	  of	  mid-­‐century	  juridical	  determinations	  with	  regards	  to	  science,	  and	  in	  particular,	  the	  recursive	  legitimations	  and	  delegitimations	  each	  imposes	  on	  the	  other.	  Clock	  is	  set	  only	  a	  few	  years	  after	  J.	  Robert	  Oppenheimer’s	  infamous	  declaration	  about	  the	  compelling	  force	  of	  science	  not	  merely	  as	  natural	  law	  but	  also	  as	  source	  of	  determinism	  or	  fate—of	  both	  desire	  and	  action—that	  had	  led	  him	  to	  build	  the	  atomic	  bomb.	  Oppenheimer’s	  statement	  evinced	  a	  common	  public	  conception	  of	  a	  pure	  science.	  This	  is	  a	  science	  legitimated,	  deemed	  as	  appropriately	  “objective”	  (i.e.	  value-­‐free),	  and	  therefore	  “good,”	  which	  exists	  beyond	  and	  therefore	  modulates	  law;	  the	  law’s	  weaker	  capacity	  for	  response—to	  mediate	  science’s	  moral	  force—lies	  in	  legal	  determinations	  of	  its	  appropriate	  scientificity.	  These	  multiple	  valences	  of	  scientific	  force	  play	  out	  parodically	  in	  this	  scene.	  The	  judge	  keeps	  the	  Kinsey	  Report	  in	  his	  law	  library,	  but	  disguised	  in	  the	  dust	  jacket	  of	  The	  Decline	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Roman	  Empire,	  which,	  unlike	  the	  Kinsey	  Report,	  he	  has	  never	  read	  but	  keeps	  in	  the	  law	  library	  for	  show.	  The	  potential	  threat	  of	  the	  Kinsey	  Report	  for	  the	  larger	  community	  is	  best	  kept	  in	  check	  by	  the	  legal	  representative’s	  determination	  of	  it	  as	  “pornography,”	  hence	  illegal,	  and	  its	  banishment	  from	  the	  library;	  the	  law	  acts	  to	  dismiss	  and	  disappear	  the	  report	  as	  (scientific)	  knowledge,	  while	  simultaneously	  failing	  to	  refute	  the	  unquestioned	  validity	  and	  force	  of	  science	  as	  social	  and	  policy	  determinant.	  	  The	  particular	  threat	  this	  scene	  evinces	  is	  the	  already	  existent	  and	  increasing	  tendency	  to	  link	  normality—as	  a	  produced	  statistical	  figure—to	  the	  desirable	  natural.	  Of	  course,	  this	  feedback	  loop	  of	  the	  production	  of	  the	  normal,	  its	  epistemo-­‐
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discursive	  production	  as	  natural,	  and	  its	  validation	  as	  morally	  right	  (and	  therefore	  “normal”)	  is	  central	  to	  Canguilhem’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  development	  of	  nineteenth-­‐century	  biomedical	  science,	  but	  it	  takes	  on	  special	  valence	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  twentieth-­‐century	  science-­‐legal-­‐policy	  apparatus,	  and	  its	  increasing	  deferral	  to	  “thin	  description”	  (Porter	  308).	  While	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  Kinsey	  Report	  evinced	  a	  much	  wider	  and	  more	  regularly	  occurring	  variety	  of	  sexual	  behaviors,	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  was	  caught	  in	  much	  larger	  debates	  about	  the	  moral	  repurcussions	  of	  such	  findings.	  Interestingly,	  however,	  the	  moral	  failings	  were	  often	  attributed	  not	  to	  an	  actual	  lack	  of	  equivalence	  between	  the	  “normal,”	  “natural,”	  and	  “moral,”	  but	  more	  to	  problems	  with	  the	  method	  and	  procedure	  of	  the	  study	  itself,	  which	  drew	  from	  an	  already	  
criminal(ized)	  population—including	  study	  subjects	  who	  were	  prisoners	  and	  male	  prostitutes—that	  exhibited	  these	  non-­‐normative,	  otherwise	  pathological	  behaviors.	  Again,	  what	  is	  remarkable	  here	  is	  that	  the	  Kinsey	  Report’s	  effects	  are	  challenged	  on	  
method,	  while	  the	  more	  general	  power,	  right,	  and	  morality	  of	  scientific	  determinations—should	  they	  actually	  reflect	  the	  already-­‐constituted	  normal	  population—remains	  virtually	  unquestioned.	  Moreover,	  it	  emphasizes	  the	  right	  of	  
the	  court	  to	  dictate	  and	  determine,	  which	  is	  to	  say,	  socially	  treat	  such	  biological	  
determinations.	  	  Although	  such	  a	  problem	  can	  already	  be	  seen	  in	  McCullers’s	  novel,	  this	  would	  come	  to	  so	  thoroughly	  and	  intricately	  imbue	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  juridico-­‐legal	  system,	  that	  that	  it	  was	  largely	  naturalized	  and	  seemingly	  inextricable	  by	  the	  time	  of	  Combahee.	  However,	  Combahee	  joins	  an	  irruptive	  legacy	  of	  minor	  science	  in	  which	  McCullers,	  and	  before	  her,	  Mead,	  also	  participate.	  This	  history	  reinvents	  scientific	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practices	  of	  experimentation	  through	  formal	  and	  generic	  cuttings	  that	  intervene	  against	  the	  imposed	  time	  of	  science	  and	  its	  determining	  capacities.	  But	  to	  understand	  the	  radical	  interventions	  that	  McCullers,	  Combahee,	  and	  Mead	  make,	  it	  is	  necessary	  first	  to	  understand	  precisely	  how	  thoroughly	  a	  conception	  of	  science	  as	  unified	  and	  disinterested	  had	  permeated	  national,	  political,	  and	  scientific	  culture	  through	  overwhelming	  national,	  corporate,	  and	  institutional	  investment	  in	  such	  a	  conception	  between	  the	  time	  of	  Mead’s	  first	  research	  and	  Combahee’s	  writing.	  	  
The	  Invention	  of	  a	  Unified	  and	  Disinterested	  Science	  	  	  	  	   Little	  has	  been	  written	  about	  how	  science	  came	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  disinterested,	  or	  how	  it	  was	  unified	  and	  popularized—both	  in	  lay	  and	  pedagogical	  imaginations—by	  “the	  scientific	  method.”	  	  However,	  the	  recent	  work	  of	  a	  historian	  of	  science,	  Theodore	  Porter,	  and	  education	  historian,	  John	  L.	  Rudolph,	  taken	  together	  make	  inroads	  into	  this	  question.	  As	  Porter	  describes	  it,	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  discourses	  surrounding	  science	  were	  almost	  always	  linked	  to	  moral	  uplift	  (Porter	  294,	  296).	  The	  rationality	  of	  science	  would	  lead	  to	  progress,	  and	  lead	  the	  way	  out	  of	  the	  irrationality	  of	  religion	  or	  folk	  belief.	  Both	  U.S.	  and	  European	  governments	  engaged	  in	  large-­‐scale	  popularization	  efforts	  for	  the	  sciences.	  Far	  from	  marking	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  inherent	  capacity	  of	  science	  to	  produce	  “true”	  or	  objective	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world,	  these	  popularization	  efforts	  were	  largely	  grounded	  in	  science’s	  technical	  value	  in	  altering	  and	  extracting	  value	  from	  the	  natural	  world—
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including	  the	  production	  of	  technologies	  ranging	  from	  navigational	  tools	  to	  industrial	  machinery.	  Science’s	  link	  to	  moral	  uplift,	  backed	  by	  government	  support,	  helped	  to	  cement	  science’s	  cultural	  authority	  and	  its	  immediate	  link	  to	  practices	  of	  discipline	  and	  control.	  The	  link	  between	  science,	  moral	  uplift,	  and	  economic	  extraction	  then	  allowed	  the	  domesticating	  value	  of	  science	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  rationale	  for	  a	  number	  of	  colonial	  and	  population	  control	  projects	  both	  abroad	  and	  within	  national	  borders.	  	  In	  this	  period,	  as	  “science”	  began	  to	  be	  divorced	  from	  natural	  philosophy,	  science	  was	  thought	  of	  as	  largely	  “technical,”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  was	  techne,	  craft	  (Porter	  293).	  	  It	  required	  an	  expertise	  and	  skill	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  a	  car	  mechanic.	  Training	  for	  the	  sciences,	  in	  the	  small	  number	  of	  US	  high	  schools	  that	  prepared	  students	  for	  an	  even	  smaller	  number	  of	  universities,	  consisted	  primarily	  of	  technical	  training	  and	  perfection	  of	  measuring	  and	  observation	  techniques	  specific	  to	  the	  field	  of	  natural	  inquiry	  the	  student	  would	  enter.	  It	  was	  a	  tedious	  and	  repetitive	  practicum	  that	  prepared	  one	  to	  get	  the	  same	  repeated	  results	  by	  proper	  sensorial	  attunement	  to	  quantitative	  techniques	  of	  physics,	  chemistry,	  or	  biology.	  It	  recognized	  that	  the	  standardized	  scientific	  perception	  was	  not	  natural,	  but	  trained.	  By	  the	  1950s,	  however,	  science	  was	  widely	  understood	  to	  be	  completely	  divorced	  from	  moral	  uplift.	  Instead,	  that	  particularly	  twentieth-­‐century	  dream	  science	  I	  mentioned	  earlier	  emerged,	  a	  science	  that	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  “pure,”	  disinterested,	  and	  largely	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  lay-­‐public	  because	  of	  its	  technicality—now	  understood	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  expertise	  rather	  than	  techne.	  The	  non-­‐scientist	  could	  only	  take	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  scientist	  at	  face-­‐value;	  and	  scientists’	  authority	  was	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enhanced	  by	  their	  perceived	  “objectivity”—which,	  as	  Porter	  notes,	  was	  often	  nothing	  more	  than	  code	  for	  the	  technical,	  highly	  quantitative,	  and	  abstruse	  processes	  of	  data	  interpretation	  (practices	  that	  sociologists	  and	  historians	  of	  science	  have	  done	  much	  to	  show	  bound	  up,	  in	  their	  technicity,	  “with	  philosophy,	  labor	  practices,	  markets,	  imperialism,	  public	  investment,	  social	  administration,	  insurance,	  poverty,	  transport,	  medical	  therapeutics,	  nationalism,	  imperialism,	  criminal	  law,	  electrification,	  art,	  and	  objectivity”	  (Porter	  297)).	  Simultaneously,	  “the	  scientific	  method”	  had	  become	  the	  pervasive	  pedagogical	  technique	  for	  science	  education.	  The	  scientific	  method,	  which	  (usually)	  consisted	  of	  five	  simplified	  steps	  that	  had	  little	  or	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  actual	  practices	  of	  experimental	  science,	  was	  promoted	  as	  making	  scientific	  rationality	  available	  to	  disciplines	  far	  beyond	  the	  sciences,	  and	  imagined	  to	  bear	  on	  every	  day	  problems.	  This	  invented,	  supposedly	  unified	  method	  was	  the	  bane	  of	  post-­‐war	  scientists	  who	  soundly	  rejected	  its	  applicability	  to	  their	  experimental	  practice.	  	  Although	  the	  two	  trajectories—the	  move	  towards	  a	  fully	  objective	  science	  that	  required	  expertise,	  and	  the	  move	  towards	  a	  general	  method	  that	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  daily	  life—seem	  oppositional,	  they	  actually	  worked	  together	  to	  instantiate	  the	  desirability	  of	  a	  scientific	  approach	  in	  aspects	  of	  life	  that	  seemed	  outside	  science’s	  traditional	  purview	  and	  reinforce	  the	  overall	  authority	  of	  scientific	  expertise.	  Simultaneously,	  what	  Auguste	  Comte,	  father	  of	  positivist	  science,	  had	  earlier	  called	  “the	  moral	  sciences”—and	  which	  we	  today	  call	  the	  social	  sciences—benefited	  in	  terms	  of	  authority	  from	  the	  scientific	  method’s	  unification	  of	  technical	  fields.	  The	  social	  sciences—as	  they	  were	  professionalized	  throughout	  the	  first	  half	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of	  the	  twentieth	  century—became	  increasingly	  technical,	  quantitative,	  and	  for	  those	  reasons,	  seemingly	  objective,	  built	  on	  empirical	  observation	  and	  its	  quantitative	  extrapolations.	  Tracing	  this	  change	  can	  help	  us	  understand	  more	  about	  not	  only	  the	  particular	  ways	  into	  which	  data	  about	  people	  was	  made	  into	  “objective”	  description,	  but	  also	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  people,	  as	  they	  became	  more	  available	  to	  quantification,	  became	  differently	  available	  to	  moralism	  coded	  as	  scientific	  and	  determined	  fact.	  Interestingly,	  and	  a	  point	  to	  which	  I	  will	  return,	  certain	  practices	  of	  identity	  politics	  have	  depended	  on	  the	  very	  categories	  and	  strategies	  of	  the	  social	  sciences,	  which,	  when	  understood	  as	  fixed	  rather	  than	  strategically	  produced,	  have	  placed	  strong	  limits	  on	  their	  political	  capacities.	  In	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  empiricism—understood	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  scientific	  inquiry—no	  longer	  centered	  on	  the	  philosophical	  questions	  that	  marked	  its	  emergence.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  empiricism	  no	  longer	  had	  to	  ask	  or	  answer	  questions	  about	  how	  perceptions	  could	  become	  available	  to	  thought	  or	  about	  the	  relay	  between	  belief	  and	  knowledge.	  Historically,	  empiricism,	  according	  to	  its	  canonical	  reading,	  asserts	  that	  all	  possible	  knowledge	  comes	  from	  sense	  perception,	  but	  does	  not	  guarantee	  the	  possibility	  of	  knowledge	  at	  all.	  Experience	  produces	  impressions,	  but	  its	  translation	  into	  knowledge	  depends	  on	  a	  practice	  of	  associations	  and	  their	  correction	  through	  the	  imaginative	  faculties	  in	  order	  to	  verify	  and	  codify	  sense	  perception.	  Empiricism	  in	  the	  philosophical	  sense—especially	  as	  it	  comes	  out	  of	  David	  Hume’s	  radical	  skepticism—offers	  relations,	  habit,	  and	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induction,	  as	  the	  primary	  grounds	  for	  organizing	  and	  interacting	  with	  the	  world.20	  In	  the	  1950s,	  Deleuze	  augmented	  or	  offered	  an	  alternative	  reading	  of	  Hume,	  which	  argued	  that	  at	  its	  emergence,	  empiricism	  was	  primarily	  a	  question	  not	  of	  how	  knowledge	  might	  emerge	  (or	  if	  it	  could),	  but	  rather	  about	  how	  subjectivity	  is	  constituted;	  subjectivity,	  then,	  made	  belief	  the	  constitutive	  grounds	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  knowledge.	  But	  by	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  empiricism	  was	  largely	  understood	  in	  opposition	  to	  both	  belief	  and/as	  subjectivity—it	  was	  understood	  to	  be	  the	  source	  of	  transparent	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world,	  and	  knowledge	  held	  greater	  value	  than	  belief,	  enabling	  surety	  about	  the	  morality	  of	  scientific-­‐cum-­‐imperial	  projects.	  Knowledge	  about	  the	  natural	  world	  was	  coextensive	  with	  the	  natural	  world	  itself—or	  close	  enough	  that	  any	  subjective	  mediation	  could	  be	  corrected	  through	  data.	  The	  facticity	  of	  nature—including	  human	  experience—enabled	  a	  narrative	  of	  inevitability	  that	  would	  supplant	  choice	  as	  the	  grounds	  moral	  decision-­‐making.	  	  This	  change	  can	  be	  understood,	  at	  least	  in	  a	  simplified	  sense,	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  positivism,	  which—as	  it	  is	  usually	  understood	  today—holds	  that	  information	  derived	  from	  the	  senses	  and	  the	  mathematical	  analysis	  of	  sensorial	  experience	  offer	  the	  only	  source	  of	  authoritative	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world.21	  To	  produce	  authoritative	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  means	  to	  transform	  the	  flows	  of	  life	  and	  the	  synaesthetic	  perception	  of	  them	  into	  separable	  data	  points.	  While	  almost	  nothing	  in	  the	  world	  is	  given	  as	  (pre-­‐coded)	  data,	  empirical	  research	  today	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See:	  David	  Hume,	  An	  Enquiry	  Concerning	  Human	  Understanding	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett	  Publishing,	  1993).	  21	  See:	  Loic	  Wacquant,	  "Positivism,"	  in	  The	  Blackwell	  Dictionary	  of	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  
Social	  Thought	  (Malden,	  MA:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  1992).	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means	  primarily	  turning	  all	  the	  world	  into	  data,	  and	  imagining	  that	  such	  data	  gives	  itself	  readily	  and	  transparently	  to	  “information,”	  or	  what	  Theodore	  Porter	  calls	  “thin	  description.”	  “Scientific	  knowledge,”	  he	  writes,	  “is	  idealized	  as	  information,	  which	  renders	  craft	  invisible.	  […]	  Information	  means	  knowledge	  that	  is	  ready-­‐made	  for	  deployment	  by	  anybody,	  requiring	  no	  interpretation.”	  This	  idealization	  of	  “thin	  description”	  helps	  to	  generate	  “the	  ‘information	  society’	  [that]	  is	  practically	  synonymous	  with	  modernity”	  (Porter	  307-­‐8).	  Today,	  scientific	  findings	  are	  often	  understood—by	  the	  lay	  public,	  policy-­‐makers,	  and	  some	  scientists—not	  in	  relation	  to	  radical	  skepticism,	  or	  even	  the	  falsifiability	  model,	  but	  to	  positivism:	  as	  authoritative	  information	  readily,	  transparently,	  factually	  given	  about	  the	  world.	  This	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  as	  information	  erases	  any	  relation	  within	  empiricism	  between	  experience	  and	  experimentation,	  between	  subjectivity	  and	  an	  encounter	  with	  the	  world.	  Porter	  highlights	  that	  this	  new	  understanding	  of	  science	  as	  objective	  and	  disinterested	  was	  crystalized	  when	  it	  became	  possible	  for	  J.	  Robert	  Oppenheimer	  in	  1954	  to	  dismiss	  any	  moral	  objections	  he	  had	  about	  the	  potential	  use	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  claiming	  instead	  that	  “the	  design	  […]	  was	  so	  ‘technically	  sweet’	  that,	  for	  a	  physicist,	  it	  had	  become	  compelling”	  (Porter	  292).	  The	  technical	  aspects	  of	  the	  physics	  problem—and	  the	  delimited	  aesthetic	  “sweetness”	  of	  solving	  it—were	  matters	  of	  concern	  for	  Oppenheimer;	  politics—or	  the	  use	  of	  the	  science	  he	  was	  involved	  in	  developing—was	  beyond	  his	  purview.	  Porter	  suggests	  that	  “this	  confinement	  of	  the	  scientists	  qua	  scientist	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  technicality	  is	  one	  of	  the	  signal	  features	  in	  the	  modern	  cultural	  history	  of	  science”	  (293).	  Science	  became	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understood	  as	  “technical,”	  and	  “technical”	  became	  code	  for	  objectivity;	  but	  such	  was	  largely	  a	  result	  of	  the	  obscurantism	  of	  the	  knowledge	  produced	  and	  the	  deeply	  embedded	  bias—residing	  in	  the	  categories	  themselves	  or	  underlying	  assumptions	  of	  empiricist	  practice—rather	  than	  any	  actual	  objectivity	  or	  disinterest.	  	  Simultaneously,	  and	  seemingly	  paradoxically,	  “the	  scientific	  method,”	  as	  it	  had	  been	  popularized	  and	  implemented	  pedagogically,	  made	  it	  seem	  as	  though	  
everything	  were	  the	  purview	  of	  science;	  or,	  rather,	  any	  problem—from	  the	  simplest	  decisions	  about	  what	  to	  buy	  at	  the	  grocery	  store	  to	  more	  complex	  ones	  such	  as	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  racial	  strife	  and	  economic	  inequity—could	  be	  solved	  through	  the	  steps	  attributed	  to	  scientific	  experimentation.	  The	  popular	  idea	  of	  a	  method	  of	  empirical	  practice	  and	  the	  authoritative	  appeal	  of	  “technicality”	  as	  a	  scientific	  ideal	  became,	  as	  Porter	  notes,	  “a	  beacon	  for	  social	  science,	  whose	  leaders	  eagerly	  took	  up	  the	  quantitative	  technologies	  worked	  out	  by	  statisticians	  […]	  to	  situate	  themselves	  as	  unbiased	  experts,	  detached	  rhetorically	  from	  the	  fray	  of	  ideology	  and	  politics”	  (306).	  	  Enter	  a	  powerful	  series	  of	  supposedly	  objective	  and	  explanatory	  studies	  immediately	  mobilized	  for	  political	  ends,	  including	  the	  Kinsey	  Report	  and	  the	  Moynihan	  Report.22	  In	  fact,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  Combahee’s	  writing,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  “science”	  as	  a	  means	  to	  (and	  exemplar	  of	  the	  value	  of)	  rationality,	  logic,	  knowledge	  and	  decision-­‐making	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  education—including,	  often,	  the	  humanities,	  which	  also	  became	  the	  site	  of	  problem	  solving	  through	  structural	  determinations,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  “hard”	  and	  social	  sciences—had	  already	  been	  naturalized	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  As	  Kevin	  Mumford	  notes,	  Moynihan’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  report	  was	  more	  complex	  and	  well	  aware	  of	  its	  political	  stakes,	  but	  the	  report’s	  enduring	  power	  was	  in	  its	  supposed	  scientificity.	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pedagogical	  practice	  for	  several	  decades.	  This	  was	  an	  effect	  of	  an	  early-­‐century	  mass	  education	  reform	  movement	  centered	  on	  what	  John	  Dewey	  articulated	  at	  “the	  scientific	  method”	  and	  on	  University	  educators’	  emphasis	  on	  “science”	  as	  the	  “heart”	  of	  elite	  education,	  which	  trickled	  down	  to	  secondary	  schools.	  In	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  as	  the	  number	  of	  students	  enrolled	  in	  high	  schools	  rose	  dramatically,	  the	  former	  practices	  of	  preparation	  for	  university	  science	  education—which	  had	  been	  largely	  technical	  (techne),	  involving	  repeated	  laboratory	  procedures	  for	  practicing	  measurements	  for	  specific	  scientific	  disciplines—were	  no	  longer	  economically	  feasible	  given	  the	  larger	  class	  sizes	  (Rudolph	  354).	  Because	  science	  was	  increasingly	  emphasized	  as	  the	  central	  feature	  of	  education	  for	  its	  more	  “rational”	  approach	  to	  knowledge	  and	  its	  practical	  (which	  is	  to	  say	  economic)	  utility,	  another	  less	  technical,	  inexpensive,	  and	  group-­‐friendly	  form	  of	  preparation	  was	  necessary.	  “New	  Psychology,”	  which	  was	  focused	  on	  education	  and	  childhood	  development,	  offered	  solutions	  (358).	  The	  New	  Psychology	  operated	  in	  a	  recursive	  fashion,	  extrapolating	  on	  ideas	  from	  evolutionary	  theory	  and	  the	  biological	  sciences,	  developing	  its	  own	  “scientific”	  practices	  along	  with	  other	  emergent	  social	  sciences,	  and	  offering	  expertise	  to	  design	  pedagogy	  for	  the	  humanities	  and	  sciences;	  unsurprisingly,	  then,	  its	  educational	  techniques	  emphasized	  a	  “scientific”	  approach	  to	  learning.	  John	  Dewey,	  one	  of	  the	  New	  Psychologists,	  was	  quick	  to	  transform	  the	  “laboratory	  method”	  of	  tedious	  practicum	  into	  an	  intellectual	  exercise	  in	  process.	  In	  his	  1910	  book,	  How	  We	  Think,	  Dewey	  “laid	  out	  the	  familiar	  steps	  of	  what	  became	  the	  popular	  view	  of	  the	  scientific	  method	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  redefinition	  of	  science	  as	  an	  everyday	  problem	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solving	  activity”	  (344).	  This	  meant	  that	  students	  need	  not	  depend	  on	  access	  to	  equipment,	  and	  also	  that	  the	  “steps”	  Dewey	  associated	  with	  science	  would	  make	  their	  way	  into	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  curriculum	  in	  order	  to	  make	  scientized	  knowledge	  available	  about	  and	  for	  all	  aspects	  of	  human	  experience.	  The	  idea	  that	  scientific	  practice	  consisted	  of	  five	  steps:	  “(i)	  a	  felt	  difficulty;	  (ii)	  its	  location	  and	  definition;	  (iii)	  suggestion	  of	  possible	  solutions,	  (iv)	  development	  by	  reasoning	  of	  the	  bearings	  of	  the	  suggestion;	  [and]	  (v)	  further	  observation	  and	  experimentation	  leading	  to	  its	  acceptance	  or	  rejection”	  quickly	  became	  the	  popular	  conception	  of	  science	  and	  the	  anathema	  of	  practicing	  scientists	  (366).23	  By	  1945,	  the	  perception	  of	  science	  as	  consisting	  of	  this	  method	  was	  so	  widespread	  that	  Harvard	  issued	  a	  report	  on	  General	  education,	  in	  which	  it	  was	  stated	  (in	  order	  to	  correct	  popular	  opinion),	  “Nothing	  could	  be	  more	  stultifying	  and,	  perhaps	  more	  important,	  nothing	  is	  further	  from	  the	  procedure	  of	  the	  scientist	  […]	  than	  a	  rigorous	  tabular	  progression	  through	  the	  supposed	  ‘steps’	  of	  the	  scientific	  method”	  (342).	  Several	  years	  later,	  Vannevar	  Bush,	  US	  research	  director	  throughout	  WWII,	  stated	  in	  no	  uncertain	  terms	  that	  it	  is	  “crystal	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  the	  scientific	  method”	  (342).	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  prominence	  of	  these	  competing	  conceptions	  of	  science—one	  that	  it	  was	  technical	  and	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  everyday	  political	  or	  personal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Today,	  those	  five	  steps	  are	  usually	  translated	  into	  science	  textbooks	  as:	  1.	  Ask	  a	  question,	  2.	  Do	  background	  research,	  3.	  Construct	  a	  hypothesis,	  4.	  Test	  your	  hypothesis	  by	  doing	  an	  experiment,	  5.	  Analyze	  your	  data	  and	  draw	  a	  conclusion.	  To	  that,	  a	  sixth	  (and	  professionalizing)	  step	  is	  usually	  added:	  6.	  Communicate/publish	  your	  results.	  Often,	  the	  publishing	  practices	  of	  the	  sciences	  and	  social	  sciences	  require	  sections	  organized	  in	  ways	  that	  resemble	  this	  supposedly	  unified	  method:	  1.	  Introduction,	  2.	  Literature	  Review,	  3.	  Method,	  4.	  Results,	  and	  5.	  Discussion.	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concerns,	  and	  the	  other	  that	  it	  was	  the	  best	  method	  for	  making	  decisions	  in	  daily	  life	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  rationality—seemed	  to	  coexist	  in	  the	  popular	  imagination	  in	  an	  easy	  fashion	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  creating	  the	  unified	  perception	  that	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  even	  name	  “science”	  a	  single	  field.	  In	  fact,	  the	  supposed	  objectivity	  of	  data	  and	  of	  empirical	  testing	  has	  become	  precisely	  the	  source	  of	  scientific	  research’s	  hidden	  or	  coded	  moral	  imperative—whether	  in	  large-­‐scale	  national	  politics	  or	  daily	  life.	  As	  Porter	  notes:	  Ironically,	  the	  [scientist’s]	  pose	  of	  disengagement	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  key	  supports	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  science	  in	  regard	  to	  practical,	  contested	  decisions	  about	  public	  investment,	  medicine,	  public	  health,	  and	  environmental	  questions.	  And	  this	  objectivity	  works	  most	  effectively	  not	  at	  times	  of	  open	  political	  contestation,	  but	  when	  the	  experts	  act	  as	  cogs	  in	  the	  machinery	  of	  bureaucratic	  action,	  advising	  administrators	  rather	  than	  appealing	  to	  an	  engaged	  public.	  (305)	  	  Undoubtedly,	  one	  of	  the	  more	  problematic	  results	  of	  this	  dual	  perception	  of	  science	  was	  the	  increased	  authority	  of	  supposedly	  scientific	  knowledge	  about	  the	  taxonomies	  of	  race	  and	  sexuality.	  The	  supposed	  transparency	  of	  the	  data	  contained	  in,	  say,	  the	  Moynihan	  Report	  or	  the	  Kinsey	  Report—if	  accepted	  as	  scientifically	  viable—could	  lead	  to	  medical	  and	  political	  policy.	  But	  these	  policies	  tended	  to	  reinforce	  structural	  inequalities	  or	  cultural	  biases	  as	  though	  their	  explanations	  for	  and	  interpretations	  of	  data	  were	  biologically	  given.	  The	  interpretive	  structures—and	  the	  aesthetic	  delimitations	  that	  had	  gone	  into	  the	  development	  of	  scientific	  analytics—were	  made	  invisible,	  seemingly	  immutable,	  and	  the	  transparent	  information	  produced	  from	  such	  studies	  were	  readily	  applied	  to	  the	  populations	  they	  purported	  to	  describe,	  reinforcing	  the	  oppressive	  status	  quo.	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   “Science”—at	  least	  of	  this	  particular	  empirical	  and	  positivist	  bent—became	  the	  central	  method	  for	  political	  decision	  making	  not	  despite	  its	  imagined	  distance	  from	  interest	  and	  politics,	  but	  precisely	  because	  of	  it.	  Today:	  Many	  difficult	  scientific	  questions,	  such	  as	  the	  proper	  definition	  of	  a	  species	  or	  the	  threshold	  of	  carcinogenic	  risk	  for	  a	  chemical,	  come	  very	  close	  to	  dictating	  policy	  outcomes.	  The	  political	  process	  itself	  demands	  the	  authority	  of	  objectivity	  on	  many	  matters,	  and	  so	  science	  presses,	  and	  is	  pressed,	  relentlessly	  outward.	  […]	  The	  divide	  between	  technical	  science	  and	  political	  opinion	  is	  highly	  unstable.	  The	  currents	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  overflow	  everywhere	  the	  boundary	  between	  ought	  and	  is.	  (308)	  	  But	  what	  is	  crucial	  to	  note	  here	  is	  that	  such	  a	  perception	  of	  science	  and	  the	  increased	  authority	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  to	  double	  as	  supposedly	  transparent	  moral	  prescription	  in	  matters	  legal	  and	  political—erasing	  that	  knowledge’s	  aesthetic	  and	  political	  underpinnings—is	  not	  a	  mere	  product	  of	  some	  social	  geist.	  By	  bringing	  Porter’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  increased	  technicality	  and	  “objectivity”	  of	  science	  into	  conversation	  with	  Rudolph’s	  history	  of	  US	  science	  pedagogy,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  it	  is,	  rather,	  the	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  relays	  between	  massive	  school	  reforms	  organized	  by	  psychologists	  who	  were	  themselves	  beholden	  to	  the	  knowledge	  science	  had	  given	  them	  about	  development,	  and	  to	  increased	  funding	  for	  the	  sciences	  from	  corporate	  and	  military	  sources	  that	  mobilized	  scientific	  authority	  and	  its	  economic	  prospects	  to	  recruit	  students	  as	  labor	  sources.	  The	  school	  as	  a	  training	  site	  for	  proper	  citizen-­‐subjects	  took	  on	  the	  role	  of	  enforcer	  of	  a	  national	  (white,	  masculinist)	  and	  universalizing	  bildungsroman.	  This	  helped	  to	  erase	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  value	  of	  attributing	  to	  personal	  interest,	  felt	  experience,	  aesthetic	  interpretation,	  or	  politics	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  scientific	  knowledge,	  while	  simultaneously	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taking	  the	  values	  produced	  by	  science	  as	  objectively	  given,	  allowing	  its	  knowledge	  to	  construct	  or	  enforce	  the	  systems	  that	  would	  attempt	  to	  govern,	  correct,	  and	  control	  the	  personal,	  experiential,	  aesthetic,	  and	  political.	  Science,	  then,	  recursively	  proved,	  empirically,	  that	  white	  men	  were	  the	  ideal	  citizen-­‐subjects.	  	  	  
Margaret	  Mead	  and	  a	  Feminist	  Empiricism	  	  	   	  	   The	  politics	  that	  inhere	  in	  science’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  world	  were	  all	  but	  erased	  by	  post-­‐war	  scientists	  and	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	  pedagogues,	  who	  largely	  succeeded	  in	  making	  the	  political	  dimensions	  invisible	  by	  presenting	  science	  not	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  aesthetic	  determinations,	  but	  as	  a	  disinterested	  description	  of	  a	  world	  given	  readily	  and	  transparently	  as	  data-­‐information.	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  inherent	  politics—which	  names	  the	  excessive	  field	  from	  which	  a	  scientific	  explanation	  has	  been	  cut	  and	  produced—that	  Combahee	  leveraged	  in	  their	  production	  of	  a	  minor	  empiricism,	  an	  invested	  science.	  Here,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  for	  Combahee,	  their	  revolutionary	  science	  is	  only	  possible	  from	  underneath;	  it	  is	  produced	  by	  those	  who	  experience	  the	  personal	  and	  political	  effects	  of	  civic	  disinvestment	  in	  their	  daily	  lives.	  	  The	  penultimate	  line	  to	  Combahee’s	  Statement	  is	  a	  quote	  taken	  from	  Robin	  Morgan’s	  Sisterhood	  Is	  Powerful	  (in	  which	  Morgan	  coined	  the	  term	  “herstory”);	  Morgan	  writes,	  “I	  haven’t	  the	  faintest	  notion	  what	  possible	  revolutionary	  role	  white	  heterosexual	  men	  could	  fulfill,	  since	  they	  are	  the	  very	  embodiment	  of	  reactionary-­‐vested-­‐interest-­‐power”	  (Combahee	  22).	  Although	  Combahee	  does	  not	  comment	  on	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the	  quote,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  tell	  if	  they,	  like	  Morgan,	  cannot	  imagine	  a	  revolutionary	  role	  for	  white,	  heterosexual	  men,	  they	  do	  assert	  what	  appears	  to	  be,	  for	  them,	  the	  contrapositive	  of	  Morgan’s	  statement:	  “As	  black	  feminists	  and	  lesbians,	  we	  know	  that	  we	  have	  a	  very	  definite	  revolutionary	  task	  to	  perform”	  (22).	  They	  affirm	  their	  belief	  that,	  being	  positioned	  against	  “reactionary-­‐vested-­‐interest-­‐power,”	  their	  revolutionary	  task	  is	  immanent	  to	  their	  social	  situation	  and	  emerges	  from	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  needs.	  Their	  project,	  then,	  begins	  from	  an	  autonomously	  generated,	  self-­‐determined	  claim	  to	  their	  own	  value.	  This	  marks	  a	  powerful	  departure	  from	  the	  presuppositions	  and	  determinations	  of	  institutional	  science	  and	  its	  public	  perception.	  Indeed,	  their	  invested	  science	  requires—against	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  supposedly	  value-­‐free	  objectivity	  of	  contemporary	  empiricism—insisting	  on	  the	  value	  of	  valuation	  itself,	  value	  that	  is	  always	  personally	  and	  socially	  produced,	  and	  that	  has	  effects	  that	  are	  complex,	  undetermined,	  and	  not	  fully	  rational.	  The	  effects	  of	  any	  value	  determination	  are	  the	  products	  of	  a	  long	  chain	  that	  originates	  in	  choice	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  frame	  in	  which	  to	  compose.	  This	  frame	  can	  only	  be	  composed	  through	  a	  disorganization	  of	  the	  frame	  as	  apparently	  given,	  and	  such	  reorganization,	  triggered	  by	  new	  sensorial	  arrangements,	  also	  begins	  in	  choice,	  belief,	  position,	  and	  interest,	  but	  now	  affirmed	  as	  valuable	  rather	  than	  erased.	  	   A	  similar	  position	  with	  regards	  to	  science	  and	  its	  utility	  had	  been	  adopted	  almost	  half	  a	  century	  earlier	  by	  Margaret	  Mead.	  However,	  her	  tactics	  would	  necessarily	  differ	  from	  Combahee’s,	  as	  her	  particular	  social	  situation—as	  a	  middle-­‐class	  white	  girl-­‐then-­‐woman	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  ‘30s—differed.	  The	  concerns	  of	  minor	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empiricism,	  which	  both	  produces	  and	  is	  produced	  by	  subjectivity,	  can,	  according	  to	  Deleuze,	  only	  be	  “correctly	  raised	  at	  the	  level	  of	  practice,”	  which	  is	  grounded	  in	  a	  particular	  subjective	  situation;	  it	  “cannot	  be	  dissociated	  from	  the	  imperatives	  of	  experimentation	  and	  struggle,”	  which	  mark	  a	  specific	  situational	  problem.	  	  Mead	  is	  an	  especially	  useful	  figure	  for	  understanding	  the	  relations	  at	  work	  in	  this	  chapter,	  because	  she	  worked	  in	  the	  very	  scientific	  field	  that	  Spillers	  named	  as	  helping	  to	  produce	  the	  pathologization	  of	  otherness:	  anthropology.	  Mead,	  however,	  occupies	  a	  strange	  position	  that	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  place	  her	  squarely	  in	  the	  lineage	  of	  “primitivist”	  anthropology	  that	  came	  out	  of	  a	  research-­‐based	  practice	  that	  characterized	  the	  work	  of	  early	  American	  armchair	  anthropologists.	  Mead,	  a	  student	  of	  Franz	  Boas,	  was	  part	  of	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  field	  anthropologists,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  first	  women	  anthropologists.	  Her	  first	  book,	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Samoa	  (1928),	  although	  it	  depended	  on	  the	  language	  of	  primitivism,	  departed	  in	  many	  ways	  from	  an	  understanding	  of	  non-­‐Western	  cultures	  as	  being	  temporally	  frozen	  in	  the	  past.	  Mead’s	  text,	  written	  in	  a	  fledgling	  period	  of	  American	  anthropology	  and	  growing	  scientific	  authority,	  made	  a	  claim	  to	  more	  fully	  and	  systematically	  scientize	  the	  discipline’s	  research	  practices	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  experimentation	  (rather	  than	  research).	  However,	  her	  work	  also	  precedes	  the	  moment	  of	  fully	  institutionalized	  and	  increasingly	  corporatized	  and	  militarized	  science,	  which	  allowed	  her	  to	  experiment	  with	  a	  different	  way	  of	  being	  scientific,	  one	  that	  emerged	  from	  her	  own	  experience	  of	  oppression	  as	  a	  woman	  in	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	  US	  culture.	  Her	  way	  of	  being	  scientific	  offers	  a	  descriptive	  practice	  that	  we	  might	  say	  is	  a	  valuable	  experiment	  that	  constitutes	  a	  feminist	  and/as	  minor	  science.	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Indeed,	  Mead,	  following	  soon	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  the	  moral	  uplift	  tradition	  and	  not	  fully	  indoctrinated	  in	  a	  conception	  of	  “objective”	  science,	  posits	  an	  experiment	  that	  temporarily	  reverses	  the	  trajectory	  of	  disinterest.	  She	  suggests	  not	  that	  science	  should	  dictate	  politics	  because	  it	  unveils	  the	  natural,	  but	  instead,	  that	  political	  situations	  determine	  the	  expressions	  of	  the	  capacities	  of	  human	  nature,	  and	  by	  beginning	  from	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  political	  situation,	  one	  might	  see	  if	  and	  how	  different	  situations	  produced	  different	  natures.	  Human	  nature,	  for	  Mead,	  is	  not	  natural;	  it	  names	  a	  capacity	  and	  a	  set	  of	  possible	  actualizations.	  Her	  science,	  then,	  begins	  from	  the	  specific	  problem	  of	  being	  a	  woman,	  and	  previously	  a	  girl,	  as	  both	  had	  been	  constructed	  by	  US	  culture	  and	  (de)valued	  by	  the	  culture	  of	  science,	  which	  would	  dismiss	  the	  empirical	  value	  of	  her	  felt	  experience.	  	  	   Although	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  historical	  relationship	  between	  Mead	  and	  Combahee,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  shortly	  after	  Combahee’s	  rejection	  of	  biological	  determinism	  (they	  claimed	  in	  their	  1977	  statement,	  they,	  as	  Black	  women	  found	  “a	  particularly	  dangerous	  and	  reactionary	  basis	  upon	  which	  to	  build	  a	  politic”	  (17))	  the	  US	  would	  enter	  a	  cultural	  wave	  of	  increased	  investment	  in	  biological	  determinism,	  and,	  as	  part	  of	  that	  wave,	  Mead	  came	  under	  renewed	  national	  interest	  and	  scrutiny	  precisely	  for	  the	  aspects	  of	  her	  position	  that	  bore	  much	  in	  common	  with	  Combahee’s.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  Mead—who	  had	  died	  a	  few	  years	  earlier—and	  
Coming	  of	  Age	  were	  the	  subjects	  of	  a	  vicious	  series	  of	  attacks	  by	  Australian	  anthropologist	  Derek	  Freeman.	  Freeman	  first	  disputed	  the	  accuracy	  of	  Mead’s	  work,	  claiming	  that	  she	  had	  been	  duped	  by	  native	  informants,	  but	  he	  would	  later	  go	  on	  to	  say	  that	  she	  had	  “hoaxed”	  all	  of	  anthropology	  and	  diminished	  its	  status	  as	  a	  science,	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by	  generating	  conclusions	  that	  could	  not	  be	  properly	  falsified	  and	  writing	  a	  book	  motivated	  purely	  by	  her	  own	  political	  interests	  (Shankman	  97).	  Unsurprisingly,	  given	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  attacks,	  Freeman	  was	  part	  of	  a	  growing	  group	  of	  biological	  essentialists,	  who,	  in	  the	  1980s,	  eschewed	  the	  more	  mixed	  nature/nurture	  interpretations	  that	  had	  pervaded	  anthropology	  in	  the	  1970s,	  and	  returned	  again	  to	  fixed	  biological	  categories,	  only	  this	  time,	  they	  were	  less	  overtly	  those	  relating	  to	  phenotype,	  but,	  via	  increased	  technoscience	  capacities,	  were	  instead	  masked	  as	  genes,	  chromosomes,	  and	  brain	  structuration.	  Freeman’s	  attacks	  received	  surprisingly	  wide	  coverage	  in	  the	  popular	  press,	  even	  showing	  up	  on	  the	  cover	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  and	  Freeman	  himself	  appeared	  on	  many	  US	  talk	  shows,	  including	  the	  top-­‐rated	  daytime	  talk	  show,	  Donahue	  (Shankman	  32).	  	   In	  order	  to	  both	  increase	  is	  own	  authority	  and	  erase	  the	  historical	  specificity	  of	  Mead’s	  work,	  written	  more	  than	  half	  a	  century	  earliery,	  Freeman	  laid	  claim	  to	  his	  own	  position	  as	  a	  scientist.	  To	  confirm	  this	  status,	  he	  launched	  into	  an	  on-­‐air	  discussion	  of	  the	  (quite	  conservative	  and	  outdated)	  philosopher	  of	  science,	  Karl	  Popper.24	  Referring	  to	  Popper’s	  famous	  claim	  that	  the	  defining	  feature	  of	  scientific	  practice	  is	  its	  recourse	  to	  falsifiability,	  Freeman	  went	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  he	  was	  a	  scientist	  because	  he	  practiced	  the	  scientific	  method	  and	  adopted	  a	  disinterested	  position	  with	  regards	  to	  his	  subjects.	  While	  there	  is	  much	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  Freeman	  to	  suggest	  that	  he	  was	  both	  highly	  interested	  and	  politically	  motivated,	  one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  See	  Chapter	  1	  for	  a	  longer	  discussion	  of	  Popper.	  In	  his	  classic	  account	  of	  how	  science	  works,	  he	  argues	  that	  theoreticians	  determine	  the	  problems	  that	  experimentalists	  test,	  and	  experimentalists	  as	  best	  can	  falsify,	  but	  never	  fully	  confirm,	  the	  given	  theory.	  	  
	   209	  
can’t	  help	  but	  be	  struck	  by	  his	  insistence	  on	  his	  own	  disinterest,	  his	  investment	  in	  biological	  science	  as	  the	  full	  grammar	  of	  human	  social	  interactions,	  and	  his	  methodological	  fidelity	  to	  “science”	  (a	  claim	  that,	  again,	  a	  practicing	  experimentalist	  only	  thirty	  years	  earlier	  would	  have	  been	  loathe	  to	  make)—an	  insistence	  that	  appears	  especially	  masculinist	  in	  its	  attack	  on	  Mead	  and	  his	  dismissal	  of	  feminist	  injunctions	  to	  knowledge	  structures	  that	  would	  value	  the	  personal	  as	  political,	  and,	  in	  Mead’s	  case,	  the	  personal	  as	  scientific.	  Freeman’s	  insistence	  highlights	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  he	  understood	  anthropology	  as	  credible	  only	  when	  it	  was	  empirical	  in	  the	  mid-­‐century	  sense:	  supposedly	  divested	  of	  the	  desires	  of	  the	  researcher,	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  the	  researcher’s	  presence,	  or	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  structural	  constructions	  that	  organized	  ethnographic	  work.	  For	  Freeman,	  Mead	  served	  as	  the	  origin	  of	  contemporary	  anthropology,	  and	  the	  origin	  determined	  the	  possibilities	  that	  would	  follow.	  Mead’s	  greatest	  crime—and	  the	  ruination	  of	  anthropology	  that	  ensued	  in	  her	  ethnography’s	  wake—was	  her	  failure	  to	  be	  properly	  scientific,	  according	  to	  the	  scientific	  method.	  	   The	  public	  controversy	  surrounding	  Mead’s	  work	  spoke	  little	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  her	  work	  within	  the	  field	  of	  anthropology.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  Freeman’s	  writing,	  she	  was	  generally	  considered	  one	  of	  several	  significant	  founders	  whose	  “methods”	  were	  under	  development	  in	  her	  own	  moment	  and	  continually	  augmented	  by	  those	  who	  came	  after.	  Few	  if	  any	  anthropologists	  would	  see	  her	  as	  a	  sole	  origin	  and	  originary	  problem	  of	  anthropology	  that	  in	  some	  way	  fully	  determined	  the	  future	  of	  the	  field.	  Despite	  this,	  as	  Paul	  Shankman	  notes	  in	  his	  account	  of	  events,	  which	  he	  gives	  in	  his	  book,	  The	  Trashing	  of	  Margaret	  Mead:	  Anatomy	  of	  an	  Anthropological	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Controversy,	  Freeman’s	  perceptions	  of	  Mead	  and	  their	  mass	  dissemination	  resulted	  in	  a	  lasting	  public	  perception	  of	  Mead	  as	  a	  “bad”	  scientist,	  and	  her	  work	  as	  pseudo-­‐science.	  Yet,	  I	  suggest	  that	  if	  we	  return	  to	  the	  moment	  of	  Mead’s	  own	  writing,	  we	  find	  that	  she,	  in	  fact,	  evinced	  a	  much	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  be	  scientific	  by	  way	  of	  experimentation	  than	  did	  those	  who	  followed	  the	  simplified	  model	  presented	  by	  Popper	  and	  espoused	  by	  Freeman.	  In	  fact,	  her	  understanding	  of	  experimentalism	  is	  actually	  much	  more	  closely	  in	  line	  with	  the	  description	  of	  experimental	  conditions	  and	  	  “valuable	  experiments”	  I	  extracted	  from	  Hans-­‐Jörg	  Rheinberger	  and	  Ludwik	  Fleck	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  Fleck	  and	  Rheinberger	  both	  assert	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  desire,	  mood,	  and	  theoretical	  disposition	  of	  the	  experimentalist	  in	  determining	  what	  she	  might	  see	  or	  observe—conditions	  grounded	  in	  the	  experimentalists	  own	  lived	  situation.	  The	  experiments	  they	  are	  most	  interested	  in,	  “valuable	  experiments,”unlike	  the	  ones	  in	  which	  Popper	  is	  interested,	  do	  not	  merely	  falsify	  or	  corroborate	  a	  theory	  but	  in	  fact,	  encounter	  explanatory	  impasses	  that	  disrupt	  any	  established	  experimental	  parameters,	  and	  require	  new	  descriptive	  practices.	  	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  Coming	  of	  Age,	  Mead	  makes	  the	  surprising	  claim	  that	  the	  ultimate	  purpose	  of	  her	  book	  is	  not,	  in	  fact,	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  Samoan	  girlhood.	  Her	  ethnography,	  she	  states,	  is	  instead	  a	  scientific	  experiment	  intended	  to	  supplement	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  growing	  field	  of	  developmental	  psychology—which	  described	  adolescence	  as	  a	  tumultuous	  period	  marked	  by	  “rebellion	  against	  authority,	  philosophical	  perplexities,	  the	  flowering	  of	  idealism,	  conflict	  and	  struggle”—by	  investigating	  the	  question:	  “Were	  these	  difficulties	  due	  to	  being	  an	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adolescent	  or	  to	  being	  an	  adolescent	  in	  America?”	  (Mead	  6,	  emphasis	  mine).	  Mead	  suggests	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  dictates	  of	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	  American	  society—as	  evinced	  by	  “the	  fulminations	  of	  the	  pulpit,	  the	  loudly	  voiced	  laments	  of	  the	  conservative	  social	  philosopher,	  the	  records	  of	  juvenile	  courts	  and	  social	  agencies”—is	  that	  “something	  must	  be	  done	  with	  the	  period	  which	  science	  has	  named	  adolescence”	  (3).	  Mead	  lauds	  the	  New	  Psychology	  for	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  “take	  seriously	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  child”	  by	  bringing	  adolescence	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  scientific	  inquiry,	  but	  suggests	  that	  the	  complexities	  of	  US	  culture	  place	  severe	  limits	  on	  the	  psychological	  sciences’	  capacity	  to	  isolate	  variables	  and	  conduct	  a	  proper	  experiment.	  	  Already,	  science	  is	  the	  marker	  of	  serious	  knowledge,	  but	  in	  Mead’s	  view,	  the	  cultural	  complexity	  of	  the	  US—and	  in	  particular	  its	  ethnic	  complexity—is	  not	  appropriate	  to	  the	  scientific	  dictates	  of	  experimentalism.	  “The	  ideal	  methods	  of	  experiment,”	  she	  states,	  “are	  denied	  to	  us	  when	  our	  materials	  are	  humanity,	  and	  the	  whole	  fabric	  of	  social	  order”	  (7).	  According	  to	  Mead,	  it	  is	  the	  inability	  of	  a	  scientist—the	  “cautious	  experimentalist”—to	  properly	  account	  for	  all	  the	  structural	  and	  experiential	  features	  of	  development	  that	  has	  enabled	  lay-­‐people	  to	  promote	  the	  widespread	  conception	  that	  adolescence	  is	  naturally	  fraught.	  But	  Mead,	  dissatisfied	  with	  such	  an	  interpretation,	  asks:	  “What	  method	  then	  is	  open	  to	  us	  who	  wish	  to	  conduct	  a	  human	  experiment	  but	  who	  lack	  the	  power	  either	  to	  construct	  the	  experimental	  conditions	  or	  to	  find	  controlled	  examples	  of	  those	  conditions	  here	  and	  there	  throughout	  our	  own	  civilization?”	  (7).	  Mead’s	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  to	  produce	  an	  ethnography—which	  she	  calls	  an	  “experiment”—with	  a	  “primitive	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culture”	  for	  whom	  the	  multiple	  competing	  cultures	  and	  ideologies	  that	  comprise	  US	  social	  life	  are	  not	  present,	  enabling	  the	  isolation	  of	  particular	  features	  of	  adolescence	  for	  an	  experiment.	  Ethnography,	  she	  states,	  can	  provide	  the	  “controlled	  examples	  of	  those	  conditions	  here	  and	  there	  throughout	  our	  own	  civilization”	  necessary	  for	  conducting	  an	  experiment	  that	  will	  clarify	  these	  convoluted	  questions	  about	  American	  society,	  which	  deals	  with	  the	  intersections	  and	  competing	  interests	  of	  many	  cultures.	  Mead’s	  text	  insists	  on	  its	  status	  as	  experimental	  science	  by	  using	  the	  familiar	  language	  of	  proper	  controls	  and	  laboratory	  conditions	  while	  simultaneously	  presenting	  a	  view	  of	  science	  that	  is	  quite	  foreign	  to	  its	  popular	  understanding	  today:	  for	  Mead,	  science—and	  especially	  the	  new	  science	  (or	  newly	  scientized),	  psychology—is	  bound	  up	  in	  social	  formations	  and,	  at	  its	  best,	  ask	  questions	  that	  help	  one	  to	  understand	  and	  intervene	  in	  oppressive	  political	  conditions;	  it	  in	  fact	  emerges	  from	  a	  political	  problem.	  For	  Mead,	  who	  was	  only	  a	  few	  years	  out	  of	  adolescence	  at	  time	  of	  Coming	  of	  Age’s	  publication,	  science	  is	  inherently	  political,	  and	  her	  scientific	  inquiry	  is	  aimed	  specifically	  at	  addressing	  the	  very	  conditions	  that	  had	  oppressed	  and	  continued	  to	  oppress	  her,	  and	  which	  could	  only	  be	  addressed	  by	  studying	  adolescents.	  Late	  nineteenth	  century	  popularization	  campaigns	  that	  had	  linked	  science	  to	  moral	  uplift	  still	  held	  sway,	  which	  made	  Mead’s	  suggestion	  that	  science	  might	  be	  linked	  to	  social	  change	  less	  surprising.	  But	  it	  was	  quite	  shocking	  that	  she	  would	  suggest	  that	  such	  social	  change	  might	  be	  directed	  at	  American	  society	  rather	  than	  the	  so-­‐called	  “primitive”	  people	  she	  described.	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For	  Mead,	  as	  with	  Combahee	  and	  McCullers,	  her	  capacity	  to	  make	  political	  claims	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  a	  science	  that	  tended	  to	  make	  strong,	  taxonomic	  distinctions	  between	  people	  and	  erase	  their	  undetermined	  relationality	  depended	  on	  a	  reorganization	  of	  the	  time	  of	  anthropology.	  Mead	  lays	  out	  the	  questions	  of	  her	  experiment	  in	  the	  introduction	  and	  final	  two	  chapters	  of	  the	  book,	  which	  bookend	  an	  account	  of	  the	  life	  of	  Samoan	  girls	  that	  otherwise	  bears	  little	  mention	  of	  American	  society.	  But	  far	  from	  subscribing	  to	  a	  more	  accepted	  convention	  of	  describing	  “primitive”	  people	  as	  frozen	  in	  a	  prior	  time—an	  imagined	  past	  that	  precedes	  American	  culture	  and	  describes	  an	  origin	  from	  which	  Europeans	  have	  long	  since	  evolved—Mead	  describes	  the	  Samoans	  as	  having	  “thousands	  of	  years	  of	  historical	  development	  along	  completely	  different	  lines	  than	  our	  own”	  (Mead	  8).	  And,	  like	  McCullers	  and	  Combahee,	  Mead	  enacts	  her	  disruption	  of	  anthropological	  time	  through	  generic	  disruption.	  Mead	  not	  only	  disrupts	  the	  form	  of	  the	  ethnography,	  which	  was	  generally	  presented	  in	  the	  dry	  and	  “heavy	  German	  style”	  of	  James	  Frazer	  (Shankman	  103),25	  but	  perhaps	  more	  interestingly,	  she	  draws	  on	  the	  form	  of	  the	  romance	  or	  sentimental	  novel	  and	  its	  subgenre	  of	  the	  female	  bildungsroman.	  In	  her	  use	  of	  the	  conventions	  of	  the	  sentimental	  novel,	  however,	  she	  eliminates	  both	  the	  element	  that	  would	  make	  a	  white	  middle-­‐class	  female	  readership	  most	  easily	  identify	  with	  it—a	  white	  female	  heroine—and	  also	  eliminates	  the	  moralizing	  narrative	  of	  development	  into	  a	  proper	  and	  tamed	  wife,	  thus	  subverting	  the	  function	  of	  the	  popular	  women’s	  novel	  as	  well.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See:	  James	  Frazer,	  The	  Golden	  Bough:	  A	  Study	  in	  Comparative	  Religion	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  Univ.	  Press,	  2012).	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Recent	  studies	  of	  generic	  women’s	  writing	  and	  their	  readerships	  have	  lauded	  the	  capacity	  of	  these	  novels	  to	  produce	  communities	  of	  women	  readers.	  However,	  they	  have	  also	  suggested	  that	  the	  affective	  compensations	  provided	  by	  these	  texts	  depoliticize	  the	  experience	  of	  women.	  Janice	  Radway,	  for	  example,	  writing	  in	  1989	  about	  late	  twentieth-­‐century	  romance	  novels	  in	  Reading	  the	  Romance:	  Women,	  
Patriarchy,	  and	  Popular	  Literature,	  argues	  that	  contemporary	  romance	  novels	  produce	  communities	  of	  women	  readers	  who	  use	  the	  novels	  to	  fulfill	  their	  own	  desires	  for	  caretaking,	  which	  they	  often	  give	  but	  rarely	  receive.26	  Although	  Radway	  is	  discussing	  the	  popular	  genre	  that	  appears	  in	  mass-­‐produced	  paperbacks	  much	  later	  than	  the	  time	  of	  Mead’s	  writing,	  her	  conclusions	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  Lauren	  Berlant,	  who,	  writing	  about	  early-­‐	  and	  mid-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  sentimental	  novels	  in	  
The	  Female	  Complaint:	  The	  Unfinished	  Business	  of	  Sentimentality	  in	  American	  Culture,	  suggests	  that	  the	  intimate	  publics	  produced	  by	  the	  readers	  of	  the	  novels,	  and	  their	  escapism	  through	  the	  generic	  tales,	  provide	  an	  affective	  panacea	  that	  inhibits	  female	  readers	  from	  making	  political	  claims	  that	  might	  otherwise	  become	  apparent	  through	  their	  affective	  dissatisfactions.27	  	  Often,	  the	  female	  bildungsroman	  is	  described	  as	  a	  subgenre	  of	  the	  sentimental	  novel	  because	  it	  uses	  a	  mode	  that	  “imitate[s]	  feeling	  rather	  than	  intellect”	  (Braudy	  5),	  but	  it	  distinguishes	  itself	  from	  other	  manifestations	  of	  the	  genre	  by	  doing	  so	  in	  the	  service	  of	  depicting	  a	  coming-­‐of-­‐age	  that	  models	  the	  moral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26See:	  Radway,	  Reading	  the	  Romance,	  in	  particular	  the	  final	  two	  chapters,	  “Failed	  Romance:	  Too	  Close	  to	  the	  Problems	  of	  Patriarchy,”	  and	  “Language	  and	  Narrative	  Discourse:	  The	  Ideology	  of	  Female	  Identity.”	  27See:	  Berlant,	  The	  Female	  Complaint,	  in	  particular,	  the	  introduction	  and	  chapter	  four,	  “Uncle	  Sam	  Needs	  a	  Wife:	  Citizenship	  and	  Denegation.”	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passage	  of	  a	  girl	  into	  adulthood.	  This	  distinction,	  which	  names	  the	  female	  bildungsroman	  as	  separate	  from	  the	  larger	  conventions	  of	  bildung	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  gender	  of	  its	  central	  character,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  mode—which	  is	  that	  of	  sympathy	  rather	  than	  intellect	  or	  action—marks	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  traditional	  bildungsroman,	  as	  training	  for	  proper	  citizen-­‐subject(ivity),	  is	  a	  masculine	  form	  and	  the	  only	  possible	  citizen-­‐subject	  male.	  Rather	  than	  entering	  civic	  life,	  the	  female	  protagonists	  of	  the	  female	  bildungsroman—a	  genre	  usually	  thought	  to	  begin	  with	  writers	  such	  as	  Jane	  Austen	  and	  Charlotte	  Bronte—is	  educated	  into	  social	  propriety,	  tamed	  through	  sympathy	  into	  a	  maternal	  figure	  who	  finds	  fulfillment	  as	  a	  wife,	  and	  generates	  social	  reform	  through	  the	  extensions	  of	  her	  maternal	  sympathy.28	  Mead’s	  
style	  and	  the	  content	  of	  her	  work,	  as	  well	  as	  her	  intended	  readership,	  mirror	  those	  of	  the	  sentimental	  bildungsroman—painting	  intimate,	  quotidian	  scenes	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  social	  development	  and	  romantic	  experiences	  of	  girls	  and	  women—but	  break	  soundly	  from	  their	  effects,	  most	  explicitly,	  the	  depoliticizing	  ones.	  She	  does	  so	  through	  a	  tactic	  of	  formal	  parataxis	  that	  rejects	  the	  normalizing	  narratives	  of	  female	  coming	  of	  age,	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  far	  from	  natural	  they	  are	  socially	  constructed	  and	  socially	  useful.	  Indeed,	  no	  bildungsroman	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  Samoan	  girl	  (in	  Mead’s	  telling	  of	  it),	  because	  she	  experiences	  a	  freeing	  “absence	  of	  any	  important	  institutionalized	  role	  in	  the	  community,”	  which	  alleviates	  the	  necessity	  of	  bearing	  on	  her	  body	  the	  demands	  of	  purity/impurity,	  virginity/sexuality	  required	  of	  US	  girls	  (Mead	  111).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See:	  Laura	  Sue	  Fuderer,	  The	  Female	  Bildungsroman	  in	  English:	  An	  Annotated	  
Bibliography	  of	  Criticism	  (Modern	  Language	  Association	  of	  America,	  1991).	  
	   216	  
As	  Mead	  notes	  in	  her	  Preface	  to	  the	  1973	  edition	  of	  Coming	  of	  Age,	  her	  ethnography,	  while	  not	  written	  “as	  a	  popular	  book,”	  was	  written	  in	  order	  to	  be	  read	  by	  lay	  readers,	  by	  “those	  who	  had	  the	  most	  to	  do	  with	  adolescents—teachers,	  parents,	  and	  soon-­‐to-­‐be	  parents”	  (Mead	  xxiv).	  It	  was,	  she	  writes,	  “the	  first	  piece	  of	  anthropological	  fieldwork	  which	  was	  written	  without	  the	  paraphernalia	  of	  scholarship	  designed	  to	  mystify	  the	  lay	  reader	  and	  confound	  one’s	  colleagues.”	  Although	  intended	  as	  a	  scientific	  account,	  Mead	  makes	  clear	  that	  she	  eschews	  the	  obscurantist	  practices	  of	  much	  science	  writing,	  and	  indeed,	  her	  ideal	  reader	  is	  not	  a	  scientist	  or	  academic.	  For	  the	  Perennial	  Classics	  edition	  of	  the	  book,	  the	  psychologist	  Mary	  Pipher	  wrote	  in	  her	  foreword	  that	  “the	  reader	  whom	  Mead	  imagined	  as	  she	  wrote	  was	  her	  grandmother,	  an	  intelligent	  schoolteacher”	  (xvii).	  Although	  Mead	  does	  not	  state	  so	  explicitly,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  because	  her	  book	  is	  not	  about	  adolescence	  in	  general,	  but	  female	  adolescence	  in	  particular,	  at	  least	  part	  of	  her	  intention	  is	  to	  be	  read	  by	  women	  who	  have	  been	  or	  who	  have	  daughters	  who	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  very	  conditions	  she	  seeks	  to	  address.	  	  Her	  prose	  reflects	  these	  concerns	  by	  taking	  on	  a	  decidedly	  “literary”—and	  we	  might	  take	  this	  to	  mean	  “romantic”	  or	  “sentimental”—quality	  that	  was	  the	  bane	  of	  many	  of	  her	  academic	  readers.	  Indeed,	  her	  style,	  which	  she	  called	  “literate	  English,”	  would	  be	  “later	  dubbed	  ‘the	  wind	  rustling	  through	  the	  palm	  trees’	  school	  of	  ethnographic	  writing”	  (Shankman	  102).	  As	  anthropologist	  Maureen	  Mollow	  later	  said,	  “[Mead’s]	  conflation	  of	  modes	  of	  science,	  literature,	  and	  journalism	  was	  a	  reason	  for	  both	  her	  popular	  success	  and	  the	  ambivalence	  […]	  with	  which	  many	  of	  her	  professional	  colleagues	  regarded	  her	  work”	  (115).	  Far	  from	  “conflating”	  those	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modes,	  however,	  Mead	  seems	  to	  cut	  and	  break	  between	  them	  in	  order	  to	  present	  familiar	  themes	  while	  defamiliarize	  their	  presentation,	  cutting	  scientific	  assumptions	  with	  changes	  in	  aesthetic	  form	  and	  juxtaposing	  generic	  literary	  conventions	  with	  overt,	  almost	  manifesto-­‐like	  political	  claims.	  In	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  “there	  were	  very	  few	  studies	  on	  adolescence	  in	  other	  cultures	  and	  no	  models	  for	  writing	  up	  this	  kind	  of	  a	  field	  study,”	  Mead	  invents	  a	  form	  that	  highlights	  the	  multiple	  valences	  of	  experimentation	  that	  are	  played	  out	  both	  in	  her	  emergent	  practice	  of	  study	  (as	  an	  early	  participant-­‐observer)	  and	  in	  her	  grappling	  for	  an	  aesthetic	  form	  that	  can	  embody	  the	  multiple	  aspects	  that	  she	  sees	  as	  central	  to	  her	  scientific	  practice.29	  	  As	  Shankman	  notes,	  many	  passages	  of	  Coming	  of	  Age	  are	  written	  in	  a	  “lyrical	  and	  idyllic	  manner”	  (102).	  Famously,	  the	  first	  chapter,	  “A	  Day	  in	  Samoa,”	  waxes	  especially	  poetic,	  florid	  even,	  expressed	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  a	  seemingly	  omniscient	  narrator	  that	  surrounds	  the	  reader	  with	  the	  scene,	  with	  the	  island.	  It	  begins:	  	   The	  life	  of	  the	  day	  beings	  at	  dawn,	  or	  if	  the	  moon	  has	  shown	  until	  daylight,	  the	  shouts	  of	  the	  young	  men	  may	  be	  heard	  before	  dawn	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Although	  it	  may	  be	  tempting	  to	  dismiss	  Mead’s	  work	  as	  “bad”	  or	  “pseudo-­‐science,”	  disproven	  by	  more	  rigorous	  or	  changing	  scientific	  practices	  that	  followed,	  in	  its	  historical	  moment,	  Mead	  was	  indeed	  practicing	  “science.”	  It	  has	  become	  habit	  to	  dismiss	  science	  with	  clear	  ill-­‐effects—including,	  say,	  Nazi	  eugenics	  or	  nineteenth	  century	  race-­‐science—as	  pseudo-­‐science,	  yet	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  practitioners	  were	  practicing	  science	  (often	  as	  their	  profession)	  which	  is	  not	  a	  unified	  field,	  but	  instead	  has	  multiple	  valences	  and	  practices	  that	  were	  invented	  or	  externally	  imposed	  in	  the	  process	  of	  their	  practice.	  Revising	  history	  to	  police	  those	  borders	  makes	  of	  science	  a	  unified	  progress	  narrative,	  and	  erases	  the	  ethical	  and	  moral	  implications	  always	  
internal	  to	  science,	  making	  it	  appear	  that	  “good”	  or	  well-­‐done	  science	  will	  always	  have	  positive	  moral	  effects,	  while	  the	  ethical	  and	  political	  effects	  of	  non-­‐science	  posing	  as	  science	  are	  less	  predictable.	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the	  hillside.	  Uneasy	  in	  the	  night,	  populous	  with	  ghosts,	  they	  shout	  lustily	  to	  one	  another	  as	  they	  hasten	  with	  their	  work.	  As	  the	  dawn	  begins	  to	  fall	  among	  the	  soft	  brown	  roofs	  and	  the	  slender	  palm	  trees	  stand	  out	  against	  a	  colorless,	  gleaming	  sea,	  lovers	  slip	  home	  from	  trysts	  beneath	  the	  palm	  trees	  or	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  beached	  canoes,	  that	  the	  light	  may	  find	  each	  sleeper	  in	  the	  appointed	  place.	  (Mead	  12)	  	  The	  first	  chapter	  demonstrates	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  “wind	  rustling	  through	  the	  palm	  trees”	  moniker,	  but	  rather	  than	  using	  the	  phrase	  derisively,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  style	  serves	  not	  merely	  a	  generic	  and	  commercial	  literary	  purpose,	  but	  also	  scientific	  and	  political	  ones.	  In	  the	  paradise	  Mead	  paints,	  lovers,	  trysts,	  and	  homosexual-­‐social	  behavior	  appear	  as	  natural	  and	  beautiful—spectacularly	  unspectacular—parts	  of	  the	  landscape.	  	  The	  text	  will	  go	  on	  to	  tell	  the	  tale	  of	  the	  growth	  and	  development	  of	  adolescent	  girls	  into	  early	  adulthood	  on	  the	  island,	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  the	  life	  and	  love	  affairs	  of	  two	  (Moana	  and	  Sila),	  and	  it	  will	  further	  break	  from	  the	  conventions	  of	  academic	  ethnography	  by	  relying	  heavily	  on	  affective	  and	  personalized	  anecdotes	  about	  the	  girls	  lives	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  an	  experience	  for	  the	  reader	  that	  tends	  towards	  identification	  through	  sentiment.	  But	  from	  the	  very	  first	  pages,	  Mead	  adopts	  a	  non-­‐moralizing	  standpoint	  that	  positions	  her	  as	  both	  external	  to	  Samoan	  society	  and	  internal	  to	  and	  self-­‐reflexive	  about	  the	  experimental	  system	  that	  she	  studies.	  In	  doing	  so,	  part	  of	  the	  experimental	  practice	  is	  analyzing	  her	  data	  “in	  a	  Samoan	  context,”	  which	  is	  to	  say,	  describing	  it	  via	  its	  own	  moral	  standards	  as	  she	  understands	  them	  (Shankman	  106).	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  she	  tells	  of	  development	  and	  love,	  which	  would	  normally	  be	  characteristic	  of	  the	  sentimental	  bildungsroman,	  but	  rather	  than	  presenting	  a	  character	  similar	  to	  her	  reader	  experiencing	  trials	  and	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tribulations	  that	  might	  be	  familiar	  to	  her	  and	  modeling	  a	  proper	  negotiation	  of	  them,	  she	  presents	  the	  Samoan	  girl	  as	  different,	  more	  socially	  advanced,	  and	  psychologically	  stable	  than	  American	  women.	  Samoan	  girls,	  as	  Mead	  presents	  them,	  recognize	  love	  “as	  an	  impersonal	  force,”	  and	  are	  able	  to	  “experiment	  freely,”	  while	  not	  letting	  love,	  sex,	  and	  coupling	  determine	  their	  entire	  social	  being,	  either	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  shame	  or	  as	  the	  telos	  of	  adulthood	  (Mead	  111).	  In	  doing	  so,	  Mead	  alters	  anthropological	  time	  as	  it	  was	  usually	  presented,	  instead,	  writing	  Samoan	  girls	  as	  “remarkably	  modern,”	  which	  she	  confirmed	  as	  her	  impression	  of	  them	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  a	  colleague	  during	  the	  course	  of	  her	  research	  (quoted	  in	  Shankman	  105).	  Far	  from	  being	  frozen	  and	  prior	  in	  time,	  in	  Mead’s	  vision,	  Samoan	  girls	  are	  able	  to	  claim	  the	  very	  freedoms	  that	  she	  imagines	  as	  the	  purview	  and	  desire	  of	  women’s	  sexual	  revolution	  in	  the	  US	  at	  her	  own	  moment:	  “sex	  with	  less	  commitment,	  with	  more	  than	  one	  partner,	  and	  with	  partners	  of	  more	  than	  one	  gender,”	  as	  well	  as	  “the	  absence	  of	  romantic	  love	  and	  violent	  jealousy.”	  Here,	  the	  tendency	  of	  ethnography	  to	  look	  to	  a	  reconstructed	  past—which	  anthropologists	  like	  Lewis	  Henry	  Morgan	  had	  presented	  as	  a	  utopian	  fantasy	  for	  social	  return	  or	  restoration,	  both	  ideal	  and	  impossible—is	  cut	  by	  a	  temporal	  collapse	  that	  places	  both	  Samoa	  and	  the	  US	  in	  a	  constantly	  unfolding	  present,	  demanding	  new	  relations	  to	  past	  and	  future.	  Samoan	  girls,	  as	  Mead	  presents	  them	  in	  the	  final	  chapter,	  “The	  Girl	  in	  Conflict,”	  are	  now	  having	  to	  struggle	  with	  and	  through	  US	  mores	  that	  impose	  a	  Christian	  morality	  through	  the	  missionary	  school	  systems,	  at	  the	  same	  moment	  that	  US	  women	  are	  struggling	  to	  free	  themselves	  from	  the	  indoctrinations	  of	  proper,	  feminine	  coming-­‐of-­‐age,	  and	  trying	  to	  gain	  the	  freedoms	  that	  Samoan	  girls	  and	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women	  have.	  However,	  contrary	  to	  much	  criticism	  of	  her	  book,	  Mead	  doesn’t	  paint	  Samoa	  as	  purely	  idyllic—there	  is	  still	  rape,	  aggression,	  and	  different	  forms	  of	  sexual	  restrictiveness,	  but	  those	  are	  not	  presented	  as	  fully	  determining	  the	  lives	  of	  women.	  	  Although	  Mead’s	  work	  is	  deservedly	  criticized	  for	  constructing	  rather	  than	  documenting	  the	  lives	  of	  Samoan	  women—perhaps	  even	  primarily	  fabulating	  those	  lives—she	  highlights	  and	  mobilizes	  that	  fact,	  using	  her	  subjective	  position	  as	  the	  grounds	  of	  her	  experiment.	  For	  Mead,	  the	  valuable	  experiment	  emerges	  from	  a	  subjective	  position,	  and	  at	  its	  best	  makes	  use	  of	  what	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  will	  later	  call	  the	  “friend”	  to	  science:	  “the	  partial	  observer,”	  which	  is	  “perfectly	  positive	  and	  creative”	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Philosophy	  129).	  This	  experiment	  is	  enacted	  through	  her	  writing,	  which	  anticipates	  an	  American	  audience.	  Here,	  although	  Mead’s	  introduction	  and	  final	  two	  chapters	  call	  for	  education	  reform	  in	  the	  US,	  thus	  following	  a	  certain	  reformist	  pattern	  that	  Ann	  Douglas,	  in	  The	  Feminization	  of	  
American	  Culture	  (1977)	  would	  describe	  as	  characteristic	  of	  the	  sentimental	  women’s	  novel,	  Mead	  does	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  follow	  the	  exact	  grain	  of	  the	  “sentimental	  novel”	  portions	  of	  her	  text.	  Those	  sections,	  which	  present	  the	  lives	  of	  Samoan	  girls,	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  model	  potential	  lives	  for	  American	  girls,	  for	  whom	  the	  life	  situation	  is	  different.30	  Mead’s	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  sentimental	  novel—which	  uses	  its	  conventions	  in	  order	  to	  be	  decidedly	  unsentimental	  about	  love—inverts	  the	  mimetic-­‐didactic	  function	  of	  the	  sentimental	  novel,	  which	  in	  the	  traditional	  form	  would	  both	  depict	  a	  representative	  and	  recognizable	  female	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  See:	  Ann	  Douglas,	  The	  Feminization	  of	  American	  Culture	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Farrar,	  Strauss,	  Giroux,	  1998).	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heroine,	  and	  use	  her	  character	  as	  a	  model	  to	  be	  mimicked	  for	  personal	  and	  social	  reform	  outside	  the	  novel.	  Mead	  instead	  overtly	  produces	  difference	  between	  her	  reader	  and	  her	  depicted	  characters	  or	  studies—a	  difference	  that	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  is,	  for	  Mead,	  social	  rather	  than	  biological,	  contextual	  rather	  than	  inherent,	  but	  still	  real.	  This	  production	  externalizes	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  terms	  rather	  than	  collapsing	  them	  and	  making	  of	  the	  ethnography	  an	  escapist	  fantasy.	  Mead’s	  practice,	  then,	  is	  in	  concert	  with	  minor	  empiricism,	  of	  which	  Deleuze	  suggests	  the	  externality	  of	  relations	  is	  the	  central	  feature.	  The	  girls	  do	  not	  represent	  alternative	  formations	  for	  American	  girls,	  but	  offer	  a	  point	  of	  disjuncture	  and	  relation;	  “representations,”	  Deleuze	  writers,	  “cannot	  present	  relations,”	  which	  are	  external	  to	  their	  terms,	  constructions,	  rather	  than	  the	  province	  of	  mimesis	  (Deleuze,	  
Empiricism	  30).	  In	  using	  sentimental	  form	  to	  present	  Samoan	  girlhood	  as	  modern,	  Mead	  is	  able	  to	  collapse	  the	  imposed	  progressive	  time	  of	  anthropology,	  and	  put	  Samoan	  girlhood	  into	  parataxis	  with	  US	  girlhood,	  but	  without	  using	  one	  to	  prescribe	  the	  other	  or	  represent	  the	  ideal	  form	  of	  the	  other.	  Mead	  did	  make	  a	  direct	  appeal	  to	  education	  reform	  in	  the	  US	  in	  the	  final	  chapters,	  but	  this	  reform	  is	  a	  possibility	  signaled	  by	  an	  encounter	  with	  difference	  rather	  than	  prescribed	  as	  an	  appropriation	  of	  it.	  She	  writes:	  The	  strongest	  light	  will	  fall	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Samoan	  education,	  in	  its	  broadest	  sense,	  differs	  from	  our	  own.	  And	  from	  this	  contrast,	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  turn,	  made	  newly	  and	  vividly	  self-­‐conscious	  and	  self-­‐critical,	  to	  judge	  anew	  and	  perhaps	  fashion	  differently	  the	  education	  we	  give	  our	  children.	  (Mead	  11)	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Her	  experiment,	  then,	  consists	  primarily	  in	  maintaining	  difference	  as	  the	  grounds	  for	  encountering	  US	  (female,	  white,	  upper/middle	  class)	  subjectivity,	  and	  examining	  its	  construction	  and	  reforming	  the	  ideological	  enforcement	  of	  one	  version	  of	  it	  as	  though	  such	  a	  version—that	  of	  tumultuousness	  in	  need	  of	  strict	  moralism	  and	  taming—were	  given.	  She	  produces	  the	  experience	  of	  difference	  as	  associative	  through	  writing,	  making	  an	  experiment	  not	  only	  for	  herself	  but	  also	  for	  her	  reader.	  Here,	  although	  it	  may	  seem	  as	  though	  we	  should	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  practice	  of	  science	  and	  its	  writing—with	  one	  making	  scientific	  determinations	  and	  the	  other	  merely	  reporting	  them—as	  Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  make	  clear	  (and	  as	  I	  discuss	  in	  greater	  length	  in	  chapter	  2),	  the	  writing	  of	  science	  is	  one	  of	  the	  central	  aspects	  of	  scientific	  practice.	  It	  is	  through	  writing	  that	  the	  scientist	  is	  charged	  with	  producing	  what	  Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  call	  an	  “ordered	  account	  out	  of	  apparent	  chaos”	  (Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  33).	  Contending	  with	  the	  (positivist)	  empirical	  presumption	  that	  the	  world	  is	  given	  as	  ordered,	  the	  scientist,	  in	  the	  writing	  portion	  of	  an	  experimental	  practice,	  “is	  faced	  with	  the	  task	  of	  producing	  an	  ordered	  version	  of	  observations	  and	  utterences”	  (Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  33).	  Mead’s	  own	  attention	  to	  her	  writing—and	  perhaps	  moreso,	  to	  the	  transitions	  she	  makes	  from	  an	  initial	  report	  to	  the	  book	  version	  of	  Coming	  of	  Age—helps	  highlight	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  writing	  is	  itself	  part	  of	  the	  experiment,	  one	  that	  is	  not	  fully	  determined	  or	  given	  by	  the	  observations	  of	  the	  experimenter,	  but	  which	  is	  constituted	  in	  the	  process	  of	  its	  being	  written	  and	  re-­‐written.	  Experience,	  then,	  and	  the	  doubling	  of	  or	  re-­‐experiencing	  of	  experience	  become	  central.	  What	  Mead	  first	  wrote	  as	  notes	  in	  the	  dry	  style	  of	  science	  reportage	  is	  re-­‐written	  as	  an	  experiment	  “through	  the	  lens	  of	  her	  experience	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while	  anticipating	  the	  audience	  she	  hoped	  to	  reach”	  (Shankman	  105).	  Indeed,	  writing	  is	  central	  to	  if	  not	  the	  entire	  condition	  of	  her	  experimental	  practice.	  Her	  valuable	  experiments,	  like	  those	  described	  by	  Ludwik	  Fleck,	  move	  from	  initial	  and	  vague	  perceptions	  of	  unexpected	  phenomena—which	  is	  to	  say,	  of	  a	  culture	  she	  observes	  which	  presents	  quite	  different	  mores	  than	  she	  expects—which	  she	  records	  in	  her	  initial	  journals	  to	  the	  production	  of	  an	  experimental	  system	  that	  mobilizes	  literary	  form	  (scientific,	  sentimental,	  anecdotal,	  journalistic,	  and	  political)	  that	  can	  become	  what	  Hans-­‐Jörg	  Rheinberger	  described	  as	  “a	  vehicle	  for	  materializing	  questions”	  (Rheinberger	  28).31	  Indeed,	  in	  a	  move	  that	  is	  quite	  self-­‐reflexive	  about	  scientific	  practice,	  and	  evinces	  what	  Rheinberger	  would	  later	  from	  a	  sociological	  perspective	  say	  of	  experiments,	  Mead	  describes	  her	  experiment	  as	  that	  of	  arbitrary	  isolation	  of	  a	  segment	  of	  the	  world	  to	  be	  studied	  (the	  experimental	  system),	  but	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  then	  imagine	  her	  experimental	  system	  to	  fully	  constitute	  or	  represent	  that	  which	  is	  beyond	  its	  arbitrarily	  defined	  borders.	  Reconceiving	  of	  Mead’s	  conversion	  of	  her	  observations	  about	  Samoan	  society,	  made	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  somewhat	  arbitrary	  isolation	  from	  which	  to	  begin	  her	  thought,	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  materializing	  questions	  about	  American	  society	  that	  is	  made	  through	  the	  production	  of	  an	  external	  relation	  that	  maintains	  difference	  helps	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  her	  empiricist	  project	  departs	  from	  the	  twentieth-­‐century	  version	  of	  empiricism—especially	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  technoscience—aimed	  at	  making	  determinations	  and	  solving	  problems.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  See	  Chapter	  1	  for	  a	  longer	  discussion	  of	  Fleck’s	  and	  Rheinberger’s	  description	  of	  valuable	  experimentation.	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This	  brings	  her	  practice	  even	  more	  clearly	  in	  line	  with	  the	  disruptive	  and	  unresolving	  strain	  of	  empiricism	  described	  by	  Deleuze	  in	  his	  radical,	  minor	  reading	  of	  Hume.	  As	  Constantin	  Boudas	  puts	  it	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  English	  translation	  of	  Empiricism	  and	  Subjectivity,	  for	  Deleuze,	  empiricism	  “has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  purported	  solutions	  or	  answers	  and	  everything	  to	  do	  with	  the	  question	  and	  the	  problem,	  or	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  problem	  to	  coordinate	  and	  serialize	  other	  questions	  within	  its	  range	  of	  tonalities”	  (Deleuze	  5).	  Empiricism,	  far	  from	  taking	  experience	  as	  given,	  always	  “problematize(s)	  the	  nature	  and	  problem	  of	  experience,”	  recursively	  denaturalizing	  human	  nature,	  and	  returning	  it	  to	  capacities	  and	  the	  exploration	  of	  differentially	  constructed	  experiences	  (6).	  Mead’s	  project,	  as	  one	  that	  generates	  new	  capacities	  for	  questions,	  suggests	  a	  practice	  that	  could	  give	  new	  ways	  of	  analyzing	  and	  disrupting	  the	  prescriptive	  practices	  of	  the	  new	  psychology’s	  scientization	  of	  US	  adolescent	  development	  as	  natural,	  and	  instead,	  instantiate	  an	  ongoing	  study	  of	  its	  production.	  Such	  a	  possibility	  pre-­‐emptively	  disrupts	  and	  offers	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  disruptive	  return	  that	  would	  counter	  the	  move	  to	  totalize	  US	  education	  under	  the	  unifying	  umbrella	  of	  rational	  “science.”	  	  
The	  Revolutionary	  Time	  of	  Study	  	   The	  heuristic	  utility	  of	  isolation	  for	  experimental	  purposes	  poses	  specific	  problems—especially	  when	  experimental	  results	  become	  determined	  and	  procedures	  honed	  and	  repeatable;	  in	  such	  moments,	  isolation	  or	  segmentation	  can	  become	  naturalized,	  too,	  as	  given.	  This	  especially	  poses	  problems	  for	  the	  political	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valences	  of	  science	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  study	  of	  human	  behavior	  and	  organization,	  as	  they	  were	  for	  Mead.	  The	  choice	  of	  isolated	  experimental	  system	  and	  the	  systemic	  explanation	  applied	  to	  it	  can	  come	  to	  stand	  in	  for	  or	  map	  over	  a	  field	  that	  extends	  beyond	  the	  experimental	  frame,	  presenting	  the	  impression	  that	  a	  single	  explanatory	  system	  can	  encompass	  not	  merely	  what	  it	  has	  rationalized	  (that	  which	  is	  inside	  the	  frame),	  but	  also	  the	  irrational	  beyond	  it.	  This	  in	  turn	  naturalizes	  divisions	  of	  the	  social	  or	  of	  life	  as	  given.	  The	  frame	  itself	  is	  epistemological	  and	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  bring	  things	  into	  relation	  (to	  produce	  external	  relations)	  and	  produce	  causal	  explanations	  for	  such	  relations;	  although	  the	  frame	  has	  real	  effects,	  making	  the	  internal	  production	  of	  objects	  and	  relations	  possible,	  those	  effects	  extend	  beyond	  and	  traverse	  in	  unexpected	  ways	  what	  is	  totalized	  by	  the	  frame	  itself.	  The	  frame	  is	  not	  coextensive	  with	  the	  social	  field—the	  chaos—that	  provides	  its	  materiality.	  	  This	  problem,	  however,	  is	  not	  solely	  an	  effect	  of	  a	  powerful	  science	  imposed	  hierarchically	  on	  differential	  bodies;	  it	  also	  becomes	  internal	  to	  radical	  activist	  responses—that	  is,	  to	  counter-­‐sciences—that	  depend	  on	  an	  explanatory	  model	  developed	  through	  narratives	  of	  origin,	  systematicity,	  and	  imagined	  telos	  or	  determination	  implied	  by	  such	  an	  origin.	  The	  problem	  of	  counter-­‐sciences	  reinscribing	  similar	  assumptions	  and	  divisions	  as	  dominant	  science	  is	  central	  to	  Combahee’s	  critique,	  which	  they	  apply	  not	  only	  to	  dominant	  practices,	  but	  also	  to	  activist	  organization.	  Their	  development	  of	  an	  analysis	  of	  interlocking	  oppressions,	  intersectionality,	  helps	  them	  to	  depart	  from	  such	  an	  impass	  by	  mapping	  a	  field	  as	  it	  
is—experienced	  and	  known	  through	  its	  effects—rather	  than	  depending	  on	  a	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singular	  origin	  that	  might	  provide	  a	  fully	  systemic	  explanation	  and	  enable	  the	  location	  of	  a	  singular	  point	  of	  attack.	  Strategies	  of	  radical	  organizing,	  whether	  Marxist,	  feminist,	  or	  anti-­‐racist,	  that	  depended	  on	  analysis	  of	  a	  single	  root	  cause	  were	  an	  impediment	  to	  the	  actualization	  of	  a	  collective	  minor	  empiricism	  that	  could	  intervene	  against	  the	  erasure	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  disinterested	  science	  as	  Combahee	  seems	  to	  understand	  it.	  Radical	  political	  ideologies,	  specifically	  as	  they	  has	  been	  constructed	  around	  taxonomies	  of	  social	  life,	  or	  what	  we	  might	  understand	  as	  singular	  identities—classes,	  sexes,	  or	  races—often	  operated	  to	  factionalize	  resistance	  to	  power	  in	  ways	  that	  were	  both	  more	  and	  less	  beneficial	  to	  those	  affected	  by	  it.	  In	  Combahee’s	  moment,	  the	  most	  vocal	  and	  activist	  proponents	  of	  these	  political	  ideologies	  often	  depended	  on	  narratives	  of	  singular	  origins	  of	  oppression—be	  they	  capitalism,	  patriarchy,	  or	  racism—in	  order	  to	  offer	  a	  systematic	  or	  total	  explanation	  for	  existing	  features	  of	  oppression.	  Although	  such	  analytics	  were	  compelling	  for	  their	  explanatory	  power,	  they	  often	  had	  the	  result	  of	  separating	  or	  reducing	  both	  the	  specificity	  and	  commonality	  of	  interests	  of	  oppressed	  groups	  from	  one	  another,	  and,	  perhaps	  more	  importantly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Combahee,	  strict	  adherence	  to	  these	  ideologies	  did	  not	  merely	  divide	  groups	  from	  one	  another,	  but	  also	  factionalized	  the	  individual	  experience	  of	  group	  members	  who	  operated	  at	  the	  interstices	  of	  these	  identities.	  	  As	  I	  described	  earlier	  (and	  in	  great	  detail	  in	  chapter	  one),	  the	  arbitrary	  isolation	  of	  an	  experimental	  system	  and	  experimental	  object	  is	  one	  productive	  way	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in	  which	  laboratory	  experimental	  science	  proceeds.32	  The	  translation	  of	  this	  practice	  to	  analyses	  of	  social	  systems,	  especially	  as	  they	  emerged	  in	  social	  science	  theories,	  is	  in	  part	  an	  effect	  of	  what	  Porter	  has	  described	  as	  the	  mobilization	  of	  natural	  and	  physical	  science	  practices	  and	  epistemologies	  within	  the	  social	  sciences.	  He	  argues	  that	  what	  Auguste	  Comte,	  father	  of	  positivism,	  had	  earlier	  called	  the	  moral	  sciences—and	  which	  we	  today	  call	  the	  social	  sciences—benefited	  in	  terms	  of	  authority	  from	  the	  supposed	  unification	  of	  science	  by	  a	  shared	  “method.”	  As	  they	  were	  increasingly	  professionalized	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  social	  sciences—including	  psychology,	  sociology,	  and	  criminology—became	  increasingly	  technical,	  quantitative,	  and	  for	  those	  reasons,	  seemingly	  objective,	  built	  on	  empirical	  observation	  and	  its	  quantitative	  extrapolations.	  Interestingly,	  even	  as	  ideology	  critique	  was	  committed	  to	  understanding	  the	  politics	  of	  social	  systems,	  it	  emerged	  and	  operated	  within,	  across,	  and	  in	  conversation	  with	  the	  social	  sciences—and	  one	  need	  only	  think	  here	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  Marxist	  science—in	  ways	  that	  presupposed	  both	  the	  value	  of	  objectivity	  and	  also	  the	  systematicity,	  causality,	  and	  rationality	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  In	  order	  to	  describe	  oppression,	  then,	  ideology	  critique,	  whether	  feminist	  or	  Marxist	  or	  anti-­‐racist,	  often	  operated	  by	  isolating	  a	  given	  causal	  structure—for	  example,	  patriarchy—and	  identifying	  it	  as	  a	  singular	  locus	  of	  oppression.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  See:	  Hans-­‐Jörg	  Rheinberger,	  The	  History	  of	  Epistemic	  Things.	  Although	  such	  isolation	  need-­‐not	  be	  a	  limit	  or	  political	  problem	  for	  experimental	  science—and,	  in	  fact,	  it	  is	  often	  of	  great	  utility—it	  has	  implications	  when	  such	  isolation	  is	  understand	  as	  given	  rather	  than	  heuristic.	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Tied	  to	  singular	  identities	  and	  competing	  explanatory	  narratives,	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  for,	  say,	  the	  black	  nationalist	  movement	  to	  find	  ties	  to	  the	  feminist	  movement,	  even	  as	  the	  members	  of	  Combahee	  identify	  with	  and	  are	  oppressed	  by	  the	  forces	  that	  concern	  both	  movements.	  We	  might	  extrapolate	  from	  Combahee’s	  statement	  a	  concern	  with	  both	  the	  forms	  of	  biologism	  that	  produce	  and	  enforce	  race	  and	  sex,	  but—insofar	  as	  those	  categories	  come	  to	  constitute	  social	  structures—also	  recognition	  that	  they	  must	  operate	  from	  the	  material	  grounds	  that	  such	  categorization	  has	  wrought,	  regardless	  of	  the	  origins.	  What	  would	  it	  mean	  not	  to	  return	  to	  and	  demolish	  a	  singular	  origin	  of	  oppression—whether	  that	  be	  patriarchy,	  racial	  commodification,	  or	  Enlightenment	  scientism—but	  instead	  to	  produce	  a	  revolutionary	  practice	  that	  could	  describe	  and	  identify	  the	  multiple,	  seemingly	  competing,	  and	  often	  contradictory	  instantiations	  of	  oppressive	  forces	  in	  their	  own	  moment,	  operating	  from	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  now	  in	  order	  to	  produce,	  engage,	  and	  actualize	  the	  interrelations	  among	  concerns	  that	  science,	  social	  science,	  and	  political	  ideology	  grounded	  in	  those	  practices	  imagined	  as	  separate?	  Rather	  than	  rejecting	  the	  “knowledge”	  created	  by	  these	  practices	  on	  their	  own	  disciplinary	  grounds,	  how	  might	  one	  question	  the	  very	  value	  of	  knowledge	  grounded	  in	  given	  ontologies	  and	  produce	  an	  alternative.	  .	  .	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Combahee,	  an	  alternative	  grounded	  in	  the	  value	  of	  “belief”	  and	  the	  productive	  capacities	  of	  empirical	  thought?	  In	  response	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  organization	  based	  on	  singular	  identity	  categories,	  the	  members	  of	  Combahee	  chose	  not	  to	  assert	  “’correct’	  political	  goals”	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  committing	  “reactionary	  and	  destructive	  acts”	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	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them.	  Instead,	  they	  chose	  to	  defer	  any	  externalizing	  moralism,	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  revolutionary-­‐becoming	  of	  their	  own	  collective.	  They	  state:	  As	  feminists	  we	  don	  not	  want	  to	  mess	  over	  other	  people	  in	  the	  name	  of	  politics.	  We	  believe	  in	  collective	  process	  and	  non-­‐hierarchical	  distribution	  of	  power	  within	  our	  own	  group	  and	  in	  our	  vision	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  society.	  We	  are	  committed	  to	  a	  continual	  examination	  of	  our	  politics	  as	  they	  develop	  through	  criticism	  and	  self-­‐criticism	  as	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  our	  practice.	  [.	  .	  .	  We]	  are	  ready	  for	  the	  lifetime	  of	  work	  and	  struggle	  before	  us.	  (13-­‐14)	  	  Although	  they	  express	  a	  willingness	  to	  struggle	  along	  with	  other	  self-­‐organized	  groups	  engaged	  in	  political	  action,	  they	  suggest	  that	  any	  group	  whose	  members	  organize	  around	  shared	  oppression	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  determine	  the	  constitutive	  features	  and	  desired	  responses	  to	  that	  oppression.	  Accordingly,	  they	  do	  not	  see	  it	  as	  their	  task	  to	  “educate”	  those	  who	  are	  not	  involved	  in	  their	  collective.	  They	  state,	  for	  example,	  “Eliminating	  racism	  in	  the	  white	  women’s	  movement	  is	  by	  definition	  work	  for	  white	  women	  to	  do”	  (13).	  Study,	  internal	  accountability,	  and	  projects	  focused	  on	  eliminating	  their	  own	  oppression—“as	  opposed	  to	  working	  to	  end	  somebody	  else’s	  oppression”	  or	  presuming	  to	  know,	  understand,	  and	  critically	  determine	  the	  specific	  features	  of	  someone	  else’s	  oppression—is	  for	  Combahee	  “embodied	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  identity	  politics”	  (4-­‐5).	  Their	  political	  practice	  is	  grounded	  first	  and	  foremost	  in	  their	  analysis—of	  their	  own	  relationship	  to	  the	  multiple	  forms	  of	  identity	  they	  choose	  and	  which	  are	  imposed	  on	  them—through	  study,	  a	  collective	  study	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  emerge	  in	  both	  their	  writing	  and	  speech	  as	  a	  we.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  value	  of	  an	  autonomously	  produced	  and	  personally-­‐grounded	  science,	  rather	  than	  one	  that	  seeks	  its	  force	  through	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“education”	  and	  epistemological	  unification,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  pay	  some	  attention	  to	  Combahee’s	  description	  of	  their	  self-­‐formation.	  In	  the	  penultimate	  section	  of	  the	  Statement,	  entitled	  “Problems	  in	  Organizing	  Black	  Feminism,”	  the	  Collective	  outlines	  a	  series	  of	  internal	  debates	  over	  what	  form	  their	  revolutionary	  practice	  should	  take.	  At	  first,	  the	  group	  deferred	  making	  a	  decision	  about	  a	  specific	  shared	  political	  practice,	  and	  “individuals	  continued	  their	  involvement”	  in	  political	  projects	  external	  to	  the	  Collective—including	  Lesbian	  politics,	  sterilization	  abuse	  and	  abortion	  rights	  work,	  and	  support	  activity	  for	  ongoing	  political	  trials—while	  they	  assessed	  what	  they	  had	  and	  what	  they	  might	  want	  to	  offer	  as	  a	  group	  (10-­‐11).	  Over	  several	  years	  time,	  the	  group	  shifted,	  becoming	  increasingly	  interested	  in	  class	  analysis	  and	  simultaneously	  struggling	  over	  internal	  differences	  with	  regards	  to	  sexuality	  and	  class.	  Finally,	  in	  1976,	  they	  write,	  “Those	  of	  us	  who	  were	  still	  meeting	  had	  determined	  the	  need	  to	  do	  political	  work	  and	  to	  move	  beyond	  consciousness-­‐raising	  and	  serving	  exclusively	  as	  an	  emotional	  support	  group.	  [.	  .	  .	  ]	  We	  decided	  at	  that	  time	  [.	  .	  .	  ]	  to	  become	  a	  study	  group”	  (12,	  emphasis	  mine).	  	  The	  establishment	  of	  a	  collective	  organized	  around	  study—around	  the	  value	  of	  being	  a	  student	  rather	  than	  an	  expert—is	  not	  only	  a	  break	  from	  leftists	  groups	  whose	  goals	  were	  to	  eliminate	  the	  false	  consciousness	  of	  others	  through	  education	  in	  proper	  ideology	  (most	  notably,	  those	  that	  aligned	  themselves	  with	  scientific	  Marxism),	  but	  also	  a	  break	  from	  the	  value	  systems	  that	  organize	  time	  in	  ways	  that	  valorize	  the	  events	  of	  life	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  ending,	  to	  the	  production	  of	  history	  and	  knowledge.	  Moreso,	  it	  also	  refuses	  the	  education	  provided	  by	  a	  dominant	  and	  scientized	  educational	  system	  as	  the	  means	  to	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  and	  their	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position	  in	  it.	  While	  they	  recognize	  that	  the	  systematic	  denial	  of	  black	  youths’	  access	  to	  education	  has	  important	  economic	  repercussions—repercussions	  that	  were	  clearly	  related	  to	  the	  rapidly	  expanding	  prison	  system—they	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  advocate	  for	  the	  particular	  value	  of	  institutionalized	  education	  beyond	  its	  role	  as	  a	  means	  to	  economic-­‐qua-­‐political	  control.	  In	  turning	  to	  study	  over	  and	  against	  institutionalized	  education,	  the	  group	  contributes	  to	  a	  broader	  critique	  of	  the	  US	  educational	  system	  proffered	  by	  thinkers	  affiliated	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  black	  liberation	  moment.	  The	  critique	  they	  join	  in	  producing	  can	  be	  found	  both	  in	  the	  longer	  history	  of	  reformers	  like	  WEB	  Du	  Bois,	  Ida	  B.	  Wells,	  and	  Mary	  Church	  Terrell,	  but	  also	  in	  thinkers	  of	  their	  own	  moment,	  such	  as	  Angela	  Davis	  and	  George	  Jackson.	  In	  the	  1970s,	  Davis	  was	  an	  ardent	  critic	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  blacks	  in	  school	  curriculum,	  and	  her	  article,	  “Reflections	  on	  the	  Black	  Woman’s	  Role	  in	  the	  Community	  of	  Slaves,”	  was	  written	  to	  refute	  the	  racial	  science	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Moynihan	  report	  and	  its	  cultural	  repercussion.	  Her	  work	  was	  integral	  to	  the	  writing	  of	  Combahee’s	  Statement.	  33	  	  Jackson,	  a	  Black	  Panther	  and	  radical	  philosopher	  of	  the	  prison,	  located	  the	  specific	  problems	  of	  the	  US	  educational	  system	  both	  in	  its	  refusal	  to	  take	  black	  people	  as	  the	  agents	  and	  subjects	  of	  history	  and	  in	  its	  advocacy	  of	  “science”	  as	  the	  best	  means	  to	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world.34	  Rather	  than	  seeing	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  Davis’s	  article,	  “Reflections	  on	  the	  Black	  Woman’s	  Role	  in	  the	  Community	  of	  Slaves,”	  The	  Massachusetts	  Review	  13:1/2	  (1972):	  81-­‐100,	  is	  cited	  in	  the	  framing	  paragraphs	  of	  the	  Statement	  section	  entitled	  “The	  Genesis	  of	  Contemporary	  Black	  Feminism.”	  34	  The	  idea	  of	  “science”	  as	  a	  singular	  field	  unified	  by	  “the	  scientific	  method”	  has	  little	  to	  no	  salience	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  science.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  I	  put	  the	  terms	  in	  quotation	  marks	  above.	  A	  further	  explanation	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	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these	  two	  problems	  as	  disconnected,	  Jackson	  evinced	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  former	  was	  enabled	  by	  the	  latter’s	  claim	  to	  disinterestedness,	  which	  papered	  over	  science’s	  deeply	  interested	  political	  effects.	  While	  Jackson	  did	  not	  abandon	  the	  potentials	  of	  science,	  he	  did	  claim	  that	  the	  first	  step	  in	  a	  revolutionary	  practice	  would	  be	  “to	  extinguish	  forever	  the	  light	  of	  a	  perverted	  science”	  that	  grounds	  American	  “ideals,	  moralities,	  and	  institutions”	  (Jackson	  100).	  But	  simply	  because	  Comabhee	  joined	  in	  making	  a	  critique	  of	  education	  and	  institutionalized	  practices	  that	  reverberated	  from	  social	  science	  does	  not	  mean	  they	  abandoned	  the	  power	  of	  a	  counter-­‐social	  science.	  Instead,	  they	  mobilized	  science	  in	  its	  multiple	  forms	  as	  a	  series	  of	  tactics	  within	  a	  mutating	  field	  that	  was	  being	  produced	  anew	  by	  them	  through	  their	  empirical	  science.	  Just	  as	  an	  intersectional	  approach	  to	  identity	  politics	  required	  strategic	  relays	  between	  identification	  and	  disidentification	  with	  fixed	  aspects	  of	  identity,	  Combahee’s—and,	  more	  generally,	  	  Black	  feminism’s—engagement	  with	  and	  revision	  of	  scientific	  and	  social	  scientific	  practices	  required	  both	  the	  strategic	  deployment	  of	  technoscientific	  and	  scientifico-­‐juridical	  conceits	  as	  they	  had	  emerged	  and	  gained	  power	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  but	  also,	  simultaneous	  refusals	  of	  many	  of	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  about	  and	  conceptions	  of	  life	  that	  structured	  and	  gave	  such	  conceptions	  their	  power,	  thus	  breaking	  with	  dogmatic	  or	  unified	  approach	  to	  activism.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  members	  of	  Combahee	  were	  embedded	  in	  systems	  that	  enforced	  differential	  access	  to	  care,	  and	  so	  they	  therefore	  needed	  to	  identify	  with	  and	  support,	  for	  example,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  science	  came	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  popular	  perception	  as	  a	  field	  unified	  by	  a	  single	  method	  will	  follow	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  paper.	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social	  scientific	  practices	  of	  assessing	  and	  improving	  women’s	  health	  (Beverly	  Smith,	  one	  member	  of	  the	  Collective,	  was	  the	  first	  to	  teach	  a	  woman’s	  health	  class	  at	  UMass	  Boston),	  and	  also	  strategically	  support	  practices	  such	  as	  scientific	  jury	  selection	  which	  was,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Inez	  Garcia,	  being	  mobilized	  for	  liberatory	  purposes.	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  group’s	  efforts	  also	  required	  the	  production	  of	  critical	  alternatives	  to	  the	  pervasive	  and	  historically	  oppressive	  practices	  of	  science	  and	  social	  science	  that	  informed—in	  fact,	  had	  almost	  become—legal	  procedures	  and	  cultural	  consciousness.	  Combahee’s	  Statement	  does	  both	  at	  once	  in	  the	  formal	  construction	  of	  its	  Statement.	  	  The	  organization	  of	  their	  statement	  almost	  mirrors	  social	  scientific	  publications.	  Just	  as	  most	  social	  science	  publications	  consist	  of	  sections	  detailing	  1.	  Introduction,	  2.	  Literature	  Review,	  3.	  Method,	  4.	  Results,	  and	  5.	  Discussion,	  the	  Collective’s	  Statement	  was	  similarly	  organized.	  It	  is	  also	  divided	  into	  five	  sections	  that	  offer	  similarly	  organized	  information	  that	  include	  an	  introduction,	  history,	  orienting	  beliefs,	  discussion	  of	  problems,	  and	  future	  plans.	  This	  formal	  decision	  was	  perhaps	  influenced	  by	  members	  Beverly	  and	  Barbara	  Smith’s	  academic	  experience.	  But,	  importantly,	  the	  social	  science	  form	  of	  the	  statement	  is	  cut	  by	  the	  political	  manifesto	  form,	  transforming	  the	  seeming	  after-­‐the-­‐fact	  reportage—as	  Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  describe	  science	  writing’s	  self-­‐presentation—into	  an	  affirmation	  of	  immanent	  constitution	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  writing.	  Such	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  science	  reporting,	  then,	  offers	  a	  conception	  of	  scientific	  practice	  that	  can	  recognize	  the	  ontological	  cuttings	  of	  “science”	  as	  epistemological	  and	  technological	  processes	  inseparable	  from	  the	  personal	  and	  political—and	  the	  personal	  as	  political—because	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scientific	  practices	  and	  their	  epistemological	  determinations	  always	  emerge	  in,	  are	  informed	  by,	  and	  help	  to	  shape	  social	  organization.	  Combahee’s	  formal	  invention	  ultimately	  operates	  to	  refuse	  a	  unified	  and	  disinterested	  conception	  of	  science	  and	  articulate	  a	  set	  of	  scientific	  practices	  more	  useful	  to	  their	  social	  situation.	  Indeed,	  they	  make	  writing	  itself	  a	  part	  of	  the	  experiment,	  by	  situating	  the	  production	  of	  the	  Statement	  in	  its	  own	  writing	  as	  part	  of	  a	  present	  continually	  unfolding	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  past	  not	  yet	  completed	  and	  future	  that	  is	  not	  so	  much	  yet-­‐to-­‐come	  as	  it	  is	  always	  becoming.	  The	  very	  production	  of	  such	  an	  alternative,	  critical	  form	  of	  knowledge	  production—as	  an	  enacted	  practice—then,	  could	  be	  said	  to	  not	  only	  offer	  but	  also	  
constitute	  the	  alternative.	  The	  practice	  of	  analysis,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Combahee,	  that	  emerges	  from	  their	  belief	  in	  their	  worth	  and	  their	  investment	  in	  duration—rather	  than	  incremental	  and	  progressive	  time—as	  revolutionary	  time	  constitutes	  the	  formation	  of	  what	  philosopher	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  calls	  a	  “minor	  people,	  eternally	  minor,	  taken	  up	  in	  a	  becoming-­‐revolutionary.”	  	  
Study,	  which	  aspires	  to	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  the	  duration	  of	  that	  study	  as	  opposed	  to	  its	  end	  in	  expertise	  or	  mastery,	  appears	  in	  Comabahee’s	  statement	  as	  a	  way	  of	  reconceiving	  of	  their	  own	  practice	  that	  revalues	  temporal	  “progress,”	  and	  allows	  the	  statement	  to	  operate	  much	  like	  the	  anti-­‐bildungsroman	  of	  McCullers	  or	  the	  anti-­‐sentimental	  novel	  of	  Mead.	  In	  particular,	  Combahee	  emphasize	  that	  this	  study	  is	  grounded	  in	  their	  own	  experience,	  which	  sets	  them	  apart	  from	  the	  general	  conditions	  of	  scientificity	  but	  links	  them	  to	  this	  minor	  tradition	  of	  empiricism.	  In	  their	  statement,	  Combahee	  conceives	  of	  a	  study	  of	  experience	  that	  is	  not	  readily	  given	  to	  information,	  taxonomy,	  or	  incrementalization,	  providing	  an	  alterative	  to	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data-­‐based	  knowledge	  used	  to	  proscribe	  and	  prescribe	  behavior.	  They	  outline	  a	  practice	  that	  operates	  in	  the	  continuous	  production	  of	  description	  and	  analysis,	  which	  does	  not	  come	  from	  an	  anonymous,	  disinterested	  “outside,”	  but	  by	  contrast	  emerges	  from	  their	  own	  experience,	  from	  the	  feltness	  of	  affective	  and	  sensorial	  perception	  not	  consonant	  with	  the	  dominant	  terms	  of	  experience	  nor	  readily	  given	  to	  codified	  knowledge.	  This	  constantly	  self-­‐generating	  and	  adapting	  analytic	  enables	  the	  production	  of	  practices	  and	  procedures	  that	  can	  make	  new	  structures	  for	  enacting	  knowledge	  because	  it	  emerges	  as	  the	  capacity	  of	  experience	  to	  engender	  relations	  and	  associations	  for	  producing	  epistemological	  structures	  that,	  despite	  not	  being	  “given,”	  still	  exhibit	  real	  force.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  produce	  a	  practice	  that	  we	  might	  call	  an	  empiricism	  from	  below,	  a	  minor	  empiricism,	  that	  extracts	  empirical	  questions	  from	  the	  grips	  of	  a	  progressive	  positivism	  and	  offers	  a	  return	  to	  the	  radical	  questioning	  of	  the	  value	  of	  values,	  of	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  experimentation,	  and	  of	  the	  structuring	  procedures	  of	  knowledge	  and	  of	  thought	  itself.	   To	  understand	  the	  possibilities	  the	  Comabahee	  produces	  and	  their	  specific	  responses	  to	  a	  longer	  history	  of	  scientific	  conscription	  and	  intervention,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  read	  their	  statement’s	  formal	  effects	  as	  a	  work	  of	  literary	  invention	  or	  what	  philosopher	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  calls	  an	  act	  of	  “fabulation.”	  Claiming	  it	  as	  literary	  production	  can	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  both	  the	  insistent	  duration	  of	  Combahee’s	  work	  and	  the	  real	  implications	  of	  McCullers’s	  fiction.	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  describing	  the	  statement	  in	  terms	  of	  fabulation	  offers	  a	  useful	  way	  for	  understanding	  the	  experimental	  possibilities	  of	  experience	  as	  a	  forceful	  challenge	  to	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the	  value	  of	  positivist	  empiricist	  knowledge-­‐production	  as	  well	  as	  the	  particular	  scientific	  interventions	  Combahee’s	  collective	  (and)	  statement	  make(s).	  This	  intervention,	  although	  epistemologically	  disruptive	  is,	  like	  McCullers	  and	  Mead,	  not	  paradigm	  shifting—which	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  not	  mobilized	  in	  the	  furthering	  of	  dominant	  science.	  It	  is,	  rather,	  part	  of	  an	  ongoing,	  repeated,	  and	  necessary	  challenge	  posed	  to	  dominant	  knowledge-­‐power	  formations.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  possibilities	  of	  a	  radical	  strand	  of	  empiricism	  and	  the	  value	  of	  the	  minor—especially	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  possibility	  of	  minor	  literature—are	  suggested	  by	  Deleuze,	  both	  in	  his	  affirmation	  of	  literature	  as	  a	  “clinical”	  (creative,	  reparative)	  practice	  producing	  a	  “minor	  people”	  and	  his	  affirmation	  of	  empiricism	  as	  capable	  of	  producing	  “belief	  in	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is”	  as	  a	  central	  force	  for	  changing	  the	  values	  that	  will	  enable	  new	  political	  arrangements.	  This	  brings	  empiricism	  and	  fabulation,	  science	  and	  literature,	  into	  a	  positive	  political	  relation.	  	  Combahee’s	  Statement,	  then,	  becomes	  a	  performative	  site,	  an	  enactment	  of	  the	  production	  of	  not	  merely	  empirical	  subjectivity,	  but	  of	  collective	  subjectivity.	  In	  the	  Statement,	  the	  Collective	  imagines	  a	  non-­‐teleological	  relationship	  to	  revolutionary	  time,	  which	  is	  both	  actualized	  in	  the	  duration	  of	  immediate	  and	  tasks	  and	  also	  endures	  as	  an	  ongoing,	  never-­‐ending	  revolutionary	  practice;	  the	  Statement	  then	  appears	  as	  a	  “monument”	  to	  a	  future	  constantly	  and	  already	  in	  production.	  The	  Statement	  endures	  as	  art	  in	  the	  way	  suggested	  by	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  when	  they	  write	  that	  art	  as	  “monument	  does	  not	  commemorate	  or	  celebrate	  something	  that	  happened	  but	  confides	  to	  the	  ear	  of	  the	  future	  the	  persistent	  sensations	  that	  embody	  the	  event:	  the	  constantly	  renewed	  suffering	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  their	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recreated	  protestations,	  their	  constantly	  resumed	  struggle”	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  
Philosophy	  176).	  Decidedly,	  the	  event	  of	  ongoing	  struggle	  is	  the	  ongoing	  occasion	  for	  Comabehee’s	  production.	  They	  suggest	  that	  their	  position	  at	  “the	  bottom”	  of	  the	  social	  hierarchy	  disenables	  access	  to	  the	  procedures	  of	  civic	  reform—procedures	  that	  would	  require	  them	  to	  accept	  a	  progress	  narrative	  of	  modernity	  and	  therefore	  “fight	  the	  world”	  (12).	  For	  them,	  “fighting	  the	  world”	  is	  undesirable,	  and	  they	  see	  the	  suggestion	  that	  they	  are	  relegated	  to	  do	  so	  as	  “pessimistic.”	  More	  hopefully,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  they	  claim	  that	  the	  same	  position	  enables	  the	  thought	  of	  an	  alternative	  not	  limited	  to	  reform.	  Being	  on	  the	  bottom	  allows	  them	  “to	  make	  a	  clear	  leap	  into	  revolutionary	  action.”	  But	  revolutionary	  action	  here	  indicates	  not	  a	  revolution	  to	  be	  won;	  they	  see	  their	  “revolutionary	  task”	  as	  engaging	  in	  a	  “lifetime	  of	  work.”	  Revolution	  is	  a	  lifetime	  practice	  that	  includes	  not	  only	  their	  own	  lifetimes,	  but	  also	  the	  “countless”	  (both	  innumerable	  and	  uncountable)	  “generations”	  of	  women	  that	  preceded—and	  presumably	  will	  follow—from	  them	  (14).	  Rather	  than	  fighting	  the	  world,	  they	  join	  with	  a	  counter-­‐tradition	  that	  names	  another,	  otherwise	  invisible,	  way	  of	  seeing	  the	  material	  of	  this	  world	  as	  it	  is.	  By	  creating	  and	  joining	  this	  history	  as	  an	  insistent,	  disruptive	  force,	  they	  give	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  epistemological	  structurings	  of	  juridico-­‐scientific	  civic	  life.	  	  Recently,	  in	  “’We’	  in	  Redux:	  The	  Combahee	  River	  Collective’s	  Black	  Feminist	  
Statement,”	  Brian	  Norman	  productively	  reads	  Combahee’s	  Statement	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  the	  manifesto	  as	  a	  performative,	  in	  the	  sense	  described	  by	  J.L.	  Austen	  and	  Judith	  Butler	  reading	  Austin.	  	  Norman	  suggests	  that	  the	  statement	  enables	  the	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ongoing	  production	  of	  a	  collective	  “we,”	  a	  people,	  through	  its	  generative	  and	  continued	  enunciation.	  Norman’s	  reading	  helps	  to	  articulate	  the	  continued	  material	  and	  conceptual	  capacity	  of	  the	  Statement	  to	  affect	  and	  effect	  the	  groups	  who	  read,	  re-­‐read,	  print,	  and	  publish	  it.	  However,	  Norman	  imagines	  the	  Statement	  as	  “utopian”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  develops	  an	  impulse	  aimed	  at	  the	  future,	  which	  engenders	  ongoing	  revolution	  but	  is	  not	  itself	  fully	  successful	  as	  revolutionary.	  But,	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  groups	  own	  sense	  of	  revolutionary	  time,	  in	  which	  the	  revolution	  would	  be	  immanent	  to	  its	  own	  materiality,	  it	  could	  be	  said	  that	  their	  revolution	  both	  succeeds	  and,	  in	  the	  statement,	  makes	  what	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  calls	  “art”	  as	  “monument.”	  They	  write:	   This	  is,	  precisely,	  the	  task	  of	  all	  art,	  [to]	  extract	  new	  harmonies,	  new	  plastic	  or	  melodic	  landscapes,	  and	  new	  rhythmic	  characters	  that	  raise	  them	  to	  the	  height	  of	  the	  earth’s	  song	  and	  the	  cry	  of	  humanity:	  that	  which	  constitutes	  tone,	  health,	  becoming,	  a	  visual	  and	  sonorous	  bloc.	  [Art	  as]	  monument	  does	  not	  commemorate	  or	  celebrate	  something	  that	  happened	  but	  confides	  to	  the	  ear	  of	  the	  future	  the	  persistent	  sensations	  that	  embody	  the	  event:	  the	  constantly	  renewed	  suffering	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  their	  recreated	  protestations,	  their	  constantly	  resumed	  struggle.	  Will	  all	  this	  be	  in	  vain	  because	  suffering	  is	  eternal	  and	  revolutions	  do	  not	  survive	  their	  victory?	  But	  the	  success	  of	  a	  revolution	  resides	  only	  in	  itself,	  precisely	  in	  the	  vibrations,	  clinches,	  and	  openings	  it	  gave	  to	  men	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  making	  and	  that	  composes	  in	  itself	  a	  monument	  that	  is	  always	  in	  the	  process	  of	  becoming,	  like	  those	  tumuli	  to	  which	  each	  new	  traveler	  adds	  a	  stone.	  The	  victory	  of	  a	  revolution	  is	  immanent	  and	  consists	  in	  the	  new	  bonds	  it	  installs	  between	  people,	  even	  if	  these	  bonds	  last	  no	  longer	  than	  the	  revolution’s	  fused	  material	  and	  quickly	  give	  way	  to	  division	  and	  betrayal.	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Philosophy	  177).	  	  Reading	  for	  this	  version	  of	  Combahee,	  and	  affirming	  even	  more	  intensely,	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  Norman,	  which	  can	  be	  opened	  up	  by	  reading	  their	  capacity	  to	  bring	  together	  and	  bridge,	  through	  negotiations	  and	  relays,	  the	  seemingly	  unbridgeable	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differences	  that	  divide	  social,	  scientific,	  and	  aesthetic	  concerns,	  and	  which	  can	  be	  iterated	  in	  time,	  helps	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  not	  only	  writing	  but	  also	  reading—especially	  collective	  reading—becomes	  an	  empirical	  practice	  that	  can	  produce	  a	  minor	  people.	  This	  reading	  would	  be	  the	  “intensive	  reading”	  I	  have	  spoken	  of	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter:	  reading	  that	  continually	  puts	  a	  book	  or	  writing	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  forms	  of	  life	  outside	  of	  it.	  Combahee’s	  “study,”	  and	  their	  intersectional	  analytic,	  operates	  in	  just	  such	  a	  way.	  By	  taking	  “the	  personal	  is	  political”	  as	  the	  grounds	  of	  their	  study,	  Combahee	  helps	  to	  illuminate	  the	  personal	  and	  political	  aspects	  of	  “science”	  that	  served	  as	  the	  central	  component	  of	  pedagogy	  in	  US	  institutional	  education	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Without	  referring	  to	  a	  unified	  “science”—in	  fact,	  precisely	  by	  refusing	  to	  imagine	  it	  as	  a	  unified	  field—the	  intersectional	  analytic	  and	  political	  practice	  of	  the	  Combahee	  Collective	  makes	  a	  radical	  intervention	  against	  the	  power	  of	  a	  unified,	  positivist,	  and	  nominally	  “disinterested”	  conception	  of	  science	  and	  its	  authority	  in	  determining	  policies	  and	  institutional	  practices	  around	  raced,	  classed,	  and	  gendered	  bodies.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  returning	  to	  “empiricism”	  the	  radical	  force	  of	  
belief—what	  Deleuze	  suggests	  must	  be	  “belief	  in	  this	  world	  as	  it	  is”—rather	  than	  “knowledge”	  (Deleuze,	  Cinema	  170).	  	  The	  Combahee	  River	  Collective—as	  did	  McCullers	  before	  them—makes	  of	  experience	  an	  experiment,	  a	  force	  to	  create	  new	  
values.	  	  Importantly,	  this	  means	  taking	  reading	  and	  collective	  study	  not	  merely	  as	  practices	  by	  which	  one	  comes	  to	  understand	  experience,	  but	  as	  themselves	  forms	  of	  experience.	  	  
	   240	  
“To	  Wide	  Ourself	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  Aesthetic	  Events	  and	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  World	  	  
	  
	  
	   The	  question	  of	  what	  it	  might	  mean	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  is	  a	  pressing	  one	  for	  understanding	  minor	  empiricism,	  just	  as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  for	  understanding	  minor	  realisms.	  In	  fact,	  McCullers’s	  insistence	  that	  her	  writing	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  realism	  as	  opposed	  to	  Southern	  Gothic	  speaks	  to	  her	  conviction	  that	  her	  strange	  worlds	  are	  this	  world	  as	  it	  is.35	  I	  take	  the	  importance	  of	  “belief	  in	  this	  world	  as	  it	  is”	  from	  Deleuze,	  who,	  in	  Cinema	  2	  writes:	  The	  modern	  fact	  is	  that	  we	  no	  longer	  believe	  in	  the	  world.	  We	  do	  not	  even	  believe	  in	  the	  events	  which	  happen	  to	  us,	  love,	  death,	  as	  if	  they	  only	  half	  concerned	  us.	  […]	  The	  link	  between	  man	  and	  the	  world	  is	  broken.	  Henceforth,	  this	  link	  must	  become	  an	  object	  of	  belief:	  it	  is	  the	  impossible	  which	  can	  only	  be	  restored	  within	  a	  faith.	  Whether	  we	  are	  Christians	  or	  atheists,	  in	  our	  universal	  schizophrenia,	  we	  need	  reasons	  to	  believe	  in	  this	  world.	  It	  was	  already	  a	  great	  turning	  point	  in	  philosophy	  […]:	  to	  replace	  the	  model	  of	  knowledge	  with	  belief.	  But	  belief	  replaces	  knowledge	  only	  when	  it	  becomes	  belief	  in	  this	  world	  as	  
it	  is.	  (Deleuze,	  Cinema	  171-­‐3,	  emphasis	  original)	  	  Here,	  “as	  it	  is”	  does	  not	  imply	  total	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  fact,	  belief	  in	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  refuses	  any	  ontology	  that	  could	  be	  mapped	  by	  epistemology	  precisely	  because	  the	  ontological	  is	  never	  fully	  realized.	  Instead,	  belief	  in	  the	  world	  refers	  to	  not	  only	  the	  actualizations	  of	  the	  world	  that	  can	  be	  known—including	  those	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  In	  an	  essay	  entitled	  “The	  Russian	  Realists	  and	  Southern	  Literature”	  (1941),	  McCullers	  rejects	  the	  label	  of	  “Southern	  Gothic”	  as	  it	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  both	  her	  and	  fellow	  Southerner	  William	  Faulkner.	  She	  writes,	  “In	  the	  South	  during	  the	  past	  fifteen	  years	  a	  genre	  of	  writing	  has	  come	  about	  that	  is	  sufficiently	  homogeneous	  to	  have	  led	  critics	  to	  label	  it	  ‘the	  Gothic	  School.’	  This	  tag,	  however,	  is	  unfortunate.	  The	  effect	  of	  a	  Gothic	  tale	  may	  be	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  a	  Faulkner	  story	  in	  its	  evocation	  of	  horror,	  beauty,	  and	  emotional	  ambivalence—but	  this	  effect	  evolves	  from	  opposite	  sources;	  in	  the	  former	  the	  means	  used	  are	  romantic	  or	  supernatural,	  in	  the	  latter	  a	  peculiar	  and	  intense	  realism.”	  See:	  McCullers,	  “The	  Russian	  Realists	  and	  Southern	  Literature.”	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actualized	  by	  science—but	  also	  the	  potentials	  and	  virtuals	  existing,	  becoming,	  and	  still	  to	  be	  made.36	  Belief	  in	  the	  world	  means	  having	  a	  desire	  for	  the	  materiality	  and	  generativity	  of	  the	  world	  that	  enables	  one	  to	  connect	  to	  it.	  Even	  the	  most	  damaged	  and	  damaging	  social	  arrangements	  of	  material	  and	  cultural	  life	  can	  still	  provide	  the	  grounds	  of	  and	  from	  which	  to	  make	  a	  world	  worth	  struggling	  for.	  	   Belief	  in	  the	  world	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  sensorial	  disarrangement	  that	  also	  disorganizes	  the	  known	  world,	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  connect	  to	  it,	  rather	  than	  seeing	  it	  from	  the	  outside	  or	  from	  a	  standpoint	  sees	  a	  totality.	  Belief	  names	  a	  relationship	  to	  thought	  that	  is	  different	  than	  that	  of	  supposedly	  given	  knowledge;	  it	  offers	  the	  “identity	  of	  thought	  with	  choice	  as	  determination	  of	  the	  indeterminable”	  (Deleuze	  Cinema	  2	  178).	  Through	  belief,	  the	  world	  is	  disorganized,	  de-­‐determined	  from	  the	  fully	  coded	  structures	  of	  knowledge	  that	  aspire	  to	  or	  construct	  it	  as	  a	  systemic	  totality.	  The	  matter	  and	  forces	  that	  comprise	  the	  world	  are	  made	  available	  for	  new	  forms	  of	  organization	  that	  can	  emerge	  from	  “the	  simple	  belief	  of	  the	  one	  who	  chooses	  to	  choose	  (and	  restores	  the	  world	  and	  life).”	  The	  desire	  for	  the	  world	  and	  the	  struggle	  to	  actualize	  a	  capacity	  to	  think	  and	  therefore	  produce	  an	  aesthetic	  vision	  of	  the	  world	  that	  could	  de-­‐totalize	  it	  and	  make	  it	  available	  to	  empiricism	  and	  empiricist	  production	  is	  central	  to	  much	  of	  McCullers’s	  writing.	  	  
Clock	  without	  Hands,	  her	  final	  novel,	  and	  the	  one	  most	  concerned	  with	  science,	  offers	  a	  passage	  that	  highlights	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  vision	  from	  the	  outside	  or	  above	  that	  might	  totalize	  the	  world,	  and	  one	  from	  which	  one	  might	  find	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  ontology—to	  the	  degree	  that	  its	  chaotic	  form(ation)ing	  can	  be	  called	  ontology—that	  minor	  empiricism	  encounters	  is	  best	  described	  by	  the	  black	  radical/open	  onto-­‐epistemologies	  I	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	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the	  compulsion	  to	  enter	  into	  it	  in	  its	  partiality,	  multiplicity,	  and	  excess.	  Near	  the	  end	  of	  the	  novel,	  Sherman,	  for	  whom	  Jester	  has	  felt	  an	  intense	  and	  confusing	  love,	  has	  been	  killed	  by	  a	  white	  supremacist	  group	  that	  bombs	  his	  house.	  Jester,	  an	  aspiring	  pilot,	  takes	  the	  man	  who	  committed	  the	  bombing	  up	  in	  his	  small	  plane	  and,	  out	  of	  anger	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice,	  intends	  to	  shoot	  him.	  The	  narrative	  breaks,	  a	  white	  space	  between	  the	  otherwise	  continuous	  story,	  and	  a	  brief	  passage	  appears	  that	  could	  be	  the	  free	  indirect	  discourse	  of	  Jasper,	  although	  it	  almost	  appears	  as	  a	  though	  from	  a	  dislocated	  narrator	  bleeding	  into	  the	  reader,	  author,	  and	  Jasper	  himself.	  	  At	  length,	  the	  passage	  reads:	  Looking	  downward	  from	  an	  altitude	  of	  two	  thousand	  feet,	  the	  earth	  assumes	  order.	  A	  town,	  even	  Milan,	  is	  symmetrical,	  exact	  as	  a	  small	  gray	  honeycomb,	  complete.	  The	  surrounding	  terrain	  seems	  designed	  by	  a	  law	  more	  just	  and	  mathematical	  than	  the	  laws	  of	  property	  and	  bigotry:	  a	  dark	  parallelogram	  of	  pine	  woods,	  square	  fields,	  rectangles	  of	  sward.	  On	  this	  cloudless	  day	  the	  sky	  on	  all	  sides	  and	  above	  the	  plane	  is	  a	  blind	  monotone	  of	  blue,	  impenetrable	  to	  the	  eye	  and	  the	  imagination.	  But	  down	  below	  the	  earth	  is	  round.	  The	  earth	  is	  finite.	  From	  this	  height	  you	  do	  not	  see	  man	  and	  the	  details	  of	  his	  humiliation.	  The	  earth	  from	  a	  great	  distance	  is	  perfect	  and	  whole.	  	  	  But	  this	  is	  an	  order	  foreign	  to	  the	  heart,	  and	  to	  love	  the	  earth	  you	  must	  come	  closer.	  Gliding	  downward,	  low	  over	  the	  town	  and	  the	  countryside,	  the	  whole	  breaks	  up	  into	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  impressions.	  The	  town	  is	  much	  the	  same	  in	  all	  its	  seasons,	  but	  the	  land	  changes.	  In	  the	  early	  spring	  the	  fields	  here	  are	  like	  patches	  of	  worn	  gray	  corduroy,	  each	  one	  alike.	  Now	  you	  could	  begin	  to	  tell	  the	  crops	  apart:	  the	  gray	  green	  of	  cotton,	  the	  dense	  and	  spidery	  tobacco	  land,	  the	  burning	  green	  of	  corn.	  As	  you	  circle	  inward,	  the	  town	  itself	  becomes	  crazy	  and	  complex.	  You	  see	  the	  secret	  corners	  all	  the	  sad	  back	  yards.	  Gray	  fences,	  factories,	  the	  flat	  main	  street.	  From	  the	  air	  men	  are	  shrunken	  and	  they	  have	  an	  automatic	  look,	  like	  wound-­‐up	  dolls.	  They	  seem	  to	  move	  mechanically	  among	  haphazard	  miseries.	  You	  do	  not	  see	  their	  eyes.	  And	  finally	  this	  is	  intolerable.	  The	  whole	  earth	  from	  a	  great	  distance	  means	  less	  than	  one	  long	  look	  into	  a	  pair	  of	  human	  eyes.	  Even	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  enemy.	  (McCullers,	  Clock	  233-­‐4)	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Here,	  the	  narrative	  takes	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  an	  omniscient	  and	  reflexive	  narrator	  only	  to	  reject	  a	  preference	  for	  omniscience	  or	  objectivity.	  Following	  this	  passage,	  Jasper	  drops	  the	  gun	  from	  the	  plane	  without	  shooting	  the	  man,	  and	  returns	  to	  the	  ground.	  The	  clarity	  with	  which	  retribution	  appeared	  to	  Jasper	  disappears	  into	  an	  affirmation	  of	  ongoing	  struggle	  when	  he	  meets	  the	  intolerable	  of	  disconnection.37	  The	  perfect	  whole	  of	  a	  world	  system	  seen	  from	  above	  makes	  it	  easy	  to	  disconnect,	  perhaps	  impossible	  to	  connect.	  Explanation,	  which	  could	  only	  emerge	  from	  a	  vision	  of	  totality,	  means	  nothing	  without	  an	  engagement	  with	  the	  ground	  itself,	  and	  with	  another	  living	  being.	  In	  this	  kind	  of	  intimate	  engagement,	  knowledge	  moves	  away	  from	  explanation	  and	  towards	  description	  and/as	  experience.	  The	  sensorium,	  perceiving	  from	  a	  distance,	  tends	  towards	  division,	  organization,	  order,	  and	  mastery;	  the	  sensorium	  immersed	  intensifies	  with	  new	  and	  unregulated	  capacities.	  This	  affirmation	  of	  the	  ground	  in	  proximity	  moves	  Jester	  not	  to	  take	  a	  life,	  but	  instead	  moves	  both	  him	  and	  the	  novel	  towards	  one	  possibility	  of	  minor	  literature:	  “shattering	  lived	  perceptions	  into	  a	  kind	  of	  cubism,	  [and]	  freeing	  life	  wherever	  it	  is	  imprisoned,	  or	  […]	  tempting	  it	  into	  uncertain	  combat”	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  
Philosophy	  171),	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  engage	  in	  struggle	  rather	  than	  control	  and	  decimation.	  	  The	  disorganization	  of	  totality	  requires	  not	  merely	  a	  disorganization	  of	  space,	  but	  also	  of	  time.	  The	  stilling	  of	  flesh	  into	  bodies	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ordering	  of	  life	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  See	  Chapter	  1	  for	  a	  longer	  discussion	  of	  the	  “intolerable,”	  which	  I	  defined	  as	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  material	  conditions	  and	  practices	  are	  no	  longer	  suitable	  for	  life.	  An	  encounter	  with	  the	  intolerable	  impels	  a	  response	  that	  will	  transform	  those	  conditions.	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into	  progress	  are	  the	  means	  by	  which	  a	  spatial	  map	  can	  begin	  to	  produce	  and	  organize	  a	  totality.	  A	  concern	  with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  time	  is	  organized	  in	  and	  organizes	  the	  world	  appears	  more	  clearly	  in	  McCullers’s	  earlier	  novel,	  The	  Member	  
of	  the	  Wedding.	  Frankie’s	  long,	  strange	  summer	  and	  her	  sense	  of	  unbelonging,	  intensified	  by	  her	  desire	  to	  create	  a	  new	  and	  autonomous	  “we,”	  is	  precipitated	  by	  a	  transformation	  in	  her	  experience	  of	  and	  descriptive	  approach	  to	  the	  world.	  That	  summer	  is	  the	  end	  of	  “the	  year	  when	  Frankie	  thought	  about	  the	  world”	  (23).	  She	  realizes	  that	  her	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  has	  long	  seemed	  out	  of	  joint	  with	  the	  facts	  she	  has	  been	  given	  about	  it:	  “You	  know,”	  she	  says,	  “it	  is	  still	  hard	  for	  me	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  world	  turns	  around	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  about	  a	  thousand	  miles	  an	  hour,	  [...]	  and	  to	  understand	  why	  it	  is	  that	  when	  you	  jump	  up	  in	  the	  air	  you	  don’t	  come	  down	  in	  Fairview	  or	  Selma	  or	  somewhere	  fifty	  miles	  away”	  (15).	  The	  world	  moves,	  and	  she	  cannot	  comprehend	  her	  seeming	  stasis	  in	  it.	  And	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  even	  the	  “facts”	  of	  her	  schoolbooks	  are	  out	  of	  time	  with	  the	  world-­‐in-­‐progress.	  Suddenly,	  Frankie	  “did	  not	  see	  [the	  world]	  as	  a	  round	  school	  globe,	  with	  the	  countries	  neat	  and	  different	  colored.	  She	  thought	  of	  the	  world	  as	  huge	  and	  cracked	  and	  loose	  and	  turning	  at	  a	  thousand	  miles	  an	  hour”	  (McCullers,	  Member	  23).	  McCullers	  highlights	  the	  failures	  of	  static	  knowledge,	  especially	  that	  given	  through	  institutionalized	  education,	  to	  capture	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  world:	  “The	  geography	  book	  at	  school	  was	  out	  of	  date;	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  had	  changed.”	  Faced	  with	  ongoing	  news	  of	  the	  battles	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  Frankie	  is	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  enormity	  of	  the	  world	  and	  its	  changes,	  by	  the	  millions	  and	  millions	  of	  people	  whom	  she	  cannot	  conceptualize	  except	  as	  a	  rotating	  inner	  montage	  of	  soldiers	  of	  different	  nationalities	  in	  different	  places.	  In	  the	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midst	  of	  a	  disarranged	  world,	  she	  feels	  afraid.	  But	  importantly,	  she	  is	  afraid	  not	  because	  she	  fears	  for	  her	  own	  safety,	  but	  “because	  in	  the	  war	  they	  [might	  not]	  include	  her,	  and	  because	  the	  world	  seemed	  somehow	  separate	  from	  herself”	  (24).	  Her	  fascination	  with	  the	  war,	  then,	  and	  its	  rearrangement	  of	  the	  world	  also	  elicits	  a	  compulsion	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  world,	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  it.	  Here,	  for	  Frankie	  the	  possibilities	  of	  and	  desire	  for	  a	  loose	  and	  cracked	  world—the	  desire	  to	  actualize	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  a	  “a	  strongly-­‐felt	  need	  for	  some	  level	  of	  possibility	  that	  did	  not	  previously	  exist	  in	  her	  life”	  that	  would	  also	  bring	  Combahee	  together	  several	  decades	  later—operate	  through	  a	  disorganization	  and	  reconfiguration	  of	  physics,	  geography,	  and	  history.	  	  In	  The	  Heart	  Is	  a	  Lonely	  Hunter,	  published	  only	  six	  years	  before	  Member	  and	  set	  on	  the	  dawn	  of	  war	  rather	  than	  in	  its	  midst,	  Mick—also	  an	  adolescent	  girl	  and	  something	  of	  an	  earlier	  iteration	  of	  Frankie—experiences	  a	  shift	  in	  both	  her	  perception	  of	  the	  world	  and	  its	  possibilities	  that	  is	  directly	  engendered	  by	  aesthetic	  experience.	  The	  effects	  of	  this	  experience	  evince	  an	  unexpected	  understanding	  of	  science	  as	  organized	  by	  aesthetics.	  Alone	  in	  the	  dark,	  having	  escaped	  from	  a	  birthday	  party	  that	  brought	  her	  another	  year	  closer	  to	  a	  majority	  she	  dreads,	  Mick	  is	  thrown	  into	  a	  violent	  and	  creative	  connection	  with	  the	  earth	  by	  a	  jolting	  encounter	  with	  art.	  A	  radio	  program	  plays	  through	  an	  open	  window,	  and	  she	  hears	  Beethoven	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  The	  music	  engenders	  a	  synaesthetic	  experience,	  “boiling”	  and	  “hot”	  inside	  her,	  appearing	  as	  a	  “silver	  tune”	  and	  a	  “black	  march,”	  disrupting	  not	  only	  her	  sensorial	  organization	  but	  also	  temporal	  progression:	  “The	  music	  did	  not	  take	  a	  long	  time	  or	  a	  short	  time.	  It	  did	  not	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  time	  going	  by	  at	  all”	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(McCullers	  Heart	  100-­‐101).	  It	  makes	  of	  time	  a	  duration	  that	  is	  not	  a	  passage	  but	  an	  intensification.	  And	  it	  elicits	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  that	  she	  barely	  even	  knows	  how	  to	  ask	  beyond	  undirected,	  non-­‐sequitur	  inquiry—“Which?”—that	  at	  its	  most	  formed	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  remember	  “How	  did	  it	  come?”	  so	  that	  she	  can	  experience	  it	  again.	  The	  beautiful	  violence	  of	  disruptive	  generativity	  finds	  expression	  in	  Mick’s	  embodied	  response	  that	  brings	  her	  into	  proximity	  with	  the	  ground,	  becoming	  the	  world.	  Losing	  any	  sense	  of	  identity,	  she	  becomes	  the	  music:	  “This	  music	  was	  her—the	  real	  plain	  her”	  (100).	  But	  simultaneously,	  “The	  whole	  world	  was	  this	  music	  and	  she	  could	  not	  listen	  hard	  enough	  […]	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  of	  her	  to	  listen”	  (100).	  She	  is	  broken	  open,	  disarranged	  by	  the	  experience:	  “Wonderful	  music	  like	  this,”	  she	  thinks,	  “was	  the	  worst	  hurt	  there	  could	  be”	  (101).	  When	  the	  recording	  ends:	  Suddenly	  Mick	  began	  hitting	  her	  thigh	  with	  her	  fists.	  She	  pounded	  the	  same	  muscle	  with	  all	  her	  strength	  until	  the	  tears	  came	  down	  her	  face.	  But	  she	  could	  not	  feel	  this	  hard	  enough.	  The	  rocks	  under	  the	  bush	  were	  sharp.	  She	  grabbed	  a	  handful	  of	  them	  and	  began	  scraping	  them	  up	  and	  down	  on	  the	  same	  spot	  until	  her	  hand	  was	  bloody.	  Then	  she	  fell	  back	  to	  the	  ground	  and	  lay	  looking	  up	  at	  the	  night.	  	  	  Without	  passing	  through	  any	  articulated	  conscious	  thought,	  Mick	  tears	  herself	  open	  with	  the	  ground	  itself	  and	  finds	  herself	  in	  a	  new	  relationship	  to	  the	  world.	  Looking	  up	  at	  the	  sky	  she	  asks,	  “Why	  hadn’t	  the	  explorers	  known	  by	  looking	  that	  the	  world	  was	  round?”	  From	  inside	  the	  world,	  what	  is	  (in	  lay-­‐history)	  understood	  as	  a	  major	  scientific	  and	  geographic	  revolution—the	  discovery	  of	  the	  round,	  endlessly	  connected	  earth—becomes	  not	  a	  revolutionary	  discovery	  but	  instead	  a	  mark	  of	  the	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disbelief,	  disconnection	  from	  the	  world	  that	  had	  preceded	  such	  a	  discovery.38	  For	  Mick,	  the	  conditions	  for	  belief	  have	  been	  actualized	  in	  her	  by	  a	  jolt,	  an	  encounter	  with	  the	  intolerable	  made	  available	  and	  countered	  through	  music	  and	  an	  aesthetic	  rearrangement	  that	  allows	  her	  to	  see	  and	  feel	  the	  world	  differently.	  It	  is	  for	  her	  both	  and	  event	  that	  produces	  belief	  and	  an	  occasion	  for	  inquiry	  about	  the	  more	  general	  production	  of	  beliefs	  as	  they	  provide	  the	  grounds	  for	  knowledge	  and	  practice	  that	  already	  carries	  with	  it	  the	  doubleness	  of	  minor	  empiricism	  as	  a	  description	  that	  simultaneously	  reflects	  on	  the	  very	  practice	  of	  the	  production	  of	  that	  description.	  	  	   I	  already	  suggested	  in	  the	  opening	  pages	  of	  this	  chapter	  that	  one	  way	  writing	  might	  not	  only	  register	  but	  also	  effect	  such	  a	  change	  is	  through	  disruptions	  of	  generic	  conventions	  and	  rearrangements	  both	  of	  the	  values	  advocated	  by	  genres	  like	  the	  bildungsroman	  and	  of	  the	  assumptions	  about	  the	  workings	  of	  time	  and	  history	  that	  underpin	  such	  values.	  	  The	  strange,	  non-­‐linguistic	  and	  not	  fully	  cognitivized	  form	  that	  sensorial	  rearrangment	  takes	  for	  Mick,	  a	  transition	  that	  appears	  as	  an	  experience	  she	  does	  not	  even	  fully	  know	  how	  to	  put	  into	  questions	  even	  as	  she	  is	  curious	  about	  it,	  is	  but	  one	  way	  of	  understanding	  such	  a	  change.	  While	  for	  Mick	  this	  disruption	  operates	  at	  the	  level	  of	  a	  single	  self	  and	  through	  an	  encounter	  with	  what	  is	  traditionally	  recognized	  as	  art	  or	  the	  aesthetic,	  McCullers’s	  later	  novel,	  Member,	  turns	  to	  a	  practice	  of	  minor	  empiricism	  as	  a	  way	  of	  actualizing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Although	  Thomas	  Kuhn,	  whose	  theory	  of	  paradigm	  shifts	  within	  science	  hinges	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “scientific	  revolution,”	  would	  not	  consider	  this	  particular	  “discovery”	  a	  scientific	  revolution	  (largely	  because	  the	  myth	  that	  a	  belief	  in	  a	  flat	  earth	  pervaded	  the	  early	  modern	  period	  has	  long	  been	  dismissed),	  this	  passage	  highlights	  a	  concern	  within	  McCullers’s	  writing	  with	  “revolutions”	  and	  their	  capacities	  for	  thought	  that	  both	  pervade	  and	  extend	  beyond	  science.	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the	  disruptive	  possibilities	  of	  aesthetic	  rearrangement	  for	  a	  collective	  through	  a	  curious	  sensorial	  encounter	  with	  the	  world	  that	  can	  be	  both	  revealed	  through	  art,	  but	  also	  makes	  of	  world	  experience	  an	  aesthetic	  experience.	  	  The	  passage	  from	  Singer’s	  letter	  that	  appeared	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  isolation—a	  concern	  that	  also	  fueled	  Combehee’s	  study	  and	  Mead’s	  method—as	  a	  matter	  for	  inquiry.	  Singer’s	  seeming	  assertions	  that	  the	  group	  he	  witnesses	  is	  together	  without	  knowing	  it	  begins	  to	  raise	  new	  possibilities	  for	  understanding	  McCullers’s	  work	  beyond	  its	  dominant	  critical	  reception.	  The	  relatively	  brief	  period	  of	  critical	  response	  to	  McCullers’s	  acclaimed	  novels	  brought	  with	  it	  repeated	  suggestions	  that	  her	  novels	  represented	  the	  isolation	  and	  loneliness	  inherent	  in	  the	  human	  condition.39	  As	  Oliver	  Evans	  wrote,	  it	  seems	  that	  each	  of	  McCullers’s	  characters	  is	  in	  a	  “zone	  of	  loneliness,”	  “serving	  a	  life	  sentence	  in	  solitary	  confinement”	  (Clark	  126).	  Yet,	  if	  each	  character	  is	  in	  solitary	  confinement,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that,	  as	  with	  George	  Jackson	  in	  my	  previous	  chapter,	  such	  solitary	  confinement	  becomes	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  intolerable	  that	  constructs	  life	  itself	  differently,	  not	  only	  enabling	  new	  concepts	  of	  community	  but	  also	  actualizing	  new	  ways	  to	  construct	  them.	  	  Indeed,	  I	  find	  something	  deeply	  wrong	  with	  a	  totalizing	  reading	  of	  McCullers	  that	  would	  find	  her	  most	  enduring	  theme	  to	  be	  an	  affirmation	  of	  the	  isolation	  and	  loneliness	  inherent	  in	  the	  human	  conditions,	  when	  this	  is	  a	  writer	  who	  did,	  in	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  See	  for	  example:	  Louis	  D.	  Rubin,	  Jr.,	  “Carson	  McCullers:	  The	  Aesthetics	  of	  Pain,”	  and	  Oliver	  Evans,	  “The	  Case	  of	  Carson	  McCullers,”	  in	  Critical	  Essays	  on	  Carson	  
McCullers,	  Eds.	  Beverly	  Lyon	  Clark	  and	  Melvin	  J.	  Friedman	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  G.K.	  Hall,	  1996).	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Heart	  Is	  a	  Lonely	  Hunter,	  bring	  together	  through	  Singer	  that	  motley	  crew	  of	  a	  black	  Marxist	  doctor,	  a	  Jewish	  labor	  organizer,	  a	  capitalism-­‐hating	  business	  owner,	  and	  a	  fourteen-­‐year-­‐old	  resisting	  the	  demands	  of	  coming-­‐of-­‐age	  through	  increasingly	  politicized	  encounters	  with	  music.	  This	  is	  a	  writer	  who	  also	  brought	  together	  a	  self-­‐appointed	  “queer”	  community	  of	  a	  black	  female	  caretaker,	  a	  criminally	  prone	  white	  twelve-­‐year-­‐old	  girl,	  and	  a	  gender-­‐bending	  six-­‐year-­‐old	  boy.	  These	  motley	  crews	  are,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  minor	  people	  in	  every	  sense:	  de	  facto	  groups	  brought	  together	  by	  circumstance	  whose	  minority	  spans	  race,	  class,	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation,	  disability,	  and	  age.	  They	  accumulate	  not	  around	  a	  single,	  shared	  identity,	  but	  negotiations	  of	  identity	  with	  irreducible	  forms	  of	  difference—irreducible	  differences	  that	  affirm	  minority	  as	  a	  site	  of	  struggle.	  Struggle,	  yes,	  includes	  senses	  of	  loneliness,	  isolation,	  and	  deprivation,	  but	  it	  also	  produces	  forms	  of	  life	  and	  otherwise	  invisible	  sociality.	  McCullers,	  like	  Mead,	  but	  moreso	  like	  Combahee,	  faced	  the	  problem	  of	  being	  multiply	  pathologized.	  She	  was	  gender-­‐queer	  as	  well	  as	  bisexual,	  and	  suffered	  from	  the	  fate	  of	  many	  women	  writers	  of	  being	  pathologized	  posthumously	  for	  her	  strange	  sociality:	  repeatedly	  diagnosed	  retrospectively	  with	  bipolar	  or	  borderline	  personality	  disorder	  (94).	  Both	  of	  her	  biographers	  describe	  her	  as	  either	  childlike	  or	  childish,	  behaving	  irrationally	  far	  beyond	  her	  ascent	  into	  age	  majority	  (91).40	  And	  beyond	  these	  psychological	  pathologizations,	  McCullers	  also	  suffered	  from	  a	  debilitating	  illness—now	  thought	  to	  have	  been	  a	  series	  of	  strokes—that	  left	  her	  bed-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  See:	  Savigneau,	  Carson	  McCullers:	  A	  Life	  and	  Virginia	  Spencer	  Carr,	  The	  Lonely	  
Hunter:	  A	  Biography	  of	  Carson	  McCullers	  (Athens,	  GA:	  Univ.	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2003).	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ridden	  for	  most	  of	  her	  adult	  life.	  She	  was,	  no	  doubt,	  a	  “difficult”	  and	  “improper”	  personality,	  as	  Savigneau	  described	  her.	  And	  as	  such,	  she	  frequently	  became	  a	  social	  pariah.	  During	  her	  early	  adult	  life	  in	  Georgia,	  she	  was	  repeatedly	  criticized	  for	  her	  close	  friendships	  that	  crossed	  racial	  lines.	  And	  although	  she	  would	  live	  in	  New	  York’s	  bohemian	  communities	  and	  would	  associate	  with	  writers	  and	  performers	  of	  all	  stripes	  there,	  she	  was	  also	  disliked	  and	  cast-­‐out	  as	  a	  particularly	  needy	  and	  strange	  personality	  (Savigneau	  75).	  She	  wanted	  more	  than	  anything	  to	  be	  apart	  of	  a	  “we,”	  to	  be	  loved,	  and	  such	  a	  desire	  was	  often	  experienced	  as	  extremely	  needy.	  Indeed,	  her	  writing	  often	  reflected	  this	  sense	  of	  a	  huge,	  gaping	  desire	  for—love	  for—the	  world	  that	  threatened	  to	  swallow	  the	  world	  whole.	  As	  the	  writing	  François	  Sagan	  later	  wrote	  of	  her,	  McCullers’s	  illness	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  “someone	  who	  is	  too	  sensitive,	  who	  has	  seen	  too	  much	  and	  learned	  too	  much	  from	  what	  she	  has	  seen,	  and	  perhaps	  written	  too	  much	  about	  it,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  bear	  it	  or	  endure	  it	  any	  longer”	  (quoted	  in	  Savigneau	  253).	  Strikingly,	  this	  phrase	  is	  quite	  close	  to	  one	  that	  Deleuze	  used	  around	  the	  same	  time	  to	  describe	  the	  strange	  health	  of	  the	  minor	  writer:	  The	  writer	  would	  [not]	  necessarily	  be	  in	  good	  health	  […]	  but	  he	  possesses	  an	  irresistible	  and	  delicate	  health	  that	  stems	  from	  what	  he	  has	  seen	  and	  heard	  of	  things	  too	  big	  for	  him,	  too	  strong	  for	  him,	  suffocating	  things	  whose	  passage	  exhausts	  him,	  while	  nonetheless	  giving	  him	  the	  becomings	  that	  a	  dominant	  and	  substantial	  health	  would	  render	  impossible…	  (Deleuze,	  “Literature”	  229)	  	  	  This	  understanding	  of	  the	  writer’s	  task	  is	  one	  that	  can	  help	  us	  to	  see	  how,	  far	  from	  trying	  to	  make	  the	  world	  belong	  to	  her,	  McCullers	  was	  in	  every	  way	  trying	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  world,	  the	  affects	  of	  which	  overcome	  her.	  In	  committing	  herself	  to	  the	  world,	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she	  engendered	  a	  belief	  that	  could	  make	  it	  anew	  through	  a	  practice	  of	  writing,	  which	  also	  served	  for	  her	  as	  the	  production	  of	  a	  minor	  people.	  Recently,	  Jennifer	  Murray	  has	  suggested	  that	  one	  way	  The	  Heart	  Is	  a	  Lonely	  
Hunter	  produces	  such	  sociality	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  characters’	  failure	  to	  recognize	  their	  community	  is	  by	  creating	  a	  series	  of	  formal	  aesthetic	  associations	  for	  the	  reader	  that	  connect	  the	  characters	  even	  when	  they	  cannot	  see	  themselves	  that	  way.	  McCullers,	  she	  argues,	  collapses	  space	  and	  time,	  cutting	  from	  one	  character	  in	  one	  space	  to	  another	  in	  another,	  but	  connecting	  them	  through	  the	  landscape	  and	  milieu:	  shared	  sun	  shining	  into	  rooms	  separated	  in	  space	  and	  time,	  a	  sound	  carrying	  through	  from	  one	  scene	  to	  the	  next	  (Murray	  108).	  Ultimately,	  Murray	  asserts—in	  language	  that	  very	  much	  mirrors	  Michelle	  Murphy’s	  understanding	  of	  Combahee’s	  refusal	  of	  a	  “authentically	  revolutionary	  subject	  position”—that	  the	  novel	  negotiates	  different	  life	  situations,	  and,	  like	  Mead’s	  scientific	  practice,	  does	  so	  through	  a	  study	  of	  parataxis	  that	  refuses	  “transcendental	  values.”	  Murray	  writes:	  The	  undeniable	  strength	  of	  the	  novel	  is	  not,	  I	  believe,	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  any	  of	  the	  characters	  in	  particular.	  There	  is	  no	  "key"	  perspective	  or	  philosophy	  to	  be	  discovered	  in	  any	  of	  their	  separate	  paths	  or	  choices.	  Rather,	  the	  novel's	  force	  is	  in	  the	  overall	  movement	  of	  empathy	  with	  suffering,	  hardship,	  and	  failure,	  but	  also	  with	  love,	  companionship,	  and	  desire	  that	  it	  provokes	  in	  the	  reader.	  McCullers's	  narrator	  offers	  no	  transcendental	  values	  against	  which	  to	  evaluate	  the	  characters,	  no	  judgment	  of	  their	  choices.	  We	  are	  given	  only	  the	  unapologetic	  exposure	  of	  their	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  and	  are	  thereby	  placed	  in	  a	  position	  of	  understanding	  towards	  them.	  (114)	  	  As	  Murray	  describes	  it,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  minor	  community	  is	  actualized	  in	  readerly	  experience	  through	  the	  provocation	  of	  association.	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Here,	  I	  suggest	  that	  a	  trajectory	  that	  could	  make	  this	  associative	  practice	  
communal	  is	  not	  only	  to	  be	  found	  in	  readerly	  experience,	  but	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  tracing	  a	  larger	  movement	  from	  these	  readerly	  associations	  described	  by	  Murray,	  to	  a	  collective	  practice	  of	  minor	  empiricism	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  multiple	  characters	  in	  The	  
Member	  of	  the	  Wedding,	  the	  reader,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  McCullers	  herself.	  Tracing	  this	  passage,	  which	  connects	  writer	  to	  character	  to	  reader,	  collapsing	  the	  time	  and	  space	  that	  divide	  them,	  evinces	  the	  capacity	  of	  liminal	  experience	  or	  the	  exteriority	  of	  pathology	  to	  produce	  a	  transversal	  desire	  for	  and	  enactment	  of	  what	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  call	  “becomings”—becomings	  that	  pass	  not	  only	  from	  person	  to	  person,	  but	  also	  merge	  with	  the	  landscape,	  the	  ground,	  and	  the	  world	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  
Philosophy	  169)—as	  a	  means	  of	  breaking	  out	  of	  the	  strictures	  of	  a	  moralizing	  science	  and	  history	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  minor	  people	  through	  minor	  empiricism.	  	  	   In	  The	  Member	  of	  the	  Wedding,	  McCullers	  produces	  the	  act	  of	  questioning	  experience	  as	  itself	  a	  shared	  experience	  that	  passes	  among	  characters	  and	  readers.	  In	  this,	  reading	  becomes	  experimental	  and	  undetermined,	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  doubling	  of	  the	  empiricist	  practice	  operating	  within	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  novel.	  Indeed,	  empiricism,	  experience,	  and	  experiment	  are	  linked	  concepts.	  But	  here,	  the	  experiment	  would	  not	  be	  one	  that,	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  twentieth	  century	  positivism,	  would	  give	  way	  to	  knowledge,	  taxonomy,	  or	  transparent	  data;	  it	  would,	  instead,	  operate	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  Michel	  Foucault	  as	  an	  experience,	  “something	  you	  come	  out	  of	  changed”	  (Foucault,	  “Experience	  Book”	  27).	  Thinking	  of	  the	  matter	  of	  literature	  as	  mattering,	  as	  producing	  a	  change	  in	  thought,	  and	  thought	  as	  constituting	  the	  actualization	  of	  matter,	  helps	  to	  link	  the	  work	  of	  McCullers	  to	  that	  of	  Mead,	  and	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perhaps	  even	  moreso	  to	  the	  production	  of	  political	  collectives	  like	  Combahee.	  Here,	  McCullers’s	  literature	  resists	  a	  function	  as	  escapist,	  individual	  fantasy	  or	  as	  mimesis,	  or	  as	  universalizing	  narrative.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  reproducer	  of	  ideological	  imperatives	  via	  the	  reguatlive	  function	  of	  fantasy	  dissemination.	  Instead,	  literature	  and	  its	  study	  appear	  as	  techne,	  giving	  us	  the	  aesthetic	  capacity	  to	  alter	  productive	  perception,	  thus	  enabling	  literature	  to	  act	  as	  a	  political,	  social,	  and	  epistemological	  force.	  Literature	  links	  up	  with	  the	  world	  in	  an	  “intensive	  reading”	  practice	  that	  Deleuze	  described	  as	  “reading	  with	  love,”	  connecting	  a	  book	  to	  those	  flows	  of	  life	  outside	  and	  beyond	  it	  (rather	  than	  seeking	  inside	  it	  for	  signifiers)	  (Deleuze,	  Negotiations	  8-­‐9).	  	   This	  linking	  of	  empiricism,	  experience,	  and	  experiment	  is	  at	  least	  one	  way	  of	  affirming	  the	  ontological	  dimension	  of	  literature	  as	  thought.	  Or,	  put	  another	  way,	  at	  least	  one	  thing	  literature	  does	  when	  understood	  via	  sensorial	  experience	  is	  to	  produce	  new	  questions	  and	  new	  ways	  of	  asking	  questions	  about	  a	  world,	  not	  in	  order	  to	  know	  it	  but	  to	  constitute	  it.	  But	  let	  me	  be	  clear,	  because	  I	  am	  perhaps	  saying	  something	  a	  little	  different	  than	  it	  sounds	  like	  I	  am.	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  asking	  new	  questions	  gives	  new	  answers	  around	  which	  to	  necessarily	  construct	  the	  world.	  Doing	  so	  would	  be	  to	  reduce	  literature	  to	  a	  positivist	  empiricism;	  or,	  conversely,	  to	  make	  it	  merely	  fantasy	  or	  bad	  utopian	  literature,	  deferring	  a	  future	  forever	  to	  an	  impossible	  no/good	  place.	  Instead,	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  the	  very	  practice	  of	  asking	  questions,	  of	  being	  curious,	  is	  already	  to	  be	  social,	  with	  people	  and	  with	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  answers	  that	  constitute	  the	  community,	  but	  the	  asking	  of	  questions,	  the	  sharing	  of	  inquiry.	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   Recently,	  several	  scholars	  in	  queer	  and	  disability	  studies	  have	  sought	  to	  recuperate	  McCullers’s	  work	  from	  its	  earlier	  readings,	  and	  have	  done	  so	  largely	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  queer	  utopia,	  imaged	  but	  deferred.41	  However,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  neither	  an	  insistence	  on	  the	  universality	  of	  isolation	  nor	  the	  production	  of	  deferred	  utopia	  are	  the	  political	  limits	  of	  McCullers’s	  literary	  imagination.	  Instead,	  her	  use	  of	  empiricism	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  inquiry	  production	  has	  deeply	  political	  consequences,	  consequences	  that	  reconfigure	  that	  very	  site	  of	  the	  political	  in	  the	  immanent	  production	  of	  a	  community	  that	  questions,	  imagines,	  and	  believes.	  	  	   As	  I	  suggested	  in	  the	  opening	  to	  this	  chapter,	  the	  dual	  ending	  of	  Member	  already	  disrupts	  a	  reading	  practice	  that	  would	  use	  the	  ending	  of	  a	  novel	  to	  totalize	  it	  or	  claim	  for	  it	  a	  didactic	  function.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  novel	  refuses	  teleology	  and	  demands	  a	  reading	  practice	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  endings.	  This	  kind	  of	  reading	  highlights	  the	  capacities	  of	  the	  nonteleological,	  the	  impermanent,	  and	  the	  immanent	  matter	  of	  reading	  itself.	  Reading	  Member	  in	  this	  way,	  I	  focus	  not	  on	  the	  novel	  in	  its	  entirety,	  but	  on	  the	  second	  section	  of	  the	  novel,	  which	  is	  comprised	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  single	  day,	  made	  into	  the	  infinite	  duration	  of	  quotidian	  life,	  its	  potential	  for	  spectacular	  imagining,	  and	  its	  affirmation	  of	  experience	  as	  productive	  of	  the	  struggle	  to	  ask	  questions—collectively—in	  the	  not-­‐yet	  of	  answers,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  no	  guarantees.	  	  	   Several	  commentators	  have	  noted	  that	  central	  to	  this	  scene	  is	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  Frankie,	  her	  black	  caretaker	  Berenice,	  and	  her	  six	  year	  old	  cousin	  John	  Henry	  	  “play	  god,”	  and	  imagine	  utopian	  versions	  of	  the	  world	  as	  it	  could	  be.	  For	  John	  Henry,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  See	  Rachel	  Adams,	  “’A	  Mixture	  of	  Freak	  and	  Delicious.’”	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this	  means	  a	  world	  where	  everyone	  can	  change	  their	  sex,	  from	  male	  to	  female,	  at	  will	  (McCullers,	  Member	  96-­‐98).	  For	  Berenice,	  it	  means	  a	  world	  without	  race,	  where	  both	  black	  and	  white	  are	  gone,	  and	  no	  one	  lacks	  for	  material	  needs.	  Frankie’s	  world	  includes	  aspects	  of	  both	  John	  Henry’s	  and	  Berenice’s,	  but	  it	  also	  includes	  an	  island	  where	  people	  can	  go	  to	  war	  if	  they	  want	  to	  (97).	  For	  Frankie,	  not	  just	  struggle,	  but	  a	  
desire	  to	  struggle,	  and	  shared	  struggle	  as	  the	  site	  of	  meaningfulness	  cannot	  be	  erased,	  cannot	  be	  subsumed	  by	  utopian	  imagining.	  Yet,	  one	  might	  say,	  that	  in	  understanding	  their	  utopian	  imaginings	  as	  “playing	  God,”	  and	  remaking	  the	  world	  wholesale,	  the	  utopian	  impulse	  that	  binds	  them	  together	  is	  also	  a	  fantasy	  of	  world	  mastery	  that	  produces	  the	  world	  from	  an	  external	  standpoint	  (96).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  utopian	  impulse	  doesn’t	  bind	  them	  together—it	  does.	  It	  is	  in	  fact,	  something	  they	  do	  often,	  something	  that	  marks	  them	  as	  a	  community	  that	  imagines,	  an	  imagining	  community.	  In	  fact,	  what	  no	  commenter	  on	  the	  novel	  has	  noticed	  is	  that	  this	  is	  a	  scene	  that	  does	  not	  take	  place	  within	  the	  time-­‐space	  of	  the	  novel,	  but	  is	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  what	  they	  usually	  do.	  This	  collapse	  of	  time	  makes	  this	  amalgamation	  appear	  as	  though	  it	  is	  almost	  part	  of	  the	  same	  day	  as	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  scene,	  but	  it	  is	  not.	  But,	  the	  actually	  occurrences	  of	  the	  day	  are	  also,	  centrally,	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  imagining.	  	   On	  this	  day	  they	  do	  something	  different.	  Something	  that	  changes	  them	  in	  the	  way	  that	  contrasts	  their	  experience	  of	  utopian	  imagining,	  which	  has	  frequently	  appeared	  as	  mere	  fantasy,	  reaffirming	  their	  incapacity	  to	  change	  the	  world.	  And	  this	  something	  is	  something	  they	  can’t	  understand	  in	  linguistic	  or	  cognizable	  terms,	  yet	  it	  binds	  them	  nonetheless.	  Frankie	  tries	  to	  put	  into	  words,	  words	  that	  don’t	  even	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appear	  in	  the	  novel	  itself,	  her	  experience	  of	  The	  Event.	  The	  event	  that	  carries	  great	  weight,	  though	  she	  can’t	  understand	  it,	  and	  which	  means	  nothing,	  yet	  matters	  to	  her	  greatly.	  Despite	  a	  series	  of	  adventures	  (including	  being	  asked	  on	  a	  date	  by	  a	  full-­‐grown	  soldier	  and	  an	  encounter	  with	  a	  man	  and	  his	  escaped	  monkey),	  the	  event	  is	  so	  seemingly	  inconsequential	  as	  almost	  not	  to	  appear	  at	  all:	  It	  was	  a	  mysterious	  trick	  of	  sight	  and	  the	  imagination.	  She	  was	  walking	  home	  when	  all	  at	  once	  there	  was	  a	  shock	  in	  her	  as	  though	  a	  thrown	  knife	  stuck	  and	  shivered	  in	  her	  chest.	  F.	  Jasmine	  stopped	  dead	  in	  her	  tracks,	  one	  foot	  still	  raised,	  and	  at	  first	  she	  could	  not	  take	  in	  just	  what	  had	  happened.	  There	  was	  something	  sideways	  and	  behind	  her	  that	  had	  flashed	  across	  the	  very	  corner	  edge	  of	  her	  left	  eye;	  she	  had	  half-­‐seen	  something,	  a	  dark	  double	  shape	  in	  the	  alley	  she	  had	  just	  that	  moment	  passed.	  And	  because	  of	  this	  half-­‐seen	  object,	  the	  quick	  flash	  in	  the	  corner	  of	  her	  eye,	  there	  sprung	  up	  in	  her	  the	  sudden	  picture	  of	  her	  brother	  and	  the	  bridge.	  Ragged	  and	  bright	  as	  lightening	  she	  saw	  the	  two	  of	  them….	  (74-­‐5)	  	  	  Here,	  Frankie	  does	  not	  exactly	  perceive	  as	  “pass[…]	  into	  the	  landscape	  and	  [is	  herself]	  part	  of	  the	  compound	  of	  sensations”	  which	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  describe	  as	  “becoming	  imperceptible”	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Philosophy	  169).	  It	  enables	  her	  to	  pass	  “into	  the	  town	  like	  ‘a	  knife	  through	  everything,’”	  putting	  her	  inside	  the	  processes	  of	  perception	  rather	  than	  perceiving.	  Becoming	  imperceptible	  is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  becoming	  unseen;	  instead	  it	  is	  a	  becoming	  disorganized	  so	  as	  not	  be	  to	  be	  perceived	  or	  perceive	  what	  is	  as	  part	  of	  a	  given	  and	  recognizable	  order	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  senses,	  sensible,	  and	  sensation.	  Out	  of	  the	  corner	  of	  her	  eye,	  a	  half-­‐seen	  object	  in	  the	  alley,	  brings	  to	  her	  mind	  the	  sensation	  of	  belonging	  she	  felt	  when	  she	  saw	  her	  brother	  and	  his	  bride-­‐to-­‐be	  together	  and	  felt	  that	  she	  would	  be	  a	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member	  of	  their	  wedding.	  She	  experiences	  memory	  as	  feeling,	  not	  image,	  it	  is	  a	  repetition	  and	  a	  reexperiencing	  of	  experience	  in	  a	  uncanny,	  queer	  way.	  	  The	  relationship	  to	  meaning	  is	  here	  unclear,	  but	  clearly	  significant.	  Given	  the	  power	  and	  strangeness	  of	  feeling,	  she	  turns	  to	  see	  what	  it	  is	  that	  has	  evoked	  this	  queer	  and	  powerful	  sense	  of	  belonging.	  “And	  what	  was	  there?	  F.	  Jasmine	  was	  stunned.	  There	  in	  the	  alley	  were	  only	  two	  colored	  boys,	  one	  taller	  than	  the	  other	  and	  with	  his	  arm	  resting	  on	  the	  shorter	  boy’s	  shoulder.	  That	  was	  all”	  (75).	  F.	  Jasmine’s	  aesthetic	  disorganization	  has	  produced	  something	  that	  is	  “not	  resemblance,	  although	  there	  is	  resemblance.	  But	  it	  only	  produced	  resemblance”	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Philosophy	  (173).	  Instead	  it	  is	  a	  “becoming,”	  which	  “is	  a	  zone	  of	  indetermination,	  of	  indiscernibility,	  as	  if	  things,	  beasts,	  and	  persons	  […]	  endlessly	  reach[ing]	  the	  point	  that	  immediately	  precedes	  their	  natural	  differentiation.”	  The	  disorganization	  of	  perception	  returns	  to	  her	  a	  capacity	  for	  new	  and	  undetermined	  organization.	  	  	   What	  F.	  Jasmine	  struggles	  for,	  what	  she	  desires	  when	  she	  shares	  this	  with	  Berenice	  and	  John	  Henry,	  is	  a	  way	  not	  so	  much	  to	  articulate	  the	  uncanny	  experience	  but	  to	  ask	  about	  it.	  What?	  How?	  “Which?”—this	  sharp	  yet	  amorphous,	  “plain	  and	  exact”	  feeling	  of	  belonging	  to	  and	  with	  that	  which	  is	  only	  half-­‐perceived	  and	  has	  a	  reality	  that	  both	  is	  and	  in	  excess	  of	  what	  she	  sees	  (McCullers,	  Member	  75).	  She	  struggles	  to	  produce	  a	  question	  not	  about	  what	  it	  means	  or	  what	  it	  was,	  but	  a	  question	  nonetheless:	  a	  question	  she	  can	  neither	  formulate	  nor	  understand.	  But	  even	  in	  her	  fumblings	  to	  Berenice	  and	  John	  Henry,	  something	  comes	  across:	  transference,	  connection.	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“Listen	  to	  me!”	  Berenice	  says,	  “Can	  you	  see	  through	  them	  bones	  in	  my	  forehead?	  Have	  you,	  Frankie	  Addams,	  been	  reading	  my	  mind?	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  queerest	  things	  I’ve	  ever	  heard	  of.	  I	  cannot	  get	  over	  it.”	  	  	   	   “What	  I	  mean—“	  Frankie	  started	  again.	  	   	   “I	  know	  what	  you	  mean,”	  said	  Berenice.	  “Right	  here	  in	  this	  very	  corner	  	  of	  the	  eye.”	  (99)	  	  Berenice’s	  sharing	  of	  Frankie’s	  experience	  is	  as	  embodied	  as	  Frankie’s	  own,	  both	  of	  them	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  thought	  that	  is	  experience	  in	  the	  corner	  of	  their	  eyes	  (in	  the	  corner	  of	  her	  eye).	  	  Here,	  Fankie’s	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  sensible	  is	  passed	  through	  the	  sharing	  of	  sensation	  enabled	  by	  a	  fumbling	  descriptive	  practice	  that	  doubles	  the	  experience,	  passing	  it	  as	  something	  other	  than	  itself	  that	  is	  also	  itself	  repeated,	  to	  Berenice.	  	   This	  leads	  them	  to	  talk	  about	  love—“a	  thing	  known	  but	  not	  spoken”—for	  the	  first	  time;	  and	  F.	  Jasmine	  experiences	  herself	  as	  the	  strange	  self-­‐proclaimed	  adult	  she	  has	  produced	  herself	  to	  be,	  “a	  person	  who	  understood	  and	  had	  worthwhile	  opinions”	  (100).	  	  And	  as	  they	  continue	  to	  talk,	  to	  all	  three	  erupt	  into	  tears	  together,	  and	  then	  to	  sit	  together,	  melting	  into	  one	  another.	  .	  .	  until	  dinner	  is	  over.	  They	  produce	  a	  monument	  to	  sensation	  through	  “deframing[,]	  following	  lines	  of	  flight	  that	  past	  through	  the	  territory	  only	  in	  order	  to	  open	  it	  onto	  the	  universe,	  that	  go	  from	  house-­‐territory	  to	  town-­‐cosmos,”	  cutting	  through	  experience	  like	  a	  knife	  making	  them	  indiscernible	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Philosophy	  187).	  The	  moment	  ends,	  but	  it	  is	  both	  absolutely	  temporary—in	  the	  novel’s	  last	  section,	  Berenice	  quits	  her	  job	  and	  John	  Henry	  dies—and	  yet	  it	  is	  deeply	  consequential	  in	  ways	  that	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  permanent	  production	  of	  identity	  or	  Frankie’s	  coming	  of	  age;	  it	  “does	  not	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commemorate	  or	  celebrate	  something	  that	  happened	  but	  confides	  to	  the	  ear	  of	  the	  future	  the	  persistent	  sensations	  that	  embody	  the	  event”	  (177).	  The	  conversation	  following	  Frankie’s	  half-­‐formed	  question-­‐revelation	  about	  the	  event	  enables	  Berenice	  to	  affirm	  the	  seriousness	  and	  autonomous	  potential	  of	  being	  minor—both	  in	  Frankie’s	  sense	  of	  being	  a	  young	  girl	  and	  in	  her	  own	  of	  being	  a	  black	  woman.	  She	  affirms	  that	  she	  herself	  chose	  to	  get	  married	  at	  thirteen,	  and	  she	  did	  it	  because	  she	  wanted	  to:	  she	  has	  as	  much	  right	  to	  happiness	  as	  anyone.	  This	  recognition/production	  of	  shared	  minority	  allows	  them	  to	  share	  their	  feeling	  of	  caughtness:	  	   “I	  think	  I	  have	  a	  vague	  idea	  what	  you	  were	  driving	  at,”	  [Berenice]	  said.	  “We	  all	  of	  us	  somehow	  caught.	  We	  born	  this	  way	  or	  that	  way	  and	  we	  don’t	  know	  why.	  But	  we	  caught	  anyhow.	  I	  born	  Berenice.	  You	  born	  Frankie.	  John	  Henry	  born	  John	  Henry.	  And	  maybe	  we	  wants	  to	  widen	  and	  bust	  free.	  But	  no	  matter	  what	  we	  do	  we	  still	  caught.	  […]	  We	  each	  of	  us	  somehow	  caught	  all	  by	  ourself.	  Is	  that	  what	  you	  was	  trying	  to	  say?”	  	  	  	   	   “I	  don’t	  know,”	  says	  Frankie,	  “but	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  be	  caught.”	  	   	   “Me	  neither,”	  said	  Berenice,	  “don’t	  none	  of	  us	  want	  to	  be	  caught.	  I’m	  	  caught	  worse	  than	  you	  is.”	  	  	   	   Frankie	  understood	  what	  she	  meant,	  but	  it	  was	  John	  Henry	  who	  asked	  	  in	  his	  child’s	  voice,	  “Why?”	  	  	   	   “Because	  I’m	  black,”	  she	  said.	  “Because	  I’m	  colored.	  Everybody	  is	  	  caught	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  But	  they	  done	  drawn	  completely	  extra	  bounds	  around	  all	  colored	  people.	  So	  we	  caught	  that	  first	  way	  I’m	  telling	  you	  about,	  as	  all	  human	  beings	  is	  caught.	  And	  we	  caught	  as	  colored	  people,	  too.	  Sometimes	  a	  boy	  like	  Honey	  feel	  like	  he	  can’t	  breathe	  no	  more.	  He	  feel	  like	  he	  got	  to	  break	  something	  or	  break	  himself.	  Sometimes	  it	  just	  about	  more	  than	  we	  can	  stand.”	  	  	   	   “Yes,”	  Frankie	  said.	  “Sometimes	  I	  feel	  like	  I	  want	  to	  break	  something	  	  too.	  I	  feel	  like	  I	  wish	  I	  could	  tear	  down	  the	  whole	  town.”	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“So	  I’ve	  heard	  you	  mention,”	  Said	  Berenice.	  “But	  that	  won’t	  help	  none.	  	  The	  point	  is	  we	  all	  caught.	  And	  we	  try	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  to	  wide	  ourself	  free.”	  	  In	  the	  recognition	  of	  difference	  that	  both	  understands	  the	  doubling	  of	  strictures	  placed	  on	  Berenice	  without	  erasing	  the	  reality	  of	  Frankie’s	  own	  strictures,	  they	  produce	  the	  relationality	  that	  they	  call	  caughtness,	  and	  their	  experience	  takes	  on	  a	  decidedly	  political	  valence:	  a	  desire	  to	  tear	  down	  the	  town	  and	  struggle	  into	  freedom.	  The	  desire	  for	  freedom,	  the	  affirmation	  of	  struggle	  in	  its	  irreducible	  difference,	  and	  the	  shared	  questioning	  of	  experience	  politicize	  the	  intimate	  space	  of	  imaginative	  empiricism:	  experience	  as	  collective	  experiment	  that	  produces	  an	  imagining	  community,	  a	  motley	  crew.	  It	  is	  the	  affirmation	  of	  the	  immanent	  production	  of	  a	  people,	  “even	  if	  these	  bonds	  last	  no	  longer	  than	  the	  revolution’s	  fused	  material”	  that	  makes	  possible	  an	  understanding	  of	  seemingly	  failed	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  impermanent)	  social	  production	  as	  immanently	  successful	  in	  its	  experimental	  production	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Philosophy	  177)	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  also	  affirms	  the	  need	  to	  continue	  experience	  and	  questions	  without	  even	  the	  imagined	  guarantees	  of	  knowledge.	  	  Understanding	  minor	  empiricism	  as	  a	  practice	  that	  emerges	  in	  the	  face	  of	  no	  guarantees	  to	  produce	  belief	  as	  a	  way	  of	  connecting	  up	  with	  the	  world	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  unfinished	  music	  that	  marks	  the	  time	  of	  Frankie’s	  summer.	  It	  raises	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  this	  unfinished	  music,	  begun,	  partially	  constructed,	  it’s	  rules	  and	  possibilities	  apparent	  but	  not	  fully	  fated,	  makes	  the	  summer	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  empiricism	  appear	  as	  a	  way	  of	  extending	  time	  to	  latch	  on	  to	  the	  music	  itself.	  It	  becomes	  the	  opportunity	  to	  play	  on,	  from	  and	  with,	  the	  still-­‐hanging	  music,	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connect	  up	  to	  it,	  extend	  it.	  This	  suggests	  a	  way	  of	  overcoming	  and	  participating	  in	  an	  identity	  politics	  of	  partiality	  through	  minor	  empiricism,	  one	  that	  affirms	  the	  partial	  observer	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  gift	  that	  is	  not	  only	  the	  friend	  to	  science,	  but	  also	  of	  politics.	  The	  partial	  and	  reflexive	  observer	  becomes	  a	  privileged	  position	  for	  interacting	  with	  and	  contributing	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  struggle	  against	  power	  by	  oscillating,	  tactically,	  on	  the	  ground	  to	  encounter	  specific	  and	  given	  conditions	  as	  they	  come.	  Music	  as	  material,	  example,	  and	  metaphor	  extends	  the	  understanding	  I	  offered	  earlier,	  by	  way	  of	  Deleuze,	  of	  science	  as	  a	  composition	  on	  a	  plane	  of	  reference.	  Although	  a	  dominant	  science	  continually	  papers	  over	  the	  plane	  of	  reference	  produced	  by	  these	  disruptive,	  minoritarian	  empiricisms,	  they,	  by	  contrast,	  continue	  to	  link	  up	  to	  each	  other	  anew,	  without	  necessarily	  even	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  community	  they	  are	  making.	  McCullers,	  Mead,	  and	  Combahee	  produce	  an	  irruptive	  and	  renewable	  plane	  of	  reference	  on	  which	  to	  make	  of	  science	  a	  composition	  that	  affirms	  the	  organizational	  power	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  the	  inherent	  politics	  of	  knowledge	  production.	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